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Chapter 11. Parliaments and Congresses: Concentration Versus Division of Legislative Power

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Patterns of Democracy
This chapter is in the book Patterns of Democracy
Chapter 11Parliaments and Congresses: Concentration Versus Division of Legislative PowerThe second component of the federal-unitary dimension is the distribution—concentration versus division—of power in the legislature. The pure majoritarian model calls for the concentration of legislative power in a single chamber; the pure consensus model is characterized by a bicameral legislature in which power is divided equally between two differently con-stituted chambers. In practice, we fi nd a variety of intermediate arrangements. In Chapters 2 and 3 we saw that the New Zealand parliament (after 1950) and the Swiss parliament are, in this re-spect, perfect prototypes of majoritarian and consensus democ-racy, respectively, but that the other three main examples deviate from the pure models to some extent. The British parliament is bicameral, but because the House of Lords has little power, it can be described as asymmetrically bicameral. The same description fi ts the Barbadian legislature because its appointed Senate has delaying but no veto power. The prefederal bicameral Belgian parliament was characterized by a balance of power between the two chambers, but these chambers hardly differed in composi-tion; in the new federal legislature, elected for the fi rst time in 1995, the Senate is still not very differently composed from the 187
© Yale University Press, New Haven

Chapter 11Parliaments and Congresses: Concentration Versus Division of Legislative PowerThe second component of the federal-unitary dimension is the distribution—concentration versus division—of power in the legislature. The pure majoritarian model calls for the concentration of legislative power in a single chamber; the pure consensus model is characterized by a bicameral legislature in which power is divided equally between two differently con-stituted chambers. In practice, we fi nd a variety of intermediate arrangements. In Chapters 2 and 3 we saw that the New Zealand parliament (after 1950) and the Swiss parliament are, in this re-spect, perfect prototypes of majoritarian and consensus democ-racy, respectively, but that the other three main examples deviate from the pure models to some extent. The British parliament is bicameral, but because the House of Lords has little power, it can be described as asymmetrically bicameral. The same description fi ts the Barbadian legislature because its appointed Senate has delaying but no veto power. The prefederal bicameral Belgian parliament was characterized by a balance of power between the two chambers, but these chambers hardly differed in composi-tion; in the new federal legislature, elected for the fi rst time in 1995, the Senate is still not very differently composed from the 187
© Yale University Press, New Haven

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents vii
  3. Preface to the Second Edition ix
  4. Preface to the First Edition xv
  5. Chapter 1. Introduction 1
  6. Chapter 2. The Westminster Model of Democracy 9
  7. Chapter 3. The Consensus Model of Democracy 30
  8. Chapter 4. Thirty-Six Democracies 46
  9. Chapter 5. Party Systems: Two-Party and Multiparty Patterns 60
  10. Chapter 6. Cabinets: Concentration Versus Sharing of Executive Power 79
  11. Chapter 7. Executive-Legislative Relations: Patterns of Dominance and Balance of Power 105
  12. Chapter 8. Electoral Systems: Majority and Plurality Methods Versus Proportional Representation 130
  13. Chapter 9. Interest Groups: Pluralism Versus Corporatism 158
  14. Chapter 10. Division of Power: The Federal-Unitary and Centralized-Decentralized Contrasts 174
  15. Chapter 11. Parliaments and Congresses: Concentration Versus Division of Legislative Power 187
  16. Chapter 12. Constitutions: Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review 204
  17. Chapter 13. Central Banks: Independence Versus Dependence 226
  18. Chapter 14. The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy 239
  19. Chapter 15. Effective Government and Policy-Making: Does Consensus Democracy Make a Difference? 255
  20. Chapter 16. The Quality of Democracy and a “Kinder, Gentler” Democracy: Consensus Democracy Makes a Difference 274
  21. Chapter 17. Conclusions and Recommendations 295
  22. Appendix Two. Dimensions and Ten Basic Variables, 1945–2010 and 1981–2010 304
  23. References 311
  24. Index 338
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https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300189124-013

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents vii
  3. Preface to the Second Edition ix
  4. Preface to the First Edition xv
  5. Chapter 1. Introduction 1
  6. Chapter 2. The Westminster Model of Democracy 9
  7. Chapter 3. The Consensus Model of Democracy 30
  8. Chapter 4. Thirty-Six Democracies 46
  9. Chapter 5. Party Systems: Two-Party and Multiparty Patterns 60
  10. Chapter 6. Cabinets: Concentration Versus Sharing of Executive Power 79
  11. Chapter 7. Executive-Legislative Relations: Patterns of Dominance and Balance of Power 105
  12. Chapter 8. Electoral Systems: Majority and Plurality Methods Versus Proportional Representation 130
  13. Chapter 9. Interest Groups: Pluralism Versus Corporatism 158
  14. Chapter 10. Division of Power: The Federal-Unitary and Centralized-Decentralized Contrasts 174
  15. Chapter 11. Parliaments and Congresses: Concentration Versus Division of Legislative Power 187
  16. Chapter 12. Constitutions: Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review 204
  17. Chapter 13. Central Banks: Independence Versus Dependence 226
  18. Chapter 14. The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy 239
  19. Chapter 15. Effective Government and Policy-Making: Does Consensus Democracy Make a Difference? 255
  20. Chapter 16. The Quality of Democracy and a “Kinder, Gentler” Democracy: Consensus Democracy Makes a Difference 274
  21. Chapter 17. Conclusions and Recommendations 295
  22. Appendix Two. Dimensions and Ten Basic Variables, 1945–2010 and 1981–2010 304
  23. References 311
  24. Index 338
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