Chapter 3. British Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Nazi Germany’s Intentions

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Acknowledgments ix
4. Introduction 1
5. Chapter 1. Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention 14
6. Chapter 2. Indicators of Nazi Germany’s Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934–39 44
7. Chapter 3. British Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Nazi Germany’s Intentions 58
8. Chapter 4. The British Intelligence Community’s Assessments of Nazi Germany’s Intentions 102
9. Chapter 5. The Carter Era and the Collapse of Détente, 1977–80 114
10. Chapter 6. US Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente 126
11. Chapter 7. The US Intelligence Community’s Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Détente 158
12. Chapter 8. Indicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985–88 178
13. Chapter 9. US Decision Makers’ Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 192
14. Chapter 10. The US Intelligence Community’s Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 224
15. Chapter 11. Summary and Implications 241
16. Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses 255
17. Notes 259
18. Index 345