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The Tet Offensive And Its Aftermath

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The American War in Vietnam
This chapter is in the book The American War in Vietnam
THE TET OFFENSIVE ANDITS AFTERMATH*Ngo Vinh Long 1967 the American "war of attrition" and its "pacification program" hadfailed miserably in Vietnam, allowing the National Liberation Front (NLF) tocontrol most of the countryside in the South. Confronted by the deterioratingsituation in the South, the United States stepped up its air war against theNorth to unprecedented levels throughout 1967 in the hope of getting the North tocall off the NLF attacks in exchange for a bombing halt. It was under these circum-stances that the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the North decided inOctober 1967 to carry out a series of widespread offensives against the urban areas inthe South. These were aimed at reminding the United States that its main enemiesand problems were in the South and not in the North and inducing Washington tocall off the bombing against the North and go to the negotiating table. The attacks,which began during the Vietnamese New Year in 1968—and were hence dubbed"the Tet Offensive" in the West—were composed of three phases, lasting untilOctober of that year. During the first phase, from the end of January until the begin-ning of March, the NLF strike force achieved dramatic gains while receivingrelatively light casualties. The attack should then have been broken off, with militaryforces retreating into the countryside to consolidate their gains in newly liberatedareas. But because of Politburo decisions to mount second and third phases of theOffensive, the revolutionary units were left too long in forward positions around theurban areas and were subjected to horrendous air and artillery strikes. In addition,after the third phase was launched, American and Saigon troops "leapfrogged" overthe revolutionary forces still massed around the urban areas to attack them from theI would like to thank the William Joiner Center for the Study of War and Social consequencesat the University of Massachusetts/Boston for suporting my work in 1987 when I conductedinterviews in several provinces in the southern part of Vietnam and for helping to arrange myparticipation in the conference. I also acknowledge with gratitude the comradely criticisms ofthe Center's Co-Director, Professor David Hunt, on the original paper and a subsequent revi-sion.The original version of this paper was written in early 1988 and was divided into threeparts. Parts I and II, which dealt with the Tet Offensive from an overall perspective and fromthe perspective of the key province of Long An, were published in the January-February andMarch-April issues of the Indochina Newsletter, a publication of the Asia Resource Center.Copies of this publication can be obtained from 2161 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA02140. The entire paper, including Part HI, which focused on the 1969-1972 period, was pre-sented to the History of Vietnam War conference held in Hanoi from November 25-27,1988.The above article is a revised version of that paper.B*
© 2018 Cornell University Press, Ithaca

THE TET OFFENSIVE ANDITS AFTERMATH*Ngo Vinh Long 1967 the American "war of attrition" and its "pacification program" hadfailed miserably in Vietnam, allowing the National Liberation Front (NLF) tocontrol most of the countryside in the South. Confronted by the deterioratingsituation in the South, the United States stepped up its air war against theNorth to unprecedented levels throughout 1967 in the hope of getting the North tocall off the NLF attacks in exchange for a bombing halt. It was under these circum-stances that the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the North decided inOctober 1967 to carry out a series of widespread offensives against the urban areas inthe South. These were aimed at reminding the United States that its main enemiesand problems were in the South and not in the North and inducing Washington tocall off the bombing against the North and go to the negotiating table. The attacks,which began during the Vietnamese New Year in 1968—and were hence dubbed"the Tet Offensive" in the West—were composed of three phases, lasting untilOctober of that year. During the first phase, from the end of January until the begin-ning of March, the NLF strike force achieved dramatic gains while receivingrelatively light casualties. The attack should then have been broken off, with militaryforces retreating into the countryside to consolidate their gains in newly liberatedareas. But because of Politburo decisions to mount second and third phases of theOffensive, the revolutionary units were left too long in forward positions around theurban areas and were subjected to horrendous air and artillery strikes. In addition,after the third phase was launched, American and Saigon troops "leapfrogged" overthe revolutionary forces still massed around the urban areas to attack them from theI would like to thank the William Joiner Center for the Study of War and Social consequencesat the University of Massachusetts/Boston for suporting my work in 1987 when I conductedinterviews in several provinces in the southern part of Vietnam and for helping to arrange myparticipation in the conference. I also acknowledge with gratitude the comradely criticisms ofthe Center's Co-Director, Professor David Hunt, on the original paper and a subsequent revi-sion.The original version of this paper was written in early 1988 and was divided into threeparts. Parts I and II, which dealt with the Tet Offensive from an overall perspective and fromthe perspective of the key province of Long An, were published in the January-February andMarch-April issues of the Indochina Newsletter, a publication of the Asia Resource Center.Copies of this publication can be obtained from 2161 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA02140. The entire paper, including Part HI, which focused on the 1969-1972 period, was pre-sented to the History of Vietnam War conference held in Hanoi from November 25-27,1988.The above article is a revised version of that paper.B*
© 2018 Cornell University Press, Ithaca

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Coercive Diplomacy In Vietnam: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis Reconsidered 9
  5. The Tet Offensive And Its Aftermath 23
  6. Nixon And The PRG's 7 Points 47
  7. China's Role In The Vietnam War 71
  8. Cooperativization, The Family Economy, And The New Family In Wartime Vietnam, 1960-1975 77
  9. US Scholarship And The National Liberation Front 93
  10. The Future Of The Veterans' Lobby And Its Potential Impact For Social Policy 109
  11. Glossary 123
  12. Contributors 125
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https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501719462-003

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Coercive Diplomacy In Vietnam: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis Reconsidered 9
  5. The Tet Offensive And Its Aftermath 23
  6. Nixon And The PRG's 7 Points 47
  7. China's Role In The Vietnam War 71
  8. Cooperativization, The Family Economy, And The New Family In Wartime Vietnam, 1960-1975 77
  9. US Scholarship And The National Liberation Front 93
  10. The Future Of The Veterans' Lobby And Its Potential Impact For Social Policy 109
  11. Glossary 123
  12. Contributors 125
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