Volume 10, Issue 2

According to contemporary nominalism, there are no abstracta. A common way of arguing against the existence of abstracta deploys a causal theory of reference. In short, we have no good reason to believe in what we cannot refer to and, since reference is causal and abstracta are causally isolated, we cannot refer to abstracta. In this paper, I examine just how far this sort of argument takes nominalism.

Zusammenfassung In Kants Schriften kommt das Wort ‚Metapher‘ nur spärlich vor. Das heißt jedoch keineswegs, dass er das Vorkommen von Metaphern ignoriert und nicht problematisiert hat. In diesem Beitrag habe ich vor, mich mit zwei Schlüsselbegriffen der kantischen Ästhetik zu befassen, nämlich mit der ästhetischen Idee und der symbolischen Darstellung. Hinter beiden verbergen sich Strukturen, die sich als Explikationen der Funktionsweise von Metaphern verstehen lassen. In der analytischen Philosophie des vorigen Jahrhunderts ist die Metapher zum Gegenstand von mancherlei Studien und konkurrierender Theorien geworden. Darunter befinden sich – freilich in einem durchaus unterschiedlichen Begriffsapparat formuliert – auch die beiden Theorien aus der Kritik der Urteilskraft. Trotz allem Konsens gehen sie in der Schlüsselfrage der Existenz der metaphorischen Bedeutung auseinander. Während Max Black seine Auffassung auf der Idee der metaphorischen Bedeutung aufbaute, argumentierte Donald Davidson hingegen, dass diese Idee die Funktionsweise der Metapher nicht zu erläutern vermöge. Diese bis heute unentschiedene Streitsache ist im Rückgang auf Kants Ästhetik aufzuspüren, und zwar in der Form der (heutzutage gleichfalls aktuellen) Frage, ob sich die Funktion von ästhetischen Ideen auf die symbolische Darstellung von sittlichen Vernunftideen reduzieren lässt. Zusammenfassung The term ‘metaphor’ is rare in the writings of Kant. However, it doesn't imply that he ignored or did not question the ubiquity of metaphors. In the present paper, I want to discuss two cardinal concepts of Kant's aesthetics viz., the aesthetic idea and the symbolic presentation. Behind both are contained structures which can be seen as explications of the function of the metaphor. The problem of metaphor has come to a noteworthy revival and to the subject of many competing studies in analytical philosophy. Among them can be found – formulated surely in very different concepts – the two theories from The Critique of Judgement. Despite a considerable amount of agreement, these theories diverge in the key issue of the usefulness of the notion of the metaphorical meaning. While Max Black's account is based on the idea of the metaphorical meaning, Donald Davidson on the other hand argued that such an idea cannot explain the function of the metaphor. This undecided issue can be transposed back into the aesthetical theory of Kant as the issue, whether the function of aesthetical ideas can be reduced to a symbolic presentation of moral ideas of reason.

This essay deals with the question of the descriptive vs the normative within the philosophy of religion. Philosophy as an enterprise based on argument involves the implicit appeal to the reader's or interlocutor's ability to recognise certain ideas as meaningful or meaningless. In philosophy of religion, we also need an implicit agreement on what could intelligibly qualify as an expression of (genuine) religious faith. But in many cases, this cannot be assumed. It is argued that, if we really want to describe possible uses of religious expressions, we cannot do so independently of what we see as religious possibilities for ourselves. And to find out about this is not only a matter of description but also of making decisions for our own part, finding out what we can go along with. The first part of the essay amplifies on these general remarks. Then Peter Winch's discussion of the Resurrection is considered as a case in point. The essay ends with general conclusions about the role of ‘the philosophical “we”’ in conceptual inquiries.