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Expressing, meaning, showing, and intending to indicate

  • Wayne A. Davis
Published/Copyright: June 3, 2008
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Intercultural Pragmatics
From the journal Volume 5 Issue 2

Abstract

This paper is a critical examination of the theory of self-expression developed by Green (2007), adjudicating some of the principal differences between it and the theory I have developed (e.g., in Davis 2003). Green seeks to show how self-expression is related to the fundamental linguistic notions of speaker meaning, assertion, and implicature, and how self-expression enables others to know our minds. Green defines self-expression in terms of showing, and speaker meaning in terms of reflexively intending to show. I agree that self-expression does sometimes show what our mental state is, but deny that self-expression entails showing. I argue that speaker expression as well as speaker meaning depends on intention, but deny that reflexive intentions are involved. The central intention in both is providing an indication of ones mental state.

Mitchell Green has developed a highly original and illuminating theory of self-expression. He is motivated by the laudable conviction that understanding self-expression is an integral part of understanding who we are, and the key to understanding a wide variety of disparate phenomena. He therefore seeks a theory that shows how self-expression is related to the fundamental linguistic notions of speaker meaning, assertion, and implicature, and how self-expression enables others to know our minds. He proposes to define self-expression in terms of showing, and speaker meaning in terms of reflexively intending to show.

I have developed a theory that accords with Green's in many respects, from general orientation to specific details. I will here focus on adjudicating some of the principal differences. I agree that self-expression does sometimes show what our mental state is, but deny that self-expression entails showing. I argue that speaker expression as well as speaker meaning depends on intention, but deny that reflexive intentions are involved. The central intention in both is providing an indication of ones mental state.

Published Online: 2008-06-03
Published in Print: 2008-June

© 2008 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin

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