FIVE

The Digital Census and Kurdish Community Self-Organisation

Iida Käyhkö

Introduction

In this chapter digital responsibilities are examined through a local lens, considering how a digital deployment of a civic policy, in this case a population census, reveals how the state can take digital responsibilities for granted. It also shows how local actors are often required to step in and make it possible for individuals to action their civic responsibilities digitally. This is a study that can be framed as one situated at an intersection between digital responsibility and civic responsibility.

The study examines digital responsibility practices among London's Kurdish community in relation to the UK's 2021 census and provides input on creating accessible and secure digital services for marginalised communities, particularly those that have a fraught relationship with the state. It provides a window into the existing practices of responsibility among London's growing Kurdish diaspora, and what these can tell policy makers about the concerns and challenges encountered in digital interactions with the state. Further, it looks at how digital services are engaged within a particular cultural setting, and why specific cultural environments must be considered in discussions on digital responsibility.

Figure 5.1: Digital census



The study engaged with the largely Turkish-speaking North London Kurdish community, which settled in Hackney, Haringey and Enfield throughout the 1990s and 2000s. This is a multiply marginalised community experiencing housing and employment insecurities, the UK's hostile environment towards migrants, as well as criminalisation due to political activity. For this study, interviews were carried out with community organisers who designed and implemented a self-organised outreach and support plan for the 2021 census. Further, the social media output from Kurdish organisations and community members was analysed.

The study found that the idea of digital responsibility was shaped by specific cultural settings, and that practices of outreach and support may already exist in informal and semi-formal networks, unnoticed or unaided by local councils or central government. While the census of 2021 might have been expected to be met with suspicion among London's Kurdish community, steps taken by community organisers created a sense of trust and excitement around it and provided secure and accessible environments for community members to fill in the census. The shouldering of digital responsibility is not merely

Figure 5.2: The need for community response

a question of providing expertise or assisters to marginalised communities, but rather of engaging with existing community networks from a perspective of civic responsibility. By examining digital responsibility through a perspective of civic responsibility, this study urges a move towards an understanding of relational and communal challenges and resources in questions of digital responsibility, and the role of community self-organisation in providing both security and access.

The study begins with a brief outline of the context in which the research was carried out, focusing on the Kurdish community's relationship with the British state and with census-taking. Following this, the study design is outlined. This is followed by methods and findings, before a discussion section and conclusions.

Background

The 2021 UK census was a digital-by-default census or a so-called 'smart digital census'. This approach to gathering

census data is regarded as having a number of advantages over a paper-based data collection approach. These advantages include (Younus et al, 2024): greater data accuracy, efficient and cost-effective data collection, reduction of data errors and a more comprehensive analysis of population trends and a more inclusive means of gathering data on these trends. Of particular interest for demographers are the trends in ethnicity. The 2021 census enabled further data gathering and analysis on the relationships between ethnicity and national identity in England and Wales. The design of the 2021 census included automated capacity to identity as ethnically Kurdish, and the use of a smart digital census enabled the first real-time data gathering on the demographics of the Kurdish diaspora in London.

The Kurds are the world's largest stateless people, with a significant diaspora population outside of Kurdistan. The area of Kurdistan is divided between four states – Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran – with the largest Kurdish population living within the borders of Turkey (McDowall, 2021). Kurds have been the target of genocidal and assimilationist policies for several decades across these four nation states. The UK is host to a significant diaspora community which is politically active in grassroots community organising and lobbying over the political rights of Kurds within Kurdistan (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2018).

As is frequently noted in introductions to the Kurdish people, no reliable census data on the Kurdish, or indeed Alevi, population exists almost anywhere in the world, including the region of Kurdistan (Sirkeci, 2000; van Bruinessen, 2000). The four nation states occupying Kurdistan are not keen to encourage Kurdish nationalism or political activity through providing opportunities to identify as Kurdish; further, forced assimilation efforts across the region have not only denied the existence of the Kurdish people, but also succeeded in erasing the ethnic and cultural background of many families and communities (Sirkeci, 2000).

In Europe, Kurds are largely included in Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi or Syrian citizenship and ethnic categories, reflecting the diversity in linguistic, national and cultural identifiers among Kurds. In the UK, the only way to identify as Kurdish in the national identity, ethnicity or language portions in the censuses prior to 2021 was through the writing-in option. In addition, the Home Office does not collate data on the ethnic background of asylum seekers, only their country of origin (Demir, 2012). Consequently, the precise number of Kurdish people in the UK is not known. The majority of the Kurdish population of the UK is subsumed into the 'Turkish' citizenship category – reflecting the Kurds' societal position as an 'invisible' minority population (Baser, 2011; Enneli et al, 2005). Kurdish community organisations emphasise that the lack of a straightforward way of identifying as Kurdish has led to many Kurds self-identifying according to the nationality they hold, rather than using the write-in option (van Wilgenburg, 2021).

Estimates from Kurdish community organisations regarding the number of Kurds living in the UK have ranged from 100,000 to 180,000 (Demir, 2012); these estimates, however, are not recent enough to reflect the arrival of significant numbers of Kurdish refugees from Syria following the civil war, nor those fleeing the escalation of anti-Kurdish political repression in Turkey in recent years. In the 2011 census in England and Wales, just under 50,000 people identified as Kurdish (ONS, 2011). A similar number of people stated their first language was Kurdish (Gopal and Matras, 2013). Both identifications were done through the write-in option.

This study was situated in the UK, with the Kurdish diaspora settled in London. This study built on an existing research relationship with the largely Turkish-speaking North London Kurdish community, which settled in Hackney, Haringey and Enfield throughout the 1990s and 2000s, with Dalston and Green Lanes as two local hubs of community centres and businesses (Wahlbeck, 1998). One of these community centres, in Haringey, is a central hub for Kurds across North London.

Much of the community actively involved in the day-to-day activities of this community centre considers itself part of the broad Kurdistan Freedom Movement, which is a network of broadly left-wing civil society organisations which has its origins in the PKK (Partîya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Worker's Party). As the PKK is included in listings of terrorist organisations in the UK and in the European Union, the community experiences political repression and criminalisation in the form of arrests, raids and surveillance (Sentas, 2016). The British state's relationship with NATO ally Turkey is seen by many in the community as a security concern: many active community members are political refugees fleeing repression, whose extradition the Turkish state continues to demand (Sentas, 2018).

Further, London's Kurdish population experiences insecurity and criminalisation on two other levels. First, as asylum seekers, refugees and migrants under the UK's hostile environment policy, many among the community face bureaucratic challenges in accessing employment, housing and public services (Enneli et al, 2005). Racism and Islamophobia are common experiences, which further impact housing and employment opportunities as well as educational achievement (Jones, 2013). Second, Kurdish

Figure 5.3: Trust – a key challenge

men and boys frequently face discriminatory policing and stop-and-search practices which specifically target young racialised men (Ali and Champion, 2021). These experiences contribute to a generalised sense of suspicion towards the state.

Research approach

The study was designed to examine what we can learn about digital responsibility from looking at how a community with severe mistrust of the state engages with the state's data collection enterprise. The context for the study is the completion of the 2021 UK census that was designed as a digital-by-default activity. As part of the study, responsibilities for the following were considered: barriers to digital participation among London's Kurdish community, the role existing community networks play in facilitating engagement with the census, and community mitigation of anxieties concerning the use of personal and sensitive data when facilitating interaction between the state and individuals.

In April 2021, at the tail end of the third COVID-19 lockdown across England and Wales, the Office for National Statistics commenced its once-a-decade flagship project in a new format: the first census in which the majority of data was collected online. As the census moved online for 2021, the possibility for assisted, 'search-as-you-type' write-in options provided a greater number of officially recognised options for national identity, ethnicity, language and religion. The ONS ran a public consultation on tick box provision for ethnic groups, with certain modifications made for 2021, and stated: 'Write-in answers, online "search-as-you-type" functionality, together with provision of communications, community engagement, and advice and help from field force and contact centre staff, will ensure everyone can tell us how they wish to identify themselves' (ONS, 2020).

Kurdish was included for the first time as a 'search-as-you-type' option for national identity, ethnicity and language, while

Alevi was included for the first time as an option for religion. This had been lobbied for by a number of Kurdish and Alevi community organisations over the years and was celebrated widely as a crucial moment of recognition for the Kurdish diaspora community, with potential geopolitical repercussions (van Wilgenburg, 2021).

However, the COVID-19 pandemic hindered much of this work, as noted in a Parliamentary briefing paper: 'The COVID-19 pandemic poses operational challenges to census-taking, with the potential to affect both the preparation phase (e.g. engaging with community groups), and the census itself (e.g. carrying out face-to-face work to support people to complete returns)' (Barton and House of Commons Library, 2021).

Census information was provided to all households via post, with directions to responding online and an individual reference number included. Much of this correspondence emphasised the fines households might accrue by not responding to the census. To aid with non-digital census responses, field staff were sent to knock on doors across England and Wales. Many local services, libraries in particular, offered support in filling in the census (Barton and House of Commons Library, 2021).

Study design and methods

This study approached known community organisers with semi-structured interviews relating to their support and outreach efforts for the 2021 census, with the following interview questions:

- What were your concerns regarding the census of 2021 and the Kurdish community?
- What were the aims of the outreach and support work you helped carry out?
- What kinds of obstacles/concerns did people in the Kurdish community experience/express regarding the census? Were there positive aspects to it, too?

- What support did you receive for this outreach work from local government?
- How do you feel about state services increasingly moving to digital platforms? What impact do you think this will have on the Kurdish community in the UK?

Further, this study looked at social media content produced by members of the community to promote participation in the census.

Findings

The main findings focused on the role of community organisations in mediating the census requirements from the state and capability gaps and anxieties of members of the Kurdish diaspora. The first theme sets out the actions that the community organisations undertake to encourage and enable individuals to complete the census. The second theme sketches the main barriers to access for this particular group of census respondents. The third theme explores how the completion of the census keyed into the wider security concerns experienced by this participant group. The fourth and final theme reflects the disconnection between the establishment of the responsibility to complete the UK census, as set out in the instructions from the UK Government, and the avoidance of the responsibility – as perceived by the community organisers – by the local council to help individuals complete the census.

Support and outreach work

Community organisers at the Kurdish community centre in Haringey carried out an outreach and support project to help provide information on the census, as well as practical support in responding to the census. Outreach activities included:

- Creating social media content to be shared across different platforms, including on community WhatsApp groups.

Figure 5.4: Types of outreach



- Running adverts in local North London newspapers to publicise available support.
- Providing short clips to be run on Kurdish TV channels available in the UK.

These outreach messages emphasised the importance of filling out the census, included some practical visual guidance on responding to the census and highlighted that, for the first time, the census included 'Kurdish' as an option for national identity, ethnicity and language and 'Alevi' for religion as 'search-as-you-type' options. Some of the activities undertaken were modelled on outreach efforts for previous censuses, and the familiarity of community organisers with other digital support efforts in the past; however, they noted that the provision of these 'search-as-you-type' options added to their sense of needing to provide support for filling in the census.

In addition, community organisers assisted in filling in the census over a six-week period at a community centre in Haringey. Every Sunday, as well as on one weekday night,

four community members equipped with laptops would assist, translate and in many cases fill in the census for community members requiring assistance. The community organisers were from a younger generation of the community, all proficient in English and confident with their technological skills, but with no formal training in offering such services. However, as is common among children of migrants, many among this generation of Kurdish community members have been supporting their parents or families in relation to asylum claims, citizenship accession and other legal and/or bureaucratic processes from a young age (Fisher et al, 2016). Further, these community organisers were all well known in the community through their involvement in community organising. There was an expectation from the Kurdish community that they would make themselves available to support with census responses; this occurred within existing organisational and interpersonal relationships of trust and accountability.

Figure 5.5: Targeted census support

Social media content produced by community organisers and members included videos of different lengths, as well as infographics featuring GIFs of box-ticking or writing in 'Kurdish' or 'Alevi'. Much of this content was circulated widely across Instagram, Facebook and Twitter by organisational and individual accounts. This often-humorous content shares certain elements: explaining the significance of the census for local issues such as funding, or other state support for Kurds and Kurdish organisations; and just as frequently, emphasising the importance of making the UK's Kurdish population count in questions of foreign policy. A video, produced by young members of the Kurdish community, which premiered on YouTube in March 2021, pokes gentle fun at Kurdish cultural stereotypes while providing accessible information about the census in Kurmancî Kurdish. In the video, a census field worker arrives at the door of a North London Kurdish household, is promptly invited in, with a lavish spread of tea and food provided. The video shows the census field worker asking questions about the inhabitants of the household, the work they do and their national identity, ethnicity, language and religion, with the mother stating that they are all Kurdish, speak Kurdish and belong to the Alevi faith. At the end of the video, the mother invites the census worker, at this point addressed as 'sister', to stay the night, in a portrait of Kurdish hospitality (Sinayic, 2021).

Inclusivity and access

Community organisers outlined three central concerns for the Kurdish and Turkish-speaking community in London regarding filling in the census: access to a computer, technological skills and English language proficiency. Interviewees also noted that many older members of the community are illiterate or not confident in their ability to read. While many people received some support from family members, often children of different ages, the support provided by the community centre was

Figure 5.6: Technology barriers to overcome



also key to being able to and confident in responding to the census. The community organisers emphasised that despite the outreach work, many of the community members who received assistance in responding to the census were visiting the centre for other reasons: language classes, cultural events or on social visits. "We would grab them as they came in", one interviewee put it. The social nature of these interactions was emphasised by all interviewees: they described having tea together with community members while filling in the census or having community members offer dried fruit or homemade treats in thanks for the help they received.

Community organisers all emphasised the sense of excitement generated by the census:

> [The census] created a huge excitement in the community, and a sense of belonging [because it] gave us the opportunity to declare who we are … I heard my mum's neighbours talking about it, I heard aunties and uncles at weddings and funerals asking each other, "Have you filled it in yet?" (Interview 1)

This was also the main focus of informational social media content created by the community: emphasising the chance to identify as Kurdish and/or Alevi. All interviewees noted the sense of acceptance and belonging engendered by the inclusion of 'search-as-you-type' options, with many community members saying that seeing 'Kurdish' and 'Alevi' come up in the census form made them feel recognised by the state, and therefore more a part of British society. This was felt to be simultaneously a gesture of recognition and goodwill on behalf of the British state, and a demonstration of successful lobbying efforts by Kurdish and Alevi organisations:

> [The census] gave a feeling of being part of the wider British community. A Christian country giving us the chance to declare who we are! People really feel that this was a chance to show the British state that we are here. (Interview 2)

> I was excited to be part of the census. It was an opportunity to say, "I am a part of this community." (Interview 3)

Insecurities and concerns

On the other hand, community organisers noted that some members of the community were afraid of the possible consequences of identifying as Kurdish, Alevi or both: "Two or three families I helped [respond to the census] had this worry of declaring themselves Kurdish and Alevi. They were asking me, 'Will this cause problems when we travel to Turkey?' People are so worried about imprisonment and harassment" (Interview 1).

Specifically, this fear was related to the sharing of personal data with the Turkish state, and the possible negative consequences that might be encountered when travelling to Turkey to visit family, or consequences for

family members living in Turkey. Interviewees pointed out that as political migrants, many community members have personal experience of persecution and repression due to their ethnicity or religion. Community members generally were not trusting, or feel inadequately informed, about who their personal information would be shared with. It is significant, however, that none of the community organisers spoke directly about questions of security, indicating that these were not a prominent element in their interactions with community members. When asked, they did note these fears over data sharing with the Turkish state. However, they were not able to recall specific phrases or facts they might have used to assuage these fears. Although the ONS census website included information on data confidentiality, this was not mentioned by any of the community organisers as having been a useful tool for them in communicating with community members. The provision of simple reassurance was enough. Similarly, most of the social media content shared by community organisers did not seek to explain the privacy and security of personal data provided in the census, nor the possible repercussions of not filling in the census, but maintained a focus on the more positive aspects of the census.

Many also felt a lack of trust in the British state and a lack of expectation of future inclusivity:

> This is just the government collecting information for themselves. Our expectations of the British government are not matched. Just a census isn't enough. (Interview 2)

> A lot of people were asking, "What are you doing for Kurds now?" We had this option [of identifying as Kurdish/Alevi] on the census, but we still only have a write-in option on council forms. Nothing has been provided for the community. Why isn't the government

> providing a GCSE in Kurdish, or including Alevism on the curriculum? (Interview 1)

Sharing of responsibility

This feeling of the census not being enough to mitigate lack of support for the Kurdish community was felt particularly by the community organisers interviewed; they had received no support from local councils in their outreach and support work. When asked about their expectations regarding the council, the interviewees varied in their responses: from expressing no expectations of help, to articulating disappointment – particularly that local councillors from a Kurdish and/or Alevi background were not at all involved. None of them, however, expressed a feeling of surprise over the lack of support. It is important to note that it is possible that other Kurdish and/or Alevi community organisations in London received support from local authorities, but that there was no such outreach for this particular community centre.

Interviewees noted that without greater resources for outreach and support work, they felt they ultimately only reached a limited part of London's Kurdish community. They also emphasised future issues related to the British state's relationship with the Kurdish diaspora community; one interviewee pointed out that the struggle to carry out adequate outreach and support work for digital service access will continue for at least the next two or three decades, "until everyone in the community is digitally capable".

Finally, interviewees emphasised that in general, trust towards the state is minimal among much of the Kurdish community. They noted that many community members have been living and working in the UK for decades and have faced harassment by the police throughout. One interviewee characterised the British state as making few efforts to create bonds and warned: "In time, it will be impossible to come together."

Thinking about digital responsibility

Three lessons on digital responsibility can be learnt from this case study of the census outreach and support work carried out by the Kurdish community in North London:

1. Inclusivity is key to accessibility.
2. Trust and a sense of security are important in mitigating security concerns.
3. Community self-organisation can play an important yet invisible role in supported access.

First, all community organisers emphasised the significance of the recognition of Kurdish and Alevi identities in the 2021 census, and most of their outreach output emphasised this aspect of the census over all others. While it may have been expected that there would be hostility towards the census among a community that has a fraught relationship with the British state, this was not the case: the excitement and sense of belonging generated by the inclusivity of the census design far outstripped any concerns. There is a growing body of literature within digital civics, human computer interaction and critical security studies that focuses on describing difficulties of access among marginalised communities, and the many governmental, government-supported or grassroots efforts to facilitate access (Jensen et al, 2020a, 2020b; Talhouk et al, 2016). A growing body of literature emphasises the need for involving migrant communities in the design process to provide communities with secure and accessible digital services (Almohamed and Vyas, 2016; Fisher and Yafi, 2018).

The importance of inclusivity – even small acts such as 'search-as-you-type' options – may generate an unexpectedly large sense of goodwill and even community mobilisation efforts. Significantly, the number of people identifying as ethnically Kurdish in the 2021 census almost doubled from the 2011 census, from slightly under 50,000 to over 90,000.

Speculatively, one might surmise that the provision of the 'search-as-you-type' option, alongside community outreach both in person and online, together had some impact on this increase in numbers. Importantly, as this study shows, simply making the census digitally available did not make the census accessible. There was a clear disconnection between the realising and establishment of the responsibility of individuals and households to complete the census (as set out by the UK's central government) and the ability of individuals to respond and carry out this responsibility. In order for actioning of the individual's responsibility to take place, community organisations had to realise, establish and absorb the responsibility of making the census accessible to individuals. The findings also show that the excitement and sense of belonging generated by the inclusivity of the census design created the conditions under which community organisations were willing to insert themselves in this way. More must therefore be done to increase inclusivity across different spheres of digital services.

Second, this study highlights the significant role played by trust and a sense of security in responding to security concerns and underscores the significance of the relationship between responsibility and security. This relationship is no less important in the digital context and where the responsibility framework

Figure 5.7: Digital innovation needs inclusive responsibilities

is outcomes-based the likelihood is that digital protections and legal compliance will be the security approach, and where the responsibility framework is constitutively based the likelihood is that relational support, consensus building and trust-building will be the security approach. While none of the community organisers were able to – or even aimed to – provide detailed information to community members on the security of personal data in the census, their trustworthiness and accountability, and the safe, familiar space they created for the outreach work, played an important role in allaying security concerns. The role of relational services and access provided by kin or community networks on which many marginalised users depend is frequently characterised by networks of trust, which often operate very differently from more formal supported access efforts (Chouhan et al, 2019; Cipolla and Manzini, 2009; Ruiu and Ragnedda, 2016; Selwyn et al, 2005).

This relational approach foregrounds the role of ontological security, of feeling a sense of security, in accessing digital services (Giddens, 1991; Roe, 2008). As noted by Coles-Kemp and Jensen (2019, p 181), it is 'an individual's senses of trust and confidence that enables and sustains effective access' Marginalised people face heightened material and ontological insecurities in interacting with the state, often relating to asylum or residency claims (Jensen et al, 2020a). This study shows that it is not merely the provision of information that is central to reducing a sense of insecurity concerning digital services, but also the relationships, spaces and existing sense of trust that communities can offer. These relational services in turn provided the pathways through which responsibilities are actioned and in so doing, fostered a sense of positive security and enablement that reduced security anxieties. As the findings show, the choice of action could be tailored through the interactions between the community organisations and the individuals. The relational services also helped to establish a credibility of the civic and digital responsibilities that had been established around the delivery of the census.

Figure 5.8: Dispersed responsibilities

Finally, this study shows the significance of community self-organisation – often unnoticed or unaided by local councils or central government – in providing access and a sense of security. The shouldering of digital responsibility as carried out by the Kurdish community organisers interviewed in this study does not relate to the frequently evoked themes of *blame* and *culpability* for designers, innovators and organisations within digital responsibility literature. For example, van de Poel and Sand (2018) discuss the problems of attributing responsibility in innovation, proposing that accountability processes must be able to confirm the 'moral authorship' of innovators, and that a virtue-responsibility approach should enable innovators to take on responsibilities actively and voluntarily. This approach – of having to *create* a sense of responsibility for when things go wrong, and to coerce, or preferably to convince actors to take it on – is an underlying theme across much of the digital responsibility literature (Lima and Cha, 2020; Markus and Mentzer, 2014). It does not, however, describe the central questions of digital responsibility explored in this study. Instead,

the community organisations adopted a constitutive form of responsibility, which is forward-looking and largely uses social practices to negotiate and carry out responsibilities.

The study also provides an alternative framing of *responsibilisation* – which is typically regarded as governments requiring individuals to take action to reduce their vulnerability to cybersecurity issues, or to access digital services (Renaud et al, 2018). In this instantiation of responsibilisation, Kurdish community organisers independently took on the responsibility of providing digital access to the census for community members: community organisers did not expect support from local councils or central government, but did express their disappointment at the lack of it. Specifically, they articulated a wish for help in their outreach efforts and publicising the support work they were offering. Importantly, they were happy to self-organise support. The move to insert themselves between the state and the individual shows that community organisations understand that you cannot have effective responsibilisation without ensuring that the individuals can

Figure 5.9: Real relationships and digital responsibilities



action the responsibilities that are being conferred upon them. The provision of support by trusted members of the community in a shared cultural context and familiar space contributed to the access and sense of security felt by community members in relation to filling in the census. Therefore, it is crucial for local councils and central government to appreciate and understand existing relationships and community efforts in the realm of digital responsibility, and to support these on the terms of communities in question, especially about the agreement of all parties to monitor and regulate across the digital environment.

Conclusion

This study shines a light on the complexities of actioning digital responsibilities and highlights the disconnect that often exists between the civic responsibilities realised and established by governments and the realities of actioning those responsibilities by digital means. This study also reflects how responsibilities might be realised and established using an outcome-focused responsibility framework but are actioned using a constitutively based responsibility framework. The study also shows how through actioning digital responsibilities, responsibilities are often re-distributed and re-negotiated in order to enable individuals to make the required responses.

The problems of access and security faced by London's Kurdish community are well understood by community members and organisers. The well-coordinated outreach and support efforts relating to the 2021 census reflect this. These problems range from ones commonly found among marginalised and migrant communities, to highly specific issues encountered by the Kurdish community. This study shows that the shouldering of digital responsibility is not merely a question of providing expertise or assisters to marginalised communities, but rather of engaging with existing community networks of trust and duty. By examining digital responsibility through a perspective of civic responsibility, this study urges a

move towards an understanding of relational and communal challenges and resources in questions of digital responsibility, and the role of community self-organisation in shouldering a range of responsibilities regarding security and access. This study also indicates the need for further research on the differences and overlaps of formal and informal support, as well as the specific needs of different communities in accessing digital services.

Digital responsibility efforts should seek to build on already existing, everyday relationships between people and organisations to create shared parameters and practices of access, security, inclusion and responsibility. Leaving informal or semi-formal networks and communities already shouldering digital responsibilities unsupported and unacknowledged creates a sense of disconnection and resentment among communities, and disregards opportunities of developing shared responsibilities. A greater focus on inclusivity and collaboration with communities would increase the accessibility and security of digital services in particular for marginalised communities. Doing this design, outreach and support work on the terms of communities and with respect to existing networks and spaces of trust would be more likely to create a positive feedback loop of inclusion and shared responsibility. Supporting self-organisation efforts is a chance to create dignified, culturally sensitive digital inclusion in the future.