

# Introduction: Rethinking Migration – Challenging Borders, Citizenship and Race

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Socioeconomic systems and life itself depend on movement, yet we are poorly equipped to understand mobilities and how they enrich and impoverish our lives. Our habits of thought render some forms of (im)mobilities overly conspicuous and occlude others. The laptop I'm working on has components made from minerals obtained from Australia, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda and was most likely made in China, but its presence on a table in Bristol is unremarkable. The movements required to make it have been naturalized by centuries of forms of rule and technological change; they pass unnoticed, sedimented into everyday life. But other kinds of movement, chief among them 'migration', are exceptionalized. The territorial claims of sovereignty seek to fix people and places, even if trade, data and finance are acknowledged as needing to flow. To understand the apparently contradictory demands of sovereignty and capitalism, of supply chains and immigration controls, we need to look *at* and *from* the national border ([Hattam, 2022](#)). And the border is not only at the geographical edges of state territories. From document checks to free ports, via the domains, gateways and passwords of cyberspace, borders hatch the entirety of territory. Bordering processes in their multiple manifestations are part of all our lives, whether or not we are designated 'migrants'.

While there is nothing new about human movement, 'migration' has become a key concern of policy, politics and the media ([Manning and Trimmer, 2020](#); [Cole, 2022](#)). Across the world, 'migrants'<sup>1</sup> are positioned at best as a problem that needs managing but more often as a threat to culture, economy and politics, and particularly to the nation. While

many of those with a stake in migration debates – including, of course, migrants themselves – challenge the migrant-as-problem framing, they often acknowledge the repertoire they can draw on is limited: migrant as victim of human rights abuse (refugee, modern-day slave, broken body on the shore); or migrant as hard-working contributor (entrepreneurial actor, community builder). Migration academics too are increasingly concerned their scholarship unwittingly reproduces hegemonic representations of migrants as poor, racialized and culturally Other, and they are reflecting on how their research contributes to the widespread perception that migration is a problem (Dahinden, 2016; Schinkel, 2018; Anderson, 2019). A new, more critical scholarly engagement with migration is emerging that asks how we research migration without reinforcing the migrant as a problematic subject. But how do we move beyond critique and intervene to improve policy, practice and organizing rather than simply criticising them from the sidelines?

In scholarly and policy work, and often too in activism, migration (including asylum) is typically treated as a stand-alone issue, overlooking the fact that human movement is inextricably bound up with multiple mobilities (of goods, ideas, data) and socioeconomic processes and that only certain kinds of human movement, and certain kinds of people who move, are legally and socially labelled ‘migrations’/‘migrants’. Recognizing this and situating analysis of human movement within this broader landscape of processes and relations enables migration scholars to connect their work with other fields. This edited collection has contributions and curated conversations from academics across different disciplines, plus a conversation with a long-term activist, who all share an interest in different aspects of movement but do not necessarily research migration per se. It demonstrates how interdisciplinarity can open new insights into human movement and how the questions we ask across our disciplines are shaped by assumptions about stasis and mobility. Reflecting on ideas and actions centred on migration, with all their assumptions and contradictions, helps us better understand the worlds we are making. This volume offers conceptual, critical and creative approaches with two aims: first, to support academics, activists, policy makers and non-specialist readers in developing new thinking about migration and to make connections between migration and other academic, policy and activist fields; and, second, to demonstrate how academic research can contribute to practice and new thinking without conforming to a policy agenda or reifying policy categories.

This introduction to the book first explores the category of ‘migrant’. Who counts as a migrant is highly unclear and variable across policy, practice and academic research. Crucially, if we cannot be clear about who is a migrant, neither can we be clear about who is a citizen, and this has consequences for citizens and non-citizens alike. Having troubled this category, the

introduction poses three questions that illuminate three key, interrelated challenges faced by migration studies. These are challenges not only for researchers, but also for policy makers and other non-academic stakeholders. First, *what movements matter?* The separation of human movement/migration from the movement of non-human species and non-living things means our understanding of human movement is often highly partial and distorted, and we misread patterns and miss crucial interconnections. For example, trade and migration, the mobilities of goods and people, are deeply interconnected but typically siloed in research and political debates (though perhaps less in policy practice). Second, *how are we to denaturalize bordering?* The unquestioning assumption of the nation state form means we miss both the work that the nation state does and how it reproduces itself. This is particularly evident in the study of human movement (the nation state form is key to the making of migrants and citizens), but it also raises important issues across the social sciences and indeed beyond – for instance, what does the idea of a ‘national dataset’ obscure? Third, having problematized and complicated ideas of ‘migration’, we ask, *what are we to do with ‘migration’?* This discusses the power of representation and how social-forensic categories affect what they name – the ‘refugee’ is subject to restrictions and is expected to act in certain ways, and being labelled or labelling oneself a ‘refugee’ affects how one feels about oneself. Again, this is not restricted to the label refugee; one could say the same about other social categories, such as a trans person, a COVID-19-immune person or someone who is highly skilled. Names interact with the named, with consequences for research and politics.

Having outlined these challenges, this chapter then sets out the volume’s approach and chapters and how they exemplify responses to these challenges and can rethink migration and mobilities, arguing that conceptually based, critical and creative thinking is as important for practice as it is for theory.

## **The category ‘migrant’**

If everybody moves, when does movement become migration, who counts as a migrant and why? Even government statisticians, who are rigorous in the search for terminological clarity, do not have a singular definition. The two most common definitions are ‘foreign born’ and ‘foreign national’, and the statistics on, for instance, migration and employment, can look quite different depending on which of these definitions is used.

However, in public and political debate the small print of definitions is rarely of interest and the term migrant is loosely deployed. It can be used to describe historically minoritized communities – the Rohingya in Myanmar, rendered stateless under the Citizenship Law 1982, or ‘second-generation migrants’ in Europe. Furthermore, not everyone who crosses an international border is described as a ‘migrant’, and the European Commission is adamant

that the term should not be applied to ‘European mobile citizens’, framing debates on the movement of European Union (EU) citizens as completely separate from those on the movement of ‘third-country nationals’ (Ruhs, 2019). The United Nations takes the purpose of moving as well as the length of time a person stays in a state as relevant to defining migration and distinguishes between short-term and long-term international migrants (for example, United Nations, 1998). In everyday usage too, ‘migrant’ is distinguished from, for example, tourist or business traveller. But these distinctions are not particularly robust: for instance, the question of whether students should count as migrants is much debated, and northern Europeans and North Americans living abroad tend to think of themselves as expats, not migrants. Foreign-ness does not have to be associated with subjection. Saba Le Renard (2021), for example, has researched Westerners in Dubai not only as privileged migrants but also as local elites who play an important role in reproducing national, racialized, class and gender hierarchies. Putting it crudely, in media coverage – and therefore much public debate – a ‘migrant’ is a person whose movement, or whose presence, is considered a problem. Meanwhile border controls are typically – in wealthy countries at least – aimed at controlling the mobility of the poor.

The classed nature of migration, rendered visible in everyday understandings of who is a migrant, is evident in policy. Those who are wealthy or educated find it easier to access mobility, whether through global talent schemes or tourist visas, or by purchasing a golden visa or passport. The idea of migrants as working in low-waged jobs is partly a matter of perception, because foreign-born/foreign nationals in high-status work – bankers, professors or neurosurgeons – are not imagined as migrants even if they are subject to immigration controls. Across the world, immigration controls treat the low- and high-waged differently. National immigration regimes are typically twin-track: facilitating entry for the (better-paid) ‘brightest and best’ while imposing far more restrictions, pre and post entry, for the ‘low-skilled’. Visas for the latter are often temporary, with immigration systems designed to make it difficult to achieve legal permanent residence or citizenship.

These distinctions are both managed and obfuscated by the language and ideology of skill. Despite the systemic reliance of employment relations and labour market analyses on its analytical power, what constitutes skill remains remarkably elusive. Skill may be represented in years of education or in qualifications, or subject to special tests, but there is always something extra. One way of capturing this ‘extra’ is specialization, which can become a proxy for skill, with highly specific skills claimed for certain occupations, winning them improved wages and status. In this skills hierarchy, those who can turn their hand to everything – construction workers who dig and plaster today and lay foundations and build walls tomorrow, domestic workers who clean and cook at the same time as caring for an older person – are ‘unskilled’ and

left to hustle at the bottom of the skills pile. They are typically the most marginalized workers and include, of course, migrant workers who, labelled ‘unskilled’, are consigned to precarious work and status.

While being a low-skilled worker has specific consequences for migrants because of its associated conditionalities for immigration status, the consequences of the skills regime are deeply felt by citizens too. As Natasha Iskander puts it: ‘By denying the unskilled the more abstract, more agentic, and more subjective registers of personhood, these representations reduce the unskilled down to their bodies. Their contribution to the economy and to their jobs becomes recast as corporeal’ (2021, p 13). But the framing of migration and migrant labour is such that the low-skilled migrant is positioned as an (unfair) competitor with the low-skilled citizen for access to the labour market, making it difficult to tease out the shared interests in thinking against skills hierarchies.

Migrants can also be citizens. A foreign-born person may be a citizen in law through naturalization or deriving citizenship from a parent, while the possibility of dual and even multiple citizenships in many states means that a foreign national can also be a citizen.<sup>2</sup> If we do not know who counts as a migrant, this has consequences for citizens, as evidenced by the UK’s Windrush scandal, which saw Black British citizens wrongly detained and deported, and denied benefits, jobs, medical care and other legal rights. Importantly, neither migrant nor citizen are legal terms alone (nor, indeed, are refugee, skill or asylum seeker). In the academic literature, it is recognized that citizenship is a normative term, and likewise in political debate, being a *citizen* is more than a claim about legal status. This remains unacknowledged when it comes to the term ‘migrant’, but it is observable that these overlaps are experienced with far greater intensity by poor and negatively racialized citizens. Perhaps the paramount example of this in Europe are Roma people who may be EU citizens yet nevertheless are often removed/deported as criminals, nomads or homeless.

## **What movements matter?**

Our globe is in motion, turning daily on its axis, annually around the star that is our sun. So too is the earth beneath our feet, where tectonic plates birth land. The sea is endlessly shifting, from tides and currents to the deep-sea ocean circulation that can take a thousand years to complete. Reaching for food, driving to work or trekking across glaciers, human beings are part of this movement. Mobilities, human and non-human, are not enacted on a static planet, but are part of patterns that make our worlds. These kinds of relationship have been explored in the work of mobilities scholars. The ‘mobility turn’ seeks to develop ‘a sociology which focuses upon movement, mobility and contingent ordering, rather than upon stasis, structure and

social order’ (Urry, 2007, p 18). It analyses how social relations are stretched across the world and how they draw on transport, communication and digital infrastructures and on the intersections of mobility infrastructures, such as roads, communications devices and electricity.

That social relations and mobilities are interrelated is not new. Drawing on research in multiple disciplines, including archaeology, linguistics, genetics and anthropology, Patrick Manning (Manning and Trimmer, 2020) argues that ‘cross-community migration’ was critical to the rapid social evolution and spread of *Homo sapiens*. As humans moved, so too did languages, ideas, technologies and associated ecologies – some argue that plant domestication was not driven by human agency but was an evolutionary response to recruit humans as seed dispersers (Spengler, 2020). These entanglements have become ever more complex as human associated movements have accelerated. Industrialization, colonialism and digital technologies, structured by a global carbon-based capitalism, demand, shape and manage multiple mobilities and set in train processes that are beyond our capacity to anticipate.

Through the multiple effects of climate change, we are experiencing, and for many in the rich world rediscovering, the inextricability of the human and the non-human. Fossil fuel dependence and extractive capitalism are significantly impacting climate and environment and impelling the migration of species, required to adapt, move or die (Shah, 2020). Species move in response to different stimuli and pressures and this movement is often disorderly and difficult to track. But the mobilities of human and non-human species are disrupting the framings of nativity and alienage as the conditions of ecosystem integration. These connections are vividly illustrated in our health. The biologist Rob Wallace has, along with others, researched how multinational agribusiness has undermined local food security across the world and changed the dynamics of land use in complex ways, initiating socioeconomic processes that broaden humans’ interface with wildlife (Wallace et al, 2020). Undercut smallholders branch out into wild game or are pushed into areas that are difficult to cultivate. In this context, human movement can expose us to new pathogens and disrupt ecologies that have held them in check. Importantly, the impoverished people who move do so in a local context shaped by global agribusiness, fisheries and livestock production – huge industries owned and controlled by a handful of multinational corporations and invested in by globalized finance capital.

COVID-19 vividly demonstrated the impossibility of disconnecting the socioeconomic and the biological and how both are bound up with movement. Controlling human movement became a critical response to controlling infection and in early 2020 many of us were required to confine ourselves to domestic spaces to contain the virus. Flight bans and quarantines were imposed by multiple states, and across the world there

were brutal crackdowns on people on the move. However, human societies and economies cannot function without movement, so at the same time there were multiple exceptions made. Some jobs were declared ‘essential’, exempting them from the most severe restrictions. How these jobs were defined varied, but food provision, health, logistics and care services were common to lists drawn up by countries across the world ([Anderson et al, 2021](#)).

It was notable that most of these essential jobs were designated ‘low-skilled’ and were poorly paid and low status – for example, crop pickers, food processors, care assistants, shop assistants, delivery workers, cleaners. It is scarcely surprising, then, that in many high-income countries ‘migrants’ represented a substantial proportion of these essential workers (see, for example, [Fernández-Reino et al, 2020](#); [OECD, 2020](#)). Movement was also necessary for the production and distribution of food and essential medical supplies. Take the case of the global demand for rubber gloves, produced largely in Malaysia. Malaysia’s rubber glove industry is structurally dependent on migrant labour, and rubber glove supply across the world therefore depends on labour recruitment from Nepal, Indonesia and Bangladesh ([Anderson et al, 2023](#)). Trade and human movement are not parallel systems but interconnected, and rubber gloves in a hospital in Washington need immigration bureaucracies in Kathmandu to be functioning effectively. Migration is highly politicized in the country where migrants are physically present, but this politicization does not attach to the goods they make, particularly when they are exported. This means the critical role of migration regimes for global trade can be overlooked even though, in practice, trade policy can often become a form of migration policy and trade policy instruments are increasingly important for international migration governance.

## **How are we to denaturalize the border?**

Our current analysis of human movement is distorted by a focus on migrants, confusion about who is a migrant, and by taking migration as disconnected from other areas of social, economic and biological life. These distortions are informed and compounded by the problem of ‘methodological nationalism’. This equates society with the modern nation state, which is seen as a container of social processes. The nation state is assumed and naturalized, thereby invisibilizing how its exigencies shape socioeconomic relations and the multifaceted work – political, legal, social and imaginative – required to reproduce the nation state form.

Methodological nationalism ([Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002](#)) has, for several decades, been recognized as a challenge across the social sciences, but it has particular and significant consequences for academic and political



understandings of migration (Anderson, 2019). Empirically, it treats movements across borders as materially different from movements within borders, particularly in the Global North (in the Global South, ‘displacement’ commonly refers to both). Normatively, it positions the international migrant as transgressing naturalized territorial boundaries and disrupting the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995). Scholars of migration are, then, at the sharp end of the vexing epistemological, empirical and ethical challenges posed by methodological nationalism.

This naturalization of the nation state is not confined to migration scholars, nor to social scientists: ‘in a world of nation states nationalism cannot be confined to the peripheries’ (Billig, 1995, p 11), and social scientists often fail to reflect on the importance and naturalization of the nation state more generally. Methodological nationalism is in part a manifestation of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995), the quotidian and seemingly mundane reproductions of the nation in routine habits of language and assumptions, in symbols and in reporting on weather, national sports teams, and so on. It allows contradictions to pass unnoticed: consider the claims that the National Health Service (NHS) offers ‘universal health coverage’, when it patently does not (this was manifest in the then UK Health Secretary Matt Hancock’s tweet on 17 November 2019: ‘It’s the *National* Health Service not the *International* Health Service. ... [A]fter Brexit we’ll extend the NHS surcharge to all non-UK residents’ (Hancock, 2019, emphasis added)). When paired with ‘state’, the nation describes and renders palatable a form of rule. The ‘nation’ in nation state humanizes state power: contrast appeals to the ‘national interest’ with appeals to ‘state interest’. It is, moreover, a form of rule that normalizes controls over cross-border mobility. As John Torpey (1999) argues in his history of the passport, modern states’ monopoly over the legitimate means of movement is an essential element of the ‘state-ness of states’. Nation states can make many different and varied kinds of populations – they may or may not make an autistic population, for example – but they *must* make ‘migrants’ if they are to be a nation state (Sharma, 2020).

One response to methodological nationalism that has emerged from migration studies is the framework of transnationalism. This recognizes human communities and communications as not restricted to a single nation state and migrants as building social fields that connect across borders (Vertovec, 2007). ‘Transnational studies’ seeks to decentre the nation state and look across spaces and scales, enabling us to see how the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ change when we ‘don’t assume they are automatically linked to particular types of territory or space’ (Levitt, 2011, p 168). In this way, it denaturalizes the borders that make territories and shows how migration and migrant communities adjust to, remake and exceed them. However, transnational approaches engage with methodological nationalism but not ‘banal nationalism’, keeping the nation inside the nation state portmanteau.



There is much to be learned from paying attention to the work of ‘national’ when it is not attached to state. ‘National’ is ambiguous (Mongia, 2018). It can signify a legal relation with, or recognition by, the state – as in ‘national territory’ or ‘national citizenship’. But it can also mean belonging to the nation, with the nation understood as referring to culture/cultures, languages and a people that stretches back in time. It slips between its meanings of formal citizenship status on the one hand and belonging to the nation on the other. Membership of the nation, like citizenship, is claimed through ancestry, but unlike citizenship, national membership is often imagined as independent of and predating the state. It is possible to be considered as belonging to the nation and yet not be a legal citizen, and some states offer fast-tracked naturalization for ‘ethnic members’ across multiple generations even if they have never set foot on the state’s territory. Conversely, some racialized and/or minoritized citizens may have the legal status of citizen but may not be imagined or depicted as belonging to the nation, making them vulnerable to citizenship loss. In India, for example, the implementation of strict requirements for documenting citizenship and the publication of the National Register of Citizens in 2019 removed citizenship from 1.9 million people in the highly diverse region of Assam, rendering linguistic and religious minorities vulnerable to arbitrary and indefinite detention. Who sheds and who retains their migrancy is bound up with nationally specific ways of encoding and remaking race (Lentin, 2014; Mongia, 2018; Sharma, 2020).

David Theo Goldberg argues that the development of the modern state ‘depended on the ideological work of manufacturing sameness’ and that this sameness became bound up with the ideological work of the construction of race:

States are racial ... because of the structural position they occupy in producing and reproducing, constituting and effecting racially shaped spaces and places, groups and events, life worlds and possibilities, accesses and restrictions, inclusions and exclusions, conceptions and modes of representation. They are racial, in short, in virtue of their modes of population definition, determination and structuration. (Goldberg, 2002, p 104)

The state’s projection of political and symbolic power over a territorialized population makes ethnicity and/or ‘race’ a critical marker of difference. In the nation state form, the emphasis is on belonging to the nation. At the same time, the racializing force of the state form requires navigation around racist ideologies, particularly as ideas of racial group and hierarchies were vocally repudiated by powerful liberal democracies after the Nazi Holocaust. This navigation is facilitated by the ambiguity of the term ‘national’. Immigration

controls affect to eschew race, but they take nationality as foundational. Indeed, through ‘nationality’, skills are embodied and acculturated – having small hands, having the right attitude or being naturally more hard-working and obedient can become associated with what country a person was born in. To designate such physical and behavioural characteristics as ‘racial’ would be unacceptable, and rightly so, but describing them as ‘national’ can be presented as simple common sense.

The hostility to migration in many states today cannot be understood independently of the migrant as a racialized category, but migration scholarship has demonstrated a certain aversion to discussing ‘race’ and racism, preferring ideas of ethnicity or culture and, relatedly, integration. But once migration is no longer at the border, it becomes ‘race’. While some scholars (such as Paul Gilroy, Claudia Bruns, Goldberg) have taken a transnational approach to racism and resistance, these have largely not been scholars of migration.<sup>3</sup> Yet the imbrication of racism and nationalism shapes who counts as a migrant as well as experiences of migration and relations between different migrant ‘communities’, which are typically segregated by nationality/country of origin.

## What are we to do with ‘migration’?

Who counts as a migrant and who counts as a citizen/national is contradictory, contextual and racialized, but this does not mean the category can be abandoned. Being a ‘migrant’ matters and, for now at least, not only in terms of legal status. Nationalized subjectivities shape how we imagine ourselves and they give rise to many different forms of socialities and politics. Nationalized subjectivities are not confined to citizens. Those legally classified and/or socially imagined as migrants may also feel the importance of language and habits more strongly than they do when they are living ‘at home’, and much migrant organizing is around country of origin as Brid Brennan discusses in her interview at the end of this volume.

Philosopher Ian Hacking has theorized how human sciences<sup>4</sup> ‘make up people’ (see [Hacking, 2006](#)). His work on ‘dynamic nominalism’ builds on and critiques the philosophical nominalist tradition that holds, crudely, that taxonomies are created by human beings. When it comes to the classification of people, he argues, names interact with the named, and human action is tightly linked to human description. It is not that bureaucrats and social and human scientists recognize an already existing kind of person, but rather that that kind of person can emerge at the same time as the kind is being invented. Making up categories of people ‘changes the space for possibilities of personhood’ ([Hacking, 1986](#), p 165); the identification changes how people feel about themselves and their experiences and shapes possibilities for action.

In Hacking's analysis, experts and scientists play an important role in what he calls the 'looping effect', initially in the identification of a potential form of grouping and later in the generation of expert knowledge on the grouping that is both legitimized and disseminated via institutions. Consider the Victim of Trafficking (VoT). Like other recently identified social-forensic categories, from autism to trans identity, once trafficking was identified as a phenomenon, numbers rocketed, and it has become an area of expertise and intervention. Trafficking has seen a huge increase in the numbers of state functionaries, businesses, NGOs and international organizations generating knowledge and policies about trafficking and, more recently, 'modern slavery'.

As categories become socialized, they emerge as groups that are spoken for, on behalf of and negotiated with. Representation is not only about *Darstellung* (portrayal) but also *Vertretung* (speaking for; Spivak, 1988). For minoritized groups, these two are treated as conjoined, but that is not the case for dominant groups. A middle-class White male speaking in a European parliament is rarely regarded as portraying the constituency of middle-class White males or as speaking principally for middle-class White males. In contrast, a Muslim parliamentarian is often, whether or not they want to be, regarded as speaking for all Muslims, as Black people are held to speak for Black people, and migrants for migrants.

What, then, are migration scholars and activists to do with the category of 'migrant'? Here one can turn to critical race theory to look at ways of responding to the epistemological, ethical and conceptual challenges of managing and developing an 'inherited' concept. Mills (2017) helpfully compares 'race' to 'phlogiston' and 'witch'. Both were terms in use in the 17th century. 'Phlogiston' was a gas believed to be emitted by materials on combustion. Phlogiston does not exist, and it has been dropped as a scientific construct. Witches in the sense of evil women with magical powers do not exist either, but the witch is still used in stories and to describe believers of Wiccan religion. 'Race', he suggests:

is arguably more like 'witch' than 'phlogiston' in that many social and political theorists have contended it can still do useful work for us. [...] Instead of seeing race ... as part of a natural hierarchy, one reconceptualizes it so it refers to one's structural location in a racialised social system, thereby generating a successor concept. People are 'raced' according to particular rules – we shift from a noun to a verb, from a pre-existing 'natural' state to an active social process. (Mills, 2017, p 4)

Migration studies is halfway to a successor concept in the debates about the terminology of illegal/undocumented/unauthorized/clandestine. No one is illegal any more than they are a witch, but they are 'illegalized' through an

active social – and state-endorsed – process. Perhaps, then, we can think of ‘migrantized people’. In this spirit, there have been calls to ‘demigrantize’ migration studies; that is, to ‘move away from treating the migrant population as the unit of analysis and investigation and instead direct the focus on parts of the whole population, which obviously includes migrants’ (Dahinden, 2016, p 2218). This also has the potential to address the increasingly complex relation between migration and race.

## Rethinking migration and mobilities

The three questions are discussed separately in this chapter for analytical purposes, but all are related to who counts as a migrant and in (research) practice they cannot be disentangled. They are opportunities as well as challenges. Taken together, they show the richness of thinking both *with* and *against* migration. Thinking with migration shows us how mobility patterns and makes our worlds; thinking against migration exposes how habits of thought and assumptions about migration obscure connections and other ways of living in the world. Both, together, show us how efforts to manage certain kinds of movement are critical to how we are governed.

This volume illustrates how migration can be rethought and how that rethinking can reveal new things about the ways we live in the world. It is *multidisciplinary* in that contributors are writing from their own disciplinary perspective, but it is also genuinely *interdisciplinary*, with introductions to each of the four parts co-authored by academics from a range of different fields. All contributions, in different ways, encourage us to think more broadly about who counts as a migrant, or a citizen, and what we mean by the term ‘migration’. Each part foregrounds one of the challenges outlined earlier: ‘Multiple Mobilities’ shows how human movement is connected to other mobilities and the efforts made to manage some of those mobilities. ‘Productive Borders’ illustrates the historical contingency of nationhood but also the tremendously productive nature of borders and how this reaches into our ideas of race and nation. ‘Transformative Representations’ uncovers the dynamic politics of naming and how this can work with and against people on the move. The final part, ‘Beyond migrants and migration’, examines aspects of the contemporary political landscape and what it tells us about the making and unmaking of difference.

‘Multiple Mobilities’ comprises three chapters that connect human movement to other mobilities, using these entanglements to explore human/non-human imbrications and assemblages. Using the case of the Campo Santo Teutonico cemetery in Rome, Lucy Donkin examines how the moving of people and material, particularly soil, made connections between different sites and inspired beliefs and practices. Place became portable and ‘the earth functions as a diagnostic device, highlighting connections between

different forms of movement’ (p 27). What is brought with us as we move, and what does that tell us about our worlds? These relations are often obscured as our imaginations have been so thoroughly schooled in normalizing the contemporary nation state form. With an imagination that starts from the boundedness of place, and a very particular idea of territoriality, it is hard to recover the engagements that render place mobile and allowed pilgrims to visit places as if they were Rome, or that transported soil to make connections between sacred places. Donkin’s piece is suggestive of ways of thinking about mobility and place that are not premised on mobility as through place, but rather connect mobility- and place-*making*, meaning that movement does not have to be disruptive of place.

In contrast, Laurence Publicover looks at the early voyages of the East India Company – the first steps in initiating processes of mobility that were to violently disrupt life-worlds across the planet. He describes voyages that suggest in microcosms the unimaginable collisions, partnerships and accelerations that would ensue, attending to the many hidden histories that looking at mobilities in practice (in his case, the sailing ship) exposes. He reveals the role of more-than-human agencies and the materiality and instability of human/non-human assemblages – the shipworms, for example, ‘undermined human autonomy within these voyages’ (p 60). The fantasy of manly adventurers is exposed in the face of not only the weaknesses but also the multiple dependencies of the Company agents. More particularly, the movement of these Englishmen was only possible because of multiple other movements – of ocean currents, of supplies, animals, goods and other forms of organic and inorganic matter – and these movements did not always further the progress of those who believed they were in charge.

María Paula Escobar Tello’s chapter starts from the governing of animal mobilities, more particularly cattle in the UK, charting the historical expansion of the control of the movement of animals to the control of the movement of disease/bacteria to the control of the growth of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) – this latter made ontologically accessible in large part through the policies created to deal with it. She examines how the cow passport ‘fastens together the complex assemblage of material objects, documents, regulations, organizations, veterinary inspectors, administrators and others on which policies depend’ (p 66). Such an approach reveals how animal and policy mobilities are interconnected, but also how both are embedded in social, economic and historical contexts that stretch beyond efforts to control animal mobilities. She considers the global policies to tackle AMR in the O’Neill report and their potential for application in low- and middle-income countries. In contrast to the unremarked and relatively smooth policy mirroring between the UK and the EU, global AMR policy has proven far more difficult. She explores the impact of differences in context between where policies are devised (in this case, the UK) and where they

are implemented (she takes the example of Colombia as emblematic). While policy makers may claim successful policy mobility (diffusion) is a matter of time, she holds that the challenges are far more structural and argues for the relevance of international power relations and colonial histories.

Taken together, these chapters show us how broadening our understanding of 'migration' to make connections with other forms of mobility and with the more-than-human that moves can help us better understand how human movement has and continues to impact on and reflect ecosystems, socioeconomic relations and technological change.

The chapters in 'Productive Borders' take mobility as a lens to denaturalize and historicize borders and expose how they are productive deep within state territory as well as at its edges. People's movements and the huge efforts to govern these movements are, quite literally, world-making and shape how 'migrants' and 'citizens' alike are governed. This part is not only about how movement is controlled but also about how those who move and those who stay are imagined and how they imagine themselves. All three chapters consider all or part of the area of land that today comprises the UK – London (Martins Junior), England (Smith) and the UK (Dias-Abey) – over different periods.

Mobility is a feature of what it is to be human. Brendan Smith parks the question of when mobility became migration by defining 'migrant' as the mobility of those who 'sought to move permanently' (p 95). While borders/frontiers and territory/land were quite differently understood in medieval times, control over *who* lived *where* was, as today, closely associated with rule or sovereignty. Also, as today, there was a variety of reactions towards the stranger, whether challenging or bolstering kingly power. Smith focuses on three groups whose movement was shaped in different ways by 'the royal will' (p 97): exiles, colonists and labourers. His chapter suggests a reading of contemporary immigration controls not only as codifying and bureaucratizing the relationships between ruler and ruled, but also as consequential for the relationships between those who are ruled. It also points to the powerful importance of imaginaries informed by scripture for people's understandings of the meaning and experiences of movement and of exile.

Manoj Dias-Abey's careful analysis of the emergence of the Aliens Order 1920 and its consequences also engages with power and imaginaries but with an eye to their direct contemporary impact. He describes how Britain post World War I, despite still being an imperial power, was confronted by radical shifts in economic conditions and significant changes to the global political economy. The government was also alarmed by increased labour militancy and internationalism (related too to the anti-colonial nationalism organizing in the British Empire). He argues that nationalist divisions between workers that had been sharply drawn during the war were entrenched and normalized

by newly introduced restrictions on labour migration. These institutionalized a *national* labour force for a *national* labour market in a context of international radicalism and organizing. Not only did this move enable the government to claim that it was ‘protecting’ British workers living in the UK, but it also constructed the idea (arguably the ideology) of a distinctively *national* labour market both as an object of knowledge and an object of politics. Seafarers, many of whom were colonial subjects, became a flashpoint in this context. This multinational labour force was then, and continues to be, critical to global trade flows, yet when they put into land their presence, in stark contrast to the goods they bring, is regarded as a threat or danger. The Coloured Seamen Order 1925, which deemed ‘coloured’ seamen alien unless they could prove their British subject status, evidences the importance of race in both the hostility and the policing of these early immigration control efforts.

Racism is also very much to the fore in the chapter by Angelo Martins Junior. He examines the consequences of illegality as a category signifying both stigma and status. More particularly, he focuses on how it shapes economic and social relationships between Brazilians living in London, and his research participants do not necessarily build nationally solidaristic ties. Race plays an important role here. While in the UK the relation between race and migration is viewed through the prism of nationality, in Brazil there is a close association between race and class. For migrants to London, this means that race maps onto legal status – low-earning people are more likely to find it difficult to enter on appropriate visas given the costs of entry to Europe. Legal status works to undermine national solidarity but also is entangled in complicated ways with race. His chapter demonstrates how social hierarchies are constructed and globalized but also embedded and context dependent, stretching across international borders but also changed by them.

The three chapters in ‘Transformative Representations’ expose both the complexities and the consequences of the representation of ‘migrants’. Juan Zhang explores how Chinese citizens living abroad found their citizenship ‘spoiled’ or tainted by an Other identity during the COVID-19 pandemic. This became the context of a highly moralizing discourse of deservingness and of blame that circulated in many different forms across the world and was strongly inflected by nationalism. Thus, in China the virus was represented as a foreign import, while in the US and Europe it was often described as ‘the Chinese virus’. Chinese people living outside of China were caught by both representations: in their country of residence they often became a target of racism, but those who travelled or returned also found themselves a focus of opprobrium within China, as not only had they left the motherland, but now they were *qianli songdu*, ‘spreading the virus for a thousand miles’. In a new take on the association of migrant bodies with disease, the moral citizenship of Chinese living abroad



became suspect – some labelled them ‘pandemic refugees’. They were represented in both popular and official media as selfish and irresponsible, undeserving subjects who brought risk home. Zhang’s chapter illustrates the power of representation in rendering good citizenship precarious and undermining the basic right of citizenship to enter one’s state of citizenship. Nevertheless, the underlying values of deservingness and good citizenship were reproduced by many of those living in this dilemma, who responded to stigma by counterclaims that they were good citizens who followed the rules. They located themselves in the deserving camp by living by ‘Chinese’ pandemic rules and practices even though abroad, thereby proving themselves good citizens with the right to return – in contrast with those who were irresponsible and rightly excluded.

Nariman Massoumi also looks at ‘home’, but in this case as an intimate space threatened by the chaos of outsiders. In a very different context from that explored by Zhang, he too exposes the hostility that can be directed at co-nationals and how some claim a superior form of cultural belonging over others – for example, that they are more ‘civilized’ – which shapes and is shaped by racism. In his analysis of the autobiographical film *Persepolis*, he shows that the receptive audience for secular Leftist Iranian representations of their lives and movements is such that the director not only *portrays* but *speaks for* an Iran that is acceptable to Europe and North America. He argues that ‘giving voice’ to people from marginalized groups – in this case, through diasporic cinema – can reproduce exclusionary nationalisms.

Florian Scheduling reminds us that representation is not restricted to the visual but is also about enunciation and silence. Listening to three musical events that were responses to the Russia–Ukraine war, he argues that while they offered support to Ukrainians on the move, they also continued to exceptionalize migration. This is strikingly illustrated by the Concert for Ukraine in Birmingham, in which almost no Ukrainian musicians performed because they were refused UK visas. He examines how borders and nations are made in sound, how these are crossed, and how thinking sonically can help challenge methodological nationalism. All three chapters analyse migration and movement in relation to a crisis (COVID-19, the Iran–Iraq War, the Russia–Ukraine war). This highlights the association of migration with crisis, which often passes unremarked but which, as all three chapters illustrate, profoundly shapes ideas of migration and mobility.

The final two chapters, in ‘Beyond Migrants and Migration’, return us to migration as a lived experience and as struggle and invite reflection on the relation between academic work and migration in practice. Holly Rooke and Natasha Carver examine the management and reproduction of ideas of race and migration through a textual analysis of British politicians’ speeches on migration. This is in a context where draconian immigration legislation was spearheaded by a Home Secretary whose parents were migrants from

Mauritius and Kenya and who described herself as a ‘child of Empire’. The highly diverse Cabinet of the British Conservative government pursued extremely harsh immigration policies, demonstrating the dangers of assuming that *Darstellung* is necessarily consonant with *Vertretung*. Rooke and Carver’s careful analysis of politicians’ language shows how they manage speaking for and in support of the nation. Finally, Brid Brennan from the Transnational Institute, a migrant rights activist for more than four decades, reflects on her experiences of organizing at national and global level. She discusses what can be learned by activists from academic work that is not straightforwardly related to policy.

## Conclusion

The ideologically charged migration lexicon is not only a terminological and epistemological challenge, but a conceptual, ethical and theoretical one. Scholars continually risk reifying the figure of the migrant, thereby contributing to the construction of a problem subject. In the past, research on migration tended to reinforce the strongly imagined norm of national and stable communities disrupted by migrants, and its focus on difference contributed to the constructed distinction between the ‘migrant’ and the ‘citizen’. However, this is changing. Migration studies is increasingly reflexive, examining its conceptual tools with an approach that is both critical and creative, striving to think outside policy that is ever more restrictive and to use research to contribute to building radically different worlds. This collection demonstrates the importance of interdisciplinary work to advance our understandings of migration and mobility and to show that intellectual work can help excavate connections and discern surprising patterns. It is an invitation to imagine, think and act across disciplines, institutions and, of course, national borders to undo separations and build connections, not only in the field of migration but across the multiple exclusions and separations that divide our contemporary world.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> As will be discussed, we recognize that what migration means is highly contested. However, for ease of reading, where possible we write migrant and migration rather than ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’.
- <sup>2</sup> In many states (for example, Croatia, Myanmar, Spain, UK), citizenship itself is not a singular legal status.
- <sup>3</sup> As an exception, see the special issue on ‘racism and transnationality’ of the *Transnational Social Review*, with an introduction by [Caroline Schmitt](#), [Linda Semu](#) and [Matthias Witte](#) (2017).
- <sup>4</sup> Under the rubric of human sciences, [Hacking](#) (2006) includes ‘many social sciences, psychology, psychiatry and, speaking loosely, a good deal of clinical medicine ... specific sciences should never be defined except for administrative and educational purposes. Living sciences are always crossing borders and borrowing from each other’.

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