Why Intelligence Fails

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Why Intelligence Fails

Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War

ROBERT JERVIS

Cornell University Press

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To Daniel and Joshua

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.

—Carl von Clausewitz

The main difference between professional scholars or intelligence officers on the one hand, and all other people on the other hand, is that the former are supposed to have had more training in the techniques of guarding against their own intellectual frailties.

—Sherman Kent, chairman of Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952–1967