

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
I. THE STRATEGIC SETTING	7
I. THE RISE OF AMERICAN SEAPOWER	7
II. BRITISH SEAPOWER	8
III. JAPAN'S EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER	12
IV. JAPANESE-AMERICAN POLITICAL RIVALRY	13
V. THE AMERICAN NAVY AND JAPAN	15
VI. THE JAPANESE NAVY AND THE UNITED STATES	20
II. THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF NAVAL LIMITATION	23
I. THE UNITED STATES	23
II. GREAT BRITAIN	32
III. JAPAN	36
III. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921-1922	43
I. PRELIMINARIES	44
II. THE CONFERENCE	57
III. RATIFICATION	69
IV. CONFOUNDED EXPECTATIONS	73
I. NAVAL PLANNING AND DOCTRINE	73
II. DEPLOYMENT	78

viii Contents

III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FAR EAST	93
IV. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE	96
V. THE GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1927	108
V. THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1930	113
I. HOOVER AND STIMSON	113
II. PRELIMINARIES	118
III. THE CONFERENCE	129
IV. RATIFICATION	138
VI. CONFOUNDED EXPECTATIONS AGAIN	147
I. THE UNITED STATES	147
II. GREAT BRITAIN	155
III. JAPAN	158
VII. THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1935-1936 AND ITS AFTERMATH	165
I. PRELIMINARIES	165
II. THE CONFERENCE	175
III. BREAKDOWN AND BREAKOUT	180
VIII. CONCLUSION	193
I. FINDINGS	194
II. NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION AND ARMS CONTROL TODAY	200
APPENDIXES	203
A. TONNAGE ALLOWED UNDER THE TREATIES OF 1922 AND 1930	203
B. TONNAGE OF COMPLETED SHIPS IN 1922 AFTER SCRAPPING BY TREATY	205
C. NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAMS, 1922-1939	206
D. U.S. AND JAPANESE AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION, 1932-1939	208
NOTES	209
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE	255
BIBLIOGRAPHY	257
INDEX	277