Home Dynamic Interpretation: The Art of Persuasion
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Dynamic Interpretation: The Art of Persuasion

  • Michael E. Libonati
Published/Copyright: December 16, 2002
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

The article explores Aristotle's view that the function of rhetoric is "not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case."The article briefly illustrates the implications of adopting Aristotle's descriptive approach for teaching statutory interpretation.

The article then links the normative approach of "dynamic interpretation" with Aristotle's category epideictic rhetoric. The article suggests that the case for dynamic interpretation is strengthened by insights drawn from social science and the civil law tradition and weakened by reliance on hermeneutics.

Professor Eskridge's argument is praised for its emotional and moral force.

The remarkable disparity between the seminal character of the Eskridge article in the academic literature and the absence of citations in case law and Supreme Court briefs is noted. Several hypotheses accounting for this puzzling disparity are discussed.

The article concludes with an attempt to persuade the scholarly community to engage with the legislature and statutory law as instruments for law reform.

Published Online: 2002-12-16

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 27.9.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.2202/1539-8323.1033/html
Scroll to top button