Aporia

Wittgenstein used the concept of language games to refer to all forms of linguistic expression in practical contexts and to the myriad ways in which signs are used in language. He used the term to specify speaking as an activity and to relate it to a form of life. Wittgenstein was well aware that his proposal for “language games” did not solve the central problems of language. Until today, the essential characteristics of the concept remain unspecified.

The contributors in this volume analyze the reasons for the difficulties in understanding the concept and propose new essential characteristics and contents, by examining language games such as certainty and error, belief, strategy, and their linguistic foundations.

Ontological commitment implies that each theory is supposed to specify the type of entities that form its components. Representatives of a theory share an ontological commitment in relation to the objects they refer to. There are theories that admit the existence of universals while others do not. As there are different ways of speaking about universals it is necessary to decide what a universal term corresponds to. It is essential to have a criterion that enables us to decide which kinds of objects are allowed as references for the terms used. In this volume two different approaches are discussed: first, in cases where only extensional languages are accepted; second, when intensional elements are required to determine the meaning such terms as "Sachverhalt", intentional statements or representations. The ontological commitment associated with extensional theories exclusively admits the existence of physical objects, whereas intensional theses additionally include universal and abstract entities. The study of ontological commitment enables us to measure the ontological economy of theories. This serves as a basis for the choice of theory. The authors of this volume discuss relevant issues of both models and provide new solutions.

The aim of this volume is to investigate three fundamental issues of the new millennium: language, truth and democracy. The authors approach the themes from different philosophical perspectives. One group of authors examines the use of language and the meaning of concepts from an analytic point of view, the ontology of scientific terms and explores the nature of knowledge in general. Another group examines truth and types of relation. A third group of authors focuses on the current factors influencing our concept of democracy and its legal foundations and makes reference to moral aspects and the question of political responsibility. The chapters provide the reader with an overview of current philosophical problems and the answers to these questions will be decisive for future development.

The problems associated with understanding come to light in many facets of our lives. This volume is dedicated to describing these facets and clarifying problems related to levels of comprehension, conceptual analysis, understanding oneself and the other as well as cultural aspects of understanding. The authors address the topic in different theoretical frames such as hermeneutics, phenomenology, transcendental, and analytic philosophy.

The book links the concept of intention to human action. It provides answers to questions like: Why do we act intentionally? Which impact do reasons and motives have on our decisions?

Certain events are identified as intentional actions when they are considered as being rationalized by reasons. The linguistic description of such events enables us to reveal the structure of intention. The mental and the linguistic constitute irreducible ways of understanding events.

Among the topics discussed are intentionality, actions, the linguistic form to talk about intentionality and actions, Brentano’s view of intentionality, the phenomenological approach to intention and Wittgenstein's proposals.

The contributions by Wolfgang Künne, Peter Simons, Christian Bermes, Kevin Mulligan, Severin Schroeder, António Marques, Margit Gaffal, Michel Le Du, Jesús Padilla Gálvez, Bernhard Obsieger and Amir Horowitz show that actions and decisions are guided by intentional considerations.

The book is exceptional because it applies the notion of foms of life to the context of human action. It provides answers to the following questions: Why do we act in a specific way? Why do we make particular decisions? Does one's form of life and language games determine our actions and decisions? Wittgenstein proposes a holistic method which enables us to give coherent answers to these questions. To answer the question of the contents of actions and decisions we have to explain how we have institutionalized these actions or decisions. To this aim we shall reveal the frame within which language games are introduced and have come to function as practice and custom. The scheme of order underlying the language games is illustrated. Human actions and decisions follow particular rules. By highlighting the underlying scheme of order we may gain a perspicuous view of these rules. The aim of this book is to show that actions and decisions generate rational choice. This choice is explained by demonstrating the particular functions of the language games involved.

This book traces the consequences of Goodman’s typology of symbolic systems. If all symbolization relies on establishing relations between things, and can be located at the intersection between semantic and syntactic clarity as well as syntactic and semantic ambiguity, there must be a region that “touches” upon both dimensions. This study locates metaphor in this borderline region, thereby generating novel philosophical questions.

To what extent can we doubt certainties? How are certainties expressed in words? Which language games convey certainty? To answer these questions we have to recall the method Wittgenstein used in his investigations. When we look at language games and forms of life as inseparable phenomena, do forms of life then provide any certainty? On the other hand, do we automatically relapse into relativism once we doubt certainties? Which formal structures underlie certainty and doubt? The book is intended to answer these questions.

Wittgenstein has written a great number of remarks relevant to aesthetical issues: he has questioned the relation between aesthetics and psychology as well as the status of our norms of judgment; he has drawn philosophers’ attention to such topics as aspect-seeing and aspect-dawning, and has brought insights into the nature of our aesthetic reactions. The examination of this wide range of topics is far from being completed, and the purpose of this book is to contribute to such completion. It gathers both papers discussing some of Wittgenstein’s most provocative and intriguing statements on aesthetics, and papers bringing out their implications for art critic and art history, as well as their significance to epistemology and to the study of human mind.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings inspired contemporary philosophical thinking and advanced many issues that had been addressed by traditional philosophy. The questions raised by the Viennese philosopher initiated debates on a reconsideration of philosophical terminology. This is especially true for a term that has generated at least three significant controversies since its creation and will probably generate more disputes in the following years. It is the expression “form(s) of life” which translates into German as “Lebensform(en)” and “Form des Lebens”. The present volume contains contributions on forms of life, language games and the influence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on other scholears.

This book explores Wittgenstein's conception of ethics, religion and philosophy. It aims at providing us with the tools necessary for assessing to what extent the Austrian philosopher can be considered an anti-Enlightenment thinker. The articles collected in this volume explore the relationship between Wittgenstein's thought and that of several authors who were, in various ways, key to the counter-enlightenement, authors such as Hume, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, James and Pierce. One of the central issues examined here is Wittgenstein's opposition to the Cartesian method of doubt – a cornerstone of the enlightened movement against prejudice and superstition.

The work of L. Wittgenstein addresses a huge variety of topics. The spectrum ranges from mathematics to the analysis of ethical problems. These issues have generated many important philosophical discussions and the aim of this book is to examine a the broad range of philosophical problems. Michael Le Du investigates the relevance of the problems and solutions proposed by Wittgenstein in his philosophy of social sciences. Sabine Plaud explores the synoptic views vs. the primal phenomena in Wittgenstein on Goethe’s Morphology. Eric Lemaire makes several critical remarks on Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphyscial readings. Ay?egül Çakal asks what the repudiation of private language means in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Alejandro Tomasini Bassols looks into Wittgenstein and the myth of hinge propositions. Lars Hertzberg discusses P.M.S. Hacker’s point of view about Wittgenstein’s meaning of “concept”. Jesús Padilla Gálvez analyzes Wittgenstein’s criticism against Gödel’s project of metalogic.

The Rei(g)n of Rule is a study of rules and their role in language. Rules have dominated the philosophical arena as a fundamental philosophical concept. Little progress, however, has been made in reaching an accepted definition of rules. This fact is not coincidental. The concept of rule is expected to perform various, at times conflicting, tasks. Analyzing key debates and rule related discussions in the philosophy of language I show that typically rules are perceived and defined either as norms or as conventions. As norms, rules perform the evaluative task of distinguishing between correct and incorrect actions. As conventions, rules describe how certain actions are actually undertaken. As normative and conventional requirements do not necessarily coincide, the concept of rule cannot simultaneously accommodate both. The impossibility to consistently define ‘rule’ has gone unnoticed by philosophers, and it is in this sense that ‘rule’ has also blocked philosophical attempts to explain language in terms of rules.

If we read Ludwig Wittgenstein’s works and take his scientific formation in mathematical logic into account, it comes as a surprise that he ever developed a particular interest in anthropological questions. The following questions immediately arise: What role does anthropology play in Wittgenstein’s work? How do problems concerning mankind as a whole relate to his philosophy? How does his approach relate to philosophical anthropology? How does he view classical issues about Man’s affairs and actions? The aim of this book is to investigate the anthropological questions that Wittgenstein raised in his works. The answers to the questions raised in this introduction may be found on the intersection between forms of life and radical translation from another culture into ours. The book presents an extensive analysis of anthropological issues with emphasis on language and social elements.