

Foreword

Social scientists and even historians of contemporary Europe have shown a consistent bias in focusing their attention on the great nations, neglecting the smaller countries. Only recently the project on the smaller European democracies initiated by Hans Daalder, Robert Dahl, Stein Rokkan, and Val Lorwin has tried to correct that imbalance. Now the reader has in hand a book that tries to do the same for one of the smaller nondemocratic countries of southern Europe, which fortunately has now become one of the smaller democracies. Our image of nondemocratic polities in Europe has been shaped by the vast and thorough literature on Nazi Germany, the not so vast or impressive but still important work on fascist Italy, and some research on Franco's Spain. Portugal was left largely to more or less competent journalistic accounts, generally favorable to Salazar, or to voices of the opposition to the *Estado Novo*. This work and other writings of the authors represented in it are a first step to include Portugal in comparative research on themes central to the understanding of European and world politics. Comparative social science is confronted with the difficulty that the number of cases of micro-political and social phenomena is limited, but that limited universe is even further reduced by our neglect of phenomena that can be conceptualized in the same generalized terms and middle-range theories. We shall not make progress in understanding issues like totalitarianism and authoritarianism, the role of fascist movements, the nature of corporatism and bureaucratic authoritarianism, the importance of cultural tradition versus diffusion in the success of political ideologies, the role of the military in nondemocratic regimes and their crises, the transition from induced mass apathy to mass mobilization, or the emergence of party systems, to mention just a few, until we study them in a larger number of countries, including the smaller countries of Europe. A solid empirical and monographic research on a larger number of countries will allow the generalists and the theorists to avoid the pitfall of building their efforts on a single central and well-studied case, for example, fascist Italy, rather than considering Italy to be one more case with its distinctive characteristics. Certainly, the debate on corporatism in this volume is an im-

portant contribution to a theme of significance not only to the study of Portugal. It should also be noted that a number of the scholars represented in this debate have worked on Latin American politics. This is no accident and reflects the need to consider southern Europe, particularly the countries of the Iberian peninsula, in a broader framework.

Portugal is one more instance of a pattern of social and economic development common to the periphery of advanced industrial or post-industrial societies—a pattern that extends across a variety of political systems from Bulgaria through the south of Europe and even across the Atlantic to the shores of Acapulco. All those countries share the advantage of being close to the richer industrial countries that consume their products, particularly those of their agriculture and increasingly those of their industries. Almost all of them have benefited from the possibility of sending their surplus labor to work abroad and from the remittances of those new proletarians in the advanced countries. Their geographic location and climate have attracted millions of tourists and with them the development of a tertiary sector that has allowed them to compensate for the weakness of their balance of payments. In addition, their relatively modern infrastructure, compared to most of the third world, and their periods of political stability, achieved by coercion or consensus, have attracted foreign investors and accelerated indigenous economic development. Those changes have had different incidence from country to country in both time and intensity—maximum in Italy, less so and later in Portugal—but in all of them have altered fundamentally the social structure, most concretely reducing the absolute and relative weight of the population active in agriculture. The gigantic changes in rural society, the disruption of peasant life, and the transfer of men and women from rural settings to growing metropolises and to the labor market in central and western Europe, or in the case of Mexico to the American Southwest, raise the questions of central interest to anthropologists on the one side and sociologists on the other and have far-reaching political implications. All those changes have their positive side but no one studying them can ignore the human costs, the social discontinuities that go with them, and the other consequences that are not always positive for social stability. It is natural that the issues connected with the theory of *dependencia* formulated in the context of Latin American societies should also enter the intellectual discourse about southern European countries.

The impact of decolonization on both the society and the national

consciousness has been central to the history of western Europe since Spain lost its colonies in the nineteenth century. Let us not forget that Spanish liberalism found some of its most active supporters in the first half of the nineteenth century among officers unwilling to fight for the overseas empire (the Riego *pronunciamento* in 1820) and among those returning from the hopeless struggle to retain it (the Ayacuchos and Espartero). Exaggerating the analogy, we could say that the Spanish bourgeois revolution in the nineteenth century was carried largely by military men in an era of decolonization, just as the Movimento das Fôrças Armadas was in 1974 the carrier of a socialist revolution—two revolutions that in many respects went beyond what the social structure of those countries would have produced without that externally created crisis. The problem of reintegration into the society of expellees after defeat has been a recurrent phenomenon since the Greeks left Turkey after World War I. Germans and Finns had to move westward after World War II, Algerians returned to France, and now overseas Portuguese have to be integrated in Portuguese society. The success or failure of that process is important to the stability of the receiving country, and certainly the historical economic context of the return of the Angolans has not been the most favorable.

Democracy has been far from stable in western Europe, and the transition from constitutional monarchy to democracy, often a discontinuous process as in the case of Germany, in southern Europe has been marked by even greater discontinuity even when it was initiated as early as or earlier than in other west European countries. After all, nazism lasted only twelve years while nondemocratic rule in Italy, Portugal, and Spain lasted several decades and Greece intermittently suffered nondemocratic rule in the twentieth century. Southern European countries provide unique examples of early and accelerated political modernization in socially and, particularly, economically underdeveloped societies and, perhaps as a result, of the breakdown of “democracies in the making.” In this they contrast with other countries, such as Imperial Germany, whose industrialization went ahead of political change. Being “democracies in the making” has characterized southern European nations, and with it totalitarian and authoritarian periods and therefore a discontinuity in their political development. We need to know much more about the crises of democracies, the periods of authoritarian rule, the transitions to new democratic regimes, and the legacies left by the political past to understand the present and the future. It is in this area that this volume makes important contributions.

Fortunately, American scholarship, even when slowly and with insufficient means, has developed an interest in southern Europe. The organizations and institutions mentioned in the Acknowledgments, particularly the Council for European Studies with its workshops and conferences, the Concilium for International and Area Studies here at Yale, the University of New Hampshire, and the Gulbenkian Foundation on the other side of the Atlantic, had helped to create a nucleus of scholars before the Portuguese Revolution spurned an unfortunately somewhat flashy interest in Portugal. It is our hope that these scholars, now integrated into the Conference Group on Modern Portugal, will continue their activities coordinated with the Committee on Southern Europe COSE that is trying to bring together scholars from both sides of the Atlantic—a common effort to study and understand this part of Europe, so long neglected. Let us not forget that more Europeans live in Portugal than in any of the Scandinavian countries or even Austria or Switzerland. In fact, the population of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in 1975 added up to almost 110 million people, while the Benelux countries, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland, the largest of the smaller European democracies, only contained 45.9 million people. The GNP of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in 1975 at market prices in U.S. dollars was \$290,110 million with an average per capita income of \$2,641, while the absolute GNP of the smaller European countries just mentioned was almost the same, \$299,490 million. But the difference in population meant that per capita income in the latter was \$6,776. Southern Europe is the home of a large number of people: one out of every five Europeans outside the Soviet Union and more than one out of every four in non-Communist Europe. Politicians probably more than scholars are aware of the importance of the southern European votes in the new Europe. All of us should be conscious that the political stability in this part of the world, which in turn is dependent on continuous social and economic progress and the capacity to overcome the cleavages created by political conflict and a difficult past, is central to the future of Europe. Dramatizing things, let us imagine the impact of a Pinochet in any southern European country on the consciousness of western Europe, on the stability of other European democracies. Certainly, knowledge and understanding of southern European societies and politics might not be decisive in preventing serious crises but they can help to prevent them and to deal with them intelligently. My hope is that this work and future work by scholars in the area and by Americans

interested in it will increase our pool of knowledge, understanding, and love for millions of Europeans confronted with difficult problems that other parts of Europe faced or solved earlier. Let us hope that this work will represent only a first step in a continuing and every day more intense effort of the scholarly community.

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