

Notes

Introduction

1. Sisson and Rose 1990.
2. Pavkovic and Radan 2007, 73–78.
3. PRIO Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
4. Walter 2009, 1.
5. According to PRIO, territorial civil wars have accounted for 1,575 conflict-years between 1946 and 2005.
6. Fearon 2004.
7. Kaufmann 1996.
8. Walter 1997; Fearon 2004.
9. According to PRIO, there have been ninety-five territorial and ninety-two ideological civil wars.
10. Walter 2009, 1.
11. Pierson 2004, 89.
12. Following standard definitions of secessionism, such as Horowitz (2000).
13. Horowitz 2000, 231–32; Cunningham 2014, 70–72.
14. Lustick et al. 2004, Grigoryan 2015, Brancati 2006.
15. I am immensely grateful to Bridget Coggins (2011, 2014) for providing me her data on secessionist movements. I made three main adjustments to this data. First, Coggins's data begins in 1931, but I used only post-1946 movements. This is because data on violent ethnic conflict, for which I used Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009) is only available for that period. Second, I culled nationalist movements against imperial rule. For theoretical reasons, I do not believe secessionist movements in modern nation-states should be conflated with anticolonial movements. Any movement that was geographically cut off from its target by a substantial body of water, as was the case for African and Asian movements against British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch rule, was deleted. With geographic contiguity in mind, I included the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which some scholars (but not me) consider an “empire.” Third, I added nine cases not included in the Coggins data but part of the EAC data: Mali-MPA (1990–94), Nigeria-Biafra (1967–70), Ethiopia-Ogaden I (1975–83), Ethiopia-Ogaden II (1996–2005), Ethiopia-Afar (1996), Iran-Kurds I (1946), Iran-Azerbaijan (1946), Indonesia-South Moluccas (1950), and Macedonia-UCK (2001).

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16. See Hale 2008, Hechter 1992, Horowitz 2000, Jenne 2007, Siroky 2009, Sorens 2008, Sorens 2012, and Wood 1981.
17. Gourevitch 1978, Rogowski 1987, and Midford 1993.
18. Gilpin 1983.
19. Fearon 1995, Copeland 2000, Powell 2006.
20. Fearon and Laitin 2003, Kalyvas 2006, Walter 1997, and Staniland 2012.
21. Weinstein 2007.
22. Staniland 2014.
23. Pearlman 2011, Krause 2014, Christia 2013, Seymour 2014.
24. Weinstein 2007, 6.
25. Valentino 2004 and Downes 2007.
26. Ron 2003.
27. Davenport 2007.
28. Walter 2009, Toft 2003.
29. Walter 2009, 20–21.
30. Walter (2009, 88) finds that “reputation building is not just a significant factor in government decision-making, it is also a substantively important one, but Toft (2003, 43), espousing the same argument, attains different results: a positive but insignificant relationship.
31. Toft 2002–3.
32. Walter (2009, 25) attempts to ameliorate the internal variation problem by arguing that the reputation argument can indeed account for variation within states by focusing on the element of time: even though ethnic profiles do not change over time, later movements will see less violence than earlier ones, because governments have more of a reputation to create earlier. Notwithstanding the dubious logic of this claim—why would a state, which practiced violence in an earlier time period, use less violence when faced with another secessionist movement, when clearly its bid to create a “harsh” reputation failed?—the empirical record is simply at odds with her argument. Of the nineteen states which saw varied levels of violence against secessionist movements, only four (United Kingdom, Spain, Azerbaijan, and Philippines) were more violent against earlier rather than later movements, according to the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset. The remaining fifteen states were either more violent against later secessionists, or faced secessionist movements during similar time periods—a possibility Walter does not consider.
33. Cunningham 2014, 38.
34. *Ibid.*, 83.
35. *Ibid.* This move is reflective of a broader trend to analyze rebel movements’ internal structures and cohesion. See Pearlman (2011), Staniland (2014), and Krause (2014).
36. Cunningham 2011, Cunningham 2013.
37. Cunningham 2014, 82, 92, 122.
38. *Ibid.*, 37.
39. Spruyt (2005) shows that a high number of veto points within imperial metropoles made concessions to anticolonial nationalists less likely, consistent with Cunningham, but he does not argue, as she does, that a low number of veto points also make concessions unlikely.
40. As opposed to all the other reasons a group might distrust a state’s offer of concessions.
41. Not least because Cunningham (2014) does not probe the conditional effects of “veto factions” at low, mean, and high levels of veto factions on the likelihood of either “concessions” or “institutional concessions.”
42. Griffiths 2015.
43. On such conflicts, see Spruyt 2005, Lawrence 2013, MacDonald 2013.
44. For example, see Balcells 2010, Ahmad 2015, Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013, Shesterinina 2016. For a notable exception, see Kalyvas and Balcells 2010.
45. Mearsheimer 2001.
46. IR scholars, e.g., Vasquez (1993) generally consider territory as something to be fought “over,” but in this case territory plays a more subtle role, since the state is not fighting “for” the territory *per se*.

47. The literature on these questions in general is massive. Some influential works on nationalism include Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Greenfeld (1993), Hobsbawm (1983, 2012), and Smith (1986). On ethnic conflict, the classic work remains Horowitz (2000). On nationalism and war, see Posen (1993b), Van Evera (1994), Cederman et al. (2011), and Wimmer (2012).

48. Mylonas 2012.

49. Bulutgil 2008.

50. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010.

51. On such decisions, see Saideman (1997).

52. Jenne 2015, 32–36.

53. Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008.

54. See Kuperman 2008, Bloom 1999, Jenne 2007, and Siroky 2009.

55. Fazal 2007, Atzili 2011

56. Horowitz 2000, 272.

57. Coggins 2011 and Coggins 2014.

58. Defined as those conflicts that (a) were fought within states over territory, that is, secessionist conflicts, and (b) reached “Level 2” intensity according to PRIO.

59. Heraclides 1990, 348–50.

60. Which is often either an overstated concern or a fig leaf for other interests. See Krasner (1999).

61. On the importance of large bodies of water in international politics, see Mearsheimer (2001).

62. The dissolution of the Soviet Union is a unique case in the study of secessionism, evinced by even the ethnic core of the state—the Russian nation—seeking to “secede” from it. See Beissinger (2002).

63. Gerring 2007, 40–58.

64. Ibid., 131; Van Evera 1997, 84; George and Bennett 2004, 151.

65. Gerring 2007, 131–33.

66. George and Bennett 2004, 166–67.

67. Ibid., 156–60.

68. Mahoney 2003, 360–63. See also George and Bennett (2004), 207–17.

69. George and Bennett 2004, 211.

70. Gerring 2007, 88–90 and Van Evera 1997, 78.

71. For the Balkans, see, for example, Siroky (2009). For the Caucasus, see Toft (2003).

72. Gerring 2007, 91–93.

73. Ibid., 97–101; and Van Evera 1997, 82.

74. See Staniland 2012.

75. Van Evera 1997, 79.

76. Gerring 2007, 115–16.

77. Ibid., 101–02.

78. Ibid., 104.

79. George and Bennett 2004, 23.

80. Primarily from the National Archives (College Park, Maryland), the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes, and the Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1947–80.

81. Archives at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

1. An External Security Theory of Secessionist Conflict

1. On this point, see Downes (2007) and Valentino (2004).
2. Downes 2007, Valentino 2004.
3. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010.
4. See Hale 2008, Hechter 1992, Horowitz 2000, Jenne 2007, Siroky 2009, Sorens 2008, Sorens 2012, and Wood 1981.

5. Horowitz 2000, 231–32; Cunningham 2014, 70–72.
6. Arreguín-Toft 2001.
7. Moravcsik 1998, 22–23.
8. Wilkinson 2006.
9. Toft 2003, Walter 2009, Cunningham 2014.
10. Lyons 2009, 168. This generosity was down to Eritrean rebels helping the ruling party's ascent to power in a long and brutal civil war. See Lorton 2000, 101–2.
11. Negash 1997, 175–77; and Tekle 1994.
12. Abbink 2003, 409.
13. Zegeye and Tegegn 2007, 14.
14. Lorton 2000, 103–5.
15. Natsios 2012, 215–18; and LeRiche and Arnold 2012, 188–212.
16. Cunningham 2014, 3–4.
17. For a challenge of the anarchy assumption, see Lake (2009), Clark (2009), Donnelly (2009), and Butt (2013). Mearsheimer 2001, 32–33. For an important critique of the overemphasized role that the idea of fear occupies in some branches of IR theory, see Brooks (1997), especially 447–50. For a more general and an extremely cogent critique of this pessimistic view of interstate relations, see Wendt (1992) and Wendt (1999).
18. Mearsheimer 2001, 55–75. See also Waltz 1979, 192.
19. Tilly 1985 and Tilly 1992.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Olson 1993.
22. See, *inter alia*, Laitin 1985 and Posner 2005.
23. Gellner 1983.
24. Hirschman 1969, 13.
25. *Ibid.*, 14.
26. Gilpin 2001.
27. Gowa and Mansfield 1993.
28. Abbott and Snidal 1998.
29. This clever analogy is from Coggins (2011).
30. Bull 1977, 13.
31. A similar dynamic is observed with externally imposed sanctions. Pape (1997) argues that one of the reasons economic sanctions are ineffective is that targeted regimes deflect the costs of those sanctions onto domestic rivals and enemies, presumably including ethnic rivals.
32. Both Mearsheimer (2001) and Waltz (1979) make the point in their discussions of material power.
33. Quoted in Reynolds (2009). Emphasis added.
34. Toft 2003.
35. Jana 2011, 115.
36. Mearsheimer 2001.
37. *Ibid.*, 57.
38. National Material Capabilities dataset, from the Correlates of War. Re. IR scholarly works, e.g., Mearsheimer 2001.
39. Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987.
40. Vasquez and Henehan 2001.
41. See, *inter alia*, Toft 2003, Kahler 2006, Goddard 2010, Shelef 2010.
42. Huth 1996, 114.
43. Mearsheimer 2001.
44. The discussion of the commitment problem is drawn from Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006).
45. Grigoryan 2015.
46. Brancati 2006.
47. Elkins and Sides 2007.
48. Though coercion also has long-term costs in such models. See Lustick et al. 2004.

49. For an alternative model of ethnic war as a commitment problem, where the inability to commit explains minority group's secessionist demands rather than the state's response to them, see Fearon (1994).

50. Brubaker 1996, 80–81.

51. There is a vast literature on the state's promotion of particular national myths. *Inter alia*, see Podeh 2002, Wang 2008, VanSledright 2008, Brand 2014, Guichard 2010.

52. On civic and ethnic nationalism, see Greenfeld (1992) and Brubaker (1992).

53. Posner 2005, Wilkinson 2006.

54. Christia 2013.

55. Glaser 2010, 35–36.

56. Hale 2008, 48.

57. *Ibid.*, 75.

58. Kramer 1992, 4.

59. On signaling intentions in IR, see Yarhi-Milo (2014) and Kertzer (2016).

60. Seward to Adams, April 10, 1861 (FRUS).

61. Butt 2013, 591.

62. Freilich 2012, 12.

63. Separatist movements from Coggins's (2011, 2014) dataset that did not result in a war, as defined by either PRIO or the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset: UK-Scotland, France-Brittany, France-Basques, France-Corsica, France-Savoy, Spain-Catalans, Italy-South Tyrol, Italy-Sardinia, Italy-Padania. *Re.* the Pacific, Australia-Papua New Guinea, New Zealand-Maori, Vanuatu-Tafea, Vanuatu-Vemeranans, Solomon Islands-Guadacanal.

64. The Kurds against each of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. India's conflicts in the Northeast (Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Assam) and Northwest (Kashmir and Punjab), Pakistan (Bengalis), Sri Lanka (Tamils), and Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill).

65. Indonesia (Aceh, East Timor), Philippines (Mindanao), and most commonly, Myanmar (Karens, Mons, Arakanese, Kachins, Shans). The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, featuring Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Albanians, and Slovenians; Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh).

66. Nigeria (Biafra), Ethiopia (Eritreans, Oromo, Somali, Ogaden, Afar), Sudan (South-erners). One must be careful in not overstating trends in the large-n data without more sophisticated statistical analysis. More important, the bulk of the empirical support for my argument follows in the historical chapters. However, it is heartening for the theory that it is not obviously falsified by the geographic distribution of separatist conflict. For instance, if states in peaceful regions tended to use coercive policies, or more damagingly, if war-prone regions such as the Middle East and South Asia consistently saw states adopt accommodationist stances, one would have significant cause for concern. That is evidently not the case.

67. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010.

68. See Mylonas (2012), Bulutgil (2008), and Grigoryan (2010) on how alliances with geopolitical rivals of the state can spell trouble for ethnic groups.

69. Weiner 1971's "Macedonian syndrome."

70. Horowitz 2000, 281–85.

71. Moore and Davis 1998, Saideman 1997.

72. Mylonas 2012, 41–42.

73. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010.

74. Downes 2007 and Valentino 2004.

75. Kaufman 2001, 3.

76. See the discussion by Wendt (1999, 215) on whether "states are people too."

77. Mercer 2014.

78. Petersen 2002, 19, 37; Kaufman 2001, 27–28.

79. Petersen 2002, 40–68.

80. Elangovan and Shapiro 1998, 548. See also Joskowicz-Jablonec and Leiser 2013, 1799.

81. Rovner 2011.

82. Salehyan 2009, 26–27; *ibid.*, 29. Emphasis in original.

83. *Ibid.*, 38–39.

84. Ibid., 37.
85. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010
86. Cunningham 2014, 72–74.
87. See Cunningham 2011.
88. Staniland 2012.

2. Pakistan's Genocide in Bengal and Limited War in Balochistan, 1971–1977

1. The third chapter in Fair (2014) is titled “Born an Insecure State.”
2. Jalal 1995, 22–23.
3. Pakistan got the “short end of the stick in terms of the division of fixed assets,” notes Fair (2014, 56).
4. Talbot 2009, 95.
5. Ibid., 96; and Fair 2014, 65.
6. Talbot 2009, 124.
7. Lieven 2011, 62.
8. Jones 2002, 110.
9. Ibid., 110.
10. Ibid., 110–11; Cohen 2004, 206.
11. Butt 2013.
12. Gerring 2007, 97–101; Van Evera 1997, 82.
13. Gerring 2007, 131; Van Evera 1997, 84; George and Bennett 2004, 151.
14. Van Evera 1997, 86–87.
15. Bass 2013, 21.
16. Jones 2002, 152.
17. Ayres 2004, 45.
18. Jones 2002, 152.
19. “Let me make it very clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function . . . therefore, so far as the State language is concerned, Pakistan's language shall be Urdu.” Quoted from Ayres (2004, 43–44). Original speech available in Mahomed Ali Jinnah, *Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947–48* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1976), 82–86.
20. Jones 2002, 154–55. See also Sisson and Rose 1990, 9–12.
21. Jones 2002, 156–57.
22. <http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/dec/demons.htm>.
23. Jones 2002, 157–58.
24. Baxter 1971, 207. On the respective social and political backgrounds of Bhutto and Mujib, see Raghavan (2013, 21–22).
25. The theme of exploitation was one Mujib strongly emphasized in his election campaign in both wings of the country. See *Dawn* reports: “Jagirdars, capitalists will not be elected: Mujib urges W. Pakistanis to make efforts,” 07/05/70; “90 lakh jobless in East Pakistan: Mujib denounces ‘exploiters,’” 09/01/70; “AL to realise 6-point plan at all cost: It will end long chapter of oppression, says Mujib,” 09/21/70; “Past regimes exploited Bengal, says Mujib: ‘Elections to decide people's fate for years to come,’” 10/10/70; “Awami League deserves overwhelming majority”: Mujib warns people against ‘exploiters and vested interests,’” 10/13/70; “If elected AL will end exploitation, says Mujib: W. Wing people urged to rise against exploiters,” 11/1/70.
26. Sisson and Rose 1990, 30–31. These results reflected a growing regionalization of Pakistan's politics. See Raghavan 2013, 28.
27. Bass 2013, 25.
28. “Bhutto calls on Yahya: ‘Useful talks’ on vital problems of country,” *Dawn*, 12/29/70.

29. "NA to be convened at the earliest, says Mujib," *Dawn*, 01/14/71; "Yahya satisfied with useful talks with Mujib: Matters relating to NA session also discussed," *Dawn*, 01/15/71.

30. "Yahya and Bhutto have long talks: Generals Hamid & Peerzada join in briefly," *Dawn* 01/18/71; "Bhutto to meet Mujib shortly, Yahya discloses: 'Top national leaders must cooperate': Useful exchange of views with PPP chief," *Dawn*, 01/19/71.

31. "Mujib-Bhutto talks end: search for accord to go on," *Dawn*, 01/30/15. Multiple sources attest to Awami League disgust with Bhutto's focus on ministries for the PPP during these talks.

32. Blood, Confidential telegram 371, December 1970. Interestingly, this very stance is itself strong evidence against the persistent belief that Mujib was always a secessionist; his strident demands to exercise power in Pakistan, as late as March 1971, should in some way be seen as an indication he did not want to leave it.

33. Notably, other parties based in the West did not consider Bhutto their representative despite his attempts to cast himself as such, and decried his extreme tactics. See *Dawn* reports: "Azam asks Bhutto to take cue from Sheikh Mujib," 12/30/70; "NAP MNAs to attend NA session, says Wali: 'Constitution-making should be above party politics,'" 02/18/71; "Presence of all parties in NA essential: CML willing to play full part, says party statement," 02/24/71; "Convention ML decides to take part in NA session," 02/28/71; "Ahle Sunnat to attend NA session: Earlier decision reversed," 02/28/71; "Bhutto's 'threatening attitude' criticized: Reactions to postponement of N.A. session," 03/04/71; "Transfer power to AL now: Only solution of crisis, says Asghar," 03/05/71; "Mujib has right to rule, says Nur Khan," 03/07/71; "Azam asks Bhutto to explain his latest stand," 03/08/71; and, especially, "Leaders want immediate calling of Assembly session," 03/05/71; "People demand NA session," 03/06/71; "Many leaders support Mujib's four demands: Bhutto's intransigence held responsible for crisis," 03/09/71; "NA minority groups back AL's four-point demand: Plea for interim governments at Centre and Provinces," 03/14/71; "Shock expressed over Bhutto's demand: Transfer of power to 'two majority parties,'" 03/15/71; and "Early transfer of power urged," 03/15/71. See also Ahmed (1979, 214).

34. Jones 2002, 163. As early as December 21, Awami League leaders felt compelled to publicly contradict Bhutto's claim that Sindh and Punjab were "bastions of power" and thus the constitution required PPP input. "AL competent to make constitution alone: Tajuddin repudiates Bhutto's contention: No 'bastions of power' after establishment of democracy," *Dawn*, 12/22/70.

35. Ahmed 1979, 211. See Bhutto's making dexterous legal and political objections to Mujib's proposals in Bhutto (1971, 45–46).

36. In his book on the 1971 war, Bhutto wrote that "in essence, the Six Point formula was meant to strike at the roots of our nationhood. Initially it would have created two Pakistans, and later might well have brought five independent States into being." He also criticized Mujib for "unleashing hatred against West Pakistan" and "blam[ing] West Pakistan for everything" and claimed, without any discernible hint of self-awareness, that Mujib's "language and methods were of fascism" (Bhutto 1971, 13–14). Also see Sisson and Rose 1990, 59–60.

37. Wolpert 1993, 145.

38. Ahmed 1979, 206.

39. In multiple telegrams, American and British diplomatic sources attested to Yahya's ex ante desire to transfer power to civilians.

40. Jones 2002, 165.

41. Sisson and Rose 1990, 88–89. See also Raghavan 2013, 36–40.

42. Mujib was informed of the decision by Admiral S. M. Ahsan, a man sympathetic to the Bengali leader.

43. Laporte 1972, 100.

44. Wolpert 1993, 148.

45. Sisson and Rose 1990, 90.

46. Rahman 1972, 94.

47. Laporte 1972, 101.

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48. Bhutto 1971, 41.
49. Williams 1972, 59.
50. Sisson and Rose 1990, 132.
51. "Political activity banned: Awami League is outlawed," *Dawn*, 01/27/71.
52. Jones 2002, 146–47.
53. Sisson and Rose 1990, 132.
54. Haqqani 2005, 71.
55. Jones 2002, 168.
56. Haqqani 2005, 73.
57. Bass 2013, 53.
58. Sisson and Rose 1990, 222.
59. Nawaz 2008, 258; Haqqani 2005, 62–63; Wolpert 1993, 135.
60. Choudhury 1993, 187; Haqqani 2005, 51; Sisson and Rose 1990, 222.
61. "Mujib wants peace with neighbours: Kashmir, Farakka issues to be settled with India amicably," *Dawn*, 01/04/71.
62. Secret letter by J. D. Hennings to I.J.M. Sutherland, Feb 26, 1971, DO 133/201.
63. Confidential telegram A-0002 by the Consul-In-Charge Andrew Killgore January 7, 1970.
64. Telegram Dacca 02586 by US Consul Archer Blood, December 1970.
65. Ahmed 1979, 219.
66. Murshid 1971, 12–13.
67. Quoted in Devji 2013, 97.
68. Jalal 1994, 241
69. Devji 2013, 5.
70. Hechter 2000, chapter 4; Brubaker 1996, 79–80.
71. Weber 1976, chapter 10; Posen 1993b; Hobsbawm 1983.
72. Fair 2014, 69.
73. Cohen 2004, 67–68. As Ayub himself put it in a *Foreign Affairs* essay in 1960, Pakistani state-builders faced a challenge: "Prior to 1947, our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims; territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller, provincial loyalties. But when suddenly Pakistan emerged as a reality, we who had got together from every nook and corner of the vast sub-continent of India were faced with the task of transforming all our traditional, territorial and parochial loyalties into one great loyalty for the new state of Pakistan." Pakistan's diversity called "for a new and bold experiment with political and administrative science to weave unity out of diversity. The situation is often difficult but not baffling, for a common ideology provides a positive base for cohesion. The firmness of this base is strong or weak accordingly as that ideology is understood and practiced rightly or wrongly." Khan (1960, 548–59).
74. Fair 2014, 154, 278.
75. Ayres 2004, 51.
76. Bass 2013, 81.
77. Khan 1967, 189.
78. Bhutto 1971, 17; and Williams 1972, 44.
79. Williams 1972, 77.
80. Jones 2002, 170.
81. Wolpert 1993, 156. Bass (2013) writes an interesting history of the war, organized around this famous telegram.
82. Bass 2013, 72.
83. Ibid. See also Confidential telegram Dacca 01010 by Blood, March 31, 1971, confidential telegram Dacca 01037 by Bell, April 1, 1971.
84. Confidential telegram Dacca 01037 by Bell, April 1, 1971.
85. Hamoodur Rehman Commission report 2000, 510; see also Bass 2013, 82–83.
86. BBC Urdu: Hindu ko khatam kar do. http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/interactivity/specials/1143_16_december/page8.shtml. My translation.

87. Salik 1977, 72–73. Among all the books written by military officials serving in the war, Salik's is perhaps the least biased and most honest.

88. Ali 2010, 57–58. See also Bass 2013, 53–54.

89. Telegram Dacca 01338, April 16, 1971; Telegram Dacca 01797 by Blood, May 20, 1971.

90. Telegram Dacca 01745 by Parr, May 17, 1971.

91. Confidential telegram Dacca 01722 by Blood, May 14, 1971.

92. Telegram Dacca 02187 by Carle, June 17, 1971.

93. Nasr 1994, 168–69.

94. *Ibid.*, 66–67.

95. Laporte 1972n26.

96. Confidential telegram Dacca 01193 by Blood, April 8, 1971.

97. Airgram A-103 by Farland, "Conversations with West Paks and Bengalis," June 4, 1971.

98. Telegram Karach 01710 by Luppi, August 24, 1971.

99. Confidential telegram Dacca 01193 by Blood, April 8, 1971.

100. Confidential telegram Islama 04007 2/2 by Farland, April 29, 1971.

101. Confidential telegram Islama 04655 by Farland, May 15, 1971.

102. Confidential telegram Dacca 01722 by Blood, May 14, 1971.

103. Intelligence memorandum 73 No. 2074/71, Directorate of Intelligence, October 12, 1971, "The Situation in East Pakistan."

104. Memorandum, Office of National Estimates, September 22, 1971, "The Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Six Months Later."

105. Intelligence memorandum 81, Office of National Estimates, May 28, 1971, "Indo-Pakistani Tensions."

106. Article attached to Airgram A-871 from US Embassy in London, June 16, 1971.

107. BBC Urdu: Sonar Bangla sey taaruf. http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/interactivity/specials/1143_16_december/index.shtml. My translation.

108. As Blood said of disentangling the government's anti-Indian/Hindu propagandistic position from genuine anti-Indian/Hindu beliefs held by soldiers, it was an "already complex issue . . . clouded further." Dacca 01193, April 8, 1971.

109. Confidential telegram Islamabad 050825Z, FCO 37/904. Similarly, see Confidential letter from D. F. Duncan, British High Commission in Islamabad, May 19, 1971, DO 133/203 and Confidential telegram Islama 03180 by Farland, April 7, 1971.

110. See selected *Dawn* reports from the first two months of the war: "Armed Indians enter E. Wing: adequate steps taken," 04/02/71; "Infiltration by armed Indians an act of war: leaders slate interference in Pakistan's internal affairs," 04/02/71; "Relief' camps dole out arms: Military vehicles for Indian infiltrators," 04/03/71; "Consequences will be serious": India warned by Pakistan again," 04/03/71; "Indian arms convoy destroyed: Fresh infiltrations reported," 04/04/71; "Arms smuggling from India into E. Wing: Foreign newspapers expose Delhi's doings, motive," 04/04/71; "Indian troops moving covertly into E. Wing," 04/06/71; "Armed infiltrators being effectively dealt with: Miscreants isolated, rejected by people of E. Wing," 04/06/71; "India preparing to invade E. Wing: Unusual military activity along international border," 04/08/71; "Pakistan warns India: Infiltration, gun running must stop," 04/09/71; "People helping Army in checking infiltrators," 04/11/71; "2 companies of Indian BSF wiped out: Captured soldiers give details of Delhi buildup," 04/12/71; "Confrontation on the border: Aggressive Indian advance to frontier," 04/13/71; "Arms captured from Indian infiltrators," 04/15/71; "Armed forces out to destroy infiltrators: Tikka warns citizens not give shelter to miscreants," 04/19/71; "Pakistan's strong protest against Indian intrusion: Border post between Comilla and Brahmanbaria attacked," 04/20/71; "More arms depots set up in Tripura: Frantic Indian bid to help infiltrators sent into E. Wing," 04/20/71; "Armed interference by India condemned: Delhi advised to abide by wise counsels of world," 04/23/71; "Indian arms, ammunition seized in Rajshahi: Responsible witnesses give account of enemy activities," 04/27/71; "India mobilizing more infiltrators: 10,000 ex-servicemen to aid insurgents," 04/29/71; "Arms supplies from India for insurgents," 05/01/71; "India steps up aid to agents in E. Wing," 05/02/71; "Indian bid for foreign interference: aid-to-refugees plan politically motivated, not humanitarian," 05/05/71; "Bangla Desh Guerillas: Training Camps in India,"

(05/08/71); "India to increase assistance to E. Wing secessionists," 05/10/71; "Wireless set seized from infiltrators: organized resistance liquidated by Army," 05/10/71; "Armed incursions by India in Jessore sector," 05/12/71; "Indian military moves: W. Bengal border cleared," (05/13/71); "War threat by Mrs Gandhi: Refugee bogey raised as pretext," 05/20/71; "Captured deserter admits Indian help to rebels: People handed over ex-2nd Lieutenant to Army," 05/24/71; "Systematic Indian confrontation aims at undoing Pakistan," 05/26/71; "Unique war moves under glare of publicity: Lok Sabha told of Indian Army 'alert': tension reports," 05/29/71; "India's diabolical plot unveiled: Delhi wanted to cripple and enslave East Pakistan," 05/31/71.

111. Arif 2001, 119.

112. Niazi 1998, 39

113. *Ibid.* 33.

114. *Ibid.*, 41-45.

115. Telegram from the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 6, 1971.

116. Niazi 1998, 46. Emphasis added.

117. Telegram 936, April 8, 1971, DO 133/201.

118. Confidential telegram Delhi 1358, April 8, 1971, FCO 37/904.

119. Confidential telegram Calcut 00470 by Gordon, March 27, 1971; secret telegram from I.J.M Sutherland, April 14, 1971, FCO 37/904; Confidential telegram from James, FCO 37/904, April 6, 1971; confidential telegram Delhi 080950Z, FCO 37/904, April 8, 1971.

120. "Charges of Indian military support to opposition forces in post-March 25 period visibly have more substance" than those alleging collusion before March, according to Telegram Islama 08049, August 8, 1971.

121. Confidential telegram Delhi 151015Z, April 15, 1971, FCO 37/905.

122. Confidential telegram Delhi 221115Z, April 22, 1971, FCO 37/905.

123. Confidential telegram Calcutta 071039Z, May 7, 1971, FCO 37/905.

124. Secret telegram Calcut 00744 by Gordon, April 27, 1971.

125. Confidential letter from Major General J. H. Penrose, British High Commission Delhi, May 12, 1971, FCO 37/905; confidential telegram Calcutta 211300Z, May 21, 1971, FCO 37/905.

126. Confidential telegram Calcut 00750 by Gordon, April 28, 1971.

127. Rashiduzzaman 1972, 196.

128. J. D. Hennings to I.J.M. Sutherland, July 23, 1971, FCO 37/919 and A. J. Collins to G. L. Bullard, September 21, 1971, FCO 37/920.

129. Eleanor R. Lane to South Asian Department, July 23, 1971, FCO 37/919.

130. Eleanor R. Lane, August 25, 1971, FCO 37/919; Intelligence note, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, April 26, 1971, "India and 'Bangla Desh'"

131. Central Intelligence Bulletin No.42, Directorate of Intelligence, July 22, 1971.

132. Confidential telegram Islama 04007 by Farland, April 29, 1971.

133. For example, see Telegram Dacca 03200 by Spivack, August 13, 1971.

134. Telegram Dacca 02733 by Carle, July 20, 1971. Pakistani authorities admitted to the policy of collective punishment. See Telegram Dacca 02495, July 5, 1971. For a description of such reprisal attacks, see Telegram 04123, September 30, 1971.

135. Telegram Islama 09795 by Farland, September 27, 1971.

136. Record of conversation between British permanent undersecretary of state and Indian high commissioner, April 19, 1971, FCO 37/905.

137. Central Intelligence Bulletin No. 42, Directorate of Intelligence, July 22, 1971, "Pakistan."

138. For example, see Confidential telegram Islama 02277 by Sober, March 15, 1971.

139. Confidential telegram Delhi 051000Z, FCO 37/904.

140. Letter from the Pakistani Ambassador to Secretary of State Rogers, March 31 1971.

141. For example, see Telegram Islama 06012, June 16, 1971.

142. Telegram Dacca 02733 by Carle, July 20, 1971.

143. Confidential telegram Dacca 01052 by Blood, April 2, 1971.

144. Telegram Dacca 04895 by Spivack, November 11, 1971.

145. Kalyvas 2006, 138–50.

146. Confidential letter from the British High Commission in Dhaka, July 27, 1971, <https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CKboH2iUcAEIv46.png>.

147. Confidential telegram 331, May 21, 1971, DO 133/203.

148. For example, see Confidential telegram 331, May 21, 1971, FCO 37/905; Confidential telegram 1349, May 27, 1971, FCO 37/905; Confidential telegram 361, May 31, 1971, FCO 37/905; Confidential telegram 1413, June 3, 1971, FCO 37/905; Confidential letter from F.S. Miles, British Deputy High Commissioner, May 27, 1971, DO 133/203; Confidential telegram 1477, June 10, 1971, FCO 37/905.

149. Laporte 1972, 103.

150. Kumar 1975. See also Bass (2013 chapter 3). Indeed, the early days of the crisis saw speculation that “Awami League appeals for Indian help have so far only related to medicines, ammunition, and walky-talky sets. The supply of such items across the long stretches of the unguarded frontier might of course be somewhat less risky and more feasible for the Indian authorities if they decide to help at all.” P. J. Fowler to J. D. Hennings, April 2, 1971, DO 133/201.

151. As one British diplomat cabled in March, 1971, “Ashok Ray, Head of the Pakistan Division of the MEA [Ministry of External Affairs], has for example told me on two occasions that it is part of the Indian calculation that if Pakistan divides or if Rahman gains control of East Pakistan’s revenue, Pakistan will not be in a position to support an army of more than six divisions. He has also said that India would welcome this because of the consequences which would follow as the threat from Pakistan against Kashmir diminished.” W. K. Slatcher to J. A. Birch, March 19, 1971, DO 133/201. Similarly, an American diplomat noted in secret telegram Delhi 301315Z, March 30, 1971, that “the Indians would prefer [an independent Bangladesh] quickly. The result would be the emergence of an independent East Bengal, which the Indians believe they could live with and contain . . . [independence] would also offer the advantage that an independent West Pakistan deprived of the resources of East Pakistan would no longer be able to pose a credible threat against Kashmir.”

152. <http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/dec/demons.htm>.

153. Jones 2002, 135.

154. Marri 1974, 299.

155. Khan 2009, 1072.

156. Quoted in Harrison (1981, 25).

157. Makran, Kharan and Lasbela were the others (Jones 2002, 132).

158. Independent princely states were quickly incorporated into either India or Pakistan, sometimes by force. The most famous instance was Kashmir, whose incorporation into the Indian Union is still cause for considerable controversy and dispute today.

159. Jones 2002, 132.

160. Hussain 2003, 35.

161. Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, 47–48.

162. Ahmad 1992, 149–54.

163. Talbot 2009, 225.

164. Ibid., 224; and Jones 2002, 133.

165. Jones 2002, 133.

166. Some interviewees, such as Rashed Rahman, suggest the number of Nauroz’s men executed was as high as nine. M.M.A. Talpur claimed the number was seven. Also, Dunne 2006, 32–33; and Bansal 2006.

167. The antecedent organization of the NAP was the Pakistan National Party, a coalition of leftist and ethnic parties based in West Pakistan. See Hussain (2003, 38).

168. Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, 49.

169. Lindholm 1977, 62.

170. Ahmad 1992, 181.

171. Sober, confidential telegram 4632, May 26, 1971, FCO 37/1140. Telegram Islama 03904, May 3, 1972, also ominously noted that “numerous problems in province-center relations remain to be ironed out, some of which have potential for serious trouble.”

172. Ahmad 1992, 182.
173. Wolpert 1993, 211; Ali Dayan Hasan, who has “spoken extensively” to Bugti during the month they spent together in 2001, told me that Bugti admitted to “destroying” the Baloch nationalist movement in the 1970s. Hasan described Bugti colorfully as a “historical turncoat” and “a toady, a lackey, ass-licker of the state.” Rashed Rahman told me that Bugti had predictable, parochial concerns: he wanted to be governor of the province, but the constitutional accord Bhutto had signed with the NAP gave the provincial governments the power to appoint governor, and thus Bugti spent a good part of 1972 in Bhutto’s ear, telling him of a “big rebellion brewing” in the province. Bugti himself claimed publicly that “I, as a Baluch, felt that the NAP was embarked upon a path that could only mean the ultimate destruction of the Baluch and that it had to be stopped. NAP leadership had discredited itself in its ability to give Baluchistan good Government. Discrediting Baluch leadership would ultimately mean the end of the Baluch.” Speech at Pakistan Army Staff College, Quetta, November 23, 1973, reported in U.S. State Department Aigram A-105 from the U.S. Consul General, Karachi, November 29, 1973.
174. Wolpert 1993, 211.
175. Talbot 2009, 225–26.
176. “Mengal’s warning against fomenting trouble in provinces,” *Dawn*, 01/14/73; “NAP Executive blames vested interests for Lasbela fighting,” *Dawn*, 01/28/73.
177. “Bizenjo says Qayyum instigating armed rebellion in Lasbela,” *Dawn*, 01/27/73. See also Mengal’s similar rendition to British officials in February 1973, contained in J. R. Venning, confidential letter “Lasbela Affair,” February 15, 1973, FCO 37/1336 and to American officials in March, contained in Airgram A-18 from the U.S. Consul General in Karachi, March 14, 1973.
178. “The situation in Lasbela,” *Dawn*, 02/03/73.
179. “Centre sending troops to Baluchistan to restore law and order,” *Dawn*, 01/31/73.
180. Baloch nationalists such as M.M.A. Talpur categorically told me that the jam of Lasbela, one of Bhutto’s “handpicked people,” created the initial unrest in Baluchistan. Rashed Rahman agreed with this sentiment, noting that “from day one, there was an attempt to sabotage the Baluchistan government,” and that “some sardars with Bhutto, like the Jam of Lasbela” created a rebellion which the Baloch government could only deal with by raising a *lashkar* (tribal fighting force). Shehryar Mazari stuck to this line too: the jam of Lasbela—“with the establishment” he told me—instigated the uprising, for which Mengal raised a levy, which Bhutto used an excuse to send in troops.
181. J. R. Paterson, confidential telegram “Troubles in Baluchistan,” January 31, 1973, FCO 37/1336.
182. Jones 2002, 133.
183. Intelligence Note RNAN-9 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, February 15, 1973; Telegram 1606 from the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 24, 1973.
184. M.M.A. Talpur told me that the entire Iraqi arms incident was “a whole show, on media” and Rashed Rahman told me that Bhutto was “the author of, or complicit in, the plan to have arms shipped to the Iraqi embassy” and that there was “no evidence ever produced for Bhutto’s position” on the question.
185. Intelligence Note RNAN-9 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, February 15, 1973, and Telegram 1389 from the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 16, 1973.
186. Mazari 1999, 309.
187. Khan 2009, 1076; and Dunne 2006, 35–36.
188. Interviews with Hamid Hussain and Mohammad Taqi.
189. Ahmad 1992, 185; Talbot 2009, 226.
190. Wolpert 1993, 217, 230.
191. Jones 2002, 134.
192. Dunne 2006, 36–38; and Harrison 1981, 37.
193. Mazari 1999, 301.
194. Harrison 1981, 38–39; and Dunne 2006, 38.

195. Jones 2002, 135.

196. Ahmad 2000, 185.

197. See, for example, Mazari 1999, 305; Nawaz 2008, 332–35; Talbot 2009, 224.

198. Nawaz 2008, 333.

199. Valentino 2004, Schirmer 1998, McGill 1989, Collazo-Davila 1980.

200. “Federal Constituted Presented,” “Wali demands national debate,” *Dawn*, 01/01/73; “Wali Khan for more powers to Senate, less to premier,” *Dawn*, 01/02/73.

201. “Opposition slated for backing out of accord,” *Dawn*, 01/03/73; “A Document of Trust,” *Dawn* editorial, 01/06/73; interview with Rashed Rahman.

202. “If accord is broken, PPP will give its own constitution,” *Dawn*, 01/04/73; “PPP constitution not acceptable: Wali accuses ruling party of flouting mandate,” *Dawn*, 01/08/73; “Any backing out of constitutional accord unjustified: Rashid on PPP mandate,” *Dawn*, 01/15/73; “No moral or legal force in Wali Khan’s stand: Pirzada recalls his consent to Accord,” *Dawn*, 01/19/73; “Ajmal Khattak denies backing accord: Says Bizenjo, Arbab did not consult Wali,” *Dawn*, 01/20/73.

203. “Wali accepts PPP offer of talks on Constitution,” *Dawn*, 01/21/73; “Bhutto holds talks with Wali, Bizenjo” *Dawn*, 1/29/73; “NAP rejects certain provisions of draft Constitution but keeps door open for further negotiations,” *Dawn*, 01/28/73; “Pakistan must get a democratic constitution at any cost, says Bhutto,” *Dawn*, 01/31/73.

204. “Wali accuses PPP of diversions from Constitution-making,” *Dawn*, 02/24/73.

205. “Centre sending troops to Baluchistan to restore law and order,” *Dawn*, 01/31/73; “Pakistan must get a democratic constitution at any cost, says Bhutto,” *Dawn*, 01/31/73; “Constitutional deadlock may end, says Bizenjo” *Dawn*, 01/31/73.

206. “Bhutto’s speech in Sibi: Constitution assured by March 23 or April 21 at latest,” *Dawn*, 03/01/73; “Wali urges mutual trust, consensus on Constitution,” *Dawn*, 03/04/73; “Wali, Kasuri, Mufti criticise draft Constitution in NA,” *Dawn*, 03/06/73; “New conference on constitutional accord proposed,” *Dawn*, 03/06/73.

207. “Bhutto removes both NAP governors and Mengal’s govt,” *Dawn*, 02/16/73; and “NA begins today task of framing a constitution,” *Dawn*, 02/17/73.

208. J. L. Pumphrey, confidential telegram 1896, August 17, 1973, FCO 37/1336.

209. Airgram A-32 from U.S. Consul General Karachi, May 3, 1972.

210. Airgram A-135 from U.S. Embassy, August 22, 1972. Khair Bakhsh Marri, the president of the Balochistan NAP, and Sardar Ataullah Mengal, the then chief minister, reportedly had the strongest reservations. See Telegram Karach 02192, November 4, 1972.

211. Telegram 011054Z from Sober, March 1, 1973.

212. Telegram 201127Z from Sober, March 1973. From the same month and source, see also Telegram 061213Z from Sober, March 1973, especially paragraph 5.

213. Pumphrey, Telegram 3736, December 8, 1972, FCO 37/1139.

214. Research Study RNAS-15 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, July 17, 1973.

215. Telegram 3585 from the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, May 3, 1973.

216. Proceedings from Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan, PLD 1976 Supreme Court 57.

217. Interestingly, as one of my interviewees emphasized, the *pukka* left—that of the student unions and urban labor, especially in Karachi—did not support the Baloch nationalists, primarily out of discomfort with the notion of allying with tribal chieftains who exploited the peasantry. But the London Group was composed of affluent Punjabis, left-leaning though they may have been, that saw the conflict more in terms of anti-Bhuttoism than pro-Baloch. Interviews with Ali Dayan Hasan, Ahmed Rashid, and Rashed Rahman.

218. Interview with MMA Talpur.

219. Interview with Shehryar Mazari.

220. Anonymous Mazari family member.

221. Translated by Saniya Masood, research assistant at the Lahore University of Management Sciences.

222. Niazi 1987.

223. Rasheed 2012.

224. Raza 1997.

225. He recounts stories of meeting local tribal chiefs from the Marri tribe alone and armed with only a pistol—"my behavior was reckless," he writes with a strange sense of pride—and working on flood relief in 1976, but little else. See Musharraf 2008, 158–59.

226. Talbot 2009, 226.

227. Telegram Karach 00692, May 3, 1973.

228. Airgram E.O. 11652 from Amconsul Peshawar, May 18, 1973. See also C. R. Budd from the British Embassy in Islamabad, May 3, 1973, FCO 37/1336, Airgram A-003 from Peshawar, March 16, 1973, and Mazari 1999, 304.

229. Ramsbotham, confidential telegram 336, April 2, 1972, FCO 37/1140. Indeed, as early as February 1972, the shah was "very worried about the future of Pakistan" and it "was very much in Iran's interest that Pakistan should hold together and become viable." R.A. Burrows, confidential telegram February 8, 1972, FCO 37/1140.

230. Telegram 071048Z from Sober, May 7, 1973.

231. "Shah due in Larkana today: Talks on matters of bilateral interest," *Dawn*, 01/15/73; "Shahanshah in Larkana," *Dawn*, 01/18/73.

232. Telegram Islama 00469, January 17, 1973.

233. South Asia Department, secret note on "Baluchistan: The Present Situation," February 22, 1973, FCO 37/1336.

234. "Shahanshah is satisfied with his talks here," *Dawn*, 01/24/73.

235. Feldman 1974, 136–37.

236. Telegram 130455Z from Hekc, March 13, 1973.

237. "Teheran gives fraternal welcome to President," *Dawn*, 05/11/73; "Iran not to recognise BD before Pakistan," *Dawn*, 05/12/73.

238. "Summit talks successful," *Dawn*, 05/12/73; "Tangible results of Shah, Bhutto talks forecast," *Dawn*, 05/14/73.

239. "We not only look upon you as the Head of State of a friendly, brotherly, and allied country to which we are bound by common ties of religion. But we also have the highest regards for Your Excellency personally as a statesman who under extremely difficult and exceptional circumstances has completely dedicated himself to serving his nation . . . from the very start of your assumption of this responsibility you have had to face such difficulties as rarely beset by statesman. Your Excellency has confronted all these difficulties with fortitude, faith, and with an unflagging spirit, and you have always been mindful of your vital responsibilities towards your people and history, which developed upon you when you accepted the Presidency." Quoted from "Shah and Bhutto reaffirm everlasting ties," *Dawn*, 05/12/73.

240. "Shah's warning: No bid to harm Pakistan will be tolerated," *Dawn*, 05/13/73; "Defence cooperation pledged: Iran, Pakistan joint communiqué," *Dawn*, 05/15/73.

241. "Shahanshah to visit Pakistan," *Dawn*, 05/15/73.

242. Telegram 160750Z by Hekc, May 16, 1973.

243. Secret telegram from British embassy in Delhi, FOB 762, August 31, 1973, Confidential telegram from British embassy in Islamabad, FOB 280345Z, August 1973, Telegram 150850Z from U.S. Consul in Karachi, August 15, 1973.

244. Telegram Tehran 08238, November 21, 1973.

245. J. R. Paterson, confidential letter on "Baluchistan," June 13, 1973, FCO 37/1336.

246. Ahmad 1992, 184; Telegram Karach 01626, August 6, 1974.

247. Interview with Asad Munir.

248. Interview with S. P. Shahid.

249. Interview with Hamid Hussain and S. P. Shahid.

250. Interview with Hamid Hussain.

251. Raman 2007, 21.

252. Jones 2002, 134–35.

253. Ahmad 1992, 178.

254. Interview with Hamid Hussain.

255. Interview with M.M.A. Talpur and with Asad Munir. Interestingly, Rashed Rahman provocatively claimed in an interview that the Soviets did in fact offer support to the movement, but its asking price in terms of acquiescence was too high; accepting this aid would be “exchanging one set of masters for another.” However, most historical and interview sources lay the lack of support at the feet of the Soviets, not the rebels.

256. Intelligence note, “Pakistan: Bhutto smites the NAP,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, February 16, 1973. See also Memorandum by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, July 17, 1973.

257. Interviews with Ahmed Rashid, Rashed Rahman.

258. Jones 2002, 134.

259. Haqqani 2005, 170. See also Fair 2014, 116.

260. Interview with Shehryar Mazari.

261. Interview with Hamid Hussain.

262. Interview with Asad Munir.

263. Interview with Mohammad Taqi.

264. Interview with Shehryar Mazari.

265. Interviews with Hamid Hussain and with anonymous military officer. Interview also with Asad Munir.

266. Telegram 051241Z from the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, March 1973, noted that “according to our best information, Afghan forces remain substantially where they were prior to recent developments.” This state of affairs did not change throughout the conflict, probably because of internal upheaval in Afghanistan.

267. Interview with S. P. Shahid.

268. J. R. Paterson, confidential telegram on “Foreign Arms in Baluchistan,” January 9, 1973, FCO 37/1336.

269. Telegram 110541Z by Sober, April 11, 1973; Telegram Islama 01816, March 2, 1973; Telegram Islama 08632, October 4, 1973.

270. Telegram 011030Z by Tiger, March 1, 1973.

271. Wolpert 1993, 217.

272. Interviews with Hamid Hussain, Mohammad Taqi, and Asad Munir.

273. Interview with Ali Dayan Hasan and Asad Munir; Talbot 2009, 225.

274. Valentino 2004, 207.

275. Schirmer 1998, 16–17.

276. McGill 1989, 12; and Collazo-Davila 1980, 115–16.

277. Schirmer 1998, 36; McGill 1989, 13; Valentino 2004, 207.

278. P. D. McEntee, Confidential telegram, September 24, 1973, FCO 37/1336.

279. See Valentino 2004 and Downes 2007 on how increased military threats usually see more brutal responses.

280. Interview with S.P. Shahid.

281. Hamid Hussain.

282. Interview with S. P. Shahid.

283. Walter 2009, 29.

284. George and Bennett 2004, 207–17.

285. Bhutto may have been a civilian but his democratic credentials were not overwhelming. See Wolpert 1993.

286. Rashiduzzaman 1972, 191.

287. Haqqani 2005, 73.

288. Nawaz 2008.

289. Lieven 2011, 59.

290. Indeed, as Fair (2014) shows, how *little* Pakistan’s military learns strategic lessons is itself a puzzle.

291. Interview with Hamid Hussain.

292. Wolpert 1993, 203.

293. Khan 2009, 1075.

3. India's Strategies against Separatism in Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir, 1984–1994

1. In Coggins's (2011, 2014) dataset, only Myanmar and Indonesia come close to India's level of secessionism.
2. Garver 2002, 11; *ibid.*, 14.
3. Nayar and Paul 2002, 115.
4. *Ibid.*, 133.
5. Garver 2002, 16.
6. Nayar and Paul 2002, 118.
7. *Ibid.*, 132–35.
8. Cohen 2004, 27–28, 53; Mistry 2004, 74.
9. Nayar and Paul 2002, 135.
10. Thomas 1986, 11.
11. Wilkinson 2015, 127–31.
12. Thomas 1986, 12–13.
13. *Ibid.*, 19.
14. See, *inter alia*, Mudiam 1994, 16 and Parekh 1991, 35.
15. Mudiam 1994, 16.
16. Tanham 1992, 24; Thomas 1986, 57.
17. "Borders can be soft if there is no hostility, says Indira," *Dawn*, 03/10/73.
18. Lacina 2009, 998–1000; Upadhyay 2009, 35.
19. Baruah 2005. Bhaumik 2009 explicitly questions this phrasing: "It is unfair, however, to signpost this remote periphery as a region of 'durable disorder.'" See Bhaumik 2009, 88.
20. Lacina 2009, 1000.
21. Upadhyay 2009, 29.
22. *Ibid.*, 41.
23. Gopalakrishnan 1995, 62.
24. Interview with Sanjoy Hazarika.
25. For example, see Sahadevan 2003; Dasgupta 1988, 146.
26. Sahni and George 2001, 298; Dasgupta 1988, 157.
27. Dasgupta 1988, 157; and Bhaumik 2009, 115–16.
28. Baruah 1994, 868.
29. Upadhyay 2009, 42.
30. Dasgupta 1988, 159.
31. Bhaumik 2009, 115.
32. Baruah 1986, 1187.
33. *Ibid.*, 1189–90.
34. Sahadevan 2003, 406; Dasgupta 1997, 352; Dasgupta 1988, 161.
35. Baruah 1999, 121.
36. Barpujari 1998, 57.
37. See quote by S. L. Shakdher, India's chief election officer, in Baruah 1999, 120.
38. Bhaumik 2009, 117–18.
39. Barpujari 1998, 59–60.
40. Dasgupta 1988, 160.
41. Baruah 1986, 11.
42. *Ibid.*, 1193–98.
43. Barpujari 1998, 61–67; Baruah 1986, 1198–99; Dasgupta 1988, 162.
44. "Peace fragile in Assam a year after carnage," *New York Times*, 02/26/84.
45. "Fresh move on Assam finalized," *Times of India*, 01/07/1985; "Assam leaders to get invitation soon," *Times of India* 01/07/1985; "Assam talks resume," *Times of India*, 02/01/1985.
46. The agitators wanted the state assembly dissolved, Rajiv didn't. "Assam problem near solution," *Times of India*, 06/01/1985.
47. "Optimism on Assam," *Times of India*, 08/03/1985; "Assam solution at hand: PM," *Times of India*, 08/13/1985.

48. "Major setback to Assam talks," *Times of India*, 08/15/1985; "Accord signed on Assam," *Times of India*, 08/16/1985.

49. The text of the entire accord is available in appendix C of Barpujari 1998.

50. "Gandhi seen near success in reaching accord in Assam," *Washington Post*, 08/13/85.

51. Interview with Sanjoy Hazarika.

52. "Gandhi cools another hot spot with Assam pact," *Los Angeles Times*, 08/16/85; "Another success for Rajiv," *Christian Science Monitor*, 08/19/85.

53. "Assam accord negotiated by Gandhi," *Washington Post*, 08/16/85.

54. "In Assam's pastoral setting, blind hatred thrives," *New York Times*, 12/06/85; "Unnecessary misgivings," *Assam Tribune*, 09/21/1985; "PM's visit," *Assam Tribune*, 08/12/1985; "Leaders welcome accord," *Assam Tribune*, 08/17/1985; "AASU leaders express happiness over accord," *Assam Tribune*, 08/18/1985; "Assam accord a Magna Carta for peace, says Assam Minister," *Assam Tribune*, 08/31/1985.

55. "Unprecedented ovation to movement leaders," *Assam Tribune*, 08/22/1985.

56. "Assam agitationists form new party," *Times of India*, 10/14/1985; Baruah 1994, 871; Dasgupta 1988, 165.

57. "Assam said to plan to deport Bangladeshis," *New York Times*, 12/21/85.

58. "A leader of anti-immigrant radicals takes office in Assam," *New York Times*, 12/25/85.

59. Jana 2011, 115.

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322. “Uproar in parliament: Kashmir action not excessive,” *Kashmir Times*, 05/23/90.
323. “PM for strong measures in J&K, Punjab,” *Kashmir Times*, 12/15/90.
324. “Kashmir dispute is souring India-Pakistan ties,” *New York Times*, 01/31/90.
325. “Indian crackdown in Kashmir helps fuel separatist cause; militants, troops skirmish daily in city,” *Washington Post*, 05/06/90.
326. Interview with anonymous former Congress Party official; “Mufti: no slackness in dealing with militants,” *Kashmir Times*, 04/07/90.
327. “Mufti warns Pak against aiding, abetting terrorism in Kashmir,” *Kashmir Times*, 05/13/90; “Mufti warns Pak, asks ‘misguided’ youths to lay down arms,” *Kashmir Times*, 06/18/90.
328. “Farooq for iron hand policy, radical solution in Kashmir,” *Kashmir Times*, 12/13/90. The previous year, he had promised to “raze Srinagar” if compelled to by Pakistan’s war in the state. See “Trouble in Kashmir,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 05/18/89.
329. Interview with retired colonel Vivek Chaddha.
330. Interview with retired lieutenant general H. S. Panag.
331. “Ultra-sophisticated arms to be used in Kashmir, Punjab,” *Kashmir Times*, 06/07/90.
332. “Long haul in Kashmir,” *Times of India*, 07/07/90, 10.
333. “Kashmir militants’ mood subdued,” *Times of India*, 04/24/90, 11.
334. “Sheer politicking,” *Kashmir Times*, 03/07/90.
335. “Probe into excesses,” *Kashmir Times*, 10/06/90; “As Srinagar burns,” *Kashmir Times*, 10/11/90. See also “Caught in crossfire,” *Kashmir Times*, 10/15/90.
336. “First things first,” *Kashmir Times*, 02/02/90.
337. “Remove confusion,” *Kashmir Times*, 03/26/90. See a similar position espoused in “A breakthrough,” *Kashmir Times*, 03/24/90.

338. “J&K comes under President’s rule,” *Kashmir Times*, 07/19/90.

339. Cunningham 2014, 72–74.

340. Interview with anonymous former security official.

341. Bhaumik 1996, 42. Raman (2007, 7–8) claims Pakistani training of Naga rebels began in 1956.

342. Bhaumik 2009, 16, 97, 158.

343. For example, see Raman 2007, 34–37.

344. Ganguly 1996n3.

4. The Ottoman Empire’s Escalation from Reforms to the Armenian Genocide, 1908–1915

1. Van Evera 1997, 79.
2. George and Bennett 2004, 166–67.
3. Lewy 2005.
4. Hovannissian 2007, 3–17. For an excellent critique of the contested and often biased historiography of the genocide, see Dyer (1976). As he points out, it is difficult for unbiased students of the conflict to understand what happened, caught between alleged Turkish “falsifiers” and Armenian “deceivers.” Suny (2011) is also a worthwhile account on the historiography of the Armenian genocide. Because of the deep politicization associated with it, the Armenian genocide can be fraught with peril for scholars. Gingeras (2009) describes the process by which he came to decide on the subject of his dissertation in his preface: “Friends and colleagues with years of experience in Ottoman studies warned me that I was essentially contemplating professional suicide . . . there were the political consequences to consider. A dissertation dealing with Kurds, Armenians, or other taboo subjects in Turkey was bound to bring troubles down around me. No matter what I did, I was told, someone would be very unhappy with my work. Someone, be it a member of the Turkish government, members of the Armenian diaspora, or other Ottoman scholars, would eat me alive for having challenged, upheld, or ignored some aspect of Eastern Anatolia’s recent history. In short, the advice I had was: don’t do it. Drop it. Don’t kill your career before it begins.” He settled on aspects related to western Anatolia instead.
5. For reasons I am unable to gather, such books are often published in English by the University of Utah press.
6. For example, Gunter (2011, 2) exhorts those “who presently support anti-Turkish positions” to “realize that the unfortunate events so often described as ‘genocide’ would be best seen otherwise.”
7. As Orwell famously warned, language and rhetoric are often the plains on which such battles are fought; writers such as Güclü (2010, 51 and 97) do not even concede the use of the word *deportation*, instead using the more anodyne “relocation.” Alternatively, massacres are described as “energetic measures.”
8. See, for example, Güclü (2012, 44–45).
9. Gunter 2011, 8. Elsewhere he writes, “Both the Armenians and Turks suffered horribly at each other’s hands. Neither had a monopoly on total innocence or evil. Both, however, continue to maintain grossly exaggerated positions highly favorable to themselves and react negatively to contrary suggestions with vehement self-righteousness” (16).
10. Somakian 1995, 1–3.
11. Ibid.
12. Somakian 1995, 4. Toft (2003) describes the importance of demographic factors—particularly population concentration—to the process of political mobilization along ethnic lines. For an example of Turkish-based historiography that dismisses Armenian claims of atrocities based on allegedly skewed demographic figures, see Güclü (2010, 33) and Gunter (2011, 22).
13. Naimark 2001, 19.
14. Dadrian 1995, 45–47.
15. Güclü 2010, 36.
16. Dadrian 1995, 31.

17. Bloxham 2003, 147.
18. Valentino 2004, 158.
19. Somakian 1995, 5–9.
20. Dadrian 1995, 35.
21. Bodger 1984, 76. On the conditions under which states will support ethnic affiliates across borders, see Saideman (1997).
22. Bodger 1984, 76–77.
23. Sohrabi 2011, 73.
24. *Ibid.*, 72–78, quote on 72.
25. Kayali 1997, 41.
26. Kirakossian 1992, 63.
27. Turfan 2000, 133 and 144.
28. Kirakossian 1992, 59.
29. Zürcher 1984, 8–15.
30. Göcek 2011, 63. The era was referred to as such because the Young Turks were restoring the constitution of 1876, in effect for two years only.
31. On the rise of nationalism in the press during the Young Turk era, see Arai (1992).
32. Naimark 2001, 24.
33. Kirakossian 1992, 71–72.
34. Bloxham 2005, 49.
35. Rae 2002, 140; and Dadrian 1999, 69. Notwithstanding a flier for the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or the Dashnaks, which claimed that it would “fight until its last drop of blood for the liberation of the fatherland.” See Bloxham 2005, 50.
36. Kayali 1997, 43–44.
37. *Ibid.*, 1997, 51.
38. Melson 1987, 69.
39. Melson 1992, 155–56; and Ahmad 1969, 27. See also Turfan 2000, 151. It should be noted, however, that despite being in alliance with the Young Turks, there were very few Armenians in the movement itself. See Zürcher 1984, 22.
40. Ahmad 1969, 9.
41. Turfan 2000, 145.
42. Üngör 2011, 28.
43. Somakian 1995, 38; Kirakossian 1992, 89; Suny 2015, 156. Quote from Morgenthau 1918, 195.
44. Quoted in Kirakossian 1992, 107. See also Suny 2015, 158–60.
45. Quoted in Kirakossian 1992, 90–91.
46. Kaligian 2009, 13; and Rae 2002, 148.
47. Suny 2015, 155–57.
48. Aydin 2013, 51; Ünal 1996, 36–37. While Ünal bizarrely put these conciliatory efforts down to the Ottoman Empire’s “fundamental” hatred of European powers, much more likely is that at the time, the revolutionary and often Western-based Young Turks genuinely desired, and believed in, cooperative relations with Europe.
49. Kayali 1997, 82.
50. Morgenthau 1918, 194.
51. In a similar vein, Mylonas (2012) discusses “accommodationist” versus “assimilationist” policies.
52. Rae 2002, 137.
53. Üngör 2011, 30.
54. Kirakossian 1992, 80.
55. Üngör 2011, 25–27.
56. Akçam 2004, 62–67.
57. Üngör 2011, 42.
58. Melson 1987, 72.
59. Ahmad 1969, 153.
60. Üngör 2011, 43. See also Melson 1987, 71.

61. Melson 1992, 153–61; Rae 2002, 152; and Ahmad 1969, 152–54.
62. Mann 2005, 129.
63. Hovanessian 1987, 26.
64. Balakian 2003, 165. For more on Gökalp and the new Turkish nationalism, see Üngör (2011, 33–36).
65. Bloxham 2005, 59.
66. Melson 1992, 161–62. See also Davison 1948, 481.
67. Somakian 1995, 39.
68. Balakian 2003, 162.
69. Gingeras 2009, 39.
70. *Ibid.*, 38. Indeed, there is evidence that such motifs revolving around territorial loss and abandonment have survived to the contemporary Turkish state. See Göçek 2011, 41.
71. Balakian 2003, 159. See also Bloxham 2005, 59–60. There is a fourth point to be made about the losses in the Balkan wars, and that is that the Young Turks' families were overrepresented among refugees from the conflicts. The Young Turks generally originated from Salonika and Pristina, now under Greek and Serbian rule respectively. Young Turk leaders such as Talaat, Renda, and Cavit became refugees along with their families, and this doubtless played a role in their radicalization. See Üngör 2011, 45–46.
72. Üngör 2011, 50.
73. Morgenthau 1918, 198.
74. McCarthy 2001, 95–96
75. Kirakossian 1992, 77.
76. Quoted in Kirakossian 1992, 95.
77. Akçam 2012, 139; Gingeras 2009, 37–38; and Balakian 2003, 159–60.
78. Bloxham 2003, 146. Erickson 2001, 15–17. Given these facts, the Ottoman Empire performed adequately in the Great War, especially when one considers its substandard equipment, training, and development. See Macfie 1998, 128–60.
79. Somakian 1995, 46–48.
80. Bloxham 2005, 54.
81. Bodger 1984, 90–95.
82. Davison 1948, 486–88.
83. Quoted from Somakian 1995, 58.
84. Davison 1948.
85. Bloxham 2003, 150–51.
86. Somakian 1995, 59.
87. In fact, the long-term trend in this regard was clear, as Ottoman sovereignty had been chipped away beginning with the externally imposed *İslahat Fermani* of 1856, a program of reform concerning human rights and public policy, and continuing through the postwar settlement after 1878 (see Aras and Caha 2000, 31). Emblematic of this larger trend were the so-called Capitulations, or contracts between the Ottomans and foreign powers concerning foreign nationals. These contracts, which began in the sixteenth century under Suleyman I, were privileges the Ottoman government granted non-Ottoman subjects when they were traveling or living on Ottoman soil. These were cause for great resentment and were done away with on the eve of the Great War; Foreign Minister Halil claimed that Turkey had finally freed itself from the " tutelage of the great powers." See Ahmad 2000; Akçam 2006, 78–81; and Balakian 2003, 171.
88. Quoted in Akçam 2006, 118.
89. Quoted in Kirakossian 1992, 98.
90. Somakian 1995, 58–59.
91. Bodger 1984, 96.
92. Dadrian 1995, 44–45.
93. Kirakossian 1992, 96.
94. Dadrian 1995, 192–93. See also Akçam 2006, 119.
95. Quoted in Balakian 2003, 161. As he notes in a comment on the editorial, "In the Turkish mind, the struggle to keep the Balkans was never far from the Armenian Question."

96. Akçam 2004, 87.

97. Bloxham 2003, 150–51.

98. Mylonas 2012, 9. See also Kirakossian 1992, 104.

99. Gingeras 2009, 42.

100. The only sliver of possibility of cooperation between the two groups was itself security based. The Young Turks offered the Armenian community autonomy if it resolved to support it in the war—on both the Turkish and Russian sides of the border. The Ottoman Armenians refused, arguing that Russian Armenians could not be expected to fight for the Ottomans. See Mann 2005, 134–35.

101. Quoted in Reynolds 2009, 165. Emphasis added.

102. *Ibid.*, 165.

103. *Ibid.*, 166–67

104. Suny 2015, 285.

105. On the massacres under the sultan between 1894 and 1896, see Dadrian (1995) and Melson (1992, chapter 2).

106. See, for example, Suny 2015.

107. Armenian historians often use U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau's memoirs as supporting evidence for their claims that the Turks were simply racist and were looking for an opportunity to exterminate the Armenian people. Certainly Morgenthau was better placed than most to make observations on Ottoman policy. But it bears noting that Ambassador Morgenthau was hardly the most impartial of observers. Indeed, those who have read his memoirs could scarcely walk away from them without feeling that Morgenthau was, simply put, a racist man. To wit, this is how he characterized the Turks as a people: "Essentially the Turk is a bully and a coward; he is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him. And now that the fortunes of war were apparently favouring the empire, I began to see an entirely new Turk unfolding before my eyes. The hesitating and fearful Ottoman, feeling his way cautiously amid the mazes of European diplomacy, and seeking opportunities to find an advantage for himself in the divided counsels of the European powers, gave place to an understanding, almost dashing figure, proud and assertive, determined to live his own life and absolutely contemptuous of his Christian foes. I was really witnessing a remarkable development in race psychology—an almost classical instance of reversion to type. . . . We must realize that the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter contempt for all other races. A fairly insane pride is the element that largely explains this strange human species. . . .

They were lacking in what we may call the fundamentals of a civilized community. They had no alphabet and no art of writing; no books, no poets, no art, and no architecture; they built no cities and they established no lasting state. . . . They were simply wild and marauding horsemen, whose one conception of tribal success was to pounce upon people who were more civilized than themselves and plunder them." Citing testimony from such racists is common practice for scholars making the case that the Turks had always longed for genocide. For another example, see Dadrian (1999, 70), where we are expected to trust the word of an observer who claims that "the Turk is extremely jealous of the Armenian, jealous of his mental superiority, of his thrift, and business enterprise. He has, therefore, resorted to oppression."

108. Dyer 1976, 99. There are concerns about "blaming the victim" when writing about issues such as genocide, particularly since explanations that use the war and the threatening environment are often conflated with the so-called provocation thesis, which essentially claims that the Armenians had it coming. The former does not imply the latter. See Melson 1992, 159.

109. McCarthy 2001, 97. It should be noted that there was nothing inevitable about Turkey's choice of allies in the war. Senior members of the CUP sent feelers to both Britain and France in the lead up to the war. See Üngör 2011, 55–56.

110. Bodger 1984, 97.

111. Akçam 2006, 112. Indeed, just before the war began, the Ottomans attempted to rid themselves of the various reform plans instituted from without altogether. The Dutch inspector general appointed to head the reform plan was delayed in beginning his duties because of the

“critical situation in which the world then found itself”; he was asked to return to his country shortly thereafter. See Akçam 2006, 119.

112. Balakian 2003, 173.
113. Kirakossian 1992, 113.
114. Telegrams quoted in Akçam (2012, 139–41).
115. *Ibid.*, 142.
116. Lewy 2005, 91.
117. Gunter 2011, 6–7; Gingeras 2009, 42.
118. McCarthy 2001, 106. This was no exaggeration by Turkish sources. United States ambassador Morgenthau also believed the true number of armed Armenians fighting, or preparing to fight, on behalf of the Russians was about twenty-five thousand. See Lewy 2005, 92.
119. Quoted in Shaw and Shaw 1977, 314–15.
120. Quoted in Holquist 2011, 154.
121. Bloxham 2005, 72–73.
122. Bloxham 2003, 164.
123. Cable 1915–02–02–DE-001.
124. Suny 2015, 222.
125. Balakian 2003, 172.
126. Naimark 2001, 27. See also Lewy 2005, 91.
127. Akçam 2006, 141.
128. Balakian 2003, 163–67.
129. Bloxham 2003, 154–55; and Mann 2005, 140.
130. Bloxham 2003, 141.
131. Göçek 2011, 89.
132. Balakian 2003, 175–76.
133. For a general study of forced migration and security in international politics, see Greenhill (2010).
134. Hartunian 1986, 64.
135. Melson 1992, 142–44. Suny (2015, 247) also ascribes a central role to Bahaeeddin Sakir.
136. Ahmad 1969, 159.
137. Quoted in Kirakossian 1992, 118.
138. Quoted in Naimark 2001, 29.
139. Morgenthau 1918, 236.
140. *Ibid.*, 237–39.
141. Quoted in Akçam 2012, 134–35.
142. Morgenthau 1918, 230.
143. *Ibid.*, 231.
144. *Ibid.*, 228–29.
145. Lewy 2005, 101.
146. That was not the only time Ambassador Morgenthau heard prescient analysis of how the genocide would unfold. At the beginning of the war—before Turkey had even formally entered—Morgenthau told German ambassador Wangenheim that the Turks would massacre the Armenians in Anatolia. Wangenheim replied, “So long as England does not attack Canakkale or some other Turkish port there is nothing to fear. Otherwise, nothing can be guaranteed.” Here, too, advance warning was being given on the association between the external threat and internal decision-making in the Ottoman Empire. See Akçam 2006, 126–27.
147. Bloxham 2003, 143 and 152.
148. Valentino 2004, 163. See also Bloxham 2005, 66–67; and Mann 2005, 141.
149. Üngör 2011, 59.
150. While Enver did scapegoat the Armenian community for the loss in the Caucasus, he also bizarrely sought to separately thank them for their service. In a letter sent on February 26, Enver wrote to the Armenian patriarchate and requested that the patriarch send his message of “pleasure and thanks to the Armenian Nation, which was known to represent an example of complete loyalty to the Ottoman Government.” German consular officials corroborated this account, which on the surface, makes very little sense. See Akçam 2006, 143.

151. Reynolds 2011, 134.
152. Balakian 2003, 200
153. Lewy 2005, 102; Mann 2005, 141.
154. Bloxham 2003, 164.
155. Rogan 2015, 159.
156. Reynolds 2011, 135.
157. Akçam 2012, 157.
158. Gingeras 2009, 41.
159. Reynolds 2011, 135.
160. McMeekin 2015, 234.
161. Üngör 2011, 61.
162. Suny 2011, 243–44.
163. McMeekin 2015, 235–36.
164. *Ibid.*, 236–37.
165. Erickson 2013, 161–62.
166. Suny 2015, 232.
167. Erickson 2013, 169.
168. *Ibid.*, 169–71.
169. *Ibid.*, 179–80.
170. McMeekin 2015, 225.
171. Erickson 2013, 189.
172. McCarthy 2001, 107; and Morgenthau 1918, 202. See also Üngör 2011, 66–71.
173. McMeekin 2015, 227–28.
174. Balakian 2003, 197.
175. Bloxham 2003, 156–57.
176. Balakian 2003, 202.
177. On the development of the conflict in Van, see Balakian (2003, 205–7)
178. Lewy 2005, 96–99.
179. Quoted in Lewy 2005, 103.
180. Cable 1915–05–08–DE-001.
181. Reynolds 2011, 147.
182. Rogan 2015, 171–72.
183. Bloxham 2003.
184. Akçam 2006, 146–47.
185. Bloxham 2003, 169–71.
186. *Ibid.*, 173–74. See also Akçam 2012, 179–80.
187. Macfie 1998, 132.
188. Morgenthau 1918, 243.
189. Bloxham 2003, 180–82.
190. Gingeras 2009, 44.
191. Bloxham 2005, 83–90.
192. About 15 percent of deportees survived deportation (see Naimark 2001, 34). An account of Turkish history overly sympathetic to the state does not assign responsibility for the deaths during the forced marches and deportations to the Ottoman state. “Specific instructions were issued for the army to protect the Armenians against nomadic attacks and to provide them with sufficient food and other supplies to meet their needs during the march and after they were settled. Warnings were sent to the Ottoman military commanders to make certain that neither the Kurds nor any other Muslims used the situation to gain vengeance for the long years of Armenian terrorism. The Armenians were to be protected and cared for until they returned to their homes after their war” (see Shaw and Shaw 1977, 315). It would be an understatement to suggest that this view is not the dominant one held by neutral historians.
193. Bloxham 2003, 168–69, quote drawn from 169.
194. Macfie 1998, 133; Reynolds 2011, 149–50.
195. Suny 2015, 283.
196. Cable 1915–12–18–DE-001.

197. Valentino 2004, 163.
198. Lewy 2005, 98.
199. Holquist 2011, 151.
200. Bloxham 2005, 68.
201. Kirakossian 1992, 112.
202. *Inter alia*, see work by Bloxham and Melson.
203. Gunter 2011, 20–21.
204. Dyer 1976, 106–7.
205. Gingeras 2009, 43.
206. *Ibid.*, 42.
207. Mann 2005, 141.
208. Bloxham 2005, 62.
209. *Ibid.*, 66.
210. For examples of the weakness of such “evidence,” see Dadrian (1999, 96–99, 128–29). Such scholars go as far as to say the regime entered the Great War only as an excuse to annihilate the Armenians in their midst (see Dadrian 1999, 125).
211. Akçam 2012, 128.
212. Mann 2005, 112.
213. Akçam 2012, 137.

5. Peaceful and Violent Separatism in North America, Europe, and the Middle East, 1861–1993

1. Van Evera 1997, 86–87.
2. Coggins 2011, 2014.
3. Gerring 2007, 101–2.
4. Indeed, recent datasets on secessionism such as Coggins (2011, 2014) include both the first and second intifadas. For a discussion on the term *secession* as it applies to Israel–Palestine, see Lustick 1993, 22–25.
5. Ron 2003, 131; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 241.
6. Younis 2000, 3.
7. Butt 2013.
8. Though there was an increasing tendency to define them as Palestinian nationals, Arabs in Palestine would also subscribe to religious, Arab, local, and clan-based identities. See Khalidi 1997, 19.
9. Pearlman 2011, 27; and Khalidi 1997, 20.
10. Khalidi 2006, 33–36; and Pearlman 2011, 28.
11. Pearlman 2011, 35–39; and Khalidi 2006, 21–30.
12. Khalidi 2006, 120–22.
13. Pearlman 2011, 56.
14. Pearlman 2011, 56–58; Khalidi 2006, 131.
15. Khalidi 2006, 1–8.
16. Grinberg 2010, 30.
17. Khalidi 2006, 124, 191–92.
18. Pearlman 2011, 62–66; and Khalidi 2006, 136.
19. Lustick 1993, 353; see (7–27) for a synopsis of the ideological debates within Israel’s body politic on the annexation of the West Bank.
20. Quoted in Bregman 2014, xxxviii.
21. Rubin 1994, 24–44.
22. Cobban 1984, 94–95, 119–20; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 259–73.
23. Morris 1999, 394, claims that “the Arabs’ success in springing this strategic surprise” was, from the perspective of military history a feat on par with Hitler’s invasion of Russia and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
24. Schiff and Ya’ari 1989, 45–46; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 327–28.
25. Morris 1999, 561–63; Younis 2000, 163; Grinberg 2010, 34.

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26. Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 286–96.
27. Morris 1999, 565–68.
28. *Ibid.*, 573.
29. Younis 2000, 162.
30. Morris 1999, 574.
31. *Ibid.*, 575–76.
32. Sayigh 1989, 248.
33. Morris 1999, 580–81; and Azoulay and Ophir 2013, 74.
34. The section on the Israeli response to the first intifada is drawn from Morris 1999, 586–94; Ron 2003, 154; Schiff and Ya’ari 1989, 145–50; and Azoulay and Ophir 2013, 76–78.
35. Petrelli 2013, 668.
36. Ron 2003, 147–48.
37. Pearlman 2011, 124.
38. Interview with anonymous Palestinian academic A.
39. Interview with Afif Safieh.
40. Pearlman 2011, 128.
41. Interviews with Nimrod Goren, Ori Nir, Yael Patir.
42. Interview with Ilai Saltzman.
43. Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 361.
44. Shlaim 2001, 507.
45. *Ibid.*, 502–3.
46. Khalidi 2006, 184.
47. Shlaim 2001, 504. See also Grinberg 2010, 44.
48. Freilich 2012, 12.
49. Butt 2013.
50. Interview with Danny Rubenstein.
51. Interview with Amos Harel.
52. Netanyahu 1993, 187.
53. Younis 2000, 8–9.
54. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/01/21/the-party-faithful?currentPage=all>.
55. Barnett 1999, 19.
56. Thomas 2011, 123.
57. *Ibid.*, 125. Emphasis in original.
58. “Israeli-PLO talks snagged on security,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 10/26/1993.
59. “When it comes to talking peace with the Palestinians, Israel’s army is in charge,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 02/25/1994.
60. “Bibi scoffs at Sharon power bid,” *Forward*, 06/03/1994.
61. “Israel’s new premier drags his foot on peace,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 07/29/1996.
62. “A poor and mangled peace,” *Financial Times*, 10/04/1996.
63. Slater 2001, 178.
64. Shlaim 2001, 566–67.
65. *Ibid.*, 524; and Azoulay and Ophir 2013, 83–84.
66. Shlaim 2001, 528, 546.
67. This section on demilitarization is the product of interviews with Yonatan Touval, Chaim Levinson, Gadi Baltiansky, Toby Greene, Ilan Baruch.
68. Morris 2009, 136–39. Palestinians and left-wing Israelis both scoffed at the notion of Barak’s concessions, pointing out that we know remarkably little about the precise details of the offer, and that there has been a concerted effort at myth making within Barak’s government, both for domestic and international reasons, to exaggerate his generosity at Camp David. Pressman (2003, 15) argues that “the Israeli offer was unprecedented, but it was neither as generous nor as complete as Israel has since suggested,” especially concerning the contiguity of the Palestinian state in the West Bank, sovereignty in East Jerusalem, and the right of return. Rather, the Palestinian version of events, according to Pressman “is much closer to the

evidentiary record of articles, interviews, and documents produced by participants in the negotiations, journalists, and other analysts” (6). For similar criticism of Barak’s so-called generosity, see Slater 2001, 179–88.

69. Interviews with Mohammad Daraghmeh, Wafa Amr. A second reason pointed out by some interviewees was Arafat’s concerns about the civil-military balance, given a history of coups in the region, and the Palestinian military being a competing center of power within a prospective Palestinian state.

70. Interviews with Afif Safieh, anonymous PLO official, anonymous Palestinian academic B.

71. Interview with Sam Bahour.

72. Interview with anonymous Palestinian academic A.

73. On path dependence, see Mahoney 2000 and Pierson 2000.

74. Interview with Ori Nir.

75. Interview with Ehud Eiran.

76. Morris 2009, 165.

77. Interview with Ori Nir.

78. Interview with Danny Rubenstein.

79. http://en.idi.org.il/media/3930815/Peace_Index_February_2015-Eng.pdf.

80. <http://en.idi.org.il/media/599212/Peace%20Index-October-trans.pdf>.

81. Interview with Afif Safieh.

82. Ron 2003, 118–25; Newman 2005, 204.

83. Newman 2005, 205.

84. Shlaim 2001, 548–49.

85. Morris 2009, 162–63.

86. The most recent iteration of the peace process, led by U.S. secretary of state John Kerry, also fell apart due to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s inability to concede to a settlement freeze. See <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118751/how-israel-palestine-peace-deal-died>.

87. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/01/21/the-party-faithful?currentPage=all>.

88. Pundak 2001, 35.

89. Interviews with anonymous Palestinian academic B, anonymous former Palestinian Authority official, Mohammad Daraghmeh, and Gadi Baltiansky. Ilai Saltzman said that while delaying discussions of final status issues was a mistake, it was an “inevitable” one; things had to move slowly given the lack of trust between the parties.

90. Khalidi 2006, 158.

91. Interview with Afif Safieh.

92. Freilich 2012, 61.

93. Azoulay and Ophir 2013, 127.

94. Grinberg 2010, 172, 155.

95. Ibid., 160.

96. Morris 2009, 151.

97. Grinberg 2010, 160.

98. Ibid., 163.

99. Brym and Andersen 2011, 492.

100. Schulze 2001, 227–28.

101. Interviews with Ehud Eiran, Yael Patir.

102. Interviews with Amos Harel and an anonymous Israeli academic.

103. Interview with Nimrod Goren.

104. Interview with Wafa Amr. Sharon’s rise to power following the second intifada was not coincidental. As Ehud Eiran put it, “The first intifada helped the left, the second destroyed the left.”

105. Ron 2003, 198–99, and interview with Ehud Eiran.

106. Pearlman 2011, 151–52.

107. Ibid., chapter 6.

108. Pape 2005, 48.

109. Kramer 1992, 2.
110. Bookman 1994, 175; Ulč 1996, 331.
111. Kramer 1992, 2–3.
112. Ulč 1996, 332.
113. *Ibid.*, 332.
114. *Ibid.*, 333–34.
115. Kramer 1992, 6.
116. Interview with Jeffrey Simon.
117. Ulč 1996, 337–38.
118. *Ibid.*, 338.
119. Bookman 1994, 178.
120. Wolchik 1995, 228.
121. *Ibid.*
122. Ulč 1996, 341.
123. Interview with Darina Malová.
124. “Czechs, Slovaks split in elections; outcome could hasten country’s breakup,” *Washington Post*, 06/07/1992; “Czechoslovakia vote sets up sticky summer,” *Los Angeles Times*, 06/07/1992; “Czechs and Slovaks reconsider the federation,” *Financial Times*, 06/08/1992.
125. “Slovak vote fuels move toward new nationhood,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 06/08/1992.
126. Kraus 2000, 213.
127. Interviews with anonymous U.S. State Department official, Grigorij Meseznikov, and Zora Bútorová.
128. Interviews with Kevin Deegan-Krause and Grigorij Meseznikov.
129. “Prospect of split worries Slovaks,” *Edmonton Journal*, 06/28/1992.
130. Wolchik 1995, 239–40. Given the tepid support for full-blown secession among the respective publics, *The Economist* magazine noted that the divorce was “happening by accident.” Quoted in Wolchik 1995, 230.
131. Interviews with Zora Bútorová and Grigorij Meseznikov.
132. Interview with anonymous U.S. diplomatic official.
133. Interviews with Ted Russell and Martin Bútorá.
134. Interview with Kevin Deegan-Krause and Darina Malová.
135. Kramer 1992, 13–14.
136. Hilde 1999, 647.
137. Interview with Jeffrey Simon.
138. Rupnik 1995, 272.
139. Kraus 2000, 202.
140. Interviews with Darina Malová, David Cowles, Grigorij Meseznikov, Jan Eichler, Michael Kraus, Zora Bútorová, Tim Haughton, and Martin Bútorá.
141. Interview with Michael Kraus.
142. Interview with Jeffrey Simon.
143. Interview with Ondřej Ditrych.
144. Interview with Mills Kelly.
145. “Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia hasten to protect rights,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 09/03/1992; “Hungary: Harsh words,” *The Economist*, 10/31/1992.
146. Interview with Sharon Wolchik.
147. Interview with Jan Eichler.
148. “Sorting out foreign ties, minority needs,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 12/24/1992.
149. Interview with anonymous U.S. diplomatic official and with Ondřej Ditrych.
150. Simon 1993, 1–6.
151. Interestingly, Klaus would go on to become a Euroskeptic. According to Tim Haughton, this was because while European integration until Maastricht was about markets, Klaus found the EU’s involvement in social policy less acceptable. Similarly, Petr Kopecky told me of Klaus’s opposition to the euro currency, which he saw as a loss of national sovereignty.
152. Interview with Rick Zednick and Mills Kelly.

153. Interview with Ondřej Ditrych.

154. Interview with Jeffrey Simon and Chris Donnelly.

155. Interviews with Jeffrey Simon, Chris Donnelly, and Petr Kopecky.

156. Interview with Jeffrey Simon.

157. Interview with Ted Russell.

158. Bookman 1994, 179.

159. Kramer 1992, 23.

160. Simon 1993, 7–9.

161. “Czechoslovakia: Blue Velvet,” *The Economist*, 10/10/1992.

162. Bookman 1994, 183. Contemporary media reports affirmed that the split spelled greater trouble for Slovaks’ prospects than the Czechs’. See *inter alia*, “For Slovaks, cost of split with Czechs will be high,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 06/24/1992.

163. Interview with Jeffrey Simon.

164. “Czechs and Slovaks divide up assets on brink of separation,” *New York Times*, 12/11/1992.

165. Interview with Chris Donnelly.

166. Wolchik 1995, 230–31.

167. “Czechs and Slovaks,” *Washington Post*, 06/09/1992.

168. Interviews with Darina Malová, Grigorij Meseznikov, Zora Bútorová, and Martin Bútora.

169. Interview with Mills Kelly.

170. Kramer 1992, 4.

171. “Slovaks yearn to speak for themselves—Independence Movement Shakes Czechoslovak Unity,” *Wall Street Journal*, 05/22/1992.

172. “The Velvet Dissolution—Elections to decide unity of country,” *The Guardian*, 06/05/1992.

173. Several people commented on the cordiality of relations between the two since 1993, and many, including Zora Bútorová and Grigorij Meseznikov, credited the 1993 split for allowing such bonhomie. The typical argument put to me was that by going their separate ways, the Slovaks were forced to stand on their own, without the ability to blame the Czechs for their problems. Conversely, the split precluded the patronizing big brother–little brother attitude the Czechs often embodied in their dealings with the Slovaks. As such, the two ethnic groups enjoy better relations with each other today than what would have been possible had they remained united. As Tim Haughton told me, the situation is analogous to two brothers fighting over the top bunk or the remote: once they each get their own room, the squabbling disappears.

174. As Lipson 1984 argued, when push comes to shove for states, security concerns tend to trump economic ones.

175. Ulč 1996, 346.

176. Kramer 1992, 27.

177. Ulč 1996, 341; “Czechoslovakia: Velvet Divorce?” *The Economist*, 06/13/1992.

178. Ironically, one of the major factors behind Mečiar being turned out of power in the 1998 was the discontent among the Slovak body politic and society at being excluded from European institutions like the EU when all its neighbors were invited.

179. “A velvet divorce, but a rough road to single life: The Czech and Slovak republics will face different challenges after separation,” *Financial Times*, 06/22/1992.

180. Rupnik 1995, 274–76. Interestingly, there was a brief concern among some Czech politicians that splitting would slow, not hasten, admission to European institutions, which gave them pause. See “The world from . . . Czechoslovakia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 06/17/1992.

181. Interview with Jeffrey Simon.

182. Interview with Chris Donnelly.

183. Interviews with Rick Zednick and Kevin Deegan-Krause. Notably, Havel’s persistent calls for a referendum during the summer of 1992 were ignored by Mečiar and Klaus, because each knew the result of such a referendum would make a split problematic. See “Check, O Slovakia,” *The Economist*, 06/27/1992.

184. Interview with Mills Kelly.
185. Interviews with Kevin Deegan-Krause, Chris Donnelly, and anonymous U.S. diplomatic official.
186. Interview with Kevin Deegan-Krause.
187. Interview with author.
188. Interview with Michael Kraus. Despite this relatively “clean” break, certain towns and villages still represented “anomalies” if not “territorial disputes” that had to be resolved. See “Borderline case,” *The Guardian*, 10/20/1992.
189. Interview with Michael Kraus.
190. For example, see Young (1994). On the other hand, some scholars note their hesitance to call the dissolution of the Norway-Sweden union a case of “real” secession, “since the ties between the political entities involved were very loose at the outset.” See Dion (1996, 270).
191. Parent 2006, 214–17.
192. Scott 1988, 327.
193. Parent 2006, 218–19.
194. Scott 1988, 327–28.
195. Pahre 2001, 147.
196. Young 1994, 777.
197. Parent 2006, 226.
198. Lindgren 1959, 62–63.
199. Barton 2003, 72.
200. Scott 1988, 328.
201. Lindgren 1959, 62–70; and Derry 1973, 147–52.
202. Derry 1973, 152.
203. Barton 2003, 75.
204. Parent 2006, 224.
205. Barton 2003, 75.
206. Nansen 1905, 83.
207. Derry 1973, 160–62.
208. Barton 2003, 78.
209. Quoted in Scott 1988, 330.
210. Barton 2003, 78–82.
211. Young 1994, 786. Interestingly, a professor at Uppsala University published in early 1905 a series of articles that laid out the conditions for the dissolution of the union; his plans included the razing of the frontier forts and the establishment of a neutral zone on the border (see Scott 1988, 330).
212. Parent 2006, 227.
213. Ibid., 221–22.
214. See Elgström 2000, especially chapter 4.
215. Derry 1973, 164–65.
216. Lindgren 1959, 144.
217. “Moving along to agreement: Norway will destroy all new fortifications,” *Los Angeles Times*, 09/19/1905.
218. Lindgren 1959, 76, 132–35; Parent 2006, 224, 232; Barton 2003, 81; Derry 1973, 153, 158.
219. Such as the *Journal of the Civil War Era*.
220. Poast 2014, 1.
221. Ibid., 1.
222. Potter 2011, 8.
223. Toft 2003.
224. Potter 2011, 9.
225. Ibid., 32.
226. Ibid., 38.
227. Ibid., 7, 48–49; Foreman 2000, chapter 1.
228. Potter 2011, 447.

229. Quoted in Craven 1965, 60.

230. Potter 2011, 456–69.

231. Quoted in Craven 1965, 61.

232. Potter 2011, 478.

233. Craven 1965, 62.

234. *Ibid.*, 73–75.

235. Mahin 2000, 7.

236. The focus on Lincoln is hardly misplaced, since, according to historians, “The final decision regarding compromise lay in the hands of one party, and ultimately of just one man: Abraham Lincoln.” See McClintock 2008, 164.

237. Quoted in Potter 1965, 90.

238. Jones 1999, 92.

239. Potter 2011, 36.

240. Jones 1999, 91.

241. McClintock 2008, 134.

242. *Ibid.*, 138–50.

243. *Ibid.*, 165–66.

244. *Ibid.*, 170–71; see also Potter 1965, 98–103.

245. *Ibid.*, 172–73.

246. *Ibid.*, 185.

247. *Ibid.*, 195–96, 205.

248. Poast 2014, 7–10, quote on 7.

249. McClintock 2008, 206.

250. *Ibid.*, 212–15.

251. *Ibid.*, 216–17.

252. *Ibid.*, 225.

253. *Ibid.*, 226.

254. *Ibid.*

255. Mahin 2000, 44–45.

256. Poast 2014, 11.

257. Jones 1992, 10–11.

258. Seward to Adams, April 10, 1861, *Foreign Relations of the United States*

259. Mahin 2000, 23–24.

260. Jones 1992, 20; Jones 1999, 85.

261. Campbell 2003, 30.

262. Quoted in Ferris 1976, 36.

263. Bourne 1967, 252–53.

264. Ferris 1976, 24, emphasis in original; *ibid.*, 2–3.

265. Foreman 2000, 23–27.

266. Jones 1992, 15–16.

267. Mahin 2000, 30–31.

268. Jones 1992, 34.

269. Ferris 1976, 34.

270. Owsley 2008, 2–3; Jones 2010, 12.

271. Owsley 2008, 12.

272. Quoted in Owsley 2008, 16.

273. Quoted in Jones 2010, 12.

274. *Ibid.*, 15.

275. Jones 1992, 45.

276. Poast 2014, 29.

277. Mahin 2000, 12.

278. Seward to Adams, April 1, 1861 (FRUS).

279. Ferris 1976, 15. Ferris goes on to add that “after more than a generation of dealing with Americans who were coarse, bellicose, and often maladroit, Englishmen were inclined to be

supercilious and irritable about infringements by their trans-Atlantic cousins upon what they fancied as their rights and interests.”

280. Ferris 1976, 22–23.
281. Quoted in Mahin 2000, 13–14.
282. Seward to Adams, June 3, 1861 (FRUS).
283. Mahin 2000, 17–22, quote on 17; Jones 2010, 11.
284. Jones 1992, 26.
285. Quoted in Poast 2014, 31.
286. Quoted in Ferris 1976, 46.
287. Jones 2010, 44.
288. Jones 1992, 29.
289. *Ibid.*, 51.
290. Ferris 1976, 43.
291. *Ibid.*, 72–74. Indeed, French enthusiasm for intervention, if anything, worked against British desires to intervene, given British concerns that a stronger foothold in North America would allow Napoleon III, considered unpredictable and opportunistic, to pursue adventurous schemes elsewhere (see Jones 2010, 24).
292. Seward to Adams, June 19, 1861 (FRUS).
293. Mahin 2000, 46.
294. *Ibid.*, 49.
295. Seward to Adams, May 21, 1861 (FRUS)
296. Poast 2014, 34.
297. *Ibid.*, 34–35.
298. *Ibid.*, 36.
299. John Hay, diary entry, August 22 (see Dennett 1939).
300. Furthermore, the direction of events in the midst, rather than just the beginning, of the civil war also point to the centrality of concerns over British involvement. For instance, Lincoln’s famous and well-chronicled choice of emancipation was in large part a way to ward off the prospect of British intervention, which he felt was around the corner for ostensibly humanitarian reasons, given the increasingly costly toll the war was taking (see Jones 1999, chapters 3–4). Ironically, the decision-making on the other side of the conflict at this exact time was also partly motivated by external considerations; Lee’s strike at Antietam was aimed at showing the British and French the Confederacy was a viable entity. I thank Robert Art for this point.
301. Jones 1992, 57–59.

Conclusion

1. Which is often either an overstated concern or a fig leaf for other interests. See Krasner 1999.
2. Goddard (2010, 223) and Cox (1997, 682–86) discuss how the collapse of the Soviet Union led Irish Republicans to believe that England would no longer consider the prospect of an independent Ireland a threat, opening up the possibility of peace in Northern Ireland in the 1990s.
3. Jenne (2015) similarly argues that stabilizing regional conflicts is the key to peacefully resolving domestic disputes.
4. Arena and Pechenkina 2016.
5. <https://thewire.in/114376/tensions-rise-as-centre-orders-more-pellet-guns-for-kashmir/>.
6. Grigoryan 2015, Brancati 2006, Elkins and Sides 2007. For a nuanced position on this issue, see Bakke 2015.
7. <https://www.ft.com/content/0fa5b3b4-766b-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35>.
8. <https://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/09/catalonias-referendum>.
9. Walter 1997.

10. It is worth reiterating that theoretically, I expect democratic states to be no less (or no more, depending on one's point of view) violent than autocratic states when dealing with separatist movements—reflected in the experiences of India and Israel, to name two examples.

11. Although, as it so happens, separatist wars do last longer and are more intense than ideological civil wars.

12. Mylonas 2012, Bulutgil 2008.

13. Christia 2013.

14. Wilkinson 2006, Posner 2005, Varshney 2002.

15. Toft 2003, Ron 2003, Cunningham 2014, Walter 2009.

16. Wimmer 2002, Cederman et al. 2011.

