PREFACE

We aim in this book to introduce Egyptian politics to different, if sometimes overlapping, groups: those who know little about Egypt (but want to learn); those who have little background in the academic study of politics (and might find an overly scholarly approach full of off-putting jargon); those who have been trained as political scientists but know little about Egypt; and finally, those who know Egypt and its politics well (but are ready for fresh perspectives).

Addressing these different audiences has led us to be careful in our choice of terminology (explaining those terms we feel we need, such as "corporatism"), judicious in our introduction of new concepts (such as "habitus economy"), and still bold in some of our interpretations—so that we do not write incomprehensibly to those with no background but offer insights to those with deep prior understanding. We have adopted a comparative approach in framing much of our analysis without the formality of a comparative research design; that is, we draw on examples and comparisons from other cases in order to frame our presentation of Egypt and highlight its broader implications but do not present this as following any explicitly comparative methodology. And we have marked off areas in which our interpretation leads us a bit off the beaten path without positioning ourselves explicitly in every scholarly debate that has taken place.

While writing for such different audiences can be challenging, the task has emphatically not been complicated by an attempt to bring together three different scholarly voices. Our expertise and understandings have been complementary rather than contradictory. One of us (Nathan J. Brown) has worked on a variety of subjects (most recently on religion, law, and judicial structures). He took the lead on most of those sections that focus on formal political structures (mainly in part 1), as well as in editing the entire manuscript for consistency of style and usage. Shimaa Hatab was the primary drafter for most of part 2, drawing on her expertise in political mobilization and social movements in Egypt and in comparative perspectives. Amr Adly brought his expertise in political economy and development, leading our efforts in most of part 3. We all commented on each other's drafts, adding material where we had special expertise, and all pitched in on topics, such as religion or the 2011 uprising, where our expertise overlapped. The argument presented in this volume is the result of discussion among the authors and reflects our consensus view. Our individual views on some issues varied; we put this forward as a collegial project but not as a sum of individual contributions. The result is thus an integrated work rather than an anthology. All three of us have conducted primary research in Egypt, observed the society over time, and participated in international scholarly discussions about Egyptian politics in comparative perspective.

The purpose of the book is in part to draw on rich bodies of social science scholarship and political analysis produced in the Arab world, the United States, and Europe. In that way, the book incorporates recent scholarship on Egypt but also addresses broader questions in political science involving regime type, social movements, and economic development. But the book is not merely a summary. We have worked to develop and advance a persuasive and coherent presentation of modern Egyptian politics, society, and economy—and to do so not by walling Egypt off from comparative analysis, but by treating Egypt in terms of concepts and debates that have proven useful for understanding politics in terms of global trends and broader phenomena.

That broader perspective does not lead us to expect to locate Egypt as moving along a single path. Indeed, global politics seems to be moving in different directions at the same time: toward a more liberal direction and away from it. Politics is growing more participatory but not always more stable or democratic. Authoritarian regimes have tumbled in Latin

America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, where they have been succeeded by a wide variety of both authoritarian and democratic regimes, as well as several kinds of hybrids. States have grappled with a desire to control and manage societies characterized by growing complexity in the creative ways that people organize, mobilize, and spread information—and state control has sometimes withered but other times grown stronger. Socialism and communism have decayed or collapsed so thoroughly that for a long time there was talk of a "Washington consensus" among international actors who argued that free market economic reform would raise any floundering economy. But that consensus has now crumbled without a return to the past. Alternatives to political democracy, social pluralism, and economic liberalism have arisen—but democracy, pluralism, and liberal economics have not disappeared.

This ferment spans continents, but we will focus on how the trends have operated in Egypt. The strong authoritarian, state corporatist, and socialist regime that appeared so strong a half century ago gradually loosened and gave way to one that sometimes promised democracy, free association, and economic reform—but delivered none of these things.

While we will focus on Egypt, our understanding is necessarily comparative. A number of countries have sparked scholarly interest in the way they have confronted a similar array of problems, and we seek to present our analysis in a manner that draws on—and contributes to—more general ideas about regimes, development, social movements, and state structures. Brazil, Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Argentina, and Korea have all diverged from the paths of democracy, pluralism, and liberal economic development (or if they have generally followed some of these paths, they have experienced unexpected bumps and detours). But the divergences have been very different in degree and kind. Understandings of the changes have sometimes been all too teleological—asking how democracy, pluralism, and prosperity can be realized instead of asking what trends are actually operating—with the result that scholars are sometimes better able to explain what did not happen than what did.

If we understand that global trends show divergences as well as commonalities, we are similarly alert to the different ways that Egyptians experience, view, and act in politics. Our openness to diversity leads us to insist that Egypt cannot be seen as speaking with a single voice or as an embodiment of a single will.

After an introduction that will give the necessary background on Egyptian society and politics, our book presents its analysis in three sections: one on the state and regime type; one on society; and one on the economy. In each section, we structure our inquiry around a pressing debate among social scientists that will frame our understanding of Egypt. And we select non-Egyptian cases in each section for comparative purposes, to shed light on the Egyptian case but also on the general phenomenon. For regime type, we do not ask why Egypt is not democratic. Instead, we ask what regime it has and how that regime sustains itself (when it does). We compare Egypt primarily to cases in Europe to understand what factors shape a particular country's trajectory. For society, we examine what happens when state corporatism breaks down, and we seek to understand how social movements operate in an environment that is far from pluralistic. We compare Egypt primarily to Latin America and other regions to gain a more general understanding of these questions. Finally, we consider the evolution of Egypt's economy away from socialism but absent any particular alternative direction. Concepts like "crony capitalism" and the "East Asian model" animate many discussions of economic development. However, they do not always provide the most helpful way to understand economic policy making and performance. In the economic section, we compare Egypt primarily to the East Asian cases.

We hope that our efforts in analyzing and explaining Egyptian politics will meet the interests of the diverse audiences for whom we write. Our task is a large one, but it is not boundless, since there is one audience we do not mention. By writing in English, and by assuming little prior knowledge of Egypt on the part of the reader, we are not writing for an Egyptian audience. Or rather, we are not doing so in this edition of the book. But we also plan to contribute to Arabic-language discussion about Egypt. Our intention is to modify the present text in order to develop an analysis that is appropriate for an Egyptian (and broader Arabic-speaking) audience—those who will need a bit less historical background but who may still find some insights into the politics of their homeland.

In writing this book, we have benefited from much moral and even a bit of material encouragement. The three of us were initially brought together through overlapping experiences with the nascent Arab Political Science Network (APSN); Ahmed Morsy of the APSN has quietly cheered us along. We were also hosted at workshops run by the Project on Middle East

Political Science (POMEPS) and the Department of Political Science at the American University in Cairo. Marc Lynch, the director of POMEPS, has been encouraging of this project from its inception, carefully reading two drafts of the manuscript—for which readers should thank him as much as the authors! POMEPS sponsored a session in which we discussed the project outline; Tarek Masoud and Lisa Anderson provided some valuable early guidance at that session. When we had a full manuscript, we held a workshop at the American University in Cairo at which we subjected Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, Cherine Shams, Samer Shehata, Ayman Ismail, Mohamed Fahmy Menza, Nadine Sika, and Omar Ghannam to a daylong discussion of our draft. Rosalie Rubio, Mark Berlin, and Aparna Ravi helped us polish our prose, iron out wrinkles in our argument, and communicate our ideas more clearly; Caelyn Cobb led a supportive team at Columbia University Press that included copyeditor Ryan Perks and production editor Kathryn Jorge. The Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University funded some critical editorial support as we worked to fashion our ideas into presentable prose. Sultan Alamer helped us enormously with the index.

The dedication to this book speaks largely for itself, but we cannot resist a final word: Samer is deeply missed, but we hope those who knew him find this book a fitting tribute to his legacy.