Preface

In the cold winter of 2010 I had the honor and pleasure of delivering the Carlyle Lectures in the History of Political Thought at the University of Oxford. I decided to use the occasion to pull together various reflections and contentions about Italian humanist political thought I had elaborated over the previous fifteen years. My aim was to see whether, suitably developed, they might add up to something like a fresh interpretation of that neglected literature. The book that has at length emerged, though quite different from the lectures as delivered, continues to orbit around the questions I attempted to address on that occasion, and if the answers given to those questions have changed, this is in no small part owing to the stimulus provided by Oxford's extraordinary community of scholars during my residence at All Souls College that winter and again in 2014. Though portions of the book have been presented to many academic audiences from Rome to Munich and from Berkeley to Shanghai, the project as a whole is in essence unchanged from the one delivered in lecture form in the Examination Schools on High Street during Hilary term of 2010.

That project is to describe, effectively (I believe) for the first time, a new kind of political education, and indeed a new way of thinking about political questions, invented and promoted by the Italian humanists in the century and a half from Petrarch to Machiavelli. Claims to originality, whether for oneself or for one's objects of study, always set off alarms among scholars, and the sound of knives being sharpened activates one's instinct to limit and qualify. Nevertheless, I intend to persist in the claim to originality that I hope the book as a whole will justify. The claim that any significant phenomenon can be uncovered in the Western tradition at this stage in the history of scholarship, especially in a period as intensely studied as the Renaissance, is bound to be suspect on its face. But if a neglected tradition is to be discovered anywhere, it seems to me, the likeliest place to find it is among a group of sources that have remained largely unread and difficult of access. The political writings of the humanists, despite specialized study of certain texts, are still, I would contend, relatively unexplored and not well understood as expressions of a movement of moral and civic reform.[1] Even today, especially in the world of Anglophone scholarship, humanist political

literature has had the reputation of being theoretically impoverished.[2] It is often dismissed as "mere rhetoric" (in the modern sense of empty verbosity) and derivative, consisting of dull mosaics of classical quotation deployed in the service of flattering princes.

Scholarly humility requires us, however, to recognize that this all-too-typical dismissal of six or seven generations' worth of Renaissance intellectual life might have something to do with certain imperfections in our own point of view. The special *déformation* of modern historians of political thought—our own suspicion of power and propaganda, our battered but still formative myth of progress—hardly equips us to appreciate the humanist cult of eloquence and a type of reforming zeal that worked by idealizing the past. At the same time, a narrow focus on certain attractive themes within Renaissance political thought has, in my view, led to imbalance and distortion in the evaluation of humanist political writing in general. The connection between humanism and republican liberty, as explored by the great Renaissance historians Hans Baron and Eugenio Garin in the 1950s and '60s and again, more broadly, in luminous works by J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner and their followers from the 1970s onward, has stimulated wide interest in what is called "civic humanism" or "the republican tradition" from the Middle Ages down to the time of the American Revolution and beyond. The tendency to focus on republican liberty, usually combined with anachronistic understandings of what a republic might be, has left in shadow large tracts of humanist political reflection. There are, for instance, rich veins of humanist literature that discuss such themes as the morality of war, empire, and interstate relations generally; cosmopolitanism and the pitfalls (or advantages) of nativism; the proper role of wealth and the wealthy in politics; how rulers may secure obedience without coercion; the dependence of laws and constitutions on the moral character of rulers and the causes of political corruption; the justification for social hierarchies; the moral reform of elites; the theory of deliberation; the role of honor and piety in knitting together the social fabric; and how to diagnose, prevent, and reform the human impulse to tyranny. All these are themes that have been marginalized by a narrative that focuses narrowly on ideas of liberty found in the Renaissance oligarchies we are pleased to honor with the name "republics." Inattention to the wider goals of the movement leads to distortions even when attending to texts that discuss liberty. Scholars tend to dig up the relatively few mentions of republican liberty in the hope of excavating modern understandings of freedom—freedom as a natural right for instance—while failing to notice that

for most Renaissance humanists, freedom was a moral achievement, the fruit of virtue, and was prevented from collapse into license only by good character.

Another form of blindness comes from a tendency to base generalizations on the same restricted group of easily accessible texts. These are most often treatises and other works of formal theory that boast titles promising to deal with political subjects. In the Anglophone world especially, the small group of sources studied tend to be works in Italian or works that have been translated (often badly) from Latin. Many scholars have chosen to ignore that, during what Christopher Celenza calls "the long quattrocento," Latin texts were not only far more numerous, but far more prestigious than works written in vernaculars.[3] Longer works in Latin, like Francesco Patrizi's twin treatises on republican and royal education, are sometimes culled for specific themes, but they are less often studied in the round as intellectual projects. And there are whole genres of Renaissance Latin literature that have been overlooked by historians of political thought. Aside from a couple of famous speeches by Leonardo Bruni on republican liberty, the vast collections of humanist oratory, rich in political themes, have hardly been explored; the subtle constitutional analyses in antiquarian writings, such as Biondo Flavio's three books on Roman republican institutions in the *Roma Triumphans,* have remained unread; reflections on politics and international relations found in historical works have received little attention; the commentary literature on texts central to humanist political thought such as Aristotle's *Politics* and *Ethics,* Cicero's *De officiis,* Livy, and Sallust escapes study; epic, lyric, and occasional poetry as well as satire, comedy, and tragedy have been more or less completely ignored. Humanist correspondence is studded with long, semi-public letters, such as Petrarch's letters to the Emperor Charles IV, full of advice fortified by passionate study of ancient political philosophy, but these have typically been studied from a narrowly biographical perspective, if at all. Orations, treatises, letters, prefaces, and dialogues dealing with education, history, biography, descriptive geography, marriage, and household management often bear crucially on political issues, but these have only rarely been recognized as sources for the history of political thought. The humanists were reformers actively engaged in educating and advising elites, and they used every means at their disposal, every genre of literature, every form of art and culture to fill the ears of their audience with their principal message: that cities needed to be governed by well-educated men and women of high character, possessed of practical wisdom, and informed by the study of ancient literature and moral philosophy.

Even more serious than inattention to so-called informal sources of political thought is the general neglect of sources available only in manuscript. The heroic researches of the great Renaissance scholar Paul Oskar Kristeller from the 1930s through the 1990s disclosed to view the enormous body of unpublished Renaissance Latin texts in general and exposed (or should have exposed) as false the common view that any text of importance must have made it into print.[4] This assumption is quite erroneous for the early Renaissance, and there is certainly no guarantee that the authors and texts printed in the last quarter of the fifteenth century were necessarily the ones that were most popular and influential in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. As specialists are well aware, it is a fallacy to believe that there was no publication before the printing press was invented. In fact the world's manuscript depositories still boast tens of thousands of humanistic manuscripts produced by professional scribes for a literate audience, particularly in the period from the 1420s to the 1470s. Individual works by famous writers such as Leonardo Bruni circulated, in some cases, in hundreds of manuscripts that reached every corner of Europe well before the print revolution organized more formal markets for political literature.

There is, to be sure, one great exception to this general pattern of neglect: Machiavelli. Machiavelli's works in all genres have been studied almost to a fault, and stimulating books continue to be published every year about this inexhaustibly fascinating figure. Yet the books that are written, despite the current emphasis on context, are often written in substantial ignorance of the humanist literature about politics that preceded him and to which he was often responding. This situation has led to a serious distortion in wider perceptions about the Renaissance. Since Machiavelli is the only Renaissance author studied in most courses on the history of political thought, he has come to stand proxy for the political thought of the Renaissance almost in the way, two generations ago, Aquinas was taken as the archetypal representative of medieval scholasticism. One goal of this book is to make the case that the common equation of Machiavelli with Renaissance political thought should be resisted. While Machiavelli does indeed develop in an extreme form several strands within Renaissance political thought, he is in most respects highly atypical of humanist thought and in fact challenges it on many levels. Neither the Renaissance nor Machiavelli can be understood if Machiavelli is taken to be typical of the Renaissance.

A comprehensive history of Italian humanist political thought that would survey all the hitherto neglected sources and compensate for the blind spots and distortions of the current literature would certainly be desirable, but that is not the book I have been able to write. My goal in this volume is more modest. I have sought to present the political ideas of the humanists as the expression of a movement of thought and action, similar in its physiognomy if not in its content to the movement of the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment. It was a movement that was stimulated by a crisis of legitimacy in late medieval Italy and by widespread disgust with its political and religious leadership. Its adherents were men who had wide experience—often bitter, personal experience—with tyranny. They knew that oligarchs and even popular governments could be as tyrannical as princes. Their movement was largely in agreement about its goals: to rebuild Europe's depleted reserves of good character, true piety, and practical wisdom. They also agreed widely about means: the revival of classical antiquity, which the humanists presented as an inspiring pageant, rich in examples of noble conduct, eloquent speech, selfless dedication to country, and inner moral strength, nourished by philosophy and uncorrupt Christianity. The humanist movement yearned after greatness, moral and political. Its most pressing historical questions were how ancient Rome had achieved her vast and enduring empire, and whether it was possible to bring that greatness to life again under modern conditions. This led to the question of whether it was the Roman Republic or the Principate that should be emulated; and, once the humanists had learned Greek, it provoked the further question of whether Rome was the only possible ancient model to emulate, or whether Athens or Sparta, or even the Persia of Xenophon's Cyrus, held lessons for contemporary statesmen.

The interpretation of Italian humanism as a movement of moral and political reform presented in this book is not, it must be allowed, the view of the movement that is current among specialists in Renaissance studies today. In recent historical scholarship it has become customary to present humanism as a movement principally concerned with language and style; engaged in the recovery and elaboration of ancient literary genres, methods, and textual practices; and preoccupied with antiquarian and philological questions. This interpretation in my view represents a confusion of ends with means, and reflects the priorities and sympathies of modern scholars more than it does the fundamental values and goals of the humanist movement. The foregrounding in modern scholarship of Lorenzo Valla and Angelo Poliziano, both known primarily for their philological work, is

symptomatic of this outlook. I do not of course maintain that the humanists were not concerned, indeed obsessed, with correct texts and correct Latinity. Since they were professional writers, speakers, and teachers, such matters were bound to be among their central concerns as well as sources of prestige among their peers. Nor am I claiming that their work as students of texts and language is unworthy of study. That would be an odd sort of claim from someone who has spent the last forty years of his life doing just that. But no important intellectual movement lasting for centuries and numbering many thousands of adherents can ever acquire a purchase on the collective imagination without appealing to some larger common purposes and values and creating structures within which individuals can pursue meaningful activity. The early scholastics created such values, goals, and structures, as (for example) did the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment and *mutatis mutandis* the early Progressive movement in America. The humanist movement, beginning with Petrarch, did so too. It is these values, goals, and structures that I believe have been neglected or badly understood in the modern literature, and it is the project of this book to recover them.

In presenting portions of this book to various academic audiences over the last seven years, I have sometimes met with a different sort of objection to my understanding of humanist reformers. My critics will grant, since the textual evidence is overwhelming, that humanists talked incessantly about virtue, nobility, and wisdom and the urgent need for the recovery and study of antiquity. There might even be a few humanists, they admit, who believed what they were saying, perhaps a Petrarch or an Erasmus. But for most humanists such "virtue talk" was merely gestural; it was a fashion, copied from ancient sources, adopted to give one's own writings a patina of antiquity; it was a social convention adopted to lay claim to membership in an elite. You urged the young to improve their character or heaped praise on your prince or patron because that was what you were expected to do. No one believed the prince you were praising actually possessed the virtues and wisdom with which you were crediting him. Such advice was self-serving too, since in selling the humanities the humanists were selling their own wares. Moreover, when one looks at what actually went on in humanist schools, the argument continues, reconstructing their practices from surviving schoolbooks or annotated copies of the classics used by schoolmasters, one finds a moral vacuum: total concentration on grammar and syntax and the identification of names and places; utter neglect of any moral or political lessons to be found in the ancient authors. Furthermore, the spectacular misbehavior of many human-

ists and the elites they trained in the humanities showed that such men evinced little personal concern for virtue and displayed no more wisdom than others among their contemporaries.[5]

This sort of objection misses the point of my argument. Leave aside the question whether any modern historian is able to discern the motives, in all their undoubted complexity, of historical actors living many hundreds of years in the past, or to make reliable generalizations about them. We can make informed guesses, but we can never know. Grant even that many humanists may never have thought deeply about the goals and underlying values of the inherited practices in which they were engaged. This is surely a common feature of all intellectual movements; there are always leaders and followers, visionaries and epigones, as well as parasites and camp followers. To take a parallel case, probably few scholastics after the first generations were actuated by the same splendid vision that drove Irnerius, Gratian, and Abelard to create rational unity and harmony from the cacophony of inherited authorities and to impose divine order on the chaotic societies and the souls of medieval Christians. When humanists thought about their own movement, as Patrick Baker has recently shown, they saw themselves as cultivating eloquence, and through eloquence, civilization.[6] So much is certainly true and certainly illuminating. But the humanists' self-image does not necessarily reveal the deeper goals, values, and structures of the movement. Their belief in the exemplary value of antiquity, their assumption that improving human character through classical education was possible and necessary, their conviction that contemporary states needed the stores of prudence preserved in the experience of the past, were, like the modern belief in progress and science, too obvious, too much taken for granted, to require incessant restatement. And (again like the belief in progress and science) to articulate those underlying assumptions too insistently could have risked calling into question institutions and practices constitutive of individual and social identity. Self-consciousness was therefore difficult and self-criticism a kind of cultural sedition. That sort of consciousness only came later in European civilization, in writers like Machiavelli, Francis Bacon, and Hobbes.

The objection that humanist schoolmasters did not concern themselves—as far as we can tell from representative case studies of schoolroom practice—is easier to answer, and leads to a serious point concerning humanist culture beyond the schoolroom. The modern scholars who began in the later 1980s and '90s to emphasize the evidence of the schoolroom were making the claim that the high

educational ideals set forth in humanist treatises on education and taken as programmatic by earlier generations of scholars, were not exemplified by actual schoolroom practice during the Renaissance. The suggestion was that humanist educators were guilty of a certain hypocrisy or at least false advertising when they claimed that their methods would produce exceptional human beings.[7] This criticism, I believe, is unfair. It is hardly surprising that Renaissance schoolmasters spent most of their time teaching language and not ethics or politics. They were not leading seminars on Great Books. Their pupils needed to learn Latin before they could learn anything else, and learning Latin at a high level is hard. We would not say to educators who devised pre-medical programs for undergraduates today that their programs were ineffectual or constituted false advertising because the students were learning biochemistry and mastering details of cell structure, nucleic acids, and gluconeogenesis but never learning how to live a healthy life. To be a doctor one has to understand biochemistry; to be a person of high character and practical wisdom who can contribute to a human community one needs to be able to study the humanities. Or so the humanists thought.[8]

Moreover, learning to read difficult texts and write and speak in Latin was a foundation, or as the humanists would say, a doorway.[9] Once you passed through the doorway you would find Livy and Sallust, Cicero and Demosthenes, Plato and Aristotle waiting to engage you in conversation.[10] It was the lifelong companionship of the ancients that was supposed to do you good, not the mastery of irregular verbs. Real education did not end with grammar school. It was supposed to go on for your entire life. As Cicero wrote in the *Pro Archia*—a speech which became a kind of manifesto for humanists—it was supposed to enrich and inform your entire life.[11] The concept of *institutio* for the humanists did not only mean learning to read old books in school. It meant absorbing the moral and intellectual formation human beings needed to live successfully in civilized societies. It included manners *(mores)* learned informally in the family and the school. It included the customs of the community, practices like those associated with marriage, with taking meals together, with showing reverence for elders, with other ritual forms, and with military service.[12] As Machiavelli later learned from Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the formation of societies via religion, customs, and manners was at least as important to the moral health of a state than legal codes or constitutions. Moral and intellectual excellence could also be supported by what I call "the virtuous environment": physical spaces recalling in their architecture and decoration the nobler world of the ancient Greeks and

Romans, even soundscapes filled with "classical" music.[13] Humanists and the artists inspired by them created a whole culture designed to reshape the soul. And if we look for proof that *humanitas* in its wider sense produced men capable of profound moral and spiritual reflection, it is surely enough to mention the names of Francesco Petrarch, Leonardo Bruni, Lorenzo Valla, Giovanni Pontano, Marsilio Ficino, Francesco Guicciardini, and yes, Niccolò Machiavelli—all men whose education began in the humanist schoolroom but did not end there.

My focus in this book is on humanist writings that bear on political thought, but one lesson we have rightly learned from Hans Baron and Quentin Skinner is that political texts can never and should never be treated in abstraction from the political struggles and social realities that shaped them. We need to be constantly aware of what modern social and political historians have taught us about the lived experience of these frightened and fractious little towns under their often brutal princes and corrupt oligarchs. Using neutral, analytic terminology, where appropriate, is important. For example, in order to avoid the ambiguities of the term *respublica* in the Renaissance, as discussed in Chapter 3, I use the term "oligarchy" throughout to indicate regimes under the control of small groups of men. The term is meant to be descriptive rather than evaluative. It is not intended to signal disapproval, as it does for example in Aristotle's *Politics,* where it is a pejorative term meaning a regime conducted in the interests of the few rather than the many, a corruption of aristocracy, or rule by wealthy men lacking in virtue. I find persuasive the view of Pareto that all government by nature is and must always be oligarchical, the rule of few over many. For a modern scholar to engage in cheerleading in favor of republican as opposed to monarchical regimes strikes me as anachronistic and likely to mislead.[14] The modern West prides itself on its liberal democratic values, and rightly so, and it is certainly understandable that historians have hungered to understand the genesis of those values in the past. But the sort of "tunnel history" (as J. H. Hexter called it decades ago) devoted to archeologizing a "republican tradition" inevitably distorts the very different moral perceptions and categories of historical actors. The Renaissance humanists as a rule were not so ingenuous as to believe that the regimes we call republican were *eo ipso* enlightened and monarchical ones tyrannical; most of them thought pure popular regimes were dangerously unstable and unwise; most thought that the men labeled as tyrants by jurists sometimes made better rulers than those who

held legitimate titles to rule. Bartolus' view, widely shared, was that most governments were bad some of the time, and that prudence dictated one take a realistic estimate of the possibilities for improvement before advocating radical regime change, especially any change that involved giving power to ordinary people, usually referred to (tellingly) as the *plebs* or the *vulgus.* Most humanists were conservative, in other words, and even the most enlightened (from our point of view) wanted careful limits on popular power and devices to ensure that the *optimates,* the best men, the great and the good, would predominate in the councils of government. It is impossible to conduct a poll, of course, but if such a poll could be taken, it would likely find that the majority of educated people in the late medieval world preferred monarchy to oligarchy; certainly most political theorists did. We will misunderstand the relatively few humanist voices that defended popular government if we fail to understand that the rhetorical situation they found themselves in was overwhelmingly hostile to their beliefs.

A similar danger of anachronism is involved in the use of the words "humanism" and "humanist." I have decided after some hesitation to go on using these problematic terms, but it should be understood that "humanism" was not a contemporary term, and "humanist" in Renaissance Latin and Italian usage had a much narrower denotation than in modern usage. By the end of the fifteenth century the word *humanista* was sometimes used in university slang to indicate a teacher of the *studia humanitatis,* that is, ancient literature and philosophy, but the commonest terms used for the figures we call "humanists" in the fifteenth century were *literati, oratores, viri docti, studiosi, eruditi* and—interestingly, in view of the word's later history—*philosophi.*[15] In the fourteenth century Petrarch and Boccaccio often used *poetae* for the kind of men most interested in ancient culture and the artistic use of language. The terms *studiosi* and *docti* are sometimes clarified by the addition of words indicating the objects of study: *bonae litterae, optimae* or *bonae artes, honestissimae artes, studia eloquentiae, studia humanitatis.* These terms were meant to exclude the professional study of law, medicine, or theology, though it was recognized (and applauded) that many lawyers, doctors, and theologians could have interests in the humanities as well. Contemporaries were also conscious of a difference between those who had a professional interest in the language arts—chiefly schoolteachers, university professors of humane subjects, secretaries and chancellors of public men and public bodies, diplomats and court poets—and those who were their auditors, readers, patrons, and

employers. From the mid-quattrocento onward there was a further penumbra of humanism, as doctors, lawyers, philosophers, and theologians began using the methods and sources made popular by the humanists. The terms "humanist" and "humanism" are less likely to mislead now than formerly, thanks to the work of Paul Oskar Kristeller, who carefully distinguished Renaissance humanism from its nineteenth- and twentieth-century namesake.[16] The danger for scholars today is more likely to be a tendency to reify a phenomenon that displayed important local variations, or to attribute a stable identity to groups of writers whose interests, aims, and methods developed dynamically over time. As Ronald Witt has shown, the humanist movement had deep roots in the literary culture of the Middle Ages, a culture that defined itself in part by its long rivalry with the legal culture of medieval Italy.[17] That rivalry continued to shape the political thinking of humanists in the Renaissance, as we shall see, and to define the fresh approach to political problems I explore in Chapter 2. In the case of political thought, the reification of humanism in modern scholarship has often taken the form of regarding it as "republican" in its essence, a characterization that is far from accurate.[18] It is one of the goals of this book to show that what was common to humanist political literature was a commitment, not not to a particular regime type or to "republican liberty," but rather to a reform project that was in a certain sense *supra partes,* directed at political elites in general, whatever regime they served.

The plan of this book is as follows. It begins in Chapter 1 with an account of the origins of Renaissance humanism in the work of Petrarch, particularly as it bears on political thought. In Chapter 2, I present an overview of humanist virtue politics, describing in broad terms the assumptions about politics common to most humanists. One argument of this book is that Italian humanist political thought has an underlying unity that transcends partisan commitments to particular forms of government or constitutions, and Chapter 2 is where that argument is principally laid out. To put this another way, while in the ancient world an emphasis on virtue and reason is normally associated with anti-democratic politics, in the Renaissance, I contend, virtue politics is compatible with different regime types, including popular regimes, and this feature is one of its strengths as an approach to political reform. Whereas the central question of ancient political theory (according, at least, to some modern interpreters) is, What is the best

regime?, for the humanists constitutional form was far less important than the character of rulers.[19] Hence in this chapter I try also to explain why humanist political thought represents a distinctive way of thinking about politics, focusing as it does on improving the character of rulers and political elites rather than redesigning regimes and reforming institutions. The third chapter discusses humanist ideas of the state, in particular what the humanists meant by the term "republic"; it also explains why all humanist political thought, whether written by humanists in the service of oligarchies or of princes, could be described as "republican," and why "civic humanism" is not necessarily an ideological product of popular regimes. The fourth chapter discusses humanist concepts of tyranny, arguing that in general they represent a rejection of the Ciceronian and Roman-law understanding of tyranny in favor of what I call a "Greek" conception, at once more realistic and more focused on questions of moral psychology.

In the following twelve chapters I present the political thought of nine key humanist thinkers and show how they exemplify the principles of virtue politics, despite their very different political commitments. These thinkers endorsed a variety of regime types and represented a broad spectrum of opinion on a range of topics, including foreign relations and warfare (Chapters 8 and 9). They did not form a school elaborating the vision of a single thinker, like Marxists or Confucians, but drew on a common and constantly expanding reservoir of ancient sources—continually enriched with sources newly translated from Greek—to assemble distinctive versions of virtue politics. It is another aim of this book to trace the enrichment of Western political thought via this "second wave" in the reception of Greek texts. Chapter 14 discusses how George of Trebizond's passionate rejection of Platonic political thought led him to anticipate modern ideas about political liberalism and cosmopolitanism. Chapters 15–17 discuss how humanist political thinkers responded to new Greek sources made available by humanist scholars, in particular those describing the Spartan regime, those containing expositions of non-Aristotelian regime theory, and those presenting classical and Hellenistic theories of ideal kingship. Chapter 16 reveals a growing awareness among humanists that the fundamental project of virtue politics—reforming the character of political leaders or *principes*—would ultimately require corroboration from laws and institutions. Chapters 16 and 17 together show how humanist writings prepared the ground for early modern debates about constitutionalism and absolutism. I end with three chapters on Machiavelli, both to defend my contention that Machiavelli's politics is atypical of humanist political

thought, being hostile to the basic principles of virtue politics, and also to bring into sharper relief the distinctive character of humanist thinking on politics in general. In the conclusion I discuss parallels between virtue politics and the Confucian political tradition as a strategy for assessing the former's viability as an approach to politics and its significance in the global history of political thought.

Socrates. So that is what the skilled and good orator will look to whenever he applies to people's souls whatever speeches he makes. . . . He will always give his attention to how justice may come to exist in the souls of his fellow citizens and injustice be gotten rid of, how self control may come to exist there and lack of discipline be gotten rid of, and how the rest of virtue may come into being there and evil may depart.

Shouldn't we then attempt to care for the city and its citizens with the aim of making the citizens themselves as good as possible? For without this, . . . it does no good to provide any other service, if the intentions of those who are likely to make a great deal of money or take a position of rule over people or some other position of power aren't admirable and good.

Plato, *Gorgias* 504e, 514a (tr. Zeyl)

The end of political expertise is dedicated above all to making the citizens be of a certain quality, i.e. good, and doers of fine things. . . . The true political expert will have worked at virtue more than anything, for what he wants is to make the members of the citizen body good, and obedient to the laws.

Aristotle, *Ethics* 1.9, 1.13 (tr. Rowe)

The happy state may be shown to be that which is best and which acts rightly, and it cannot act rightly without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the nature of just, wise or temperate.

Aristotle, *Politics* 8.1 (tr. Jowett-Barnes)

Virtue is only achieved by an educated and well-taught mind.

Seneca, *Moral Letters* 90.46

Take the opposite course. Do not apply yourself to learning for the sake of appearance and show, nor in order to hide vain inaction behind an impressive name, but in order to take charge of public affairs more steadily amid the trials of fortune.

Tacitus, *Histories* 4.5