Volume 22, Issue 1

The scope of this short paper is to show that the examples Ilhan Inan uses to undermine Donnellan's distinction (primarily, the attributive uses of definite descriptions in general) fall short on account of wrong interpretation those examples were provided with in his paper. Whilst Ilhan Inan showed how complex definite descriptions (having an embedded referential term) may cause doubts as to which category they should be put in, these referring terms only play a secondary role. I argue that all of his three key examples are, in fact, sheer attributive uses of definite descriptions and have to be taken as such, which seriously diminishes the pedestal Inan places his argument on

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Krešimir Agbaba (this volume: Kriterion (2009) 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper (Kriterion (2006) 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's generalized accounts|an attributive use of a definite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon

Kripke presented one of the most inuential modal arguments against psycho-physical identities. His argument as exemplified by the identity of pain and its respective neural correlates will be analysed in detail. It shall be argued that his reasoning relies on an implausible conception of introspection implying an implausible conception of mental phenomena such as pain. His account does not consider possible interaction of pain and attention as well as the interaction of pain with other psychological factors. Theoretical and empirical evidences for a diferent account of pain, which represent a challenge for Kripke's argument, will be discussed.

McTaggart's negative thesis in his proof for the unreality of time, which contends that the A-series is contradictory, is still today upheld as a proof of the unreality of the properties of past, present, and future, and of the `flow of time'. In my paper, I defend the possibility of a complete and consistent description of the A-series, thus refuting McTaggart's negative thesis. I show that the failure to acknowledge the possibility of such a description is due to an ambiguity in natural language. Once this ambiguity is clarified, and in light of the disanalogy between time and space, the usual description of the A-series, `Event e was future, is present, and will be past', is shown to be a successful description of the change in the temporal A-properties (the `flow of time')

In this article we compare three different semantic theories for a propositional language, namely a valuation-semantic, a truth-set- semantic and a modal-set-semantic theory. We prove step by step that these semantic theories are mutually equivalent