Russia in the System of International Relations from the Second Half of the Sixteenth to the first Half of the Seventeenth Century

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The internal disorder of the "Time of Troubles" at the beginning of the seventeenth century was closely bound up with external political factors that reflected Russia's position in the system of European and Asian states and her relations with neighboring countries. In the final analysis, these factors flowed from those problems of foreign affairs which, in the objective path of things, history placed before the Russian state at the end of the fifteenth century. That was the period of the elimination of the fragmentation caused by the appanage system, and the end of the yoke of oppression from the Golden Horde.

The government of Ivan III (1462–1503), the first sovereign of "all Russia," already began to carry out the foreign policy program formed by Moscow politicians up to that time. The policy's first point was a consequence of the incomplete process of regaining the ancient Rus' lands, which were lost during the age of appanage fragmentation and the foreign yoke. Their reunification, which stretched over several centuries, inevitably caused Russia to collide with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and with Poland, for it was precisely to them that the lands passed, becoming known from the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries as the Ukraine and Belorussia. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which came into being as a result of the unification of Poland and Lithuania (the Union of Lublin in 1569), also governed some of the Great Russian lands, and had pretensions to others as, for example, Pskov and Novgorod. Other neighbors, Sweden and the Livonian Order, hankered after them as well.

This position of the Polish-Lithuanian rulers destabilized the internal situation in Russia. Princes of various appanages that belonged to the

uncles and brothers of the Moscow rulers, in their opposition to the latter, leaned on help from the West, appealed to it, or hoped for it. The grand princes and then the Muscovite tsars were compelled in the struggle with the remaining appanage figures to consider foreign factors.

The second point of the foreign policy program of Moscow flowed directly from the first: acquiring exits to the seas, primarily the Baltic and Black Seas, which were necessary to a young and growing state. Once, in the time of Kiev Rus', the state had had these outlets, for several coastal areas belonged to it: the Caspian, Azov, Black and Baltic Seas. But they passed to militant neighbors: the Golden Horde and Lithuania, Livonia and Sweden.

The third point of the program was the conclusion of the struggle with the Golden Horde which had oppressed Rus' for no less than two and a half centuries. From the 1420s to the 1460s it broke into a series of khanates: the Crimean in the Crimean Peninsula, Kazan', Astrakhan' along the central and lower Volga, the Great Horde, the Great Nogai Horde and the Lesser Nogai Horde in the Northern Caucasus, on the Caspian steppes beyond the Volga, Siberian and Western Siberian Khanate, and the Kazak and Uzbek to the south of it. A few of them, especially the Crimean Khanate, already from the end of the fourteenth century had become vassals of powerful Turkey, and the Kazan' Khanate strongly vexed Russia with frequent military invasions, raids, stealing of captives, demands for tribute, and ransom.

It is not difficult to notice the triune character of the origin of these problems that stood before the country and its leaders at the turn of the 15th-16th century.[1]

In the course of war at that time Moscow succeeded in returning to Russia various lands in the west and south-west (Briansk, Chernigov, Gomel', Viaz'ma, Smolensk and others with their surrounding areas). That is, ancient Russian possessions along the upper Desna, Oka, Dnieper, and Western Dvina rivers. Simultaneously, serious defeats at the hands of Russia shook the Livonian Order on the Baltic coast, also a long-time enemy.

In the first half of the sixteenth century Russia had to beat off frequent assaults by the Crimean Tatars from the south and Kazan' Tatars from the

1. K. V. Bazilevich, *Vneshniaia politika Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva. Vtoraia polovina XV v.* (Moscow, 1952); A. A. Zimin, *Rossiia na poroge novogo vremeni (Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Rossii pervoi treti XVI v.)* (Moscow, 1972); A. A. Zimin, *Rossiia na rubezhe XV-XVI stoletii (Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii)* (Moscow, 1982).

east. In the middle of the century she moved to a decisive offensive in the east and included into Russia the Khanates of Kazan' in 1552 and Astrakhan' in 1556, and then Bashkiria and the Urals: the western side after the taking of Kazan, and the eastern, after the campaign of Ermak and the destruction of the Great Siberian khanate in the 1580s.[2] From the end of the sixteenth century Russia included a significant part of Western Siberia. (The beginning was at the end of the fifteenth century, when, as a result of the campaign of Muscovite generals, Moscow acquired the lands along the lower Ob'). The successes of the Eastern policy and the expansion of Russia beyond the "Rock" (as the Ural Mountains were then called) foreshadowed the swift advance of the Russian land and sea explorers—military servitors and traders, peasants and townspeople—into the "land under heaven"—Siberia—with its furs and other wealth. Within a century they had reached the shores of the Pacific Ocean.

In the course of the long Livonian war (1558–1583) Ivan the Terrible and his government attempted to resolve the Baltic problem. However, unlike the successes in the east, in the west, in the final analysis, Russia experienced failure. Despite victories at the end of the '50s and the mid '70s (at which time the Russian army had taken possession of almost all Livonia), the war ended indecisively with the loss of all conquests along the Baltic coast. Among the causes for this were the over-straining of the strength and abilities of the state and people, economic impoverishment, bad harvests and hunger, epidemics and the massive flight of the impoverished people to the borders, and the terrible shock of the *oprichnina*, with its terror and destruction.[3] Moreover, Russia had to fight on two fronts: in the north-west against Livonia, the Polish-Lithuanian State, and Sweden, and in the south against the Crimea and Turkey.[4]

2. V. V. Kargalov, *Na stepnoi granitse. "Oborona 'krymskoi Ukrainy'" Russkogo gosudarstva v pervoi polovine XVI stoletiia* (Moscow, 1974); R. G. Skrynnikov, *Ivan Groznyi* (Moscow, 1975); R. G. Skrynnikov, *Sibirskaia ekspeditsiia Ermaka* (Novosibirsk, 1986); A. A. Zimin and A. L. Khoroshkevich, *Rossiia vremeni Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow, 1982).
3. G. V. Forsten, *Baltiiskii vopros v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh (1544–1648)*, vols. 1–2 (St. Petersburg, 1893–1894); V. D. Koroliuk, *Livonskaia voina* (Moscow, 1954); A. A. Zimin, *Oprichnina Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow, 1964); A. A. Zimin, *V kanun groznykh potriasenii. Predposylki pervoi krest'ianskoi voiny v Rossii* (Moscow, 1986); R. G. Skrynnikov, *Nachalo oprichniny* (Leningrad, 1966). Skrynnikov, *Rossiia posle oprichniny* (Leningrad, 1975). The *Oprichnina* was the private administration and court of Ivan the terrible, set up in the years 1565–1570 as a weapon in his struggle with the boyar aristocracy. [For non-Russian readers the editors suggest reference to R. O. Crummey, The Formation of Muscovy 1304–1613, pp. 161–164, 170–172.]
4. N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiia i Turtsiia v XVI-XVII vv.* vols. 1–2 (Moscow, 1946); A. A.

The collapse of military efforts in the north-west meant failure for Russia in the attempt to decide the Baltic problem. In her hands remained only a scrap of land at the mouth of the Neva. The Russian towns of Ivangorod, Iam, and Kopor'e along the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland were transferred to the Swedes. They were successfully reconquered during the Russo-Swedish war of 1590–1593, but the "Time of Troubles" in the midst of the other shocks and failures, led to the loss of this outlet on the Baltic Sea coast. There remained, for ties with European states, only the White Sea, distant and cold. Here, at the mouth of the Northern Dvina, the city-port of Archangel (1584) was built and it was "the northern window" to Europe until the beginning of the Northern war, when Russia acquired St. Petersburg and other ports on the Baltic.

At the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries Russia strengthened her position beyond the Volga, the Urals, and in Western Siberia by way of economic assimilation, the building of towns, and the further advance of traders to the east. In the Northern Caucasus the dependence of Kabarda on Russia which had been lost during the Livonian War was renewed. Georgia became an ally of Moscow.

At the close of the sixteenth century one must recognize the internal situation of Russia to be very complex and unenviable. The fault for that was the economic and social crisis that enveloped the state, the growth of mass discontent of the population because of the disasters and burdens of the time of the *oprichnina* and the Livonian War, with the introduction of brutal enserfment legislation, and the struggle for power at the top (the "crisis at the top").

The position of Russia weakened noticeably in the international arena.

In the life of countries in West and Central Europe the sixteenth century was the beginning of the capitalist era and a struggle of two state-political concepts: a program of "universal monarchy," the "supranational" power of the Habsburgs (the Holy Roman Empire or the House of Austria) on the one side, and national absolutism on the other (France and England). Simultaneously this was the epoch of humanism, the Reformation, powerful anti-feudal peasant and plebeian movements, and of numerous heresies and sects. The complex situation provoked, on the one hand, opposition of the absolutist regimes of England and France to the half-hearted intention of the Empire to unite under its power all of

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Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII v.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1948); G. D. Burdei, *Russko-turetskaia voina 1569 g.* (Saratov, 1962).

Europe; and on the other, their general struggle with the revolutionary pressure of the lower classes. It is known, for example, that Francis I, a passionate enemy of Charles V, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, in essence supported him during the Ghent rebellion of 1539–1540 in the Netherlands by giving passage to his army through the territory of France. But that same France, at first not supporting the Reformation in Germany, later, once its revolutionary wing was defeated by the German princes in subordination to the Holy Roman emperor, abruptly changed position and, in an alliance with the German Protestants, enemies of Charles V, she dealt a terrible blow to the Empire. In 1556 the latter broke up into two branches—the Spanish and the Austrian.[5]

By this time, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian state had become powerful factors of international life. And Europe had to consider this seriously. The Turks continually threatened the possessions of the German Empire. The Turkish danger compelled the Habsburgs, as well as the Pope, to look for help from the Moscow rulers. But those rulers were occupied with a struggle with Lithuania and the Livonian Order for the return of ancient Russian lands, an exit to the Baltic, and also with the khans—primarily the Golden Horde.

In the years of the Livonian War, Germany opposed "the Muscovite danger" (as the Livonian Order—an imperial fief—entered into the sphere of its interests). Emperor Ferdinand I officially sanctioned a trade blockade of Muscovy, that in actuality had been established already by his predecessor, Charles V. The Emperor and Papal Curia assisted the union of Poland and Lithuania in a dual state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569). But, in concluding peace with the Ottomans in 1568, Austria, which recognized itself as her tributary, in essence untied Turkey's hands in the struggle with Russia, and in the following year a united Crimean-Turkish army completed a campaign in Astrakhan which ended, however, unsuccessfully.

By this time the beginnings of an "eastern barrier" against Russia had formed out of the Polish-Lithuanian State, Sweden, and Turkey. The Empire supported them in every way possible—materially, diplomatically, with mercenaries, and with a trade blockade of Russia. To a significant degree this aided the failure of Russia in the Livonian War. For the Empire, such an outcome was very beneficial.[6]

5. B. F. Porshnev, *Tridtsatiletniaia voina i vstuplenie v nee Shvetsii i Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1976), 9–14.
6. B. F. Porshnev, *Tridtsatiletnaia voina*, 4–21; See also: I. B. Grekov, *Ocherki po istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii Vostochnoi Evropy XIV-XVI vv.* (Moscow, 1963); E.

The continuation of the struggle of the Habsburgs with national-absolutist England and France concluded at the end of the sixteenth century with the defeat of Philip II, the Spanish king. In the Netherlands, a bourgeois revolution was victorious, and a republic arose. The struggle of Protestantism with the feudal Catholic counter-reformation continued. That struggle placed Protestants in opposition to Catholic states, in particular opposing Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Russia at the beginning of the 1590s benefitted, and regained for herself the land near the Gulf of Finland (Iam, Kopor'e, Ivangorod, Korela). At the beginning of the 1600s she intended to promote demands for the return of Narva and Dorpat (ancient Iur'ev) with their environs.

Again, the "eastern danger" became a problem for the Empire and Russian pretenders came to the fore in the guise of "true Russian princes," pretenders to the Moscow throne. The rulers of the Polish-Lithuanian State and the Catholic courts of Western Europe stood as their support. The goal of this venture, as was admitted by Sigismund III, the Polish-Lithuanian king, was interference in Moscow affairs, the spread of Catholicism in Eastern Europe and in the region of the Baltic Sea.

When the False Dmitrii I was killed in Moscow (17 May 1606), Charles IX, the Protestant Swedish king and uncle of Sigismund III, the Catholic Polish king, informed the new Russian tsar, Vasilii Shuiskii, that the German emperor, the Pope, and the Spanish king were behind Poland's acting against Russia. He repeated similar warnings in the following years saying that the loss of Russia's independence was threatened, and offering help. And at last Shuiskii agreed: the army of Jacob De la Gardie entered the Novgorod lands and began to rob and pillage. The Swedes supplemented the Polish-Lithuanian intervention, which took on an open form from 1609 (the beginning of the siege of Smolensk).[7]

Relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden, especially with the former, had been brought to the forefront for Russia already at the end of the previous century. After the Livonian War the Russian government in its attempted resolution of the Baltic problem collided with the active opposition of the Polish-Lithuanian politicians, especially Sigismund III. This king, ruler of Poland since 1587, received in 1592 the Swedish crown as well, but lost it six years later. According

Donnert, "Rossiia i baltiiskii vopros v politike Germanii 1558–1583 gg.," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 76 (1965).

7. B. F. Porshnev, *Tridtsatiletnaia voina*, 21–33.

to the Tiavzino peace treaty of 1595 the Moscow government, fearing hostile activity on the part of Poland, agreed to include in it a clause concerning the Swedish monopoly on trade in the Baltic Sea. It would become a "Swedish lake." Swedish policy along the Eastern Baltic acquired an even greater expansionist character—the eyes of the court of Stockholm were directed toward Russian and Polish-Lithuanian possessions. And on their side, too, the Polish-Lithuanian politicians also dreamed about the Baltic coast.

At the beginning of the 1600s, in the course of negotiations with Swedish and Polish-Lithuanian representatives, Russian diplomats attempted to move forward a resolution to the question of an outlet to the Baltic, sometimes relying on Sweden, sometimes on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But these attempts were not crowned with success. After the break in the Polish-Swedish dynastic union Sigismund III did not retain hopes for the realization of plans that were frankly chimerical: mastery of the Swedish kingdom and the political subordination of Russia, in the latter case, with the complete removal from the agenda of the question of the return to Moscow of the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands.

The projects of a sort of "federation" of two governments—the Polish-Lithuanian State and Russia—prepared in the last quarter of the sixteenth century by the Polish-Lithuanian and Russian sides, were not realized, since the ruling groups of both countries pursued differing goals: the ruling elite and gentry of Russia attempted to regain the lands of Ancient Rus', the Kievan inheritance of the Moscow sovereigns; the Polish magnates and gentry wanted not only to preserve their Ukrainian and Belorussian possessions, but also to convert particular Russian lands into an object of feudal colonization. This last they tried to realize during the years of the Russian "Time of Troubles" when military actions were organized in the neighboring Slavic government.

The beginning of the "Time of Troubles" stimulated the aggressive plans of both Poland and Sweden. Their interventions, on the one hand, weakened Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, on the other hand, they made possible the formation of Sweden as a great power on the Baltic Sea.[8]

The relations of Russia with the Western European states at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries were not so

8. B. N. Floria, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia i baltiiskii vopros v kontse XVI-nachale XVII v.* (Moscow, 1973); B. N. Floria, *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia i politicheskoe razvitie Vostochnoi Evropy vo vtoroi polovine XVI-nachale XVII v.* (Moscow, 1978).

lively. For example, the Russian government exchanged letters with the French court which were sent by courier. The first Russian embassy to France was in 1615–1616 (I. Kondyrev and M. Neverov); the first French one to Russia in 1629 (Baron Courmenin).[9] From the middle of the sixteenth century the Netherlands arranged trading ties with the Russian state. The English and Danes were the rivals to their merchants. The Netherlanders traded even in the years of the "troubles," but after their end, England and the Netherlands set up diplomatic relations with Russia. Kondyrev and Neverov, without the knowledge of France, visited the Netherlands, conducting negotiations with the local authorities. Dutch diplomatic representatives appeared in Moscow later.[10]

In the second half of the sixteenth century Russia engaged in a lively trade with England. But negotiations for a military alliance, which were conducted at the end of the '60s and beginning of the '80s, were never brought to a conclusion; the English side drew back, not wanting to be drawn into a conflict in Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, negotiations for such an alliance took place with Sweden, but these too came to nothing.

Philip II displayed an interest in Russia, dreaming of her help against the Turks and even of converting Russia to Catholicism, and joining her to his possessions. Nicholas von Warkotsch, residing in Moscow in the 1580s as an ambassador of Germany, came forth as *de facto* representative of Spain. He and his adviser, the Netherlander, Van der Walle, an agent of the "Spanish King," tried to incline Moscow politicians against the Turks and the English. But Moscow did not wish to conduct war against the Ottoman Porte, nor to lose trade with England. Tsars Fyodor Ivanovich and Boris Godunov confirmed the privileges of the English merchants. Russia continued trade with the Netherlands, despite the insurrection of local "rebels" against their monarch, the King of Spain.[11]

Relations with Turkey and the Crimea in the second half of the sixteenth century were complex and difficult. Both of these states carried out an openly aggressive policy toward Russia. Suffice it to say, that of the

9. G. Zhordaniia, *Ocherki iz istorii franko-russkikh otnoshenii kontsa XVI i pervoi poloviny XVII v.*, pt. 1 (Tbilisi, 1959); V. D. Preobrazhenskii, "Franko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI-XVII vv.," *Uchenye zapiski Iaroslavskogo pedinstituta*, vyp. VII, *Istoriia* (Iaroslavl, 1945).
10. V. A. Kordt, "Ocherk snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Respublikoiu Soedinennykh Niderlandov po 1631 g.," *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 116 (St. Petersburg, 1902).
11. Ia. S. Lur'e, "Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia i mezhdunarodnaia politika vtoroi poloviny XVI v.," *Mezhdunarodnye sviazi Rossii do XVII v. Sb. statei* (Moscow, 1961), 419–443.

25 years of the Livonian war, 21 years were marked by assaults or invasions of Crimean Tatars. Some of them were devastating. For example, in 1571 the Crimean army pillaged all the land to the south of Moscow, reached the capital itself and put it to the torch. In the following year, Devlet Girey, the Crimean Khan, with a huge army, again invaded Russia with the aim of conquest—a real threat to the national independence of the state. An army of the "land" of Prince M. I. Vorotynskii saved the country (an *oprichnina* army had suffered a shameful defeat one year earlier) in a battle lasting several days on the Oka River near Serpukhov, and on the Lopasna River by the village of Moloda, smashing the conqueror. For a while the Crimeans were quiet. Then assaults were renewed along the southern border of Russia. In 1591 they again reached Moscow, but were defeated under its walls. The Great Nogai Horde, attempting to restore independence from Moscow, also carried out raids on Russian lands (in the '70s and first half of the '80s). In the second half of the '80s the Russian government again subjected the Great Nogais to its power.

At the end of the century Crimean and Nogai assaults on Russia almost completely halted. From 1593 on the Crimea and Turkey began a long and exhausting war with the Habsburgs, Hungary, Moldavia and Poland.

A change of course occurred in 1607 when they ceased the above-mentioned campaign and the Crimea concluded an alliance with Poland against Russia stricken by the "troubles." Again raids by the Crimeans followed, in which the Great Nogais took part. Peaceful relations of the Crimea and the Nogai Hordes with Russia were resumed only in 1616–1617.[12]

Trading ties with Turkey were set up in Russia fairly early, from the second half of the sixteenth century. From the end of this century diplomatic contacts began, and the exchange of ambassadors. Right up to 1569, in spite of the absence of any treaty of alliance, relations were more or less peaceful in character. But after the annexation of Kazan' and Astrakhan' by Russia and the establishment of the Great Nogais and Kabardians in vassal dependence to her, the situation changed sharply. There followed new raids by the Crimeans and the campaign of a Turko-Crimean army to Astrakhan' in 1569.[13] The ensuing failure put an end to the attempts of Turkey to fight with Russia for the mouth of the Volga, but did not stop the attempts of the Ottomans to push the Russians from

12. A. A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII v.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1948), 17–44.
13. N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiia i Turtsiia*, 1:68–120.

the Caucasus. These continued until the beginning of the seventeenth century; moreover, the sultans gave to the Crimea, their vassal, an active military role. Russian politicians, in opposition to this onslaught, relied on the power of their own state, the rising activity of the Don Cossacks, and conducted negotiations with the opponents of Turkey, the Persian Shah and the Holy Roman Emperor. At that time Moscow in no way put forward plans of war against Turkey itself, which remained a very awesome enemy.[14]

Diplomatic relations were in place with Iran from the middle of the sixteenth century. After the conquest of Kazan' a Persian envoy, Seiid-hussein, appeared in Moscow in 1553. In response, Ivan IV directed his envoy to Iran. The representatives of both states discussed questions of importance for them regarding an alliance against Turkey and the Crimea and for this they encouraged the Pope, the Doge of Venice, and the King of Spain. However, wars with their enemies long prevented Russia and Persia from concluding a treaty. Only in 1602 did both sides agree on joint activities against Turkey. For two years the Russian detachment of I. M. Buturlin marched toward Derbent (Dagestan), where there was a Turkish garrison. But failure awaited him. The death of Boris Godunov, the Russian tsar, and the adventures of the pretender prevented the fulfillment of the campaign.

Common interests in opposition to allies of Turkey—the *shamkhal* in Dagestan, Bukhara in Central Asia and Khan Kuchum in Western Siberia—also united Iran and Russia.

In the years of the "Time of Troubles" Russia in practice ignored eastern affairs. True, Abbas I, the Persian Shah, formed ties with both the False Dmitriis and the government of V. I. Shuiskii; his goal was to receive some kind of help in the war with Turkey which Persia was conducting at this time. Thus, he counted on the aid of Russian Cossacks in the Northern Caucasus (the town of Tersk and others) against the Turks, and on income from northern trade.

After the accession of Michael Romanov a Russian ambassador was sent out to Iran and ties between both countries were renewed. Abbas I, at Moscow's request, rendered financial help to Russia. Trade relations were arranged. In the correspondence of the sovereigns with one another friendship and an alliance between Russia and Iran were discussed.[15]

14. N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiia i Turtsiia*, 120–159.

15. A. P. Novosel'tsev, "Russko-iranskie politicheskie otnosheniia vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.," *Mezhdunarodnye sviazi Rossii do XVII v. Sb. Statei* (Moscow, 1981), 444–461; A. P. Novosel'tsev, "Russko-iranskie otnosheniia v pervoi polovine XVII v.,"

The penetration of Russia into the Northern Caucasus after the annexation of the Astrakhan' Khanate in 1556, the incorporation of the Kabardians, and the appearances of Russian towns and garrisons on the Terek river, provoked the dissatisfaction of two strong military-feudal monarchies: Turkey and Iran. The latter warred between themselves over the Caucasus. At first, in the sixteenth century, it was possible to speak of the predominance of Turkey in this region—she had taken almost all of Trans-Caucasia and had reached the Caspian sea, and together with the Crimea she was active in the Northern Caucasus as well. At the beginning of the following century the advantage passed from the weakened Porte to the Safavid state of Shah Abbas.

Russian presence and influence in the Northern Caucasus permitted Moscow to oppose the Turkish-Tatar danger along the southern perimeter of their possessions, to guard the Volga route, and to develop trade with countries in the Caspian region.[16]

The stormy conditions of the "Time of Troubles" in Russia coincided with significant changes in the remaining parts of Europe. In 1606 the war of Turkey with the Habsburgs ended. In Germany an offensive began of the Catholic counter-reformation against the Protestants—Lutherans and Calvinists—who had united their forces in 1608 in the Protestant, or Evangelical, Union. It stood in opposition to the Catholic league, formed in the following year. War became imminent between them and the states which supported them; on the side of the Protestant Union stood England, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden; on the Catholic side were Austria (Germany), Spain, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. True, the internal opposition in the possessions of the Austrian Habsburgs (the insurrection of Stephen Bocskay 1604–1606, the struggle for the throne between Rudolph II of Hapsburg and his brother Matthew, the religious disputes) delayed the outbreak of the European war, but not for long. Besides this, they played their role in Russian affairs: in Vienna they awaited with impatience the victorious conclusion of the Polish Lithuanian intervention in Russia, for the success of the Catholic offensive in North-East Europe would become the signal for mobilization in Western and Central Europe. But Russia, it would seem, almost on its knees, continued resistance. In 1609 Sweden arrived to help her. In order to distract Sweden, Habsburg diplomacy encouraged the Danish court in

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Mezhdunarodnye sviazi Rossii v XVII–XVIII vv. (Ekonomika, politika i kul'tura). Sb. statei (Moscow, 1966), 103–121.

16. E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo kavkaza i ikh sviazi s Rossiei. Vtoraia polovina XVI-30-e gody XVII v.* (Moscow, 1963).

war against Charles IX. The Danish-Swedish war of 1611–1613 ended with Gustav II Adolf's, the new Swedish king's, conclusion of peace with Denmark, and also of a truce with Poland. This allowed both Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to be active again in their efforts in Russia. But the entrance into the arena of struggle by the people, who rose up in patriotic war against the foreign invaders, concluded with the expulsion of the Polish-Lithuanian army from Russia. And in 1613 the Assembly of the Land chose Michael Fyodorovich Romanov as Tsar. He became the founder of a new dynasty of Russian tsars, recognized at once by England and the Netherlands. They laid the groundwork for a Russo-Swedish truce that led eventually to the conclusion of the Stolbovo Peace of 1617 that ended Swedish intervention in Russia.

Among the countries of the anti-Habsburg coalition, especially England and the Netherlands, the question of trade with Russia played an essential role. To be exact, those countries received from the Russian market strategic goods necessary for the outfitting of the fleet (canvas, hemp, tar, masts, ropes), as well as other valuable commodities (leather, wax, felt, furs, honey, etc.). Trading operations of both countries with the Muscovites were not broken even during the years of the "Troubles"; on the contrary, they expanded. In the course of embittered rivalry, Dutch merchants pushed the English from first place into second; trade with Russia, from the standpoint of contemporaries, became one of the sources of the economic power of the Netherlands. Russia had great importance for Western Europe for the transit trade from Persia as well.

In the event of its success Polish-Lithuanian intervention in Russia would benefit the Habsburgs by the breakdown of English and Dutch trade in the east. Therefore financial and military help was sent from Austria to Poland, whose emissaries hired mercenaries in Habsburg lands.

Poland, with the help of the Empire, had already attempted to realize her plans of conquest in the east. But even she was forced to resign herself to a truce with Russia at Deulino in 1618. The sending of the army headed by Prince Wladyslaw (the pretender to the Moscow throne from the time of the Russian "regency of seven") and the active support of the Empire did not help.

Russia saved her national independence. But when the price had to be paid, it was not small: the southern and eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland remained in the hands of Sweden; the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth kept the Russian lands of Smolensk, Chernigov, and Novgorod-Severskii. Their return became a problem for the future, but while Moscow politicians waited there were more current, pressing affairs.

The Russian government in the years from 1613 to 1615 directed

ambassadors to various countries: to the Netherlands—Ushakov and Zaborovskii; to England—Ziuzin and Vitovtov; to Denmark—Bariatinskii and Bogdanov, etc. They notified foreign governments of the ascension to the throne of the first Romanov. After concluding peace with Sweden and a truce with Poland it became clear in Russia that the plans of the Habsburgs and their Polish-Lithuanian allies in the east had suffered a blow. But the Russian state, after the internal and external shake-up, was seriously weakened.

The Habsburgs considered such a situation in Eastern Europe very beneficial for the struggle for an all-European Catholic empire. The Thirty Years War that began in 1616–1618 made possible the end of the repeated attempts of the Polish-Lithuanian State again to grab Russian lands, threatening her with the loss of national and state independence.[17]

In the ambassadorial book published below the activity of the Russian ambassador in England, Alexis Ziuzin is described, which, as was explained above, occurred in very complex international circumstances. The materials of this important mission very clearly and convincingly speak of this complexity. They give valuable testimony of the situation of Russia and England at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when Russia was concluding a difficult period, and the West was occupied by the dawn of its own "Time of Troubles"—the Thirty Years War.

17. B. F. Porshnev, *Tridtsatiletnaia voina*, 33–56; O. L. Vainshtein, "Rossiia i Tridtsatiletniaia voina 1618–1648 gg.," *Ocherki iz istorii vneshnei politiki Moskovskogo gosudarstva v pervoi polovine XVII v.* (Moscow, 1947), 12–42.