Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS v
3. FIGURES AND TABLES vii
4. PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
5. Introduction 1
6. 1 Compliance and enforcement 26
7. 2 Measuring tax compliance in Chile and Argentina 50
8. 3 Taxpayers’ perceptions of government enforcement 75
9. 4 General deterrence: impunity and sanctions in taxation 102
10. 5 Specific deterrence and its effects on individual compliance 127
11. 6 The role of trust, reciprocity, and solidarity in tax compliance 154
12. 7 Social mechanisms in tax evasion and tax compliance 182
13. Conclusion: tax compliance and the law 202
14. Appendix a: on the data 211
15. Appendix b: a game theory approach to the logic of tax compliance 219
16. Appendix c: a simulative game: the effects of enforcement 228
17. Appendix d: the state, the law, and the rule of law 238
18. REFERENCES 247
19. INDEX 261