Home Business & Economics Dentsū Changed Nothing: Reexamining Karoshi in Japan Through Shavell's Insights on the Incentives to Prevent Accidents
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Dentsū Changed Nothing: Reexamining Karoshi in Japan Through Shavell's Insights on the Incentives to Prevent Accidents

  • Robert McGuire
Published/Copyright: April 23, 2012
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Ten years after the Japanese Supreme Court established a duty of care for employers to guard employee health, incidents of death by overwork remain critically high. This Note argues that the Dentsū standard of near-strict employer liability does not create sufficient incentives to prevent karoshi. Applying Steven Shavell’s insight that a victim who knows his injurer will be liable for damages will not be incentivized by the law to prevent the harm, the Note explains why neither employees nor the employers responded to Dentsū. It concludes that Dentsū is correctly understood as cause of action in tort for survivors of karoshi victims, not a vehicle to change the Japanese workplace.

Published Online: 2012-4-23

©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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