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8. Moore and Wittgenstein on the Sense of “I know ”
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Norman Malcolm
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter 1
- Contents 7
- Preface 9
- 1. Descartes’ Proof that His Essence Is Thinking 15
- 2. Thoughtless Brutes 40
- 3. Descartes’ Proof that He Is Essentially a Non-Material Thing 58
- 4. Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology 85
- 5. The Privacy of Experience 104
- 6. Wittgenstein on the Nature of Mind 133
- 7. The Myth of Cognitive Processes and Structures 159
- 8. Moore and Wittgenstein on the Sense of “I know ” 170
- 9. The Groundlessness of Belief 199
- Index 217
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter 1
- Contents 7
- Preface 9
- 1. Descartes’ Proof that His Essence Is Thinking 15
- 2. Thoughtless Brutes 40
- 3. Descartes’ Proof that He Is Essentially a Non-Material Thing 58
- 4. Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology 85
- 5. The Privacy of Experience 104
- 6. Wittgenstein on the Nature of Mind 133
- 7. The Myth of Cognitive Processes and Structures 159
- 8. Moore and Wittgenstein on the Sense of “I know ” 170
- 9. The Groundlessness of Belief 199
- Index 217