Constitution Making Under Occupation
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Andrew Arato
About this book
As long as it was used in a coherent and legitimate way, the method held promise. Unfortunately, the logic of external imposition and political exclusion compromised the negotiations. Andrew Arato is the first person to record this historic process and analyze its special problems. He compares the drafting of the Iraqi constitution to similar, externally imposed constitutional revolutions by the United States, especially in Japan and Germany, and identifies the political missteps that contributed to problems of learning and legitimacy.
Instead of claiming that the right model of constitution making would have maintained stability in Iraq, Arato focuses on the fragile opportunity for democratization that was strengthened only slightly by the methods used to draft a constitution. Arato contends that this event would have benefited greatly from an overall framework of internationalization, and he argues that a better set of guidelines (rather than the obsolete Hague and Geneva regulations) should be followed in the future. With access to an extensive body of literature, Arato highlights the difficulty of exporting democracy to a country that opposes all such foreign designs and fundamentally disagrees on matters of political identity.
Author / Editor information
Andrew Arato (PhD, Political Science, Chicago) is the Dorothy Hart Hirshon Professor in Political and Social Theory at the New School. He is the author of a number of books, including Post Sovereign Constitution Making: Learning and Legitimacy (Oxford, 2016), Adventures of the Constituent Power (Cambridge, 2016), and Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).Andrew Arato is Dorothy Hart Hirshon Professor of Political and Social Theory at the New School for Social Research and founding editor of the journal Constellations. He has advised constitution makers in Nepal and the Hungarian parliament, and his books include Civil Society and Political Theory; Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy; From Neo-Marxism to Democratic Theory; The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism; and Habermas on Law, Democracy, and Legitimacy.
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Frontmatter
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Contents
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Preface
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1. The Externally Imposed Revolution and Its Destruction of the Iraqi State
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2. Postsovereign Constitution Making
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3. Sistani Versus Bremer
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4. Imposition and Bargaining in the Making of the Interim Constitution
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5. The Making of the “Permanent” Constitution
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Conclusion
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Notes
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Index
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