Triadic Coercion
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Wendy Pearlman
About this book
Author / Editor information
Wendy Pearlman is Martin and Patricia Koldyke Outstanding Teaching Professor in the department of political science at Northwestern University. Her books include We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria (HarperCollins, 2017), and Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement (Cambridge University Press, 2011)—which was a Runner up for Foreign Policy’s 2011 Best Book on the Middle East and a 2012 Choice Outstanding Academic Title.Atzili Boaz :
Boaz Atzili is an Associate Professor at the School of International Service at American University. He has written Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict (University of Chicago Press, 2012) and articles in International Security, Security Studies, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and International Studies Review.Wendy Pearlman is Martin and Patricia Koldyke Outstanding Teaching Associate Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. She is the author of Occupied Voices: Stories of Everyday Life from the Second Intifada (2003), Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement (2011), and We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria (2017).
Boaz Atzili is associate professor and director of the Doctoral Studies Program in the School of International Service at American University. He is the author of Good Fences Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict (2012) and coeditor of Territorial Designs and International Politics: Inside-Out and Outside-In (2018).
Reviews
Triadic Coercion will serve as a milestone in international relations theory and especially in the realms of deterrence and coercion theories. Pearlman and Atzili's book makes a significant contribution to the literature on asymmetrical conflicts and counterinsurgencies and to literature on the conflicts between Israel and its neighbors.
Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland:
Two accomplished political scientists tackle an issue that has received little attention in the literature: dealing with nonstate actors by targeting their hosts. They find that Israel tends to adopt this strategy far more than Turkey and India, despite its mixed results, particularly when regimes of targeted states are weak. They persuasively attribute this to 'strategic culture' which often trumps sound decisions. A thoughtful and informative contribution.
Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University:
Both policy makers and scholars talk a lot about deterring state sponsors of terrorism, but until now we have lacked a serious study of the topic. With theoretical sophistication and careful empirical research, Pearlman and Atzili show that this approach can work, but paradoxically only if the host regime being targeted is strong. This is a major contribution to understanding an important topic.
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