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6. The Chinese Communist “Liberation” of Tibet, 1949–51

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Dilemmas of Victory
This chapter is in the book Dilemmas of Victory
by early 1949, Mao Zedong and his Chinese CommunistParty comrades already knew that defeating Chiang Kai-shek and theNationalist regime was no longer a major challenge for them. Themain task facing them was how to build a “new China.” This was anissue with multiple meanings, including how to establish a new Com-munist government; how to rebuild China’s war-torn economy; andhow, as Mao had long envisioned, to carry the revolution to its higher,postvictory stage. At a more basic level, in order to build a “new”China, there was the question of how to define “China”—and theboundaries of China and the composition of the “Chinese nation” inparticular. In a practical political sense, this meant that Mao and hiscomrades would have to determine the relationship between “Chinaproper” and such outlying regions as Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet,which were inhabited mainly by non-Han minority ethnic groups.During the process of the Communist revolution up to the 1940s,the party at times had favored a program of “China federation” as away to deal with the future relationship between China proper and theminority-inhabited outlying regions. According to the program, thepeople of Muslim Xinjiang, Mongolia (both Inner and Outer Mon-golia), and Tibet would first be given “full autonomy” and then, in ac-cordance with the principle of “national self-determination,” woulddecide whether to form a federation with China proper and the Han6The Chinese Communist“Liberation” of Tibet, 1949–51Chen Jian

by early 1949, Mao Zedong and his Chinese CommunistParty comrades already knew that defeating Chiang Kai-shek and theNationalist regime was no longer a major challenge for them. Themain task facing them was how to build a “new China.” This was anissue with multiple meanings, including how to establish a new Com-munist government; how to rebuild China’s war-torn economy; andhow, as Mao had long envisioned, to carry the revolution to its higher,postvictory stage. At a more basic level, in order to build a “new”China, there was the question of how to define “China”—and theboundaries of China and the composition of the “Chinese nation” inparticular. In a practical political sense, this meant that Mao and hiscomrades would have to determine the relationship between “Chinaproper” and such outlying regions as Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet,which were inhabited mainly by non-Han minority ethnic groups.During the process of the Communist revolution up to the 1940s,the party at times had favored a program of “China federation” as away to deal with the future relationship between China proper and theminority-inhabited outlying regions. According to the program, thepeople of Muslim Xinjiang, Mongolia (both Inner and Outer Mon-golia), and Tibet would first be given “full autonomy” and then, in ac-cordance with the principle of “national self-determination,” woulddecide whether to form a federation with China proper and the Han6The Chinese Communist“Liberation” of Tibet, 1949–51Chen Jian
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