## preface

The aim of Drawing Distinctions is to argue the great importance of drawing and to advance our understanding of it as an autonomous activity. Systematic and fully philosophical, this book is also an effort at extended criticism, both theoretical and applied, which attempts to say how drawings are done, how they work and mean, and why they are important to us. Such a project could by no means be limited to issues of art or aesthetics; therefore, while the discussion develops steadily toward consideration of drawing as fine art, I argue the overall case in wider scope. Indeed, basic work on the many "practical" uses of drawing will prove highly relevant to understanding it as art, where graphic means are applied "at full stretch." Thus we will include systematic appreciations of the drawings of small children, engineers, and designers; diagrams in instructional manuals; depictions on Mayan pot paintings and prehistoric wall decorations, as well as those of Pompeii and the Renaissance; works by such artists as Michelangelo, Zou Fulei, and Cézanne, and cartoons by the creators of Tintin and Curious George. Cartoon connoisseurship, combined with close appreciations of medieval and modern engineering sketches, children's first efforts, route maps, and decorative patterns will prepare us for a planning sketch by Leonardo, a presentation piece by Dürer, Chinese nature paintings, and poignant drawings from Goya's personal sketch books. Close attention to these individual

cases will be clearly situated in recognizable contemporary contexts of art history and criticism, cognitive and developmental psychology, philosophy, and practical drawing instructions.

Drawing itself is rarely seen as itself but is rather taken for granted these days. Therefore Part I of Drawing Distinctions begins with an argument for the practical importance of "all kinds of drawing." Today, when photography receives much public notice and theorists write of "representation," little is said directly about drawing. But drawing is far more important than photography. A modern world could not exist without drawing, since all the manufactured items of that world, including cameras, must be drawn several times before they can be made, and many could not be used without further drawings. Thus, whatever other factors are involved, the line between the modern technological world and that of traditional crafts coincides with one drawn by drafters. In support of this thesis, Part I introduces readers in a nontechnical way to the kinds, basic techniques, and uses of design and engineering drawings. This discussion inevitably leads to projective systems—notably to perspective-which are pursued, for breadth and greater interest, through historical debates about the place they played in the development of modern technologies since the Renaissance. The rest of Part I concerns the wide use of drawings today in everyday practical contexts.

From a consideration of the practical uses of drawing emerge a central thesis and a strategy: a "tool-kit" conception of the treatment of drawing, one that opposes assumptions of reductive unification, especially the most influential ones, which are associated with projective accounts of perspective. This tool-kit approach is developed throughout the book up to Part IV, where it addresses art. In assembling this kit, the expositions and arguments of Parts II, III, and IV run along a progressive line, called "the course of drawing," beginning with the child's first marks and early drawing challenges and ending with master drawings. To begin this movement, the early chapters of Part II are guided by research in the developmental psychology of children's drawing. That developmental work, like most cognitive psychological work on drawing today, follows the trends of research on visual perception and is therefore spatially based-sometimes exclusively spatial. Part II seeks to expand the usual account of space, then begins broadening drawing research beyond spatial considerations.

This widening of scope, and the need to provide a theoretical account of depictions, even for children's drawings, introduces two philosophical accounts: a presentation of Kendall Walton's theory of visual depiction and a closely linked, original, critical exposition of E. H. Gombrich's work on convincing representation, focused on his classic Art and Illusion. Here I present new arguments about the topics of spontaneous visual imagining and the perceptual category of depiction as a kind of artifact of visual display. Part II closes with discussions of Mayan pot painting and Italian Renaissance wall paintings in terms of the neglected but highly important topic of decorative depiction. Thereby, Part I's issues of linear perspective receive additional development, while the important theme of contour line emerges, leading into Part

Part III renews the "course of drawing" theme, as the practical tool-kit approach systematically develops a case for drawing's autonomy and prepares us to consider drawing as art. "Course of drawing" is understood in two ways: in historical terms, connecting to Part I's Renaissance topic, and in terms of individual drawing education and development, retrieving Part II's childhood beginnings. Both discussions are organized by a progressive treatment of specific drawing elements such as line and tone, tools for rendering spatial and other

effects. Throughout we make close study of the best practical and theoretical books on drawing: Philip Rawson's Drawing, which provides historical and cross-cultural contexts for accounts of how drawings work, and an earlier classic, Josef Meder's Die Handzeichnung. I hope that readers will improve their understanding not only of drawing but of painting, photography, and cinema through this presentation, which includes attention to other standard books by drawing teachers. To carry the account further toward artistic meaning-and control the strong spatializing dispositions of even this advanced "course of drawing" account—Part III closes with a consideration of Michael Podro's "sustaining recognition" approach, illustrated by treatment of some great drawings.

The project outlined is clearly ambitious: it begins with the vital importance of design drawing, proceeds through the child's first marks to a theory of effective depiction, and then offers an account of standard devices of advanced drawing, from human prehistory and across cultures. With that basis, an important objective of Part IV is the identification and rooting out of culturally pervasive dualist conceptions of depiction: between surface and depth, medium and representation, recognition and aesthetic experience—and finally between the work and the actions and purposes of artists. Part IV concludes with the most important argument of all, a principled case for how drawing as depiction—not only in addition to depiction—can be creative art: that is, art replete with mental, psychological, and moral content. This is argued by close attention to works by Rembrandt and Cézanne.

This being no less than an attempt to explain how, from our first scribbles to great art, there can be different kinds of meanings in our marks, I hope to be excused from attempting surveys of views about a number of the topics included. Since we are on a long excursion, we will proceed in the company of helpful companions when we meet them, taking leave of them if that suits our purposes—when we meet others headed in our direction or when we reach the end of a line of thought. There will be long stretches where such guides are useful, others where we proceed on our own. The singularity of the journey means that it must be opportunistic, venturing toward destinations unrecognized by others, with abrupt encounters and de-

partures. Inevitably some readers will be puzzled by a direction or think they know a shorter path. Nevertheless, given recent growth of literature on topics concerning "depiction" and "visual representation" in psychology, philosophy, art history, and other fields, some review of at least the more philosophical side of that seems in order, if only for comparison with our approach to drawing, which will appear unusual, even peculiar, by refusing to be confined to those topics. Empirical vision research on drawing will only be touched on, although aspects of it will be consulted in the following chapters.

Partly to situate Drawing Distinctions for the reader relative to well-known works, I will shape a little history, beginning in 1960, with Gombrich's refutation, in his great Art and Illusion, of the old and widespread idea of depiction as the imitation of "visual appearances." Only in retrospect do the fact and manner of Gombrich's achievement appear obvious-although these are not widely understood to this day, even by his expositors, and imitation-of-appearances conceptions still recur in sophisticated forms among those in position to know better. What Gombrich compellingly demonstrated is that what he termed "convincing representation" in visual depiction is a constructive process, where—as is clear from drawing practices—the instruction to "imitate appearances" is useless. Anyone who wants to make an effective depiction, he pointed out, has a number of different jobs to do, particular effects to pull off. As children, we all encountered this, when we wanted to make a face look surprised or lovely, a box look six-sided, something appear heavy, sharp, wet, flying through the air, resting on or growing from something. Learning to pull off such effects—and they are endless—is a matter of acquiring what we are calling tool kits of devices, and there are basic, more or less universal, tools within these kits. Lest we think that complacent possession of such kits suffices, or that their jobs are automatically done with modern technologies, consider the rather comic words of Alberto Giacometti, who insisted that depicting what he saw was "the only thing worth doing," as he referred to "thirty-five years of dishonesty":

How can I make a nose really perpendicular? The simple fact is that I don't know how to do anything. . . . When I was a young man, I thought I could do anything. And that feel-

ing lasted until I was about seventeen.... Then I suddenly realized that I could do nothing....I started with the technique that was available..., which was more or less the impressionist..., and I worked at that until about 1925. Then suddenly...I found that it was impossible. So I had to start from scratch, searching. And it seemed to me that I'd made some progress, a little progress, till...about 1956. Since then things have been going from bad to worse.

Artists, art historians, and critics hardly took note of this aspect of Gombrich's sensible arguments from practice. However, with its author's mental breadth and great labors, Art and Illusion took advantage of a second, independent line of evidence against the monolith of "visual appearances" and in favor of a constructive approach to understanding depiction, supplied in abundance from the vision studies of the 1950s, whose lead Gombrich explicitly followed and which was confirmed by cognitive and linguistic researchers in the ensuing decades. When psychologists began experimental inquiry into environmental perception, they had to analyze it into modules—sense systems, cues, particular effects. Much of this experimental work consisted in techniques for separating these factors, testing and comparing them, and putting them back together. As is usual in cognitive studies, the commonsense gloss on how it all works often proves a poor guide. As our visual blind spots, color and acuity differences between cone and rod vision, and many other phenomena show, it is not in the nature of cognitive processes to announce their modularity. Continuing research is making explicit what image makers had known tacitly for millennia by wit, genius, or trial and error's stumbling onto perceptual effects-consolidating them, passing them on through workshop practice, and always, as Giacometti indicated, remaining open to critical scrutiny and refashioning. In arguing all this so interestingly and effectively, Gombrich did much for the status of "effective representation" in art as well, at a time when it had sunk low in theory and practice.

Still, Gombrich may not have fully appreciated the wider implications of his insight for understanding visual representation—that is, not only for breaking up the standard monolith of an "appearance" that could be "imitated" but also for the positive opening of a theoretical case for the autonomy of representation, even of representational arts. That is a question of what can be done with the elements of perception, once freed for representation by what we might call Gombrich's "lysis," but here perhaps he stayed too close to the cognitive studies that had helped him achieve it. It is a disappointing tendency of much of those studies even today to overlook the autonomy of representation. Having demolished one copy conception of perception, these studies would reconstruct another one for visual representation. For, all too often, the effort is made to understand pictorial representation as the reassembling of perceptual elements freed by the "lysis" in pretty much the same way that environmental perception does then to debate how this is possible, given that, on the one hand, many of the pieces will be missing and, on the other, specifically pictorial ones appear to intrude. This way of thinking gives up what had been achieved: it shatters the monolith of "the appearances" that could be imitated, only to have representation mimic the synthesis of nonrepresentational perception out of the pieces-and therefore to find it once again deficient—in the reconstruction. The tendency of such thought is reductive, with the surprising logic that, if representation draws heavily for its materials upon environmental perception's structures and routines, then such is basically what visual representation is; hence that an understanding of visual depiction can somehow be derived from the psychology of environmental vision: a depressingly common assumption among those who now debate the derivations. That inference is a fallacy of the material cause, of the kind identified by Aristotle in the "you are what you eat" arguments of the reductionists of his own time. The case for autonomy that I argue might then be understood as one about what Aristotle called "form": that the representational practices of human beings have their own deeply rooted nature, in terms of which they actively take from environmental perception the things they need, which they recombine and use according to their own forms and purposes. A more advanced case for autonomy, leading to a case for the autonomy of the arts of visual depiction, is that in making their own syntheses such arts are free to draw in many other elements besides the perceptual.

The moral of this story is simple: no general

theory of representation, no theory of depiction or of visual representation—thus the negative point, but where could be found a convincing, relevant account of the basic forms and functions of representation and, in particular, of visual depiction? This was a matter of a theoretical definition, one that—going back to Gombrich's book—he was not obliged to produce. His was the sufficiently daunting project of being thoughtful about what "naturalism" in visual representation is, so as to explain how this could have a history and strongly influence Western visual art forms, given their projects—or, as he liked to say, the varying "functions of the image" in different times and places. Gombrich's accomplishments there were sufficiently brilliant. Speaking of tool kits for doing jobs, what was wanting was a conceptual tool kit for thinking about representation beyond the cultural baby talk of "imitation," "illusion," "realism." These difficult theoretical questions were left to philosophers, and within a decade were taken up by Nelson Goodman.2 Goodman's Languages of Art presented a nominalist, empiricist theory of representation that stressed its autonomy, as well as that of art, but it did so with a vengeance that would have delighted Oscar Wilde's idealist, aestheticist doctrine that "Life imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life."3 Indeed Goodman so asserted the autonomy of "representational systems" as even to question the grounding of what Gombrich called "convincing representation" in the psychologists' perceptual cues and routines. Perhaps not since John Dewey's similarly surprising entry into philosophy of art had an eminent philosopher so stirred the complacent centers of philosophy to the marginalized field of aesthetics, and in time psychologists took note.4

Since this is not the place to assess the successes and failures of Goodman's theoretical effort, it suffices to note that his theory of depiction—like "semiotic" or referential theories generally—has seemed unsatisfactory to many, specifically regarding the beholder's perceptual experience, which needs to be shown as essential to the nature of such representations and crucial to our interest in them. It is not clear, for example, how Goodman's emphasis on "delicacy of discriminations" (reminiscent of Hume's like title) or his generally cognitivist approach might explain, say, the erotic interest of visual images as things seen.<sup>5</sup> Partly in response to Goodman, a number of vision-

centered approaches to pictorial depiction sprang up, leading to Richard Wollheim's remark, "Philosophical theories of representation abound"6 alas, not a good opening sentence for an article, as it is false in two ways. It is false because most of the slight articles to which Wollheim referred, with their meager analytic vocabularies, hardly constitute theories, false again because (for the reason already given) few of these actually concern representation. No theory of representation, no theory of pictorial representation; yet fools rush in-to what would be called in athletics a series of unforced errors. Although Goodman opened his treatise with an issue about depiction, he wisely deferred his account of pictures for more than 80 percent of his book. Unfortunately, even Wollheim, who defended a perceptual essence for pictorial depiction and its autonomy, and was highly critical of both psychological and philosophical perceptually based approaches on the issue of content, was not so prudent. Postulating a sui generis primitive form of perception, Wollheim strangely reserved the term "representation" for pictures of a certain kind: those in which, on a marked surface of which we maintain steady awareness, the peculiar spatial perceptual effect obtains of one thing seeming to be in front of or behind another.7 The remarkable implication of this is that sculpture in the round is not representation, nor is relief work. Thus Wollheim's account excluded from representation Michelangelo's David but not his Sistine paintings, or Barbara Hepworth's figurative sculptures but not her drawn studies for them, and implied that Pisano's and Ghiberti's doors of the Florence Baptistery go in and out of representation, depending on the depth of the undercutting.

Regarding the crucial issue of representational content—of what can be represented, as opposed to what can represent—Wollheim, unlike other perceptualists, did face the basic problem, with a set of additional requirements: that the experience is constrained by "tallying with" the intention of the artist, that it is particularly "permeable to thought" in a way in which "seeing face to face" is not, and that imagination may add to it (223–226). But, aside from the question of whether Wollheim does capture representational content, his account of intentional meaning and hence of art, insightful as it is, seems to be added on to his account of representation rather than developed out of it, so that representation as *art* is still left in question. Worse, Woll-

heim's theory of pictorial depiction shares with the other visual approaches a general failing in scope, far beyond its strange isolation from sculpture. The example of sculpture might suggest masks, masks suggest dance and theater, these in turn suggest music with words, then poetry and storytelling, cinema and television (including acting, dialogue, and music along with the pictures), and so forth: in short that loose family of productions we usually call "representations" normally understood as appealing to the imagination, whatever other uses they might be put to. No general account of representation, none of pictorial representation: when alleged theories of "representation" do not notice that their accounts of paintings on theater backdrops have nothing to tell us about the props on stage or the activities of the actors, dancers, and singers in front of those depictions, something has gone seriously wrong-similarly when an account of what makes an illustration to a Dickens story a "representation" cuts that discussion off from the vivid writing on the page that closes upon it, or a cartoon drawing from its speech balloon. Thus it was left to Kendall Walton to produce an actual theory of representation and only then of visual depiction (wisely not until page 292 of Mimesis as Make-Believe), which put the perceptual element in the right place—at least by the time of that book's publication, just thirty years after Art and Illusion.

In so doing, Mimesis stands as one of the philosophical achievements of its time, accomplishing what many had not thought possible. Since we will be considering in detail only selected aspects of Walton's theory in the following chapters, I must explain that claim briefly. For present purposes it may be enough to say, speaking of theater, that Walton's theory performed a classic rescue.8 It was Plato and Aristotle who brought to consciousness a set of ancient, vital human activities for serious study under the concept of mimesis. But though they had many penetrating things to say about mimesis, their worst and most careless comments proved the more influential, for this family of activities, now misnamed by the Latin imitatio, was placed in servile conditions for millennia—also scattered (as is usual in such stories), parts of it under grave suspicion of the Second Commandment. So, although efforts were made across the centuries to rescue and socially elevate parts of the family (usually by separating them from the rest), it was not until the eighteenth century that Enlightenment thinkers, casting about for an idea with which to bind together a new (and itself questionable) collection, "the fine arts," recollected that ancient grouping—though still under the wrongful name "imitation," which it continued to bear even with the Enlightenment's second contribution of unifying the whole under a supposed faculty of "imagination." And although the label "imitation" in time gave way to "representation," the imitation association has proved hard to shake, despite wellmeaning efforts by semiotic approaches—bringing down new indignities from modern and postmodern art movements. As indicated, it was Gombrich's great service to contend with the imitation idea for visual representations and to emphasize connections not only among all the visual arts but also with literature. Yet it was left to Walton to rescue and reunite the whole family, as autonomous and important, even under a rightful name. Still, a good ending requiring a "happy ever after," the story cannot end there. Drawing, representation, art: these are three overlapping topics, each of great significance. Although much important drawing is neither representation nor art, Drawing Distinctions may be understood as an extended argument about how drawing can be a representational art, not only effective representation.

This book completes a project started long ago in the Philosophy Department of Cornell University, when my director, Frank Sibley, recommended the recently published Art and Illusion for issues wanting philosophical reworking, then left for England. With a Woodrow Wilson Dissertation Fellowship, I began to struggle with questions unformulated by philosophers, trying to fit to Gombrich's rich perceptual account a way of thinking about representational content, which in the philosophy of the time seemed to mean something propositional. Gombrich's idea of pictorial "schemata" proving a blind alley and semiotic approaches unhelpful, I was attempting an account of content with a notion of nonreferring "representation-as" when Goodman gave a talk at Cornell, using the identical phrase. Goodman remained encouraging, but although he wrote in March 1965 that his book was not "ready to go to press for another year" and that it would be "several months yet before any of the manuscript is in usable form," his nonpropositional theory of representational content was to be unavailable for another three years. Meanwhile I worked at an unheard-of research topic and eked out a dissertation, partly expressed in my first professional publication, which includes some of the first substantive criticisms of Goodman. One of the satisfactions of the present work was to retrieve and build on the central positive ideas regarding Gombrich in that early research.<sup>9</sup>

Goodman's theory eventually proved unsatisfactory, while Walton's theory continued to build through the 1970s. I slowly worked my way clear of culturally ingrained fallacies about perspective, read psychological and (with the encouragement of Aaron Sloman during a sabbatical in Sussex) artificial intelligence studies of image perception, hosted John Willats during his visit to Canada on a Commonwealth Fellowship, and from the next sabbatical began research and teaching on photography. When Walton's Mimesis came to completion at the end of the 1980s, I began to work out from it to address two difficult form/content issues in connection with visual art: how to articulate the perceptual reciprocity of image and medium and how to define the place of mind within representation. Within three years of the publication of Mimesis, I produced a paper critically reviewing work on depiction and extending Walton's theory to show, in principle, how to include artists' mental content.10 More sustained work on that difficult topic had to await consolidation of my work on photography in the first philosophical treatise on that subject, The Engine of Visualization,11 written, like the present book, under a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada research grant, during a sabbatical leave. The present book took longer, since drawing is, as I knew from the outset, the more difficult and important topic. It also has a different organization. While Engine has the advantage of being the working out of a thesis that can be clearly stated in a few sentences, Drawing Distinctions—as just outlined—is a quest carrying us across wide fields by unaccustomed paths.

Fortunately, this book does have in common with its predecessor the advantage of relying heavily upon the work of good and generous friends who are also leading thinkers in their fields. Neither Part I nor the beginning of II would have been conceivable without the research of John Willats. Although I had cleared my head on the subject of perspective before meeting Willats, that was about all I had accomplished with regard to spatial as-

pects of drawing. Although I had collected my children's drawings, until I met Willats I had no real idea how to relate them to my work.12 Clearly, Drawing Distinctions would have been impossible without Walton's theory. And at a crucial place in this book, where it turns directly toward art, I rely on two ideas of Michael Podro's: "reciprocity" and the particularly inspired "sustaining recognition." To these three friends I owe, beyond their ideas, the encouragement of friendship. Lovers of visual art may envy a November day in London I spent with John Willats at the National Portrait Gallery and with Michael Podro at the National Gallery and at an Auerbach exhibition in the Royal Academy. I am particularly indebted to two philosophical psychologists at the University of Western Ontario: Keith Humphrey, for current vision research, and J. Peter Denny, for symmetry studies and for encouragement of my beginning efforts to conceive design in anthropological terms. The perceptions and encouragement of another philosophical psychologist, Hugo du Coudray, at Portland State University, are but part of a lifetime's tutelage, since he, as my eldest brother, has, more than anyone else, shaped all my understanding. I am grateful to an eminent scholar of Chinese art, James Cahill, for encouragement and practical advice.

Last to mention here is Richard Wollheim, who by his specific acts of generosity and immediate and unfailing confidence helped sustain my work over decades. Richard would have approved of some theoretical parts of this book, other parts not, though I think of it as carrying forward his main ideas and purposes. When I first told him of the project he immediately asked whether it was to include connoisseurship; I hope that he would have accepted much of this book as an example of what he called "substantive aesthetics." 13 I had expected to see Richard at the American Society for Aesthetics meetings in San Francisco in October 2003, where I presented some of the ideas for this book, but our last discussions were to be at two conferences in the summer of 2000: "The Creation of Art," at Aarhus, and "Reconceiving Pictorial Space?" at Bielefeld. Both were gifts from the gods toward completing this project, and I am grateful to their organizers-Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston at Aarhus, and Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz, and Margaret Atherton at Bielefeld-for inviting me. The long paper that the first conference prompted, and that the subsequent volume of conference papers permitted, forced an indispensable working-through of ideas central to this project. My interaction at the Bielefeld conference with outstanding psychologists and philosophers regarding pictorial perception was a unique opportunity: rich both in information about current empirical research and in its wealth of fruitful conceptions and "drawing distinctions." For all our differences, I hope that the other symposiasts find the spirit of Bielefeld continued here. Such focused gatherings are ideal for stimulating interaction and productive thinking, solving problems, and reformulating research.

Late in the project, two other events proved vital. First, several funded trips to Italy confirmed my ideas about the perceptual realities of rendering space by perspective and other means, and about the centrality of the greatly neglected topic of decoration, which I have tried to bring forward in this book. A long-anticipated visit to Pompeii turned confirmation into inspiration. The latter term applies as well to an event of a different sort. It was thanks to James Cutting's Bielefeld paper, whose influence is otherwise apparent in several places in this book, that I took notice of the prehistoric drawings at Chauvet Cave, published five years earlier. To encounter the immediately comprehensible works of the skilled, practiced hands of our most distant ancestors, kept in place by limestone walls for nearly forty thousand years, was an affirmation of the efforts of Drawing Distinctions, which makes a sustained case for an important but neglected group of deeply human activities whose roots and meanings we may still only guess at-suggesting, perhaps, that this is indeed a work of philosophy. I could not have argued my case by putting these images before the reader were it not for the generosity of the Chauvet project's director, Jean Clottes, editor of the beautifully produced and illustrated La Grotte Chauvet: L'Art des Origines, from which our figures are taken, generosity that lifted my spirits and this entire project.15

The prominence of illustrations in this book, unusual for a philosophy book, deserves discussion. I trust that readers will immediately understand that the project of illustrating a study that claims to be about "all kinds of drawings" might be rather daunting. Probably most will not realize the editorial limitations that must be put on projects like this, or the constraints of permissions. As for the

former, I emphasize, as I did in The Engine of Visualization, that this is a theoretical philosophy book, not a picture book, and that no figure appears here except as evidence to support an argument. The choice of figures was made on the basis of multiple such uses. Accordingly, the reproductions do not represent the taste of the author so much as the needs of the argument and the accessibility of images. The amount of Dürers, for example, does not express my artistic preferences, and I am surprised by the absence of Matisse, with whose works I have spent countless hours. Here I note that although museum holdings became increasingly available on the web while this book was being researched and written, the present selection, like that of the previous book, was greatly assisted by the holdings of the libraries of the University of Western Ontario.

As to permissions for things chosen, the generosity of Jean Clottes, Peter Horemans at Moulinsart (for the Tintin illustration), and the Fogg Museum are, understandably, singular. Many works are unobtainably lodged in private collections (a showing Cézanne, problem for Constable, Twombly), photographers and commercial firms charge commercial fees, and the permission costs of even great museum repositories have risen steadily. I am grateful for financial assistance in this from the Academic Development Fund, Dean of Arts funds, and, most specifically, for a J. B. Smallman Publication Fund, all at the University of Western Ontario, for allowing the number and quality of attributed figures. In some cases I was obliged to render images myself, which had the good effect (near the end) of realizing the ancient motto Nulla dies sine linea and helping me look longer and appreciate more fully—as readers may recall for themselves from the well-grounded exercise of copying or tracing even simple patterns. Dismissive things have been written about Wollheim's practice of looking at individual paintings not for minutes but for hours on end before writing about them<sup>16</sup>—written probably by some who have settled for a moment before a television, rising several hours later, wondering what they had been doing-but such are merely expressions of the restiveness of a particular culture of impatience. Anyone who has copied even part of a design, in any context, knows how quickly the time goes by as one looks and looks and keeps seeing more, and drawing is an efficient way of allowing

our slower integrative perceptual processes to work.

Some of the visual limitations of Drawing Distinctions are owing to my individuality and failings. On the first score, my daughters were reasonable about permissions charges for their childhood drawings, which I had faithfully dated and kept. Speaking of the disciplines of sustained looking, Part III gives great emphasis to European drawings of the human figure but rather less to nature drawing. That is partly owing to our main guide in III, Rawson, but also to my regular practice of life drawing. With more words and budget, I would have included portrait, botanical, still-life, and landscape work, and also the representation of places as places. As to failings, I particularly regret the absence of work by women artists, and there is a serious weakness in my examples due to the lack of really modern drawings. I had hoped to repair both omissions somewhat by including something by Canadian-born Agnes Martin, but was concerned about doing her printing justice. In connection with the illustrations, I am grateful to Cornell University Press and my editor, Roger Haydon, for the special format provided this unusual philosophy treatise, in which so much of the argument depends on what can be seen in the marked patterns on the pages, sensitively placed by Scott E. Levine. That reflects only part of his commitment to a project involving semi-technical descriptions, expositions of theories across a range of disciplines, close description of a variety of drawing uses, art connoisseurship, and, above all, sustained philosophical argument and theory development concerning the complexities of our cognitive processes. That writing posed a challenge, and, whatever its remaining unclarities, it was greatly improved through the close, patient copyediting of John LeRoy and the direction of Ange Romeo-Hall.

Perhaps accounts of process, expressions of gratitude, and apologies are incomplete explanations without comment on the personal motives in writing another book about a philosophically non-existent topic. I would not have written it except that drawing has been a part of my life's activity for my whole life, even when, like a musician looking wistfully at an unused instrument, I have not been able to practice it. Book writing as brain damage: the personal costs of completing such a project en-

tail a thousand mistakes and humiliations in the rest of one's life-hope being vain that, due to computing, the world might better understand what it is to have one's "hard drive" occupied for months on end. Still, the writing part of me owed it to the drawing part. Also, as an artist, from several generations of artists in different arts, I am privileged to have some way to defend an art, as art, in a mass-media age. Good drawing of any kind requires perceptual sensitivity, skill, and thus dedication. Like any meaningful activity, it entails appreciation of the richness that is always around us, open to any with the patience and discipline to perceive. From this comes satisfaction, opposite to the quick gratifications within cycles of dissatisfaction that drive a consumer marketing economy. It is predictable that such an economy would attempt, as Philip Rawson said, to "debauch" our perception of visual images through an overflow of easy imitations, so that slow and difficult—because active—processes of appreciation might fall into disuse, given that cycles of gratification presuppose real yet unrealized needs. But that this conspiracy is only partially successful is reflected in the growing popularity of museums in our time. Therefore this turns out to be a book with political implications, as is any invitation to slow down and appreciate what we already have, here both in the varied activities of drawing and in what drawings show us. We take too much for granted.

Then there is philosophy. In Drawing Distinctions, as in The Engine of Visualization, I have tried to defend philosophy out of love of it. In particular, I have attempted to show, at least in one style, how an attempt at clear, open thinking-through of important matters, not relying on jargon, rhetoric, references to fashionable authorities or personal polemics, can treat concrete matters of meaning in distinctively philosophical ways—that is, in depth with connection. Within philosophy, I have recommended to a word-bound discipline the marginalized fields of images, suggesting, for example, to philosophers of mind their loss in leaving out imagination. The reward of these efforts has been in making them near the best of my abilities; one writes the best book one can, given the conditions. In that I take my cue from the playwright, but also Stoic, David Mamet: "While you are intent on an objective, you do not have to compare your progress with that of your peers, you do not have to worry about a career, you do not have to wonder if you are doing your job, you do not have to be reverent to the script—you are at work."17

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