Knowledge and Voluntary Injustice in the Hippias Minor
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Natalie Hannan
Abstract
Plato’s Hippias Minor proposes a thesis that I call the Superiority of the Voluntary Wrongdoer (SVW), which states that the person doing something wrong voluntarily is better than the person doing it wrong involuntarily. This claim has long unsettled scholars, who have tried to determine whether Socrates is serious about SVW or disavows it. The primary strategy among interpreters is to appeal to Socrates’ prior commitment to the “Socratic paradox” that no one does injustice voluntarily; with the Socratic paradox in the background, it is argued, we can better understand how Socrates treats SVW. In this paper, I aim to show that the Hippias Minor points us towards a different understanding of SVW and the Socratic paradox, with implications for their role both in the dialogue and in Plato’s philosophy as a whole. My first step towards this understanding is to consider the distinctive methodology of the Hippias Minor. Socrates’ attitude towards his and Hippias’ arguments is characterized by πλάνη, or wavering; I argue that this wavering shows that Socrates wants to determine how he might accommodate what is compelling about both his and Hippias’ positions, rather than choosing one over the other. To that end, I look more closely at what each interlocutor proposes in the dialogue, concluding that many of their primary commitments are shared by both interlocutors and do not contradict. We do not, then, need to throw out SVW, and we can grasp the true role of the Socratic paradox: it is not axiomatic but a conditional conclusion of the dialogue, and Socrates’ attempt to reconcile SVW with Hippias’ arguments provides reasons and motivation for accepting it. Accordingly, we cannot assume that the Socratic paradox will be in place, and we should look for some indication in the Hippias Minor as to why it could hold. I argue that the dialogue provides a framework for doing so, by taking steps towards a new understanding of knowledge (epistēmē) that can support the Socratic paradox. These moves put the Hippias Minor in the position of beginning to examine and develop key ideas in Plato’s ethics and epistemology.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Aristotle on the Nature and Politics of Medicine
- Aristotle’s Disturbing Relatives
- Socrates’ First City: Pleonexia and the Thought Experiment
- The Two-Triangle Universe of Plato’s Timaeus and the In(de)finite Diversity of the Universe
- Καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος: Prudence in Aristotle’s Ethics and Biology
- Knowledge and Voluntary Injustice in the Hippias Minor
- Plato, the Eristics, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction
- Thought, Choice, and Other Causes in Aristotle’s Account of Luck
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Aristotle on the Nature and Politics of Medicine
- Aristotle’s Disturbing Relatives
- Socrates’ First City: Pleonexia and the Thought Experiment
- The Two-Triangle Universe of Plato’s Timaeus and the In(de)finite Diversity of the Universe
- Καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος: Prudence in Aristotle’s Ethics and Biology
- Knowledge and Voluntary Injustice in the Hippias Minor
- Plato, the Eristics, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction
- Thought, Choice, and Other Causes in Aristotle’s Account of Luck
