Volume 59, Issue 3 -

From a neuroconstructivistic point of view, the human brain produces an internal simulation of the external world which appears in conscious experience as the phenomenal world. This concept implies in particular that the subjective body and the organic or objective body belong to fundamentally different realms, i.e. to the mental and the physical world. The spatiality of the subject-body has then to be declared an illusion, which is done by pointing to dissociations of the subject- and object-body as in the rubber hand illusion or in phantom limbs. This alleged virtuality of body experience may be refuted, however, namely by referring to the intersubjectivity of perception which certifies the coextensivity of subject-body and object-body. Subjectivity is thus shown to be embodied as well as spatially extended, that means, as bodily being-in-the-world.

Following Carl Schmitt′s diagnosis that the area of politics is becoming diffuse, this article analyses the transformation of the relationship between the powerholders and the subordinates under the condition of an increasing numbers of observers representing a powerful factor in their own right. In the perspective of Schmitt this factor threatens the relation of protection and obedience and therefore the whole fundament of politics. By contrast this article understands the system theory of power by Niklas Luhmann as an answer to the problem: including the observers in the process of the execution of power and transforming them into managers of political risk renders the reproduction of power possible under the condition of increasing observation.

This text presents a survey of problem areas surrounding recent developments in the cognitive, social and affective neurosciences and analyzes them from a critical philosophical perspective. Issues discussed include the public circulation of brain images, the stabilizing of types of persons on the grounds of alleged “brain types”, the re-formatting of humanities disciplines under the imperatives of scientific research and funding structures, the widespread construals of “cerebral subjectivity” and the tacit naturalization of social categories and conditions in the name of neural plasticity. A brief outline of the interdisciplinary initiative of critical neuroscience is provided to suggest a perspective for further analyses of these debated issues.

Adolescent brain development has become an important target for governments to act upon, in the name of healthy individuals and economic prosperity. In the Foresight Project on Mental Capital and Wellbeing (MCW), initiated by the Government Office for Science, adolescent behaviour was identified as one of the key challenges for UK policy. The report draws on 'state of the art′ evidence from scientific experts, to recommend ways in which to 'capitalize′ on mental faculties to improve, boost, and make maximum use of the cognitive resources and mental health of individuals during the entire lifespan. Specifically, through a close analysis of the category of adolescence in cognitive neuroscience, we examine the perspective of personhood espoused by MCW. We show how the notion of 'plasticity′, which underpins the recommendations about how to “make the most” of adolescents′ developing brains and cognitive resources, creates vital linkages between neuroscience and neosocial policy.

The relatively young discipline of neuroeconomics has taken an interest in forms of interpersonal trust from its very inception in an attempt to correct one-dimensional overrationalistic pictures of homo economicus . This article analyzes the notion of trust as present in these studies, but also takes a look at typical philosophical ways of criticizing neuroscientific uses of everyday concepts such as trust that insist on their irreducible semantic complexity. It is suggested that these critical approaches are justified, but often underrate the extent to which everyday concepts change or modify their meaning under various social, economic and political pressures. If this is granted, it becomes possible to take a deepened look at the neuroeconomic concept of trust. While it is true that this concept is under the influence of an every_day concept of trust it can be shown that this everyday concept of trust gradually takes on a reduced economic twist. If this fact remains unrecognized neuroeconomics in particular and neuroscience in general can take on ideological functions in reflecting back to society a seemingly natural understanding of trust that is, in truth, highly shaped by economic forces.

The neuroscientific naturalism poses a challenge to any philosophical attempt to determine human nature. Although the neurosciences describe the cognitive capacities of human beings as something that is socially acquired, they lack adequate reflection on the social forms in which these capacities emerge and thereby tend to naturalize not only human beings, but society as a whole. In an attempt to find alternatives to the neuroscientific naturalism, the authors refer to the traditions of Critical Theory and psychoanalysis, which enable a different understanding of human nature. This is followed by the debate between Honneth and Whitebook on the question of an anti- or pre-social self, and in reference to Adorno and Lorenzer, the authors develop a concept of second nature that allows them to adhere to the dynamics of the material nature and sociality within the human subject.

The concept of law presupposes the concept of the legal relationship. Law authorizes, potentially or actually, the use of coercion in order to guarantee freedom from interference by others. But coercive norms also constitute internal negative liberty for their addressees. A legal obligation cannot require adopting, let alone endorsing, the internal perspective of the law-giver. Legal subjects remain strangers to one another. Reconciling legality with autonomy involves, therefore, conceiving of one′s self-determination from the perspective of someone whose reasoning remains ultimately secluded from others. Realizing this type of relation to oneself gives rise to the ethical legal obligation to assert oneself as a morally self-reliant individual.

Zusammenfassung Emil Angehrn: Sinn und Nicht-Sinn. Das Verstehen des Menschen. Mohr Siebeck Verlag, Tübingen 2010, 405 S.

Zusammenfassung Frank Hofmann: Die Metaphysik der Tatsachen. Mentis Verlag, Paderborn 2008, 184 S.

Zusammenfassung Günter Figal: Erscheinungsdinge. Ästhetik als Phänomenologie. Mohr Siebeck Verlag, Tübingen 2010, 304 S.