12. The Psychological Unreality of Semantic Representations

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Preface v
3. Contents vii
4. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Psychology? 1
5. Part One. Mental Representation
6. Introduction: Mental Representations and Languages of Thought 11
7. 1. Selections from Mental Acts 21
8. 2. Language Learning 38
9. 3. Propositional Attitudes 45
10. 4. A Cure for the Common Code? 64
11. 5. Mental Representation 78
12. Part Two. Imagery
13. Introduction: What Are Mental Images? 117
14. 6. The Nature of Images and the Introspective Trap 128
15. 7. Imagistic Representation 135
16. 8. Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations 150
17. 9. Imagery and Artificial Intelligence 170
18. Part Three. The Subject Matter of Grammar
19. Introduction: Some Notes on What Linguistics Is About 197
20. 10. Grammar, Psychology, and Indeterminacy 208
21. 11. What the Linguist Is Talking About 223
22. 12. The Psychological Unreality of Semantic Representations 238
23. 13. The Real Status of Semantic Representations 253
24. Part Four. Innate Ideas
25. Introduction: What Is Innateness? 279
26. 14. Innate Ideas 282
27. 15. The “Innateness Hypothesis” and Explanatory Models in Linguistics 292
28. 16. Reply to Putnam 300
29. 17. On Cognitive Capacity 305
30. 18. The Specificity of Language Skills 324
31. 19. What Is Innate and Why 339
32. 20. Discussion of Putnam's Comments 349
33. 21. Comment on Chomsky’s Reply 359
34. Index 361