

PREFACE TO THE TWENTIETH
ANNIVERSARY EDITION

TWENTY YEARS LATER

May CompLit rise again and again, sublated, in a relay, as long as the planet lasts. Comparative Literature, collectively embracing all the languages of the world, is the Humanities as such, beyond the disciplines, capable of keeping the academy internally practicing learning rather than simply acquiring and producing knowledge, and externally learning to learn from below.

A word about W. E. B. Du Bois before I begin. In the last twenty-odd years, between the first edition of *Death of a Discipline*

and this second, I have been grappling with finishing a book on his life and work. In answer to a question asked by Brent Edwards on the more superficial version of Du Bois included in *Death of a Discipline*, I have written as follows: “About *Souls of Black Folk* I have much more to say and I have said them in that forthcoming book. That Du Bois claimed ‘America’ is incontrovertible. But to call it just ‘nationalist,’ as I did in the first edition, is unwise. And he was deeply critical of what we call ‘identity politics,’ of course.”¹

In 1999 I gave a talk at the Modern Language Association convention arranged by the American Comparative Literature Association. Jonathan Culler was in the audience and told me I should expand it and give it as the upcoming Wellek lectures, and so I did. I thanked him in the first edition, and I thank him again. He was right, the book seemed to fill a need. And most favorable readers seem to have liked the book because it appeared to offer a way to practice planetary readings.²

In 1997 I had proposed “planetary” as a concept-metaphor to the Stiftung-Dialogik in Zurich.³ It was there proposed as a limit to our powers. And yet it seems an enabler for *Death of a Discipline*, where I quote a bit from the Zurich piece.⁴

Let me quote from my entry on “planetary” as it is to be found in Barbara Cassin’s *Dictionary of the Untranslatables*, as translated by Emily Apter: “My use of ‘planetary’ . . . does not refer to any applicable methodology. . . . Planetary is not susceptible to the subject’s grasp [*Begriff* = the German word for concept, containing the metaphor of grasp = *greifen*].”⁵ And in this description, I give in conclusion the double bind of the ruse of consciousness, faced with the untranslatability of the word *planetary*: “We must persistently educate ourselves into the peculiar mindset of accepting the untranslatable, even as we are programmed to transgress that mindset by ‘translating’ it into the mode of ‘acceptance.’”

It is this “translation” that produces the reading practice welcomed by readers, mostly student readers. I finesse it by way of the uncanny, of figuration.

The method of *Death of a Discipline* can be fitted into my notion of “intended mistake.” I have generally explained this emergence of method from the inaccessible by proposing a difference between the subject adrift in psycho-, historico-, politico-physical discontinuities (the planetary apart from even these) and agents validated by institutions, gender being the most encompassing, and, in the case of *Death of A Discipline*, for example, national education systems.

Today I would extend this by way of *die Vorstellung*, a German word notoriously difficult to translate. It is produced by *die Willkür*, an arbitrary need, rather than *die Wille*, which would lead you to the correct concept, of course. Today the need for a *willkürlich* (non)concept of planetarity is overwhelming. A totalizable theoretical correctness is not an option. The *Vorstellung* is contingent, dependent upon a methodological need.

In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, for example, we see the recently doctorated well-trained young Marx moving from *Vorstellungen* to the irreducible, calling that end the concept. I cannot offer a detailed reading here for considerations of space and time, but I would like to suggest that this resolution is not achieved in the case of the important contradiction between species-life (*Gattungsleben*) and species-being (*Gattungswesen*). We take it so for granted that the young Karl Marx, humanist by inclination, should be clearly aiming for the best way for species-being to be equally accessible to one and all, that we do not notice how much more time he gives to species-life, and that, understanding and following Hegel of the *Phenomenology*, how much he mistrusts the human consciousness (which for Hegel can only harbor *Vorstellungen*), and that from the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1843–44) all the way to

“The So-Called Primitive Accumulation,” written twenty years later, Marx’s sense of what we would call the Anthropocene is that it starts when human society is separated from self-consuming agriculture, separated from suckling Nature, as it were.⁶ It is species-life that accumulation cannot catch, because there is no originary *Aneignung* or appropriation there.

As I argued in the eighties, Marx’s predication of the human being is that it is super-adequate to itself, that it can make more than it needs.⁷ This is the definitive predication of the historically developing subject of the Anthropocene. Today, offering this teacher’s gift—a new *Death of a Discipline*—once again to my masters, my students—I would submit a reading of Christine Brooke-Rose’s *Subscript*⁸—which begins with a scientifically correct representation of the contingent emergence of the eukaryotic cell—wthits—from out of thwi, their, as my Google research tells me. Husserl had given us the idea of the *Gegenständlich*, something that stands over against us, distinguishing it, as is the custom of German classical philosophy, from the Latin-origin *Objectivität*. Brooke-Rose’s text starts with the eukaryote—the title of the first chapter is “Euka”—in the impossible first-philosophical task of representing the making of the human and therefore reading the irrational, as did Lacan in thinking the drives. The *Gegenstand* is before the narrative, not constitutable as the text’s *Gegensatz* or contradiction; the text starts with the contingent, geobiological human material representing the planetary.

In the text, the reader shares the impossibility of perspectivizing this multiform, multicellular, pre-human perspective. The text’s perspective is sometimes almost in the contemporary narrator’s voice: Time “warmturns, lightturns, darkturns, foreverturns”—as long as things turn, the historical is not yet there. Through vague and repetitive mapmaking, much later,

enter spatiality and the possibility of the historical. The akaryote is a “cell without a nucleus that has to depend on other organisms to survive.” And the protagonist’s name—representative of the human—is Aka (nickname for the akaryote?)—gradually becoming an individual, emerging into the narrative of Mesopotamia—literally, land “between two . . . rivers” (S 201), from where Aka’s father receives a visitor—the historical start of a civilization of agriculture—by “dying” into the entire historical future, ending with “happily ever after.” In Aka’s dying fantastic vision combined with the real historiography of the future, we read, finally in achieved free indirect discourse:

Then a horde of men with horse bodies and horse legs below them, shorter than the women because horses are stockier than bison, come galloping after them, scattering seeds like rain with wide rainbow gestures into the loosened earth as they pass. And more and more, hordes and hordes of wheat-rearers and animal-tamers invading the huge forestless plain, the entire landmass, growing grains and greens and fruits and lambs and pigs and horses and having endless offspring and living happily ever after. (S 215)

The beginning of the Anthropocene. The human in excess of herself, seeds sprouting. Species-life coming to an end at the remote origin of primitive accumulation.

“Happily ever after” echoes the same phrase occurring earlier in the text when the originary “we” emerges possibly in the rainforest of the Amazon (S 73): “we have been for ever”—this leads to the difficulty of representing time in the text—“in this rich rainy forest and live happily ever after.” The reader might

notice the divergence in tenses in the sentence once again signaling the difficulty of historical representation, now in the emerging human subject collectively female, which was already indicated on page 57, where the as-yet-undifferentiated “subject” says: “so the original division of labor between male and female has become even more unequal.” To have the originary human subject as female is “logical,” for, by the code, “the pack’s [later the “group’s,” “tribe’s”] sole duty is to survive, and replicate,” a formula repeated many many times in the text. I like to think that the impersonality or generality of the gendered subject can also be read as proper name/common noun—Aka—“also known as”—all of us?

There is a reading of Mahasweta Devi’s exquisite “Pterodactyl” in the first edition. I add a bit of reading that had not come to me until the times changed into a pervasive recall to planetarity: in the first edition we had not noticed that Mahasweta distinguishes between extinction by planetarity and anthropocentric extinction as imagined by Puran trying to “read” what the pterodactyl’s message might be. The first sentence is about planetarity. The rest about our responsibility for killing our earth: “We are extinct by the inevitable natural geological evolution. You too are endangered. You too will become extinct in nuclear explosions, or in war, or in the aggressive advance of the strong obliterating the weak, which finally turns you naked, barbaric, primitive” (157–158). The story is necessarily stylized, romanticizing the indigenous as it achieves the remote settler colonial’s “excruciating” love (196) within the powerful concept-metaphor of bringing the map alive.

To Devi’s text I would add Marguerite Duras’s mysterious *Sea Wall*, published in 1950, when the awareness of planetarity had not been politically correct for smart capitalism.⁹ To point out how irresponsible this translation is, I would quote this passage from my own recent writing:

May translating rather than translation be the future of the humanities. We will be a global community, each one of us globalizable, upstream from politics, an island of languaging in a field of traces. The trace of an “unknown” language is where we know meaningfulness is operating, but we don’t know how. Our task as teachers and translators calls us into this challenge, the recognition that a fully translated globe is nothing that we should desire. . . . The final project of translating is an epistemological project upon ourselves, like all translation, necessary but impossible. Post colonial was focused on the nation state. To supplement globalization, we need archipelago-thought. Edouard Glissant, the thinker of creolity, has said: “Translation is therefore one of the most important kinds of this new archipelagic thinking.”¹⁰ We must displace the heritage of postcoloniality into island-thinking. [Viet Nam] can move into this with brilliance. We are all islanders.¹¹

Duras’s text prefigures this move by way of a spirit turned by what she calls the “native colonials,” “the whites who had made no fortune,” and the translation misses this on every page. The comparative literary impulse reads translation translating; and notices that the echo of the sea—“la mer”—every time the book refers to the mother—the main character—as the generic unappropriated “la mère”—would be missed in English, even if it had translated the word generically rather than with the completely inappropriate “Ma.” Learn French, the French book says. Only then can we suspect that—in this text—the Anthropocene acts out the baseline human, as the sea acts out its program of destruction. This female native colonial—the mother turned by life—is staged as the baseline human. We begin to

see that the book tabulates its characters in terms of their relationship to this unheroic version of planetarity, the other term being class. The most moving class-tabulated character detail being the Corporal's (affectionate name, like *capitano* in Latin New York City, for an illiterate deaf Malay servant with a family) to identify his own poverty with the mother's, although he knows she is poor and cannot pay him.

The third term of character tabulation in *A Barrier Against the Pacific* (which is the literal translation of the title) is gender. Unlike in Brooke-Rose and Devi, this is an extramoral assessment of gender as the instrument of class-mobility as well as impermanent productive joy.¹² It is Venn diagrammed with a sustained description of the ceaseless fecundity of peasant women, a description that forbids the reader to counterfocalize by its absolute and monotonous resistance even to free indirect discourse.¹³ We must rather imagine this peculiar description extramorally, not quite knowing how to put it in the book's mode of production of value, of intellectual capital. The text has informed us that the children are fed chewed food by their mothers by mouth-to-mouth transfer, as are birds, and that they are covered with a saffron powder over nakedness to avoid malaria, that the tigers will not eat them because the tigers are not hungry!

The children offer a clue at the end of the book. The mother is dead, and everyone is about to depart, hither and yon, the son as half of a class-hypergamous couple. The closure of the book claims a solemn voice through a somewhat erratic intermittent and interruptive use of the French *passé simple* form here and there, mingled with the mundane imperfect. And right at the end, the children remain, making noise, just noise: "One heard their soft cheeping [*piaillements*] come out of the spaces [*sortir des cases*]."¹⁴

If you want human beings in a “common measure” (SW 197; translation modified) with located planetarity, the ocean eating the ground with a programmed regularity, here they are, with only a natural future, contingent as human. “No hungry generations tread [them] down.”¹⁵ Nature is these children’s “inorganic body.”¹⁶

Some years after *Death of a Discipline* I published *Readings*, addressed to English majors and post-tertiary scholars of English in India.¹⁷ But more recently I have been able to connect subalternity with a task for Comparative Literature.

“Pterodactyl” shows us the map coming alive. *A Barrier Against the Pacific* shows us the mother (*la mère*) punned with the sea (*la mer*). A peculiar passage in the book emphasizes this odd coupling, puts the children on the map even as it does not:

What the children died of in the marshy plains of Kam, enclosed on one side by the China Sea—which the mother obstinately called the Pacific, “China Sea” having in her eyes something provincial, and because, when she was young, it was to the Pacific ocean that she had reported her dreams and not to any of those small seas that uselessly complicate things—and walled in toward the East by the very long chain which ranged the coast from very high up in the Asiatic continent, following a descending curve to the Gulf of Siam where it submerged and reappeared . . . (SW 24–25; translation modified)

Placing the children in the one water of the world, misnamed “pacific,” as it destroys human work and eats the land.

These passages resonated with a sense of new tasks for elite and subaltern that had come to me as a result of the sense of

the climate disaster already upon us. Asked by New York's Asia Society to reimagine the museum, I had said:

Let me confront [my] mother's liberalism, well-inherited by me: as acknowledgment of complicity (being folded together with what I critique), I have tried to use deconstruction as affirmative sabotage: do not excuse (saying "art can heal"), do not accuse (saying "museum is colonial"), but—enter that social formation that you are criticizing as thoroughly as you can (among our hosts this is not a problem, they are deeply and authoritatively imbricated in the curatorial work, it is a powerful auto critique)—so, enter to find in it a toehold that will allow you to turn the whole thing around to serve purposes other than its original self-comprehension. The sexy name for this toehold is "the moment of transgression." The pioneering introduction of land acknowledgments into the Metropolitan Museum allowed me such a toehold—the walls of the museum were transgressed or breached. The walls of the museum of the metropolis, *the* metropolis, had been breached, it has been located as mere built space. Let us listen to Mieke Bal on the Met:

The Met fits all the priorities of its own social environment: Western European art dominates, American art is represented as a good second cousin, evolving as Europe declines, while the parallel marginal treatment of "archaic" and "foreign" art, from Mesopotamian to Indian, contrasts with the importance accorded to "ancient" as predecessor: the Greeks and Romans. As "natural" as such priorities may seem—due to what is available, one

might say; but why? the difference with the British Museum in this respect tells us that these random facts are not so arbitrary. The overall impression is one of complete control, possession, storage: the Met has the art of the world within its walls, and its visitors have it in their pocket. It is possible to attribute this odd combination to the racism inherent in the colonialist origin of the museum, safely referred back to an age before today's alleged race and gender consciousness.

Bal's piece was published in 1992. The Met has made many conscientious changes since then, as it has passed through different directorships. Yet it must nonetheless be said that it might not be enough to appoint the brilliant new Associate Curator, Patricia Marroquin Norby, Purépecha, and to "include Native American objects" now defined as "art."

Let us read the acknowledgment, necessarily in English.

"The Metropolitan Museum of Art is situated in Lenapehoking, homeland of the Lenape diaspora, and historically a gathering and trading place for many diverse native peoples, who continue to live and work on this island. We respectfully acknowledge and honor all Indigenous communities—past, present, and future—for their ongoing and fundamental relationships to the region."

The Lenapes, like subaltern Africans, were multilingual, and Lenape itself is, like Yoruba, a collective singular name for a multiplicity. What is it simply to say: we are sitting on your land but we respect you? I am not speaking of open-air museums, Yosemite, etc. Not



Bronze plaque installed on the facade of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Fifth Avenue facade. It is placed below a similar plaque that pays tribute to the City of New York.

of creating the artificial natural. I am reminding you that at the end of *Capital*, vol. 1, Karl Marx suggests that the capitalization (read spectralization-museumization) of land produces so-called primitive accumulation, making industrial capitalism possible. Thus, allowing the “Native American” the same modernity as ourselves, in today’s contested future, rather than propose “sustainable tourism” (I quote the World Monuments Heritage Fund), we should all learn to undo our minds to realize that (ourselves as) the world itself—and this is everyone—can only acknowledge that it was imposed on commons. For this, one of our tasks (indicated by

suggestions, for example, to the World Economic Forum and Comparative Education Society), is to impart to the subaltern indigenous a real sense of the cartographic world, rather than dwell on the fact that most indigenous languages have a word for “world,” but not for “colonialism,” or “deconstruction.”

How is this tremendous epistemological performance, sustained by imaginative activism rather than cost-effectiveness, to be achieved? Perhaps it will hit us by creative chance (Aristotle calls this *tuchè*) as we perform the short-term tasks assiduously, without personal politics; or, bigger yet, let us turn to the . . . mad mathematician/philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein: “when we arbitrarily conceptualize something . . . we are not surprised by those *Vorstellungen* enough to say ‘Look there!’” (trans. modified). We must wait for the re-imagined meta-museality as dictated by the planetary to surprise us.¹⁸

This surprise, at the contingent rather than the expected necessary breaking in upon us, is the quality of the literary. And the literary “translates” the planetary—the meta-museal geobiological—into contingency.

In the long passage, the task for the elite and the subaltern are differentiated as follows. I repeat:

Thus, allowing the “Native American” the same modernity as ourselves, in today’s contested future, rather than propose “sustainable tourism” (I quote the World Monuments Heritage Fund), we should all learn to undo our minds to realize that (ourselves as) *the world itself—and this is everyone—can only acknowledge that it was imposed on commons*. For this, one of our tasks (indicated by suggestions, for example, to the World

Economic Forum and Comparative Education Society), is to *impart to the subaltern indigenous a real sense of the cartographic world*, rather than dwell on the fact that most indigenous languages have a word for “world,” but not for “colonialism,” or “deconstruction.”

Comparative Literature must work out the details on the repeated relay of the performance of these tasks in terms of specific historical social relations of the production of value. Let me cite here a welcome local effort undertaken with my beloved colleague Rosalind Carmel Morris. It is to record bits of television or social media programs explanatory of climate disasters that would be accessible to the cognitive preparation of specific subaltern groups that we have associated with, learning to learn from below; and get them subtitled in the world’s wealth of subaltern languages. We would still not be able to access the unsystematized languages, and also not the vast population, the major victims of the Anthropocene, who use mnemonic languages—languages written on memory—generally described as illiterate. How to undermine top-down philanthropy in this performance? Another task for Comparative Literature beyond the disciplines. I am trying to find an answer to this, but cannot talk about it yet.¹⁹

Some years ago, I reopened an unfinished conversation with Derrida, interrogating his suggestion that followable directions within a forest—the prefiguration of mapmaking—was the first writing. My thoughts ultimately became “Halting the Map Maker,” Inaugural Lecture, 50th Annual Convention, International Association of Art Critics, Paris, November 13, 2017. I have not been able to publish the lecture because my subject there is the feminine transcendental, and, like (but of course nothing is “like” planetarity, the “just[ice] of the weather,” as *Beloved* will have it) planetarity, we cannot grasp it, but bits and pieces are here and there.²⁰ The feminine transcendental,

graspable only through the structure of marriage, is absorbed into the Earth in conclusion. In the first edition, I read Diamela Eltit, who formed part of a course, twenty years ago, when I was edging toward thinking the feminine transcendental, and had come as far as the impossibility of representing a feminist hero. Zoë Wicomb's *David's Story* was part of the syllabus.²¹ Gender remains the dangerous supplement, wedging the incalculable into the totality of any system, even of Comparative Literature beyond the disciplines. So I stand here on the margins of your book, in the name of the incalculable and the untranslatable, and say to the reader, grab the baton and run, take it somewhere else, as long as the planet lasts.

NOTES

1. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "To My Questioners: Alphabetically Listed by Last Name," *Comparative Literature Studies* 60, no. 2 (May 2023). This interview in *Comparative Literary Studies* is published as part of a forum titled "Traveling with *Death of a Discipline*: Forum on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Publication of *Death of a Discipline*." I also ask my readers to glance at my book on Du Bois, tentatively entitled *My Brother Burghardt*, forthcoming from Harvard University Press.

2. For an account of the production of knowledge on the occasion of planetarity, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Climate of History in A Planetary Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021) and its voluminous documentation. He does not, of course, think of the humanities as training in the practice of learning, but rather, contrasts them to science as follows: "Every consensus in the sciences exists only to be challenged by new research, which is why consensus is much harder won than in the humanities, which in contrast and by its very nature often seems to be a collection of schismatic churches and their conflicting dogma" ("Planetary Humanities: Straddling the Decolonial/Postcolonial Divide," *Daedalus* 151 [3] [Summer 2022]: 230). He contrasts the "findings and propositions of Earth system science, [where] the climate crisis becomes a human encounter with the idea of ourselves as a geological

force, an encounter, that is, both with geological deep time and with our entanglement with other forms of life and thus with the geobiological history of the planet.” In response to this, he sees “humanists”—by which I suppose he also means humanities teachers—as “constant[ly] invoking . . . a potential *we* of humans as part of conditional solution-proposing statements that take the form of ‘If only we . . .’” (230–231). As I will argue in this preface, our *we* must always remain ready for expansion, and change form, keeping the idea of the collectivity related to our work as “relay,” by way of something like the dispersed “new international” of which Derrida wrote many years ago (Spivak, “A Note on the New International,” *parallax* 20 [July–September 2001]: 12–16). Although I share Chakrabarty’s view that the conformity of indigenous groups to their own cultural prescriptions, often more fearful of “Nature” because of technological simplicity, should not be confused with environmentalism and is not going to lead directly to solutions to the climate crisis without massive epistemic intervention, I do think that there are mythic signals for thinking something like deep history and the geobiological in their cultural formation. As I suggest on pages 72–73 of the first edition, “We provide for ourselves transcendental figurations of what we think is the origin of this animating gift of animation, if there is any: Mother, Nation, God, Nature. These are names of alterity, some more radical than others. Planet-thought opens up to embrace an inexhaustible taxonomy of the whole range of human universals: including but not identical with aboriginal animism as well as the spectral white mythology of post-rational science.” Keeping herself to the literary, Thangam Ravindranathan has suggested that we read passages that seem to signal toward such mythic hints toward deep history and the geobiological with something like superstition (“Superstitious Reading,” paper presented at the conference, “Climate Crisis in South Asia: Imagining Other Ways,” Columbia University, October 14, 2022). As I have argued elsewhere, the contingent escapes all production of knowledge. With Wittgenstein, I suggest keeping the door open for the contingent through the idea of being surprised by alterity “translated” into the contingent. The idea will be explored further in the text (see pages 17, 23, and *passim*).

3. Initially published in both English and German as *Imperatives to Re-Imagine the Planet / Imperative zur Neuerfindung des Planeten*, ed. Willi Goetschel (Vienna: Passagen, 1999). Reprinted in a revised version as “Imperative to Re-Imagine the Planet,” in Spivak, *An Aesthetic Education*

in the Era of Globalization (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 335–350.

4. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Death of a Discipline* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 33 and 86. Hereafter cited in the text with page reference alone.

5. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Planetarity,” in Barbara Cassin, ed., *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 1223.

6. “So-Called Primitive Accumulation,” in Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, *A Critique of Political Economy*, tr. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), 873–942.

7. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value,” *Diacritics* 15 (4) (Winter 1985): 73–93.

8. Christine Brooke-Rose, *Subscript* (Manchester: Carcanet, 1999); hereafter cited in the text as S, followed by page reference.

9. Marguerite Duras, *Sea Wall* (London: Faber, 1986), 138 (translation modified); hereafter cited in the text as SW, followed by page reference.

10. Édouard Glissant, *Introduction to a Poetics of Diversity*, tr. Celia Britton (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, [1996] 2020), 27.

11. Spivak, “How the Heritage of Postcolonial Studies Thinks Colonialism Today,” *Janus Unbound* 1 (1) (Fall 2021): 26–27.

12. Extramoral in the sense of Nietzsche’s “Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, tr. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 139–153.

13. For a discussion of how textual rhetoric calls for counterfocalization, see my reading of J. M. Coetzee’s *Disgrace* in “Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teaching,” in Spivak, *Aesthetic Education*, 316–334. Gerald Prince’s warning, given to me in private conversation, that free indirect discourse recognition depends upon the reader must be kept in mind. It can produce the kind of politically correct reading as the African National Congress’s dismissal of *Disgrace* as racist.

14. SW 288; translation modified. The English makes them “babble”—humanizing—and translates *cases* as “cabins,” socializing. Earlier (SW 25) *piailler* is translated as “cheeping,” as the noise the children make.

15. This is how John Keats celebrated the sameness of creatures of natural origin, contrasting it with the differentiated lives and deaths of

individuated human beings in “Ode to a Nightingale.” In Duras’s unrelenting fictive world, these children are represented in that sameness. The translation does not preserve the rhetoric that signals this to the canny reader.

16. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” in *Early Writings*, tr. Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage, 1975), 328.

17. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Readings* (Calcutta: Seagull, 2014).

18. Please consult Vijay Prashad, “In the Name of Saving the Climate They Will Ueberise the Farmland: The Forty-Sixth Newsletter (2021),” Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, for an example of the spectralization of land. Examples are everywhere. <https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/agricultural-technology/>.

19. Work started with Oluwaseun Akinfenwa.

20. Especially in the memorial tribute to Nabaneeta Dev Sen (“A Tribute to the Incomparable,” Nabaneeta Dev Sen Memorial Lecture, January 15, 2022). I have also been unable to publish a piece relating to the feminine transcendental, “Imagination, Not Culture: A Singular Example,” William James Lecture, Harvard Divinity School, April 10, 2008.

21. Zoë Wicomb, *David’s Story* (New York: Feminist Press, 2001).