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Federalism with Bicameralism

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Published/Copyright: November 30, 2019
German Economic Review
From the journal German Economic Review Volume 16 Issue 2

Abstract

We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.

Keywords: Fiscal federalism; median voter; bicameralism
Published Online: 2019-11-30
Published in Print: 2015-05-01

© 2019 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

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  2. Federalism with Bicameralism
  3. Financial System Leverage and the Shortage of Safe Assets: Exploring the Policy Options
  4. Explaining European Emission Allowance Price Dynamics: Evidence from Phase II
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  6. Forecasting GDP at the Regional Level with Many Predictors
https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12046
Keywords for this article
Fiscal federalism; median voter; bicameralism

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Hooliganism and Demand for Football in Italy: Attendance and Counterviolence Policy Evaluation
  2. Federalism with Bicameralism
  3. Financial System Leverage and the Shortage of Safe Assets: Exploring the Policy Options
  4. Explaining European Emission Allowance Price Dynamics: Evidence from Phase II
  5. Much Ado about Nothing? The Role of Primary School Catchment Areas For Ethnic School Segregation: Evidence From a Policy Reform
  6. Forecasting GDP at the Regional Level with Many Predictors
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