On Certainty, Skepticism and Berkeley's Idealism
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Tero Vaaja
Abstract
In this paper, I survey the way Wittgenstein reacts to radical philosophical doubt in his On Certainty. He deems skeptical doubt in some important cases idle, pointless or otherwise negligible. I point out that several passages of On Certainty make it difficult to judge whether Wittgenstein intends to address a skeptic or a metaphysical idealist. Drawing attention to the anti-skeptical nature of Berkeley's idealism, I go on to argue that the question is far from trivial: rather, it affects the way we should evaluate Wittgenstein's arguments in On Certainty in general. I finally attempt to explain why Wittgenstein remained ambiguous about the target of his arguments, and discuss the possibility of making room for the idealism/skepticism distinction in On Certainty's framework.
Walter de Gruyter 2011
Articles in the same Issue
- Externalizing Communicative Intentions
- Spinoza on the Atemporal Intellect
- Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology
- Kantian Basis of Amartya Sen's Idea of the Reasoned Scrutinity of Thinking
- What Is the Problem of Teleology in Kant's Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment?
- The Concept of a Point of View
- On Certainty, Skepticism and Berkeley's Idealism
Articles in the same Issue
- Externalizing Communicative Intentions
- Spinoza on the Atemporal Intellect
- Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology
- Kantian Basis of Amartya Sen's Idea of the Reasoned Scrutinity of Thinking
- What Is the Problem of Teleology in Kant's Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment?
- The Concept of a Point of View
- On Certainty, Skepticism and Berkeley's Idealism
