Home Business & Economics 7. Contractual and Voluntary Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: There Is Still More to Do
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7. Contractual and Voluntary Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: There Is Still More to Do

  • Richard Gitlin and Brett House
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Too Little, Too Late
This chapter is in the book Too Little, Too Late
© 2017 Columbia University Press

© 2017 Columbia University Press

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents vii
  3. Acknowledgments ix
  4. Introduction xiii
  5. Part I. General Issues of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
  6. 1. Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring That Works 3
  7. 2. Sovereign Debt of Developing Countries: Overview of Trends and Policy Perspectives 33
  8. 3. Private Creditor Power and the Politics of Sovereign Debt Governance 56
  9. Part II. Two Case Studies: Argentina and Greece
  10. 4. From the Pari Passu Discussion to the “Illegality” of Making Payments: The Case of Argentina 77
  11. 5. Greek Debt Denial: A Modest Debt Restructuring Proposal and Why It Was Ignored 84
  12. Part III. Improvements to the Contractual Approach
  13. 6. Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds 109
  14. 7. Contractual and Voluntary Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: There Is Still More to Do 144
  15. 8. Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Coasean Perspective 163
  16. 9. Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Understanding the Benefits and Addressing Concerns 175
  17. Part IV. Proposals for a Multinational Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Principles, Elements, and Institutionalization
  18. 10. A Brief History of Sovereign Debt Resolution and a Proposal for a Multilateral Instrument 189
  19. 11. Toward a Multilateral Framework for Recovery from Sovereign Insolvency 206
  20. 12. Making a Legal Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Operational: The Case for a Sovereign Debt Workout Institution 223
  21. 13. Perspectives on a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework: Less Is More 231
  22. 14. Toward a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Can Public International Law Contribute? 241
  23. 15. Debts, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law: Advocating a Fair and Efficient Sovereign Insolvency Model 253
  24. Contributors 269
  25. Index 273
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