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Chapter 2. Rational decisions in a disagreement with experts

  • István Danka
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Science and Democracy
This chapter is in the book Science and Democracy

Abstract

In a ‘post-truth’ society, expert opinion in public decisions is often taken to be of minor impact. This paper considers recent developments in collective epistemology about group decisions, arguing that a general assumption of recent trends to be called as the Summative View makes them insufficient for responding to this problem properly. At least two important aspects are missing from the accounts discussed: a diversity of relevant expertise, and the fact that disagreement implies debating, the latter making a dialectical account applicable to the situation. I shall build mainly on the latter line, discussing different notions of rational movements in a debate that can occasionally make prima facie irrational decisions to be rational.

Abstract

In a ‘post-truth’ society, expert opinion in public decisions is often taken to be of minor impact. This paper considers recent developments in collective epistemology about group decisions, arguing that a general assumption of recent trends to be called as the Summative View makes them insufficient for responding to this problem properly. At least two important aspects are missing from the accounts discussed: a diversity of relevant expertise, and the fact that disagreement implies debating, the latter making a dialectical account applicable to the situation. I shall build mainly on the latter line, discussing different notions of rational movements in a debate that can occasionally make prima facie irrational decisions to be rational.

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