

## Introduction

THE Soviet regime seeks "world revolution," "world domination," "world hegemony." Such are the vague, indeterminate phrases usually employed to describe the world-wide ambitions of the Soviet Union. But these concepts do not take us very far when measured against the pressing need to define issues and sharpen the outlines of the Soviet grand design.

This study has two closely related aims. The first and principal one is to reduce to concrete terms the meanings concealed in the commonly repeated, but seldom examined, clichés about Soviet purposes and goals. The second basic aim is to question the adequacy of the existing pattern of interstate relations in the non-Soviet world when viewed in the light of the concrete Soviet plan for the future.

Some observers contend that the description of Soviet intentions must necessarily remain vague, since the Kremlin's original zeal for refashioning the entire world into an exclusive Soviet pattern has been attenuated by the conservatism and inertia that overtake any vast bureaucratic apparatus as it becomes enmeshed in the difficulties of running a modern industrial society. The logic of industrialization and the demands of an efficient rational administration, it is held, will mellow a militant totalitarian regime, even one infused with an inexorable drive for boundless expansion, into a regime that is mildly authoritarian and capable of accommodation to the prevailing nation-state system. The Soviet leaders are undoubtedly subjected to certain sobering restraints by impersonal social and economic forces. But could not these impersonal forces also be manipulated and directed by the personal force of a political elite dedicated to the achievement of its own grandiose vision? If so, it becomes imperative to know precisely what it is that the Soviet leaders want.

Another much wider audience, less steeped in the concepts of an

academic discipline, arrives at roughly the same conclusion—that the present inquiry is not a meaningful activity. This view springs from the perilous habit of wishful thinking. The West in general, and Americans in particular, tend to display a psychological resistance to facing up to the facts when the facts are unpleasant and forebode the worst. The perennial longing for an untroubled world, or simply the desire to be left alone, finds expression in reassuring self-deception. The prestige acquired from recent scientific and economic achievements has also made the Soviet regime increasingly admired and, among the wishful thinkers, increasingly accepted as a respectable member of the international community.

This study, unfortunately, can give no encouragement for complacency, since an examination of the evidence supplied by the Marxist heritage and developed abundantly by Soviet leaders and spokesmen has led to the conclusion that Soviet expectations and intentions constitute a well-delineated design for a world state.

The opening chapters are concerned with examining some of the direct evidence on this basic issue, as well as with analyzing other major Soviet doctrines that might seem contradictory to the Soviet aim of creating a world state. Then an attempt is made to derive from authoritative Soviet writings a picture of the structure and content of the world state that would follow from the logic of Soviet ideology, taking into account the important modifications of Soviet ideology that have resulted from its practical applications. Some of the questions inherent in this discussion are: How will political power be organized? Will the crucial decision-making groups be concentrated at a single nodal point, or are they to be distributed throughout the world so as to be more responsive to local needs? Is there to be a single highly integrated world economy? Is there an image of a single world culture and a single world language, and if so, what influence will existing national cultures and languages be likely to exert upon the character of these ultimate products?

Soviet methods for creating their world state are considered next, by contrasting Soviet statements concerning the completely voluntary nature of an ever-expanding Soviet state with the Soviet practice, grounded in theoretical justifications for war, of subjugating nations by means of crude military force. The question of other and rival supranational plans originating in the non-Soviet world is then examined to determine whether or not the Soviet leaders believe that

any such projects might be reconciled with their own design. The study finally rounds out the Soviet image of the future by picturing the ultimate destiny of their intended world state as it is expressed in the doctrine of the withering away of this state and its transformation into a stateless world community.

Drawing the outlines of the Soviet design for a world state is also intended to bring into focus the fate of the contemporary nation-state system and thereby to stimulate serious reappraisal of supranational projects. The Bolshevik Revolution has ejected the world state idea from the scholar's cloister and has thrust a particular version of it into the arena of practical politics. Whether or not it is palatable to examine this idea in no way alters the remarkable persistence of the Soviet regime in pursuing its vision of a world state. This persistence has created a force that must surely be reckoned with in the reshaping of the world community.

The non-Soviet world can no longer afford to ignore a design which is explicitly aimed at destroying the contemporary system of international relations. Nor can we adequately respond to the Soviet challenge by constantly being placed on the defensive and viewing with complacency a fragmented non-Soviet world in the grip of an endless crisis. Confronted with the Soviet design for a world state, can the non-Soviet world confine itself to a precarious patchwork of expedients, or must it not conceive of its future in positive, creative terms and hammer out some common plan for its own survival, which might ultimately foster the genuine integration of all nations? The final chapter of this work is a brief, suggestive sketch of certain steps that might promote the healthful expansion of a supranational community, without, in the process, risking national suicide or destroying the precious freedoms of Western civilization. This points to conclusions that are not commonly accepted in the popular forum. Yet to be a realist in politics should include not only the realm of what is possible today, but also a careful scrutiny of what may become possible tomorrow.

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# The Soviet Design for a World State

