Band 22, Heft 1

Many modern armed conflicts contain more than two fighting parties, or armed opposition groups that have factions within them. It is the moderates in an armed opposition that governments negotiate with. But the agreement’s fate depends on the approval of all other significant actors within the opposition. We construct a dynamic model of conflict in which such an actor is to decide whether to accept a peace agreement signed by the moderates or not. Using this model we analyze the behavior of our decision maker, focusing on outcomes like the optimal settlement strategy, expected duration of the conflict, and the decision maker’s expected payoff from conflict. We then determine how these outcomes are affected by changes in the conflict environment. Finally, we extend our model to analyze the implications of commitment problems, and the possibility that the conflict ends with military victory of either side.

The contemporary empirical literature on military spending has focused on institutional and conflict factors, and although has acknowledged the role of trade openness, it has not taken into account the position of a state in the trade network. Building on the concept of network centrality, we claim that the structure of trade networks affects the optimal investment in security, and that a country’s level of military spending is a function of its strategic position in the global network of a critical commodity, such as oil. Our empirical results show that network centrality constrains military spending.

The paper employs Zipf’s law to examine the distribution of military spending across countries in the world over the period 1988–2012. Military spending can cautiously be treated as a crude and distant proxy for military capacity and strength, and hence states’ hard power. The paper finds that the first-in-rank country (the USA) consistently spends more on the production of military capabilities than what is projected by Zipf’s law to correspond to a balanced international structure. This, tentatively interpreted, implies the use of military strength (and the concomitant costs for acquiring it) as a tool of hegemonic status consolidation, perhaps vis-à-vis other rising global players. In turn, the countries at the lower end of the rank, although they have overall increased their military outlays, seem to spend less on defence than this is anticipated by the law. This finding may be pointing to free-riding on the military strength of allies and other major powers.

This paper investigates the relationship between political Islam, willingness to migrate and Internet use by exploiting the second (2010–2011) and the third (2012–2014) waves of the Arab Barometer. In an effort to explain individual-level willingness to migrate from the Arab world, it investigates the channel through which the more people support political Islam the less they are willing to migrate. At the same time, it explores the fact that the Internet could potentially act as a vehicle of political Islam. Indeed, our findings indicate that there exists a positive relationship between Internet use and individual-level willingness to migrate, while there exists a negative relationship between political Islam and individual-level willingness to migrate. The findings indicate also that there is no significant effect of Internet use on political Islam.

This note examines a methodological issue pertaining to the empirical specification of the probability of crisis initiation. We show that the empirical specification of the probability of crisis initiation encounters an insurmountable methodological problem, and, by example, that the problem leads empirical researchers to incorrect conclusions regarding the relationship between regime type and crisis initiation, in particular.