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6 The Nationalist Party in Liangshan, 1937–49

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A Frontier Made Lawless
This chapter is in the book A Frontier Made Lawless
158 6 Th e Nationalist Party in Liangshan, 1937–49 From the beginning, the Guomindang had been inveterate supporters, in theory, of the sort of colonial developmentalism outlined in Chap-ter 1 . However, the actual pursuit of developmentalist policies came second to gaining and maintaining power in China, for which most things could be sacrifi ced. When the party needed the aid of Mongol leaders in the struggle against northern warlords during the Northern Expedition, they promised the Mongols that Chinese colonists would not settle their lands (though in the 1920s and early 1930s the party organized settlement schemes in present-day Inner Mongolia). 1 After forming a government in Nanjing, the party engaged in a minimal way with the Tibetan and Mongol lands and their leaders through the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Aff airs. As Hsiao-ting Lin comments, for most of the commission’s staff , the territories were places they had “never seen, were unlikely to have the opportunity to see, and perhaps did not particularly want to see.” 2 Th ere was a diplomatic mission to Tibet in 1934, and the commission ran schools where around three hundred Tibetan and Mongol youths studied – some of whom, such as the Kham native Phüntso Wangye, would later perform important functions in the Chinese takeover of non-Han territories the Republic had always claimed but not actually ruled. 3 But most of these former students played these roles for the Communist Party, not the Guomindang. Not until the Japanese invasion of 1937 did the Guomindang gain any real power in any region of the upland Southwest. The Second World War served to accelerate both colonization and colonial conflict in many parts
© UBC Press

158 6 Th e Nationalist Party in Liangshan, 1937–49 From the beginning, the Guomindang had been inveterate supporters, in theory, of the sort of colonial developmentalism outlined in Chap-ter 1 . However, the actual pursuit of developmentalist policies came second to gaining and maintaining power in China, for which most things could be sacrifi ced. When the party needed the aid of Mongol leaders in the struggle against northern warlords during the Northern Expedition, they promised the Mongols that Chinese colonists would not settle their lands (though in the 1920s and early 1930s the party organized settlement schemes in present-day Inner Mongolia). 1 After forming a government in Nanjing, the party engaged in a minimal way with the Tibetan and Mongol lands and their leaders through the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Aff airs. As Hsiao-ting Lin comments, for most of the commission’s staff , the territories were places they had “never seen, were unlikely to have the opportunity to see, and perhaps did not particularly want to see.” 2 Th ere was a diplomatic mission to Tibet in 1934, and the commission ran schools where around three hundred Tibetan and Mongol youths studied – some of whom, such as the Kham native Phüntso Wangye, would later perform important functions in the Chinese takeover of non-Han territories the Republic had always claimed but not actually ruled. 3 But most of these former students played these roles for the Communist Party, not the Guomindang. Not until the Japanese invasion of 1937 did the Guomindang gain any real power in any region of the upland Southwest. The Second World War served to accelerate both colonization and colonial conflict in many parts
© UBC Press
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