

THE VALLEY OF THE SIX NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

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A. THE PEOPLE OF THE ISLAND

ONCE THE FLOOR OF A GREAT SEA, the peninsula through which the Grand River now winds its way to open water was uplifted and then moulded by the chemistry of wind and ice into the familiar topography of the present day. Nourished by its many tributaries, among them the Irvine, the Conestoga, the Nith, the Canagagigue, and the Speed, the Grand commands one of the largest watersheds in the province, draining in all over 2,600 square miles. Taking its rise in the country once known as the "Queen's Bush," the river slopes and curves through some of the most productive agricultural land in southwestern Ontario. Successive generations of grateful farmers and hosts of visitors have waxed enthusiastic over its fertility and abundant resources of wood and water.¹ Men of the cloth, representing many diverse creeds and groups, from the Récollets of the seventeenth century to the New England Company of the nineteenth, have extolled the region's spiritual as well as material potential, viewing the Grand in part as a holy river destined to sustain a thriving and pious community. "If a world labouring under the curse exhibits such natural loveliness," remarked a missionary, "what shall the inheritance, incorruptible, undefiled, and which fadeth not away, be?"²

The earliest recorded residents of the area, the people destined to be so profoundly affected by the European crusader and colonist, were almost without exception of Iroquoian stock, descendants presumably of tribes which centuries before had trekked from their original homeland in the northwestern wilds of this continent to what is now New York and northern Pennsylvania.³ Standard

¹Detailed information on the geography and resources of the area is furnished in R. W. Packer, "The Geographical Basis of the Regions of Southwestern Ontario," *Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1953 (Ottawa, 1954), 45ff.; and Chun-fen Lee, "Land Utilization in the Middle Grand River Valley of Western Ontario," *Economic Geography*, XX (1944), 130-51.

²McMaster Divinity College, Baptist Historical Collection, "Some Account of a Recent Tour by a Minister [1841]."

³A. C. Parker, "The Origin of the Iroquois as Suggested by their Archaeology," *American Anthropologist*, XVIII (1916), 479-507. This view has recently been questioned, however, by those who conclude "that as a mechanism to account for the northeastern position of the Iroquois . . . migration fails in demonstrating any route . . . over which archaeology can convincingly trace a prior or developmental movement." For a discussion of this problem consult W. A. Ritchie's paper, "Iroquois Archaeology and Settlement Patterns," in W. N. Fenton and John Gulick, eds., *Symposium on Cherokee and Iroquois Culture* (Washington, 1961), pp.

accounts⁴ of these so-called Hurons (Wendats), Neutrals (Attiwandaronks) and Petuns assert that some time before the advent of the white man, they had fled westward from their more warlike kinsmen—the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Oneidas, and Tuscaroras⁵—who, late in the sixteenth century, had come together to form the Six Nations Confederacy or League of the Finger Lakes country. More recent interpretations, however, suggest that commercial ambitions arising out of the fur trade—that is, the desire to establish control over the productive beaver grounds of the upper lakes—rather than timidity or military inferiority prompted them to migrate to the western extremity of the Ontario peninsula.⁶ In any event, in pursuit of strategic locations where they could farm, hunt and trade in relative security, the Hurons, with a population of some 25,000, occupied the southeastern shores of Georgian Bay and set up several camps near the headwaters of the Grand River. Further to the south on the fringes of Lakes Erie and Ontario, settled the Neutrals, approximately 10,000 strong, who acquired their name by refusing to engage in the conflicts that repeatedly convulsed the relations between the Hurons and the Six Nations⁷ (A 3). The Petuns, or “Tobacco People”—they cultivated “the weed” extensively—lived immediately to the west of the Hurons on the shores of the Bruce Peninsula.⁸

Despite the dispersal of the Iroquoian family, all the groups—residents of the storied “Island of the Turtle”⁹—retained certain

27–38. On the strength of this argument another writer has commented that the Iroquois’ “historic, social, and economic patterns would appear to have developed within the general context of Northeastern culture.” B. G. Trigger, “Settlement as an Aspect of Iroquoian Adaptation at the Time of Contact,” *American Anthropologist*, LXV (1963), 89.

⁴See, for example, Diamond Jenness, *The Indians of Canada* (3rd ed., Ottawa, 1955), pp. 289 ff.

⁵Although the Tuscaroras (originally inhabitants of the Carolina country) did not join the League until the early years of the eighteenth century—some accounts assign the date 1715—the term “Six Nations” is employed throughout to describe this association of Indian tribes so that confusion might be kept to a minimum.

⁶B. G. Trigger, “The Historic Location of the Hurons,” *Ontario History*, LIV (1962), 137–48, and G. T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations* (Madison, 1940).

⁷An old but informative study of these people may be examined in J. H. Coyne, *The Country of the Neutrals* (St. Thomas, 1895).

⁸G. W. Bruce “The Petuns,” Ontario Historical Society, *Papers and Records*, VIII (1907), 34 ff.

⁹This phrase is borrowed from W. N. Fenton’s “This Island, The World on the Turtle’s Back,” *Journal of American Folklore* (1962), 283–300, an interesting study revealing, among other things, that these nations conceived their “Old Island” as “resting on the back of a turtle swimming in the primal sea.”

practices and customs peculiar to their ethnic legacy. Primarily cultivators (A 2) who ordinarily indulged in the chase only to augment the produce of the corn field (A 6), the Iroquois peoples developed relatively well-organized and functional systems of society, religion, and government (A 7-A 11). "[The] principal traits associated with maize culture," one ethnologist has explained, "have been diffused everywhere that corn will grow throughout the Eastern Woodlands. Maize culture everywhere permits semisedentary village life, frees the village elders from hunting to attend council and develop political forms. . . . One might say that the principal concerns of Iroquois life were . . . the maize complex, hunting, going on the warpath, holding councils, attending treaties and death. . . ." In the course of emphasizing the influential role which the women played in the community (A 10), the same authority remarked: "The League [in particular] was the climax form of Iroquois social structure of which the maternal household was the core image. In the . . . joint-family longhouse there developed a pattern of . . . life, with the two halves of the family living across the fire, which became the symbol of a society. When enlarged by projection from village to tribe to confederacy, the Longhouse of the League with its central fire was to dominate Indian-white relations throughout the colonies. . . ." ¹⁰

The primary kin group in this matriarchal society was made up of "all the male and female progeny of a woman, and also the progeny of a woman and of all her female descendants, tracing descent of blood in the female line and of such other persons as may have been adopted into it" ¹¹ (A 11). When such a group joined with other lineages, a clan was formed which was known by its own totem (Turtle, Bear, or Deer, for example) and which, in the case of the Mohawks, usually occupied a village of its own. As already suggested, the architectural hallmark and social centre of the Iroquois village was the longhouse, a bark structure normally measuring some hundred feet in length and fifty in breadth, through which ran a central hallway studded with hearths and flanked by apartments occupied by single families ¹² (A 5). The government established by the clans was firmly controlled by the women, who enjoyed the right to select and even depose chiefs, and had com-

¹⁰W. N. Fenton, *American Indian and White Relations to 1830: Needs & Opportunities for Study* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957), pp. 14-15.

¹¹J. N. B. Hewitt, *A Constitutional League of Peace in the Stone Age of America* (Washington, 1918), p. 530.

¹²L. H. Morgan, *League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois* (New York, 1904), II, 315.

petence in such matters as land allotment, supervision of field labour, the care of the treasury, the ordering of feasts, and the settlement of disputes.¹³

The vital link between the several tribes of the Confederacy was afforded by the presence in each of a number of the same clans, an arrangement which ensured the minimum of internal disorder. While the administrative functions of the clan were confined to questions of a local nature, those of the tribes were more concerned with larger problems such as interclan disputes, relations with allied and hostile nations, declarations of war, and provision for defence. Within the Confederacy, which was ruled by a council of fifty hereditary chiefs, three "elder" tribes—the Mohawks, the Senecas, and the Onondagas—held certain special prerogatives: thus the Mohawks were called "the fountain of good works," the sponsors of crucial matters in the councils; the Senecas, the keepers of the "western door"; and the Onondagas, the firekeepers and the custodians of the wampum.

Ultimately involved in the power politics of Europe, the Six Nations sought the support of the maritime states—England and the Netherlands—who gained control over the Hudson Valley, whereas their rivals, the Hurons, desired that of the French on the St. Lawrence. These two great river valleys, arteries of migration, trade, and war, that converged on the Niagara helped to shape the fortunes of the country traversed by the Valley of the Grand.

Apparently the missionaries were not the first Europeans in that Valley for in the Jesuits' own accounts, compiled a generation after Samuel Champlain constructed his *habitation* at Quebec, that distinction was awarded to those merchant adventurers who had sought "the advantages of the fur trade." Father Joseph de La Roche Daillon, a Récollet, visited the Valley "with the intention to preach the gospel" as early as the winter of 1626–27 (A 1), but his crusade had been ill received by the unfriendly Neutrals and a party of fellow Frenchmen had been obliged to organize a rescue mission on his behalf. A similar fate befell the equally short-lived Mission des Anges formed on the Grand in 1640 by the Jesuits Jean de Brébeuf and Joseph Marie Chaumonot (A 3). Save for an occasional trader and wandering Indian band, the Neutral country was left virtually undisturbed in the period immediately following these abortive ventures. In the years 1649–1651, however,

¹³This section is based, in the main, on J. A. Noon, *Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois* (New York, 1949), pp. 37–9.

the region was abruptly transformed into a battlefield as the militant Six Nations, in pursuit of commercial gain and new farmlands—and anxious perhaps to avenge themselves on their errant kinsmen—fell violently upon their western neighbours, shattering the hapless Neutrals and putting the Hurons to flight and the mission stations to the torch.¹⁴ Little could they have foreseen, *en route* through the peninsula to Huronia, that their descendants, a little over a century later, would be given a title, albeit a questionable one, to a section of the very country they were then laying waste. As a result of their devastating campaign, the invaders from the Finger Lakes established a sphere of influence far beyond their ancient longhouse and dared the struggling French colony on the St. Lawrence to challenge their sovereignty on that part of the frontier.

Not until the accession of Louis XIV and the massive intervention of Versailles did the French, capitalizing on information gained in limited reconnaissances in the 1650's,¹⁵ make a concerted attempt to re-establish their power in the area. Cowed by a series of assaults executed by seasoned European troops brought to the colony for that purpose, the Six Nations were compelled, in the spring of 1669, to admit an expedition of missionaries and explorers from Quebec. While Louis Jolliet and Le Sieur Péré set out to examine the country of the upper lakes, a party of Sulpician priests, led by Dollier de Casson and René de Galinée and accompanied by an inexperienced visionary named René Cavalier de La Salle, negotiated the route along the southern shore of Lake Ontario to its western end, then pushed overland some twenty miles to the Seneca village of Tinawatawa. There, near the site of recent battles, they effected a meeting on September 24, 1669, with Jolliet and Péré on the latter's return from the upper country (A 4).

The Sulpicians' odyssey brought them next to the Grand, named by Galinée le Rapide, for the swiftness of its current. Though the river obligingly provided the party with the means to reach Lake Erie, they found it disappointing chiefly because, to use Galinée's words, "of the difficulty we had in descending [it], for we had to be in the water almost all the time, dragging the canoe . . . so that although this river is not more than forty leagues in length, we took eight whole days to descend it." With such limitations, the Grand could not in the days of the fur trade hope to rival in strategic

¹⁴A. W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, 1960), pp. 118–21.

¹⁵Percy Robinson, *Toronto during the French Régime* (Toronto, 1933), p. 15.

value the Toronto Carrying Place (the Humber River, Lake Simcoe, and Severn River route to Georgian Bay), which furnished the most desirable short cut from the lower lakes to the northwest.

After the missionaries' brief sojourn in the Valley, almost a century passed before it again seriously engaged the attention of Europeans. The Seven Years' War, one of the critical contests of this hemisphere, finally destroyed the military and political structure France had so painstakingly erected in North America. Ironically, her setback was but the prelude to a crisis that seriously embarrassed her rival. Great Britain's taxation of the American colonies, imposed in part to defray the expenses of the late conflict and to subsidize her enlarged empire, merely antagonized those communities without producing the funds needed for discharging her new responsibilities. Westminster's attempt, in the Proclamation of 1763, to retard settlement in the west in an effort to pacify the uneasy Indians, further aggravated an explosive situation,¹⁶ and helped to pave the way for the American War of Independence. Those hostilities subsequently assigned to the Grand River Valley the role of haven for those who supported the losing cause.

¹⁶On the face of it, a decision of the King's legal advisers, submitted in 1757 as the Torke-Camden Opinion, invalidated this policy. Though dealing with a situation in India, it had nevertheless some bearing on the North American problem. In any case, the Opinion, in the words of one student, "was so garbled as to seem to state what was probably valid and good law, to wit, the right of any English subject to acquire land from any Indian who would sell or give it to him, and the right to enter upon it and possess it." T. C. Pease, "The Ordinance of 1787," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXV (1938-39), 175.

B. THE EXODUS TO THE GRAND RIVER

EVEN BEFORE THE War of Independence came to a close Britain was compelled to review her ancient commitments to those Indian allies who were sharing her defeats on the battlefields of New York and Pennsylvania. Under the best circumstances the problem would have been a delicate one, but it was even more complicated because not all of the Six Nations had rallied to the King's side in 1775. Some of the Mohawks and Senecas and a majority of the Oneidas either had tried to maintain a neutral posture or had campaigned actively alongside the Americans. This divided allegiance created turmoil in the ranks of the Confederacy, and would haunt for years the relations between the tribesmen who ultimately accepted the proffered asylum in western Quebec, and those who remained in the United States.

It is not surprising, in view of these developments, that many despaired of the future of the federation and anxiously awaited news "of what [would] happen to the whole [Long] house."¹ The neutral Iroquois endeavoured on several occasions to justify their motives for remaining aloof: at Niagara, on February 12, 1780, for instance, an acrimonious debate was carried on between the "Rebel Indians" and the loyal Mohawks.² Meanwhile, as the war progressed, those Indians who had honoured the alliance with Britain became increasingly apprehensive despite the assurance, first offered by Sir Guy Carleton, Governor of Quebec, and later confirmed in 1779 by his successor, Sir Frederick Haldimand, that their property and rights would be fully restored at the end of hostilities. Colonel Guy Johnson, who had succeeded his uncle, Sir William Johnson, as Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in 1774, reiterated this pledge in the spring of 1780, though he called on his Indian listeners for much "better behaviour" and "greater exertions."³ Despite these pledges, some Mohawk sachems, whose followers had already achieved a considerable degree of sophistication in New York, were fearful that "in the great Hurry of [Bus]iness" attending the peace-making their interests might be neglected and they might actually

¹Ontario, Department of Public Records and Archives (P.A.O.), Kirby Collection, Claus Papers, No. 6, John Deseronto to Daniel Claus, Dec. 3, 1778.

²Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Haldimand Papers, B 119, 104-12, Proceedings with Four Rebel Indians, Feb. 12-18, 1780.

³*Ibid.*, B 119, 119, Proceedings of Meeting of Six Nations with Guy Johnson, Niagara, March 28-29, 1780.

be forced, in the event of their returning to the Mohawk Valley, to accept the more primitive tribal conditions of the past.⁴ British authorities did their utmost to allay these misgivings throughout the critical months of 1780 and 1781, when so much depended on the Indians' ability and readiness to maintain adequate pressure on American forces. At the same time these authorities did not neglect to remind their restive allies of the treatment they had received at the hands of the rebels, alluding to the various devices employed to terrorize the villages of the Confederacy. And indeed bitter memories of that fierce border warfare would serve years later to reconcile many an Iroquois refugee with his lot on British soil.

As the tide of war definitely began to turn against the British, it became increasingly difficult to convince the loyal members of the Six Nations of their ally's ability to make restitution for their losses in New York State. Reports, albeit vigorously denied, began circulating in the spring of 1782 that some tribesmen had already contemplated suing for peace and throwing themselves on the mercy of the victors. Westminster therefore attempted to disguise the full effects of her reverses and to keep from the Indians the disquieting news that in recognizing the independence of the emergent republic she might be forced to renege on her earlier promise to restore them, as one observer put it, "to the condition they were in before the contest began." In fact, no definite provision was ever made either in the preliminary negotiations or in the definitive treaty of peace concluded in September 1783 for the territorial rights of the Six Nations.

In the beginning American officials understandably gave short shrift to the pleas of their Indian enemies, taking the view that they were "now in the same situation with the [Loyalists] who left us, their Lands forfeited in the same manner,"⁵ and never for a moment entertaining what appeared under the circumstances to be the somewhat absurd Iroquois claim to the old tribal lands in the Finger Lakes country. The Indians' mounting fear that their position was about to be betrayed stirred some British officials, who were only too mindful of the timely advice of old Indian hands, to use every means of keeping the Six Nations "in Good Humour," including attempts to convince them that Britain "was still strong" and hence capable of protecting their interests.⁶ Haldimand, who had first

⁴P.A.C., Claus Papers, III, 51-2, Daniel Claus to Sir John Johnson, Oct. 15, 1781.

⁵Haldimand Papers, B 103, 236-40, Proceedings of Six Nations Council at the Onondaga Settlement, July 2, 1783.

⁶*Ibid.*, B 103, 147-8, Allan Maclean to Haldimand, May 9, 1783.

learned of the serious omissions in the draft convention early in April, 1783, was disturbed lest the Indians assembled so expectantly at Niagara might turn on their old confederates once they learned the negotiators had virtually excluded their claims.

To complicate matters for the British, the refugees did not lack vocal and aggressive leadership. Joseph Brant, an influential Mohawk war chief who had ably supported the King's cause throughout the war, was regarded as "much better informed & instructed than any other Indians"⁷ and, accordingly, was expected to make things difficult for the Governor (B 1). Moreover, at this stage of his career Brant was held in great esteem by many persons of authority and influence, ranging from Colonel Daniel Claus of the Indian Department, who was especially impressed by the chief's "genius,"⁸ to Haldimand, who had unhesitatingly acclaimed his military services, appointing him on May 23, 1783, captain of the Northern Confederate Indians. The timing of the promotion suggests that the Governor may not have altogether overlooked the need for mollifying Brant at that dangerous juncture. Be that as it may, just two days before Brant received his new commission he addressed Haldimand on the question of boundaries and other matters arising out of the negotiations with the Americans (B 2). He made repeated references to the line of demarcation between the League and the white settlements, that had been agreed upon in 1768 and which extended from the head of Canada Creek (near Fort Stanwix, New York) to the Ohio, adding that this agreement had been "gratefully Accepted and Ratified by the different Governors and Great men" of the American colonies. Receiving no formal reply to this speech, even after an interval of three years, Brant finally visited Britain and re-opened the question in conversations with a number of responsible officials. Obviously he was little gratified by their response for following his return to the colony he appeared, despite the personal favours bestowed upon him, to have cooled perceptibly in his relations with the British, though never to the point of becoming markedly friendlier with the Americans (B 31).

Meanwhile the chief's worst fears, expressed in very "Strong Language," had been blunted by the conciliatory actions of such

⁷Educated at Moor's Charity School in Lebanon, Connecticut, through the sponsorship of Sir William Johnson, Brant was described by one of his teachers as a "promising youth of a sprightly genius, singular modesty, and a serious turn." E. B. O'Callaghan, *Documentary History of the State of New York* (Albany, 1851), IV, 211.

⁸Claus Papers, II, 207-14, Claus' "Observations of Joseph Brant's Distinguished Genius and Character."

hard-working administrators as Brigadier Allan Maclean and Sir John Johnson, who had succeeded his cousin as Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (B 1). But those persons were not so sanguine, in view of Brant's lingering dissatisfaction, as to imagine that their kind words and professed regard for the Six Nations had dulled all the chief's suspicions. Although these officials merely deferred the "evil day" when the Indians would have to be told all, their activities were warmly applauded by the badgered Haldimand. At the very least, they had succeeded in keeping alive the League's hatred of the Americans, somewhat typically described in 1783 as those "designing Knaves," those "Canting Hipocritical Yankees." Still extremely critical of Britain's inability to obtain better terms for his people, Brant nevertheless agreed to use his influence to keep the Six Nations "in temper," and to consider the possibility of settling the exiled tribesmen in close proximity to other Loyalist communities on lands still under British control in western Quebec. Haldimand had already emphasized that it had "never been the intention to abandon [the Indians] . . . as long as any part of the Continent remains in our possession."⁹

Aware of what had occurred twenty years before when disgruntled tribes had followed Pontiac along the road to rebellion,¹⁰ the Governor was most anxious to gratify Brant's desire for a suitable asylum. Haldimand's position was dangerously weakened, however, by the lack of precise instructions from his superiors at home (B 3). Furthermore, that bugbear of the first empire, frequently faulty transatlantic communications, as well as the shock inflicted by the recent "catastrophe shocking to think of"—the Anglo-American civil war—conspired to throw what remained of Britain's dominions on this continent into considerable confusion.¹¹ Goaded by necessity, Haldimand decided to proceed on his own and on May 26, 1783, resolved, following conversations with both Claus and Brant, to despatch a surveying crew under the command of Major Samuel Holland to examine the Cataraqui district at the eastern end of Lake Ontario with "a view to settle such of the Six Nations as will prefer that situation" (B 3). Although Brant had tentatively accepted a proposed "Retreat" on the Bay of Quinte, he gave priority in the end to the region with which he was already familiar—he had visited it in the company of several chiefs some

⁹Haldimand Papers, B 104, 418, Haldimand to Maclean, May 23, 1783.

¹⁰A full account of this crisis is presented in H. H. Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (2nd ed.; Chicago, 1961).

¹¹See G. S. Graham, *British Policy and Canada, 1774-1791* (London, 1930).

years before—that lying to the westward of the lake, in particular, the Valley of the Grand (B 7). Haldimand agreed that the reasons for his selection were “Politick enough,” though he felt that if the majority of the tribesmen preferred Cataraqui, “Joseph” should respect their wishes (B 9).

Brant argued, however, that a powerful and integrated Indian community on the Grand could afford a bridge to the “Western Nations,” the people of the upper lakes who for some time had figured prominently in British diplomacy and revered the Confederacy as their guardians or “Uncles” (B 14). Also, Brant did not wish to isolate his kinsmen, the Senecas, who were still clinging to part of their lands in the Genesee Valley of western New York (B 13). Had the eastern end of Lake Ontario actually been selected as the principal haven for the Six Nations, the Senecas would have been condemned to a highly vulnerable position on the borders of American settlement. This larger aspect of Indian affairs was underscored by the negotiations then going on between specially appointed Commissioners of the United States and those members of the Confederacy still residing in New York. Under the terms of the Treaty of 1783 the victors had undertaken to protect their former adversaries on condition that the tribes relinquish their claims to a large portion of their territory and deliver up all their prisoners. To ensure an agreement the Indians were obliged to surrender six hostages, one of whom, Aaron Hill, was a close friend of Brant. This procedure and the subsequent Second Treaty of Fort Stanwix which embodied the American terms proved extremely distasteful to the chief and his colleagues and strengthened their resolve to maintain close relations with their fellows on the other side of the newly established international boundary. Apart from these dictates of blood and strategy was the added inducement offered by the manifest advantages of the Grand River country: “the mildness of the climate, the fertility of the soil, and the convenience of hunting” (B 12). Admittedly some of the uprooted Iroquois made unfavourable comparisons between western Quebec and their conquered homeland in New York¹² (B 5), but both Brant and Haldimand were agreed that the former, if properly administered and developed, would enjoy every prospect of success

¹²On the other hand, an impartial observer a few years later remarked: “One is struck by the levelness, the wealth, and the good cultivation of the lands watered by the Mohawk, but it must be admitted that its valley is very narrow and that there are almost no rivers. . . .” H. Huth and Wilma Pugh, eds., “Talleyrand in America as a Financial Promoter, 1794–96; Unpublished Letters and Memoirs, II” (America Historical Association, *Report*, 1941 [Washington, 1942]), 87.

and become, in the Governor's words, "a Fertile and Happy Retreat" for the Indians.¹³

In spite of Brant's arguments, a number of sachems, including John Deseronto, had already rejected the Grand as a refuge, choosing instead the site allotted at the Bay of Quinte, convinced that in such a relatively remote area they could live undisturbed by the Americans (B 12). Although sympathizing with Deseronto's views, Haldimand regretted his decision, arguing that the Six Nations' "Strength and existence depend alone upon their being firmly united" (B 17). The situation on the Grand, moreover, was a highly strategic one for clearly it could serve as a buffer for the British communities already being formed toward the western end of Lake Ontario. Brant, who seldom took lightly any attempt to spurn his own projects, endeavoured on a number of occasions in the next few years to entice the Quinte Mohawks to disavow Deseronto's leadership and take up residence in the west.

As soon as the chief made up his mind to locate the bulk of the Six Nations in the Valley Haldimand hastened to make the necessary arrangements. On March 23, 1784, he instructed Lieutenant-Colonel John Butler, the Rangers' commandant, to purchase from the Mississauga Indians—originally a northern people of Ojibwa stock who had settled in the region before the Seven Years' War—a "Tract of Country . . . situated between Lakes Ontario, Erie & Huron" (B 6). Approximately two months passed before all the details were satisfactorily completed and the objections of some dissident Mississaugas overruled. At a meeting held at Niagara on May 22, 1784, attended by the Six Nations, Butler and his entourage, and the Mississauga delegates, the latter publicly announced their decision to transfer the sought after territory to "their Brethren" in the hope that they would always live "in friendship" together (B 10). Even so, the sum of £1180/7/4 was paid by the King's representatives to seal this otherwise commendable fraternal bargain (B 11). In the autumn Haldimand issued his oft-quoted proclamation, formally awarding the tract to the Mohawks "and others of the Six Nations" (B 16). According to the terms of the grant, they were authorized to "Settle upon the Banks of the River" and were allotted "for that Purpose six miles deep from each Side of [it] beginning at Lake Erie, & extending in that Proportion to [its] Head." What appears on the face of it to be a most unequivocal document was to stir up endless controversy, since Brant, appearing from the outset to regard the territory as his own to manage on

¹³Claus Papers, III, 277, Haldimand to Claus, Dec. 17, 1783.

behalf of the Confederacy, interpreted the proclamation as tantamount to full national recognition of the Mohawks and their fellow tribesmen, an interpretation later strongly denied by the British.

Among the more immediate problems was that of marking the precise limits of the grant. Since no qualified surveyors actually went over the ground in 1784, it was described in the most misleading terms. For example, in delineating its northern boundary the original deed from the Mississaugas to the Crown stated that the line extended from the "Creek that falls from a small Lake into . . . Lake Ontario known by the name of Waghquata [Burlington Bay] . . . until it Strikes the River La Tranche [the Thames]" (B 11). This fanciful reference accounts for the confusion which plagued the steps of the first surveying parties despatched to the area, for at once they proceeded to mistake the Thames for the Conestoga, a northern branch of the Grand. This highly unsatisfactory conclusion prompted the authorities in 1790 to plan a much more thorough examination of the upper part of the Valley (B 26); even so the original survey had established a working boundary in the "base line," projected from Waghquata to the point actually marked on the Conestoga.

Equally imperative was the need to determine the eastern boundary of the tract: already European enclaves had been formed in the vicinity and appeared to be encroaching on Indian lands. In due course Augustus Jones, a professional surveyor of Welsh extraction, who, appropriately enough, had married the daughter of a local Mississauga chief, was selected to perform the necessary duties. On the basis of the plan which he subsequently submitted, the Land Board of the District, after consulting Brant and other chiefs, decreed that the "Bend of the River easterly nearly two Miles from its Mouth . . . & the Mohawk Village [the community shortly known as Brant's Ford] shall be the two fixed Points & that a Straight line drawn from one of these points to the other shall form the Center Line of the Indian Lands on the Grand River, & that two Parallel lines to this Six Miles Distant on each Side of the Grand River Shall form the Bounds between them & the Settlement of Nassau," the territorial unit organized earlier in 1788 (B 26).

Appearing satisfactory when first submitted, this new outline, as subsequently demonstrated, did not include the actual headwaters of the Grand, the area to the north of what was later known as "Block Nichol," the parcel of land conveyed to white purchasers in 1798. According to explanations furnished later, it would appear that Jones' surveys had not been extended to the river's source for

the simple reason that the authorities had never intended that they should be, arguing that the Six Nations had "misconceived the extent" of their property (B 33–B 35). One may assume with considerable assurance, however, that haste and a profound ignorance on the part of both Indians and officials of the precise northern limits of the country ceded to the Confederacy in 1784 had led to this unfortunate result. In any event, the Indians were obliged to make the best of the situation, although leaving no one in any doubt as to their dissatisfaction.

While the disputes continued about the precise meaning of the Haldimand proclamation, the Six Nations were establishing themselves on the Grand River. In November, 1784, they were promised government assistance for their settlement, and a mill, church, and school (B 18). During the winter and spring of 1784–5 the Indians moved from Niagara to their new home. The Mohawks settled around Brant's Ford; the other refugee Nations organized their communities to the southeast. Immediately adjacent to the Mohawk tract were those of the Onondagas and Tuscaroras, on the eastern and western banks of the river respectively. The latter's nearest Indian neighbours were the Senecas and the Oneidas who occupied corresponding locations, and the Cayugas who had taken up their allotted land near the mouth of the Grand. There were, in addition, representatives of other tribes who had attached themselves to the Six Nations and accompanied them to the west after 1783, notably contingents of Delawares—the most numerous of these allies, Tutelos (or Tutelies), and Nanticokes. Their number, negligible when contrasted with the population of the Six Nations, relegated these tribes to a minor role in the politics and the economy of the area (B 19, G 11).

With respect to the Confederacy itself—though statistics must be viewed with great caution—there is no question that the Mohawks were the numerically significant as well as politically paramount group. Of the approximately 1,600 Iroquois who actually settled on the Grand, there were about 450 Mohawks,¹⁴ 380 Cayugas, 200 Onondagas, 125 Tuscaroras, 75 Senecas, and a handful of loyal Oneidas (B 19). These rough figures starkly reflected the misfortunes that had recently befallen the Six Nations and disrupted their political organization. Most of the Senecas—though many of that tribe's warriors had championed the British cause after 1776—had

¹⁴A missionary of the Church of England reported in the summer of 1788 that there were 399 Mohawks at Brant's Ford: 120 men, 154 women, and 125 children. P.A.C., Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (S.P.G.), Journals, XXV, 120–1.

an access of homesickness and elected to remain on their tribal lands in western New York and seek, if possible, a working agreement with the United States.¹⁵ In 1790 a scheme to attract them to the Grand was proposed, but was vetoed by Lord Dorchester (B 25).

From the first there is evidence of some disagreement among the Indians (B 22, B 23), yet in a comparatively short time they were able to become established in their new home. When Patrick Campbell visited the Grand River in 1792, he was impressed not only by the personality of Joseph Brant but also by the flourishing condition of the Indian settlers in their new communities (B 31).

¹⁵A census return prepared by the United States in 1792 revealed that nearly 1,700 Senecas and over 600 Oneidas had ignored the opportunity of accompanying other Indian refugees to British soil. New York Historical Society (N.Y.H.S.), Henry O'Reilly Collection, Papers Relating to the Six Nations Indians, VIII.

C. A DISPUTED TITLE

ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS arising from the Haldimand grant was the question of whether or not Indians could dispose of their lands directly to whomsoever they chose. In the years immediately following the grant, when effective government was little more than a promise in western Quebec, it was relatively easy for the strong-willed Brant to take the initiative, and to invite white settlers to the tract, actually providing them with rough land titles. For that matter, it appears that even before the area was formally transferred to the Six Nations, several whites, including two named Preston and Dodge, had taken up residence in the vicinity of present-day Galt and Kitchener, principally as fur traders—that “unruly” element so despised by John Graves Simcoe, the future Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada. Subsequently, in 1787, a number of families, all friends or acquaintances of Brant—the Dochsteders, the Nelles (C 38), the Huffs (C 32), and the Youngs—were issued deeds by the chief clearly stipulating that their grants, to extend in length “three miles back from the River,” were to “be possessed by their recipients and their posterity forever” and, it is worth noting, were “never to be transferred to any other” (C 2).

The Youngs were doubtless the family of John Young, who, according to a letter addressed to Haldimand late in 1783, resided that early “amongst the Indians settled on the river,” and frequently kept the authorities informed of untoward developments in the Valley.¹ After the Youngs and their neighbours occupied their holdings other friends of Brant, the families of John Smith (C 39) and John Thomas, encouraged by the chief’s offer of land, made their homes in the neighbourhood of what came to be known as Brant’s Ford, the Mohawk Village where a boom had been placed across the Grand.² Over the next quarter of a century, a considerable number of Europeans and Americans obtained similar leases authorizing them, at least so far as Brant was concerned, to occupy and improve lots overlooking the river. They included Benjamin Fairchild and Alexander Westbrook, two “Volunteers” who had served under the chief during the American War of Independence and

¹E.g., P.A.C., Haldimand Papers, B 103, 476–8, Young to Haldimand, Oct. 5, 1784.

²See Charles and J. C. Thomas, “Reminiscences of the First Settlers in the County of Brant,” Ontario Historical Society, *Papers and Records*, XII (1914), 58–71.

moved to the Valley in 1788; Isaac Whiting, who five years later leased "for 999 years" a farm on "Fairchild's Creek so call"^d (C 36); Gordin Chapin, Whiting's son-in-law; David Phelps, who secured a lease in 1801; William Dennis, who settled in the "Nelles Tract" in 1806; Ezra Hawley, self-styled "son of a Loyallist", who occupied a farm in 1811 (C 36); and one Benaijah Mallory, who, after obtaining a lease in 1805 (C 37) and prospering as a farmer, had a most diversified career in the colony, acting occasionally as a spokesman for the Six Nations, serving as a member of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada, and still later defecting to the Americans during the War of 1812.

While these small white colonies were being formed in the Indian lands, the Confederacy was striving to consolidate its own position. There were, however, less than 2,000 Indians (B 19, G 11), and the tract was a large one. In view of the discouraging "statistical account" of Indian population in the Valley, and the scarcity of qualified Indian "yeomen," Brant's practice of inviting white settlers to the district should not be dismissed solely as a gesture of friendship. From the very beginning the chief, obviously a considerably Europeanized entrepreneur, appears to have realized that the original grant of 1784 was much too large to be managed productively by the Six Nations alone and that the ingenuity of, and examples set by, white merchants and farmers would be highly desirable assets. Consequently, an effort was made to encourage white newcomers both to provide the Indians with informal instruction so that they might improve their domains in the most advantageous fashion and to construct mills and other facilities for processing whatever the Mohawks and their confederates could in time produce to fill their own pressing needs. Some such plan was imperative, in the view of many observers, for very few Iroquois males appeared capable, once the hunt had ceased to be profitable or feasible in that part of western Quebec, of coping with the problems of agriculture (G 7). Hence the tribesmen were to be retrained, so to speak, in the "arts of husbandry," a pursuit which had invariably been left to the distaff side of the community. At any rate, the effective termination of the fur trade³ and the close of an era in the economic history of the Valley seemed to confirm the wisdom of Brant's policy of orderly white colonization.

³As early as 1796 the Board of Trade in London had satisfied itself that the "Fur Trade cannot now probably be carried on, to any great Extent on the Eastward of the Lakes, and it will gradually diminish in Proportion as the Country becomes cultivated and inhabited." British Museum (B.M.), Liverpool Papers, Add. Mss. 38310.

None the less officials in the province shortly questioned the legality of such leases of Indian lands (C 7) on the grounds that they had been arranged independently of the Crown and if permitted to stand would unquestionably embolden other Europeans to seize control by one means or another of the better part of the Six Nations' reserve. In addition, there is evidence to support the assertion, made by many at the time, that the various leases, sales, and grants honoured by Brant in the decade after the American war seriously divided the Confederacy, because, among other reasons, they tended to violate the ancient principle that land was "not a commodity which could be conveyed."⁴ Thus in the summer of 1788 two Mohawk sachems, Captains Aaron and Isaac Hill, who had originally selected the Cataraqui site but eventually joined Brant on the Grand, took strong exception to the latter's policy of "bringing white People to settle on their lands" (B 22). Either unimpressed by Brant's argument that ancient tribal customs could never be revived in the Valley or distrusting his motives for inviting Europeans in the first place—or both—these chiefs went so far as to take up arms for the purpose of "deposing" him. Their "rebellion" proved abortive for the chastened Hills soon reappeared at the Mohawk settlement on the Bay of Quinte. At a meeting held to review their grievances in September, 1788, Sir John Johnson assured them, with as much conviction as he could muster, that measures would shortly be taken to compel the whites on the Grand to vacate their holdings (C 3). Nothing of the sort was actually accomplished, however, and when a formal investigation was launched in 1812 (C 35), it was manifestly too late to set aside the deeds and leases which Brant had assigned two decades or more before. They were not confirmed, however, until 1835, following another investigation the preceding year (C 40).

To further complicate matters during that interval the relations between the authorities and those members of the Six Nations who had accepted Brant's leadership were seriously strained when an attempt was made to prohibit further transfers of land to prospective white colonists. Trouble arose primarily because Brant contended that Haldimand's proclamation of 1784 not only constituted the creation of an estate in fee simple for the Indians, but recognized the Confederacy as a distinct national community, one presumably competent to arrange as it saw fit its own relations with other sovereign states such as Great Britain and the United States. The

⁴J. A. Noon, *Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois* (New York, 1949), p. 97.

British retorted that the Six Nations, Brant's arguments notwithstanding, did not enjoy nor should be permitted to enjoy any such status, adding, for good measure, that Haldimand's action should not be construed as the authority to dispose of their property without official approval. So far as Westminster was concerned the question had already been settled some twenty years before by the Proclamation of 1763 (C 1). "The Indians," asserts one scholar, "possessed rights of prior occupancy, although not of sovereignty, over all lands not formally surrendered by them; that all land surrenders to be legal must be made to the Crown alone; and that all persons unlawfully occupying Indian lands should be expelled by authority of the Crown."⁵

The problem, however, was not solved by appeals to established policy; and indeed it was aggravated by the reorganization of western Quebec as Upper Canada in 1791 and the appointment of John Graves Simcoe as lieutenant governor of that new colony. Nearly all students of that official's career are agreed that whatever he may have lacked in other departments of his personality, he possessed an almost inexhaustible store of imagination. "It was Colonel . . . Simcoe," writes one historian, "who found in the new frontier society of the lakes a stimulus sufficient to arouse his ingenious enthusiasm and tremendous energy."⁶ Many of Simcoe's contemporaries were less disposed to praise his almost suffocating ebullience, repelled as they were by his irritating assumption that he alone was qualified to carry out Britain's wishes in the colony. "The officers of Government," a disgruntled colleague wrote, "seem to have been considered by Gen^l Simcoe only as footballs: to be kick't about at his pleasure." "It has always appeared to me," he concluded, "as if that Gentleman thought the Government had been established as a thing whereon he might exercise the sportiveness of his fancy."⁷ This then was the personality who in the course of meticulously managing the affairs of Upper Canada collided with Joseph Brant over questions concerning the disposal of lands on the Grand River.

Simcoe positively refused to permit the Indians to sell or lease any part of their reserve, not only because he regarded any such action as a violation of the orders governing the matter, but also for fear that they would promptly be taken in by unscrupulous

⁵G. F. G. Stanley, "The Indian Background of Canadian History," Canadian Historical Association, *Report*, 1952 (Ottawa, 1953), p. 18.

⁶Donald Creighton, *The Empire of the St. Lawrence* (Toronto, 1956), p. 116.

⁷Toronto Public Library (T.P.L.), Russell Papers, John White to Russell, June 30, 1796.

"Land Jobbers" (C 7). Though there is some indication that he later offered to review his decision (C 13), Simcoe remained adamant on this point to the very end. Brant argued vainly that the Six Nations could no longer hope to survive on the hunt exclusively and that failing the speedy agricultural development of the tract, their only recourse was to sell portions of it in order to obtain some financial compensation (C 7, C 13).

The chief firmly rejected the patent Simcoe prepared in 1793 (C 5) because its acceptance would have made the disposal of Indian lands conditional upon an offer first being made to the Crown.⁸ Thus it would, in effect, have set aside the argument that those lands formed an estate in fee simple and reduced them to an estate in leasehold from the Crown (C 7). In addition, much to Brant's displeasure, the patent also made provision for the "Rascally Oneidas," many of whom had refused to fight alongside their kinsmen during the "late War" with the United States. Brant's avowed opposition to Simcoe finally prompted the latter, despite his healthy respect for the chief's unquestioned power and influence, to threaten openly "the curtailment of our [the Indians'] lands to one half of the [Grand] River" (C 23). Brant bitterly complained that he could "hardly reconcile myself to Live on Such [a] Situation" (C 6), and confided to an American acquaintance that he might consider moving to the United States if conditions in Upper Canada did not improve to his satisfaction (C 9). Matters were complicated further when Lord Dorchester, Simcoe's titular superior, publicly expressed the opinion that despite the lack of conventional legal sanctions the "advantages" Haldimand had conferred upon the Confederacy—including presumably the right of alienation—should be unconditionally reaffirmed⁹ (C 10). Condemning what he regarded as a virtual endorsement of Brant's arguments, Simcoe resented the Governor's lecturing him in the fine points of the law, inasmuch as he felt that he was adequately conversant with that discipline and had competent legal advisers of his own.¹⁰

⁸The Six Nations, it would appear, have never recognized the so-called "Simcoe Deed." Noon, *Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois*, pp. 86-8. See also G. C. Paterson, *Land Settlement in Upper Canada, 1783-1840* (Toronto, 1921), p. 223.

⁹One respected employee of the Indian Department felt that Dorchester's "Sentiments and opinions are so just & Equitable, as I apprehend will induce His Excellency [Simcoe] to give Such a full and ample a Grant of the Lands in Question, as will give Satisfaction to the Indians and I hope will remove Every Cause of uneasiness." P.A.C., Claus Papers, VII, 148, Joseph Chew to Colonel McKee, Jan. 20, 1796.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 276, Chew to McKee, Sept. 26, 1796.

Simcoe's decision in 1795 to apply for leave did not disappoint those persons who, like Brant, had come to despise his manner and envy his authority. Giving as his excuses general ill health and a "slow fever," Simcoe left York bound for Britain on July 24, 1796, never to return to Upper Canada. His place was immediately occupied, if not satisfactorily filled, by the much less vigorous Peter Russell, who assumed the duties of acting Administrator and President of the Council. No sooner had he entered upon his office than Brant, so long blocked by Simcoe, made his weight painfully felt. Even more sickly than his predecessor, Russell had more than his share of difficulties, especially with the Mohawk chief.¹¹

Convinced that he should take full advantage of the change of regimes and armed with the requisite authority from the Confederacy (C 12), Brant intensified his campaign to satisfy the prospective purchasers of Indian lands on the Grand. In a lengthy explanation composed late in 1797 the principal reason he gave for so expediting matters was by that time a hackneyed one, for he reiterated the Indians' need for an immediate assured income from land sales¹² (C 23). Even had this argument been acceptable, Russell, for one, would have opposed the proposition on the grounds that most of the applicants for property on the river appeared to be Americans (C 11), an allegation with which the chief rightly took issue, however (C 23).

Moreover, some officials, like the one who in 1785 had warned of his "ambitious views,"¹³ alleged that Brant's programme was inspired either by calculations of power—by a desire to have himself acclaimed as a person to be reckoned with in the colony—or simply by a wish to frustrate those in high places who had repeatedly quarrelled with his interpretation of the Six Nations' status. Still

¹¹The Administrator complained on one particularly depressing occasion that "Sancho Panca was never more thoroughly convinced of the Misery of Governing than I am." Russell Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1, Russell to Major Shank, Sept. 12, 1797.

¹²"To a man of Brant's sagacity," one of his earliest champions wrote, "it was . . . obvious that in such an attractive region of country [as the Grand River Valley] the approach of the white man would soon circumscribe the hunting-grounds of his people . . . that the effect would be to drive his people from the hunter to the agricultural state; in which case . . . his territory [the use of this particular form of the possessive is significant] would be far larger than it would be necessary for the latter condition of life. As a compensation for the loss of his game, therefore he conceived the idea of making sales of portions of his lands, for the creation of an immediate fund for the benefit of the nation, and of leasing other portions in such manner as to ensure a perpetual revenue." W. L. Stone, *Life of Joseph Brant—Thayendanegea* (New York, 1838), II, 397.

¹³P.R.O., C.O. 42, v. 49, Dec. 15, 1785.

others wondered whether his motives in arranging the sales were fostered by a sincere resolve to remedy the plight of his fellow tribesmen, or by one of those rarely afforded opportunities to make a handsome personal profit. Although it is not unreasonable to suppose that given some luck Brant could well have achieved all these objects simultaneously, one of the chief's most stalwart champions had little difficulty in assuring himself that Brant's plans were dictated not by "selfish designs" but by a genuine regard for his own people.¹⁴ Further, the writer insisted that at no time did Brant use one penny of the Six Nations' funds to gratify his own wants.

In this connection, it should be noted that Brant—and the Indians as a whole—had been rewarded, if not magnificently, at least adequately by British standards for their loyal conduct in the American war. Among other emoluments, Brant himself received a little over £1000 "N. Y. Currency," partly in compensation for the loss of some 600 acres of land which he had cleared or been about to clear in the Mohawk Valley before the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁵ Again, the United States, which valued him as a liaison with the restless and suspicious tribes of the Northwest, did something more than merely meet the travelling expenses incurred.

Notwithstanding the favourable character references furnished by his admirers, several commentators unhesitatingly questioned Brant's integrity. One such, Thomas Douglas, Lord Selkirk, confided to his diary the damaging information that during the negotiations which set the stage for the sale of the Grand River lands in 1798 Brant had demanded a substantial commission for his services, as high indeed as 10 per cent.¹⁶ Accurate or groundless, his lordship's comment was not the first accusation of Brant. In the late autumn of 1796 the Caughnawaga Indians—the so-called Seven Nations of Canada or "praying Mohawks"—many of whom resided within the northeastern limits of New York, had charged that Brant had surreptitiously sold a part of their lands to that state. Although he was exonerated of all blame following an official enquiry, and although his accusers did not themselves enjoy untarnished reputations for telling the truth, doubts respecting Brant's honesty were conveniently revived whenever he became involved in land transactions of any sort.¹⁷

Unquestionably, the chief's alleged misadventures in real estate

¹⁴Stone, *Brant*, II, 415.

¹⁵C.O. 42, v. 47, Estimate of Brant's Losses in American War.

¹⁶P. C. T. White, ed., *Lord Selkirk's Diary, 1803-1804* (Toronto, 1958), p. 148.

¹⁷For other instances consult *Claus Papers, IX; Report on Canadian Archives for 1890* (Ottawa, 1891), p. 215.




PLATE I. A CLASS OF MOHAWK CHILDREN, 1786, ENGRAVED BY JAMES PEACHEY. [Claus, *A Primer for the Use of the Mohawk Children* (London, 1786), insert in copy in Toronto Public Library.]



PLATE II. THE MOHAWK CHURCH, ABOUT 1850. [Jones, *History of the Ojebway Indians.*]



PLATE III. THE MOHAWK VILLAGE, 1793, BY MRS. J. G. SIMCOE, SHOWING THE COUNCIL HOUSE ON THE LEFT AND THE CHURCH ON THE RIGHT. [Simcoe Sketches, Department of Public Records and Archives, Ontario.]




PLATE IV. INDIAN CHURCH AT TUSCARORA. [Beaven, *Recreations of a Long Vacation.*]



PLATE V. MISSION HOUSE AT TUSCARORA. [Beaven, *Recreations of a Long Vacation.*]



PLATE VI. FATHER JEAN DE BRÉBEUF. [John Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto Public Library.]




PLATE VII. SIR FREDERICK HALDIMAND, BY FRANCIS ABBOTT. [Royal Ontario Museum, University of Toronto.]



PLATE VIII. PETER RUSSELL. [Department of Public Records and Archives, Ontario.]




PLATE IX. LORD SELKIRK. [Department of Public Records and Archives, Ontario.]




PLATE X. THE REV. JOHN STUART.
[Courtesy of Sir Campbell Stuart,
G.C.M.G., K.B.E.]




PLATE XI. WILLIAM JARVIS. [John
Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto
Public Library.]



PLATE XII. WILLIAM HAMILTON
MERRITT. [Department of Public
Records and Archives, Ontario.]



PLATE XIII. WILLIAM DICKSON.
[John Ross Robertson Collection,
Toronto Public Library.]



PLATE XIV. MRS. WILLIAM JOHNSON
KERR, NÉE ELIZABETH BRANT. [John
Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto
Public Library.]



PLATE XV. WILLIAM CLAUS.
[Niagara Historical Society,
Publications, no. 42.]



PLATE XVI. JOHN BRANT. [Stone,
Life of Joseph Brant.]




PLATE XVII. SIR JOHN JOHNSON.
[John Ross Robertson Collection,
Toronto Public Library.]



PLATE XVIII. QUEEN ANNE'S PLATE, MOHAWK CHAPEL, BRANTFORD. [Erskine Studio, Brantford.]

estranged many of his fellow Indians, occasioning serious divisions within the Confederacy. Lord Selkirk's opinion was shared by Red Jacket—a Seneca sachem whose distrust and envy of Brant were almost pathological¹⁸—who felt that the Mohawk leader invariably enriched himself at someone else's expense, the victims usually being the very people whom he had professed to defend. Selkirk was convinced—though his evidence, it should be noted, did not include names or specific details—that in “the affair of the Grand R[iver] lands,” the chief had been in collusion with “a few leading men” who had hoped to make capital out of land speculation in the Valley.¹⁹ He added that when the young men of the Confederacy, who clearly suspected that Brant was attempting to dupe them, protested the chief's behaviour, they were silenced by their “mothers and aunts.” This last observation, made by a perceptive European observer, confirms that the women still wielded power in the councils of the Six Nations (A 10); the classic account of Iroquoian customs stresses the frequently dominant role females played, maintaining that “their influence [made] itself felt” whenever “business of national concernment was transacted.”²⁰

Brant's defenders—and they were as numerous as his detractors—dismissed the allegations of the “younger warriors” as the work of the immature and the thoughtless who had forgotten the services that people of Brant's generation had rendered the community (C 31). His supporters never wearied of pointing out that the Mississaugas who had settled on the River Credit and adopted Brant as their chief had boasted that he “is fittest to be their Chief because he alone knows the value of Land” (C 29). As on other occasions, however, such reassuring claims on his behalf did not spare Brant, for he continued to serve as a convenient target for the most impassioned abuse. Those of the Six Nations who had settled at the Bay of Quinte complained that the Mohawk leader had

¹⁸Among other things, Brant had personally insulted the Seneca. An American official, who was on good terms with both parties, related: “on one occasion when Brant . . . and Red Jacket, had been dining with me . . . I observed . . . when the bottle had circulated pretty freely . . . evident mortification in the looks of Red Jacket. I did not at the time know the cause of this; but Brant subsequently explained to me that he . . . had been amusing [himself] at Red Jacket's expense, by telling a story about some other Indian, to whom [he] imputed the very same conduct practised by Red Jacket, when he killed his neighbour's cows. . . .” “Pioneer Settlement in Western New York . . . Personal Memoir of Thomas Morris . . . read before the New York Historical Society . . . in Feb. 1852,” N.Y.H.S., O'Reilly Collection, XV.

¹⁹White, ed., *Lord Selkirk's Diary, 1803–1804*, p. 161.

²⁰L. H. Morgan, *League of the Ho-De-No-Sau-Nee or Iroquois* (rev. ed.; New York, 1922), pp. 66, 179.

never hesitated to resort to reprehensible methods in his campaign to lure them to the Grand River, including, it would appear, vaguely worded promises to share with those who did accept his invitation all proceeds from the sale of reserve lands²¹ (C 20, B 32).

Although what had been condoned in Dorchester's day—the virtually unrestricted leasing or selling of tracts to Europeans and Americans—had been roundly repudiated in Simcoe's, that energetic frontier governor was no longer in control when the issue came to a head at the close of the eighteenth century. Rather it was the beleaguered Peter Russell who bore the brunt of Brant's criticism and ridicule and he and his colleagues proved incapable of reversing those arrangements Brant had actually made with various purchasers of Grand River property and which were formally registered and sealed on February 5, 1798.

As everyone in authority knew only too well, in the course of bringing those transactions to fruition Brant practically coerced Russell into accepting conditions which the latter's predecessor had steadfastly refused to sanction. Selkirk was repeating only common knowledge when he informed his diary that if the chief's demands had not been met he would have mounted an attack on the provincial capital itself,²² a controversial charge that was echoed by William Dummer Powell who presided over the colony's Court of King's Bench (C 21). Ever since the formation of Upper Canada, all officials who recalled the Pontiac Rebellion had been haunted by the spectre of an Indian uprising, and Brant's menacing posture in 1797 did little to sooth their ruffled nerves.²³ They were painfully aware of the manifold shortcomings of the colony's military establishment in general and of York's inability to muster an adequate defence in particular.

To compound the problem, rumours began to circulate that French and Spanish forces were being marshalled in the upper

²¹Proceedings of a Council held at the Bay of Quinte . . . September 1800, P.A.C., Indian Affairs, Records and Correspondence of the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, XXVI, 7-8. See also P.A.C., State Papers, Upper Canada, LXVII, 146. There is evidence that a number of the "Quaint Indians," anxious to avenge themselves on Brant, attempted to disrupt negotiations which the chief opened with the Connecticut Land Company, an American enterprise that sought in 1796 to obtain territory on the south shore of Lake Erie to which the Six Nations held a title. O'Reilly Collection, XII, Israel Chapin to Brant, April 30, 1796.

²²White, ed., *Lord Selkirk's Diary, 1803-1804*, p. 148.

²³For a discussion of Indian military tactics—based in large part upon the testimony of experienced British army officers of the eighteenth century—consult J. K. Mahon, "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLV (1958-59), 257-61.

Mississippi country for the purpose of attacking the exposed western flank of Upper Canada. Russell, who appears to have taken most such threats at their face value, was convinced, in spite of assurances to the contrary offered by one of his advisers, that Brant meant it when he warned that he would join "some other people" if the necessary concessions regarding the Indian lands were not offered.²⁴

The President's concern was excusable under the circumstances, for in the months following the resumption of the ancient Anglo-French conflict in 1793, it was feared that Britain's foe would do everything in her power to regain her proud position in North America.²⁵ Although the vigorous Simcoe, always afraid of an American invasion, had instituted a military training programme and undertaken to fashion strong points on the colony's borders, Upper Canada's defences at the end of the century still left much to be desired.²⁶ Vital to Simcoe's projects had been the retention of the western posts taken over from the French in 1763 and denied the United States when that country gained its independence twenty years later. In 1794, however, Britain, distracted by the conflict with her enemy across the channel, agreed in the so-called Jay's Treaty to surrender Detroit and the other disputed stations to American authorities, this over the bitter protests of those who had long maintained that Britain should offer no concessions adversely affecting the balance of power she had sought to sustain to her own advantage in the interior of the continent. Although certain parties in Upper Canada disdainfully questioned the need for any sort of compact with the United States, that country was none the less grudgingly courted by Britain in a turnabout that ushered in a brief but productive period of Anglo-American co-operation.²⁷ The French, for their part, angered by the implications of Jay's Treaty and by what they regarded as a dangerous reconciliation between the former colonies and their "Old Stepmother," proceeded to threaten the United States on the high seas and to encroach upon her interests in the Mississippi Valley (C 29). Extremely sensitive wherever the security of that great artery was concerned, the Americans proceeded to exchange with Britain valuable information on their mutual concerns in the region.

²⁴O'Reilly Collection, XI, Chapin to Pickering, June 13, 1795.

²⁵Russell Papers, William Osgoode to Russell, Jan. 26, 1797.

²⁶A gloomy report on the colony's security, prepared in the previous decade, still held true in large part for the situation at the close of the century. See C.O. 42, v. 49.

²⁷The details of this interesting diplomatic manoeuvre may be found in Bradford Perkins, *The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805* (Philadelphia, 1955), pp. 104 ff.

By that time—the early months of 1797—France and Spain appeared to be on the verge of mounting a full-scale assault on British North America (C 15). Though their rumoured campaign against Detroit and Upper Canada has been dismissed as nothing more than a cloak for a projected attack on the St. Lawrence,²⁸ responsible officials, and least of all Peter Russell, could ill afford to take chances with the safety of the colony, or defer much longer settling such compelling domestic problems as Brant's longstanding dispute over the Grand River lands (C 16). Britain's troubled Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, who was fully conversant with reports on the alleged duplicity of Indians and with Brant's thinly veiled threat to defect to the enemy if his wishes were not met, repeatedly urged Robert Liston, his envoy to the United States, to observe the chief carefully whenever the Mohawk visited Philadelphia.²⁹ Liston, in turn, who bent all his efforts to preserve the Anglo-American *entente*, admonished the Canadian administrators to accommodate Brant's claims (C 15). Always mindful of the painful possibility that the Six Nations, at Brant's urging, might turn against their old allies if Indian interests were not safeguarded, the authorities felt they were justified in viewing the matter in the most serious light.

As both British and American officials discussed the feasibility and objects of a temporary alliance, Russell, thoroughly beside himself because of Brant's menacing gestures and the alarming reports coming in from the frontier, decided to heed Liston's strongly worded advice, a decision that immediately produced a much "better humour" in the chief. Although seriously hampered by the lack of precise and sufficiently appropriate instructions (C 11) and by his inability for a time to enlist the support of his own colleagues,³⁰ Russell finally succeeded in convening a full council late in June, 1797, at Government House in York. After a lengthy discussion of the various issues involved in the crisis, the President put some unmistakably rhetorical questions to his visibly abashed aides. Above all, he wished to know if he could count upon their co-operation during the emergency which faced the colony. Judging by the speed and eagerness with which the councillors responded to his queries in the affirmative, the outcome of the debate

²⁸A. L. Burt, *The United States, Great Britain and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812* (New Haven, 1940), note 12.

²⁹Bernard Mayo, ed., *Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States, 1791–1812* (Washington, 1941), pp. 133 ff.

³⁰C.O. 42, v. 321, pp. 21–2, Russell to Portland, Nov. 14, 1796.

had never really been in doubt (C 18). Yielding to Brant's demands, the administration recognized the arrangements already concluded with the various purchasers with whom the chief had negotiated. Both Liston—who had clearly expedited the settlement (C 26)—and Brant were much gratified by this action, the latter having reported to a friend, even before Russell and his fellow councillors had assembled, that “as to the Title I believe there's no danger now” (C 17).

Unfortunately certain problems remained for all the parties concerned. The question immediately arose as to who would be expected to pay the fees charged for issuing the various patents. Brant's angry contention that that expense should be borne by government was shortly upheld by the Governor-in-Chief, General Robert Prescott,³¹ who feared that if no such step were taken the Six Nations might remain discontented and a threat to British interests. Ultimately Russell acted on his superior's strongly worded advice, substituting for regular fees special honoraria for the officials who had taken on the responsibility of preparing the patents. Despite the varied concessions already made to the Confederacy, Russell still feared that Brant would seize upon any “feasible excuse” to collaborate with an invading French army (C 19). At the very least, he was expected to capitalize on his triumphs by submitting more sweeping claims than those asserted earlier, including the Indians' right to cede additional sections of their grant to would-be buyers, an object, however, which Russell had already been urged by his critical superiors at Westminster to deny him (C 22). In a letter addressed to Sir John Johnson in December, 1797 (C 24), which protested his loyalty and reviewed his unhappy dealings with Simcoe, the chief retorted that the authorities had been tardy in honouring those pledges so vociferously offered in the previous summer. To this allegation that Russell and his colleagues were deliberately holding up the proceedings, one official who was apparently on good terms with the Mohawks replied that their leader was poorly informed and should have tried to understand the complexity of the problems that consumed so much of the President's time and patience.³²

For his part, Russell was at a loss to explain Brant's displeasure, assuming that all was going well and that the necessary arrangements were being completed as expeditiously as possible. Indeed in

³¹P.A.C., Indian Affairs, Civil Control, I (1796–7), 48–56, Prescott to Russell, July 31, 1797.

³²*Ibid.*, I (1798–9), 187, Green to Brant, Jan. 11, 1798.

his correspondence with the chief during the fall and early winter of 1797 a number of important matters had been dealt with: notably the business of appointing trustees to act on behalf of the Six Nations clothed with the authority to receive the mortgages and other securities for payment from the individuals who were making the purchases (C 28). After a number of likely candidates were canvassed, Brant ultimately settled for the services of Alexander Stewart, David William Smith, the Surveyor General (C 25), and William Claus, who, after some delay, was formally named Deputy Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs in 1800.

Learning of Russell's distress, Brant tried to convince D. W. Smith, one of the newly selected trustees, that he had not been criticizing the President personally—despite the delays in redeeming the commitments made earlier—but merely cataloguing all the difficulties that had blocked the land transfers for “some years past.”⁸³ In any case, on February 5, 1798, the chief presented himself before the authorities and, through the good offices of government, formally transferred the lands already assigned to their several purchasers (C 27). Thus ended what was surely one of the more complex episodes in the early history of Upper Canada, one which appeared to reflect little credit on the leading personalities involved.

And yet, with respect to Brant, his eagerness to alienate so much reserve land may well have stemmed—as he never tired of asserting—from a highly realistic assessment of the Indians' dubious capacity for improving their huge domain on their own, and the need for exposing them, at the admitted risk of corrupting their ancient practices and sapping their cultural defences, to the vigour and enterprise of the better class of white immigrants. Brant had encouraged the first squatters to settle in the previous decade, doubtless realizing that wherever there was good land, the man best capable of exploiting it would ultimately come into possession of it; unfortunately, as events proved, the Six Nations failed to obtain their rightful dividends from the operation of this law in the Valley. Thus the actual sale of the tracts in 1798, while it solved one problem and heralded the organized settlement of much of the Indian country, also set the stage for new crises and difficulties in that region's affairs.

⁸³E. A. Cruikshank and A. F. Hunter, eds., *Russell Correspondence* (Toronto, 1935), II, 104, Brant to Smith, Feb. 27, 1798.

D. THE WHITE MAN'S FRONTIER

OF THE SOME 570,000¹ acres that constituted the original Haldimand grant, approximately 350,000 were disposed of in the several conveyances that were formally sanctioned early in 1798 and parcelled out in six large but unequal blocks (D 4). Although Block 4, the northernmost, comprising a little over 28,000 acres, was not sold at this time, "owing to some Circumstances which did not distinctly appear to the [Land] Board" (D 6), no difficulty was experienced in finding purchasers for the remainder (D 5). Block 1 (94,035 acres) had been deeded as early as March, 1795, to Philip Stedman (D 12), who for some years operated a ferry service at Fort Erie, and Block 2 (94,012 acres) to Richard Beasley, James Wilson, and Jean Baptiste Rousseaux. The last-named, whose family had long been associated with the Indian Department, had constructed the first grist mill for the use of the Six Nations at the Mohawk Village. Block 3 (86,078 acres) was transferred to William Wallace and Blocks 5 (30,800 acres) and 6 (19,000 acres) were granted to William Jarvis and John Dochsteder respectively.

Block 1

Without exception these tracts were plagued by confusion and misfortune. Thus Philip Stedman, the original proprietor of Block 1, made no effort to occupy or give any security for his acquisition, derelictions which lend some weight to Selkirk's suspicion that Brant and the purchasers were conspiring to launch a highly speculative venture. Had that actually been the case nothing came of it, at least for the unfortunate Stedman, for he ended his days miserably in an American jail (D 6). Thereafter uncertainty reigned for several years as to how and by whom the grant should be reconveyed (D 13). At an Indian council held at the Onondaga Village in November, 1806, the assembled "chiefs and warriors," Brant included, intimated in one passage of the published proceedings—which may have suffered in translation—that certain parties who had either posed as or actually become the ill-fated Stedman's rightful assigns had paid several annual instalments on the interest, but had ultimately been refused the opportunity of making further

¹One chart indicates that the total acreage was approximately 675,000. The figure quoted above, however, is the generally accepted one. See G 26.

payments and obtaining a clear title to the property (D 8). Doubtless this was because they had chosen to ignore the good offices of the trustees, an omission that normally invalidated such applications.

In any case, it appears that no fewer than three claimants presented themselves to the authorities, armed with credentials purporting to show that they had come into lawful possession of the tract. They were, in order of appearance, Elisha Welles (D 6, D 7), Peter Hogeboom (D 15, D 17), and Daniel Penfield (D 14); Welles' place of origin is unknown, but Hogeboom and Penfield were residents of New York City and Albany respectively. According to Hogeboom's rather garbled testimony he had obtained a deed from Welles in the summer of 1802—reputedly bought from an unnamed assignee two years before—and, he claimed, moreover, that he had paid the Six Nations the not inconsiderable sum of almost \$9,000; at the same time Hogeboom accused Penfield of deliberately falsifying the record by asserting that the latter's deed postdated his own (D 15, D 17). Apparently Penfield paid little attention to Hogeboom's charges; more than two years before, in the spring of 1807, he had duly advised the Lieutenant Governor that he had become "vested in all [the title] which the several antecedent purchasers" had enjoyed to the Block in dispute. Furthermore, virtually echoing Hogeboom's financial report, he disclosed that in the summer of 1802 he had paid over to the Indians about a quarter of the price, some £2,100, and accordingly requested the necessary patent from the authorities.² Shortly before he sent his memorial off to York, he presented Joseph Brant with what he thought were equitable arrangements for discharging his financial obligations to the Indians (D 14). They appeared on the surface eminently fair, but William Claus, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, concluded that had they been accepted, the Indians would have incurred a heavy monetary loss, perhaps as much as \$13,000 (D 16). Consequently, Penfield's appeals for immediate action were denied (D 18).

This decision may have been governed—apart from the fear that Brant had exceeded his authority as agent of the Six Nations—by the growing crisis in Anglo-American relations and the mounting fear that former citizens of the United States then domiciled in the colony might prove an acute embarrassment in the event of hostilities. At this juncture applications for land from prospective immigrants of Penfield's ilk were scrutinized most carefully.

²P.A.C., Upper Canada State Papers, IX (i), 190–5, Penfield's Memorial, May 2, 1807.

It is a matter of some moment that one of the leading "War Hawks"—the aggressive group in the American Congress that helped to precipitate the War of 1812—had evinced an interest in acquiring some Grand River property some ten years earlier, actually entering into negotiations with Brant on the matter. Peter B. Porter, Yale-educated and New England-reared and named in 1811 to chair the Senate's influential Committee on Foreign Relations, had, after moving west to Ontario County, New York, established his reputation as a champion of the Niagara country, a skilful promoter of his own transportation interests, and a most vocal supporter of the war that promised to open the way for the American conquest of Upper Canada.³ But Porter's attempt to obtain title to a township on the Grand in 1801 did not succeed, a fate which the subsequent campaign "On to Canada" shared.

Such distractions notwithstanding, some questions affecting Indian lands were resolved before the War of 1812, and by 1811 Claus and other officials, after reviewing the difficulties attending the disposition of Block 1 had come to the conclusion that the various affidavits presented by Elisha Welles, Peter Hogeboom, and Daniel Penfield were "spurious" and the so-called Stedman transfer nothing but a clumsy forgery. At that time, Stedman's sister, Mrs. John Sparkman, and her husband, who had been denied recognition earlier,⁴ were accepted as heirs at law to the Block. Shortly thereafter, however, they were forced through straitened circumstances to convey it to Thomas Clark, a prosperous merchant and resident of Stamford in the Niagara peninsula. Barely five years later Clark in turn sold the tract to his equally affluent cousin, William Dickson, who assumed the mortgage and paid £ 15,000 in hard cash for the property (D 18). From that point in 1816 the fortunes of Block 1, long plagued by one minor disaster after another, took on a much rosier hue.

Block 2

Like those of its neighbour, the early affairs of Block 2 were full of confusion. Only one fact, apparently, can be accepted with any certainty—even before Richard Beasley purchased the titles of his one-time associates, James Wilson and Jean Baptiste Rousseaux,

³George Dangerfield, *The Era of Good Feelings* (New York, 1952), pp. 34–8.

⁴The authorities excused the delay on the grounds that she had no right to a tract for which her brother had refused to make payments. P.A.O., Upper Canada Land Book A.

that aspiring frontier squire virtually took full charge, since the terms "Beasley Tract" and Block 2 became practically interchangeable in the conversations of legislators and settlers. But in 1803 Beasley's career was almost nipped in the bud when the authorities, following their lengthy investigation of all the assignments of 1798, charged that he had not only failed to make regular payments on the principal and interest but had completely ignored the trustees, thereby violating one of the conditions of the original conveyance (D 6). Thereupon the Six Nations in full council—reputedly coached by Brant—countered that an exception should be made in Beasley's case, since he had "honourably" endeavoured to meet some of his commitments by paying over sums of money directly to the Mohawk chief (D 7). Yet this was precisely the point to which Claus addressed himself in the ensuing debate, contending repeatedly that the two parties to the transaction, Beasley and Brant, both of whom he obviously distrusted, had deliberately circumvented the trustees and ignored official regulations. In the end the whole matter was referred to the Executive Council for a judgment.

Still another problem confronting the government stemmed from Beasley's natural anxiety to capitalize on his investment. Less than two years after his title had been recognized, he had sold a portion of Block 2 to a group of Mennonite immigrants, the advance guard of a considerable influx of would-be settlers from Pennsylvania. In the spring of 1800 two such arrivals from Franklin County, Joseph Shörg and Samuel Betzner, both of whom had spent some time in the vicinity of Niagara and Ancaster where a number of Mennonites had already congregated, were advised by an earlier visitor, Jacob Bechtel, that the Valley of the Grand, particularly Block 2, was highly attractive and merited their investigation. Heeding Bechtel's suggestions, the Mennonites "found everything beyond their expectations," promptly sought out the jubilant Beasley, the owner of the land they had carefully toured, and negotiated a purchase on the southern limit of the Block.⁵ They duly received from "the Squire" what appeared to be the necessary titles and immediately brought in their relatives and friends from Niagara. Three years later, however, while the Executive Council was reviewing Beasley's financial dealings with Brant, it was discovered that the former had neglected to advise the Mennonites that their deeds were virtually worthless because of a large mortgage still outstand-

⁵See Ezra Eby, *A Biographical History of Waterloo Township* (Berlin, Ontario, 1895).

ing on the property (D 20). Even before the outcry of the aggrieved had subsided, Beasley confessed his negligence and offered to make whatever amends he could for his recent behaviour.⁶

In the end, this somewhat chastened "Land Jobber"—Simcoe's epithet has some relevance here—after submitting a number of proposals to the government, agreed to sell outright to the unhappy Mennonites a parcel of 60,000 acres for the sum of £10,000 (D 19) and, in addition, to pay off the mortgage (D 22). Moreover, with respect to the latter obligation he promised to work through the good offices of the trustees in order to fulfil, somewhat belatedly, the condition to which Claus had attached so much importance. Bargain or not, Shörg and Betzner were taken aback by Beasley's proposition, even contemplating for a brief period the abandonment of their enterprise. Eventually several of their associates returned to Pennsylvania and there, after some difficulty, persuaded a group of their more adventuresome and affluent co-religionists and other interested investors to organize a joint stock enterprise for the purpose of completing the purchase of the original tract.⁷

The fruits of their labours, the so-called German Company, launched yet another *Volkswanderung* on this continent when it despatched to the middle Grand the requisite capital and the picturesque trains of heavily-laden "Conestoga wagons." The principal officers and directors of the Company who arranged the final details with Beasley and the trustees were the brothers Daniel and Jacob Erb, Samuel Bricker, and Benjamin Eby (D 19, D 21), the last-named doubling as secretary-treasurer of the venture and bishop of the first Mennonite Church formed in the new community. In addition, Eby helped to lay the foundations of present-day Kitchener, first known as Ebytown and, at Eby's own suggestion, renamed Berlin in 1825 out of respect for the German immigrants then flocking into the district.⁸ A fellow official of the Company, John Erb, constructed the first mill at the junction of the Grand and the Speed, setting the stage for the establishment of the town of Preston. A few years later, in 1816, his brother, Abraham, also prospered as a miller and became in time one of the founders of the village of Waterloo.

⁶Mabel Dunham, *Grand River* (Toronto, 1945), pp. 88–9.

⁷A. B. Sherk, "The Pennsylvania Germans in Waterloo County," Ontario Historical Society, *Papers and Records*, VII (1906), 100 ff.

⁸For a discussion of this German immigration and its effects, see G. E. Reaman, *The Trail of the Black Walnut* (Toronto, 1957).

For their guidance during the proceedings with Beasley, the Company relied heavily on the talents and advice of William Dickson, described as a "reputable lawyer and merchant of Niagara." Commissioned to legalize all the transactions entered into by the Pennsylvanians, Dickson, who subsequently became a powerful figure in the Valley, secured on June 29, 1805, for the Mennonites and others whom the Company had sponsored a clear title to the tract of 60,000 acres that was finally assigned to them. William Claus, who had supervised these rather complex arrangements, had apparently anticipated some trouble from the purchasers who he felt had been too anxious at one stage to obtain more favourable financial terms. But no serious difficulties actually materialized, owing in part to the good nature of the Mennonites and in part, if one may believe Claus, to the presence, at the latter's invitation, of two military officers, prepared to support the Deputy Superintendent General had an attempt been made to intimidate him (D 23). The gratification produced by the orderly sale of the land was soon destroyed when it was discovered that there were 2,900 acres fewer than the number actually specified in the original patent (D 24, D 25).

It would appear that in all four separate surveys had been undertaken in the years 1796 to 1805. The first, executed by Thomas Welch (D 2) had made a return of 93,160 acres, a figure that was duly recorded in the office of the Surveyor General, David William Smith. None the less, one day before the authorities formally recognized the transfers on the Grand, that is, on February 4, 1798, Smith, following another study made by Augustus Jones (D 3), who had surveyed the whole of the Indian lands some seven years before, changed the initial figure to 94,012, the one that was actually quoted in the documents signed on February 5. Still another survey, carried out by James Mitchell some time later arrived at the figure of 93,180 acres (D 30). Distressed by these many disparities, officials authorized Richard Cockrel, an experienced surveyor, to conduct a further examination of the Block. Apparently it was his survey, completed early in 1805, that prompted Dickson to intervene, for Cockrel's findings indicated that the tract contained no more than 91,112 acres, leaving 2,900 unaccounted for and for which Beasley had been duly charged. Though the matter was still being discussed in a most technical fashion as late as 1809 (D 25), Cockrel's figures had obviously been accepted in as much as in 1807 Beasley was provided, by way of compensation, with some 3,000 acres in an adjoining tract (D 27).

Block 3

While Block 2 was thus taxing the patience and arithmetical prowess of the authorities, the adjoining property, Block 3, was arousing the interest of the Pennsylvanians. In the process of arranging for the settlement of their compatriots and examining the limits of their acquisition in the "Beasley Tract," Daniel Erb and Benjamin Eby, accompanied by Augustus Jones, ventured into Block 3 and were impressed at once with its possibilities. This parcel of land had originally been conveyed to William Wallace who turned out to be almost as improvident as the wretched Stedman; unable to honour the terms of his contract he had been forced to relinquish all but 7,000 acres of the Block. Speaking for the Six Nations, Brant announced in September, 1806, that of the remaining 79,000 acres, 5,000 and 10,000 were to be reserved respectively for himself and Ann Claus, the daughter of Sir William Johnson (D 26). At the same time, the Indians confirmed a transfer of 15,000 acres at the northern end of the Block made by Wallace to Captain Robert Pilkington of the Royal Engineers. Pilkington's ambitious project for establishing a settlement was subsequently thwarted, leaving the way open for the Pennsylvanians; in May, 1807, the Six Nations assigned them the remainder of the tract. Naming the principal rivers traversing their enlarged domain the Conestoga and the Canagagigue, the new owners lost little time in surveying and charting the property.

The communities organized by these people have long posed interesting questions for students of the frontier. The Waterloo district, "the last area [in the colony] to receive settlers from Pennsylvania," one historian has observed, "is . . . now the only locality in Ontario to retain the ethnic characteristics of its [founders]."⁹ The pronounced folk traits of these pioneers from the south were magnified by the relative inaccessibility of the area in the early days of settlement, its very remoteness and isolation unquestionably constituting a great inducement to a group so anxious to preserve the purity of their religion and to be insulated from the less desirable influences of profane society. Apart from the Mennonites there were representatives of other separatist communities such as the Tunkers or Dunkards, who in 1801 established the nucleus of a congregation on the middle Grand through the efforts of two of their leaders from Lancaster County, George Shupe and David Gingrich. The old-time Tunker, "with his long hair parted in the middle . . . and his

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 108.

full beard," soon became a familiar figure in the area.¹⁰ But good works were closely allied with material progress and success in more worldly enterprises; consequently, the devout from the Susquehanna, like the Mohawk from eastern New York, looked appreciatively upon the fertile banks of the Grand as worthy reminders of the bountiful water courses which had sustained them in more comfortable, if not more promising, days.

Block 4

The early career of the northernmost of the Indian lands, Block 4 or Block Nichol, is shrouded in obscurity, for in 1798 when it was formally put on the auction block no buyer came forward (D 5). In later years, however, Joshua Cozens claimed that he had bought it from Joseph Brant in the fall of 1796 (D 29). Cozen's agent, a Connecticut merchant called Samuel Clark, attempted to sell the land in England, even trying to interest Simcoe in the speculation (D 28). Failing in his mission, Clark pawned the deed in 1799 for £ 250 with a London firm which shortly afterwards went bankrupt. Cozens spent the rest of his life trying to substantiate his claim to the land; as late as 1839 he was still sending memorials to the British government,¹¹ despite the fact that Lord Glenelg had finally decided the issue against him two years earlier.¹² It was agreed that Cozens had probably had some speculative dealings with Brant, but was denied that these ventures were ever sanctioned by the government, a step necessary to validate all Indian land sales.

Meanwhile, Block 4 had been sold to Thomas Clark, a Niagara merchant, in 1806 (D 9). Two years later Clark sold the southern section, which passed to the Reverend Robert Addison, the rector of St. Mark's Church in the village of Niagara. Upon his death Mrs. Addison conveyed it to Captain William Gilkison, a cousin of John Galt and a former sea captain who had served for some years on Lake Erie. Gilkison died in 1833, but his sons followed his plans for the development of his tract in and around Elora. In the 1830's Clark sold the rest of Block Nichol, which was then opened up by settlers from Scotland.

¹⁰A. B. Sherck, "The Tunkers," United Empire Loyalists' Association, *Transactions*, VI (1909), 66; E. M. Sider, "The Early Years of the Tunkers in Upper Canada," *Ontario History*, LI (1959), 121-9.

¹¹P.A.C., G 93, p. 344, Normanby to Arthur, Aug. 14, 1839.

¹²P.A.C., G 79, pp. 86-109, Glenelg to Head, Jan. 29, 1837.

Block 5

In 1798 Block 5 near the mouth of the Grand River on the east side, was sold to the Provincial Secretary, William Jarvis (D 5). Apparently in financial difficulties, Jarvis had by the late summer of 1806 already decided to surrender that property, requesting his lawyer to advise him as to the best means by which this could be achieved. Acting on the recommendations proffered, he presented himself before a session of the Executive Council on September 4, 1806, and initiated proceedings for "yielding" the land, with but one stipulation: that in return for the surrender he be compensated for the money he had already consigned to Brant and the Six Nations. Although he failed to receive as much financial consideration as he had sought—£ 600 instead of £ 750¹³—Jarvis nevertheless returned the Block to the Crown on April 28, 1807, thus opening the way for its resale to a *bona fide* purchaser (D 31).

That role was played by a personality whose entire career in North America is a long essay in philanthropic colonization. Thomas Douglas, Lord Selkirk, whose lively comments on the affairs of the Valley have already been quoted, sought asylums in several locations on this continent for impoverished Highlanders and uprooted Irish peasants.¹⁴ Initially he had shown an interest in Block 4, but he had subsequently changed his mind, desiring instead land at the mouth of the river commanding the Lake Erie shore. For that matter, within a month of Jarvis' surrender it was announced that the Confederacy at a general meeting had expressed its willingness to reconvey Block 5 to Selkirk (D 32). But when a deed was offered on June 25, 1807, formally granting "Mr. Jarvis' Township" to his lordship, it was cancelled on the grounds of having been "erroneously issued," certain details of the transaction having left both Selkirk and the authorities dissatisfied with its terms.¹⁵ Nevertheless the matter did not rest there for by the autumn of 1807 Alexander McDonell, the Earl's principal agent in Upper Canada, had renegotiated the transfer with Brant and the proper officials (D 33), the last public business, incidentally, that directly involved the chief, who died at Burlington on November 24.

¹³Actually this money was provided by the prospective purchaser.

¹⁴Selkirk's career in the colony has been traced in F. C. Hamil, "Lord Selkirk in Upper Canada," Ontario Historical Society, *Papers and Records*, XXXVII (1945), 35-48.

¹⁵P.A.O., Crown Land Papers, Selkirk Grant, June 25, 1807.

McDonnell was eager, on his employer's behalf, to make full and immediate use of Block 5, in hopes that this most recent investment would reimburse Selkirk, at least in part, for his "enormous" expenditures elsewhere, notably at the Baldoon Settlement near Lake St. Clair in the County of Kent. Much to McDonnell's delight all the formalities were completed on November 18, 1807, only six months after Jarvis had surrendered the Block. His pleasure, heightened, among other things, by the opportunity the transfer afforded for completing a long sought canal from the Grand to the Chippawa River, diminished in the spring of 1808 when he discovered that the "intrigues" of a certain John Norton, a Scot who had been adopted by the Mohawks and made a chief, had spread to the lower part of the Valley (D 34). There the younger leaders of the Confederacy were stirred up to oppose not only the sale already registered by Brant and the older sachems, but the grant of two "reservations"—one straddling the river further up its course, the other dominating its mouth—which occupied strategic positions on the borders of Block 5 (D 35). McDonnell averred, moreover, that apart from an alleged desire to exhibit his dramatic sway over the younger spokesmen of the Six Nations, Norton was actually conspiring with two ambitious millers from the Head of the Lake—the brothers Samuel and Richard Hatt—to obtain for themselves the land in question.¹⁶ Despite Norton's intervention, but one manoeuvre among many in his attempts to assume the leadership of the Indians following Brant's death, the opposition was largely overcome through the support furnished Selkirk by William Claus, Norton's bitter rival (D 36). As a result, a new deed, to take the place of the patent cancelled in the previous June, was prepared and issued to Selkirk on April 9, 1808.

There then remained the problem of acquiring the tract above the grant and the other at the river's outlet. While the former transaction was arranged with relatively little difficulty, after the land in question was divided so as to accommodate certain Seneca families who had planted corn fields in the area, the disposition of the "lower reservation," Sherbrooke Township, involved Selkirk in lengthy negotiations with William Dickson who had been promised it by grateful Indian chiefs in return for his professional services (D 39). The speculative paths of the two Scots had already crossed: before McDonnell and the Earl had selected Block 5 they had briefly entertained the possibility of acquiring Block 1. In return eventually

¹⁶Information on the Hatts' career is contained in T. R. Woodhouse, "The Birth of the Town of Dundas," *Ontario History*, XLIII (1951), 61-4.

for their disclaiming an interest in that property, Dickson, in association with Augustus Jones, a fellow purchaser in Block 1, had presented Selkirk with a clear field in Block 5. As to the "reservation": it was only with the greatest reluctance that Dickson finally agreed to transfer it to the philanthropist, and only when his lordship offered the "enticing" sum of \$2,000 (D 36). Indeed even after receiving a note for that sum, Dickson attempted to retrieve the tract, a manoeuvre which McDonell succeeded for a time in thwarting. But Dickson's persistence was finally rewarded, for in a few years he again came into possession of the land, dutifully returning the "consideration money" to Selkirk (D 43). By that time it was obvious that the latter, having already failed in his attempt to revitalize the community at Baldoon, was anxious to wash his hands of the several Upper Canadian ventures he had fostered. In the interval he had been distracted by greener fields in the Northwest, and eventually forsook the Valley of the Grand for that of the Red. Later, upon his death, Block 5 passed into the hands of Henry John Boulton, best known as a staunch supporter of the Family Compact.

Block 6

The fortunes of Block 6 had also been adversely affected by misunderstandings and controversies similar to those of its sister tracts. The smallest of the holdings conveyed by the Six Nations in 1798, it was originally granted to John Dochsteder "as a reward for his Services" to the Confederacy (D 37). Brant, who authorized the transfer, insisted that it amounted to a free gift—at no time had the thought occurred to him that Dochsteder should pay any price for the property. By 1798, however, the grantee, obviously hard pressed for cash, had been forced to sell the Block to a Benjamin Canby for "a valuable consideration." Although the impression is given that at least part of the money was to be held in trust for the Six Nations, William Claus, who supervised the arrangements, does not appear to have demanded of Canby an initial cash payment to either the Indians or the unfortunate Dochsteder, the latter indeed realizing in the end no return whatsoever (D 8, D 38). Some years later Block 6 became the Township of Canborough, but like its neighbour, Moulton Township (Block 5), it was not developed to any significant extent until after the establishment of the port of Dunnville in 1830, named for John Henry Dunn, one-time Receiver General of Upper Canada and a trustee for the Six Nations.

Sherbrooke Township

Meanwhile, the individual who had already been involved in the complicated transactions concerning Blocks 1 and 2, was again playing a part in the tangled land affairs of the Six Nations. William Dickson, a native of Dumfries, Scotland, had emigrated to Niagara in 1792, the year in which Simcoe, whom the young Scot greatly admired, arrived to assume his duties as Lieutenant Governor. Because of Dickson's professional efforts on their behalf the Six Nations in November, 1808, promised him 4,000 acres at the very mouth of the Grand River, immediately adjoining the Block (No. 5) conveyed in 1798 to William Jarvis (D 39, D 43). As we have seen, Dickson then "reluctantly" sold the land to the Earl of Selkirk, who had become the owner of Block 5, but this sale was later rescinded, and Dickson once more came into possession.

The strategic importance of the mouth of the Grand River had been demonstrated during the War of 1812, and in the early fall of 1815 Commodore Edward Owen, the naval Commander-in-Chief, proposed building a naval establishment there (D 40). Agreements were made with the Six Nations and with Dickson, whose property encroached on the site (D 41—D 43), and by the early months of 1818 the Sherbrooke Depot was definitely taking shape at the mouth of the river. The only British base on Lake Erie in those early years, it figured prominently in official plans for over a decade. As the international situation showed signs of improvement at the opening of the 1830's, however, officials in the Naval Department at Kingston decided to reduce the establishment on the Grand. The determining factor, unquestionably, was the improvement made to the original Welland Canal in 1833, which shifted the centre of naval operations from Sherbrooke—the site of Port Maitland—to Port Colborne, strategically a far better located settlement at the southern end of the refurbished waterway.

Brantford

It was only a matter of time before the Ford itself, the head of navigation on the Grand and commanding one of the main overland routes from the Head of the Lake, would be coveted by merchants and land speculators. The earliest citizens of the community, according to information compiled in 1830,¹⁷ included Wil-

¹⁷P.A.C., Indian Affairs, Civil Control, V (1830), 478-504, Peter Robinson's Report on Brantford.




FIGURE 1. BRANTFORD, 1830. [Ontario, Department of Lands and Forests.]

liam Dutton, who had bought his lots from the Six Nations in the spring of 1822; John Wilkes, the purchaser a year later of six lots on the thoroughfare now known as Dalhousie Street; and the Muirhead families who in 1828 moved thither from their original homestead at Niagara and leased property from Dutton. All their titles were confirmed in 1830, much to their gratification (D 45), when the Mohawks formally surrendered 807 acres as a village plot (D 44), although nearly 600 acres were still unclaimed on the day the instrument of surrender was actually signed. Once certain administrative difficulties were overcome (D 46) and the requisite surveys and appraisals were made, the unsold portion was auctioned off on May 14, 1831, at the attractive price of £10 a lot, a transaction that ushered in a productive stage in the economic development of Brantford.

Cayuga Township

In the 1830's white settlement pressed closely upon the Indian lands. Two more large surrenders were made by the Six Nations—the townships of North and South Cayuga, Dunn, and the remainder of the townships of Canborough and Moulton (D 1). Part of this land was bought by a group of Mennonites (D 47); the remainder was acquired by individual settlers, and by men like John DeCou, the Niagara miller, who developed lumbering and quarrying enterprises on 1,200 acres on both sides of the Grand in North and South Cayuga townships.

Surrender of Residual Lands

Meanwhile, more and more immigrant settlers were arriving in the province. By the 1830's the problem of white encroachment on the Six Nations' lands was becoming acute. There were squatters without a vestige of title, but there were also many settlers who had bought land from individual Indians, or who had acquired some sort of right to their land through transactions with the Six Nations, although these dealings did not have government sanction. A full-scale enquiry of their claims was undertaken in 1834, and many such informal titles and leases were confirmed the following year (C 40). However, this merely legalized past transactions; unauthorized sales and agreements continued to be made. Finally in January, 1841, the Indian Superintendent, Samuel P. Jarvis, informed the

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Indians that the only way in which white intruders could be kept off their land would be for them to surrender it to the Crown, to be administered for their sole benefit (D 48, D 49). The Six Nations would retain the lands which they actually occupied, and a reserve of 20,000 acres. This surrender was accordingly made by the Confederacy on January 18, 1841 (D 50), ending the confused history of the alienation of the Indian lands on the Grand River.

E. THE WAR PATH: 1812 AND 1837

I

THE RECURRING DIFFICULTIES AND TANGIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS that respectively marred and spurred on the early growth of the European borderland in the Valley of the Grand were punctuated in 1812 by an international crisis that affected not only Upper Canada but the whole of British North America. The social and political experiments undertaken by Simcoe and his immediate successors were almost frustrated by the "second American War of Independence," a conflict that threatened to accomplish what the first had fallen short of a generation before: the complete destruction of Britain's western empire.

Briefly, the American republic, fearing that its recently won sovereignty was jeopardized by Britain's seizure of its ships on the high seas and by her alleged arming of the Indians, went into the struggle convinced that its only salvation lay in destroying the vestiges of British rule on this continent. Gone in 1812 were the circumstances which had helped to forge the short-lived *rapprochement* of the late 1790's. Then the principal threat to the United States had been Franco-Spanish expansion in the Northwest; a decade later, because of her interference with American rights and property, Britain loomed as the primary danger. At any rate, "Mr. Madison's War" shortly involved Upper Canada's white citizens and Six Nations inhabitants in one phase of the global contest that had been under way for almost a quarter of a century.

It has long been customary to stress the dissension that frequently hamstrung the early operations of the invading Americans; as much time perhaps could be allotted to a discussion of the disturbances that arose in Upper Canada out of the competing jurisdictions of the Indian Department and the military (E 17). Arguing that Indian affairs had for a considerable time been virtually the exclusive preserve of his office—in 1796 they had been taken out of the hands of the Commander of the Forces where they had resided from the beginning¹—Claus and his colleagues, hard-working and esteemed individuals such as Alexander McKee, Joseph Chew, and William Caldwell, claimed that they should have sole jurisdiction

¹P.A.C., Indian Affairs, Indian Claims, 1790-1857, DCCV, "Brief History of the Indian Department."

over the Indians during hostilities, a view which field commanders, however, found difficulty accepting.

After crossing into Upper Canada on July 12, 1812, General William Hull, the American commander in the northwest, commissioned a number of Hurons to proceed to the Grand River Valley and assure the Mohawks and their confederates that his invading forces would not harm their interests (E 3). Though the Six Nations paid little heed to Hull's pledges, they professed, nevertheless, no great desire to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the conflict on the side of the King. For one thing, many Indians complained that their ancient attachment to the Crown had not been sufficiently rewarded in the long interval since the close of Haldimand's regime; for another, large groups of their kinsmen still resided within the territorial limits of the republic and, accordingly, the tribes on the Grand abhorred the prospect of engaging in what conceivably could deteriorate into fratricidal strife. Indeed a few days after the United States declared war, a deputation of Senecas from New York, led by the peaceable Cornplanter, appeared at the Mohawk Village, to present, among other things, a message from Red Jacket calling upon its residents to remain neutral (E 1). Yet, it soon became evident—much to Cornplanter's embarrassment—that not all his fellow delegates had fully convinced even themselves that neutrality was the best course to pursue; still others, when interrogated at any length, conceded that they were still reasonably well disposed toward their original "great white father." Consequently, the effectiveness of the Seneca's mission left much to be desired.

None the less, certain officials, including John Norton, who had some years before the War offered suggestions on how the Indians should be employed to strengthen the colony,² were cautioned to watch carefully for signs that the Six Nations might be plotting to collaborate with the Americans. Their worst fears were soon dispelled, for the Grand River tribesmen informed the visiting Senecas that should the region be attacked they would not hesitate to co-operate with the British in its defence.³ Notwithstanding this public protestation of its loyalty, the Confederacy, at least in private councils, continued to question the wisdom of intimately involving itself in the campaigning that was already unfolding on Upper

²P.A.C., Indian Affairs, Civil Control II (1808), 376-89, Norton to unknown correspondent, Aug. 10, 1808.

³B. J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812* (New York, 1869), p. 400n. See also E. A. Cruikshank, "The Employment of the Indians in the War of 1812," *American Historical Association, Report*, 1895 (Washington, 1896), pp. 321-35.

Canada's borders.⁴ Major-General Isaac Brock, who by this time, in addition to his duties as acting Lieutenant Governor, had taken command of the militia and regular forces in the colony, made no attempt to conceal his displeasure with the dilatory tactics of Britain's erstwhile allies (E 2), not to mention the information which came in a short time later that the Six Nations "positively refused, with the exception of a few individuals, taking up arms" (E 4). One suspects that old grudges—though genuine indifference may well have been the deciding factor in some cases—were worked off under cover of the crisis confronting the colony.

When Brock actually summoned the tribes' support in the early summer of 1812 he learned to his dismay that fewer than fifty of the Mohawks and "their brethren" were prepared to take part in his projected campaign against American positions in the Northwest.⁵ Although there is reason to believe that Tecumseh, the celebrated Shawnee leader of the western Indians, visited the Six Nations' settlements during his tour of Upper Canada, there is nothing to indicate that they were any more receptive to his appeals than they had been to Brock's. Absorbed with their local difficulties, acutely aware of their weakened position, and insulated by the feeling that their own special interests might be lost sight of if they made common cause with their "Nephews" on the frontier, the people of the Confederacy made no significant contribution to the vigorous and successful attack that Brock and Tecumseh subsequently unleashed on Detroit and the Michigan Territory.⁶

And even when 100 Indians from the Grand volunteered for service on the Niagara, the commander-in-chief gloomily predicted that they would, once diligent attempts were made to subvert their allegiance, readily throw in their lot with the enemy (E 2). Another thought that disturbed Brock was that so long as the bulk of the Six Nations remained uncommitted, their white neighbours would defer enlisting in the militia units then being organized at Fort George, for fear of what might happen to their families and property in their absence. (E 4). In an effort to resolve this difficulty, he despatched Joseph Willcocks to the Valley, urging that land speculator, who was well known to the tribes, to use his influence with

⁴M. M. Quaife, ed., *The John Askin Papers* (2 vols., Detroit, 1928-31), II, 711, Charles Askin's Journal of the Detroit campaign, July 24, 1812.

⁵P.A.C., C 676, p. 208, Brock to Prevost, July 26, 1812.

⁶As one correspondent had bluntly put it years before, "The Six Nations seem almost entirely detached from the Western Confederacy." University of Western Ontario, Lawson Memorial Library, Harris Papers, Robert Hamilton to William Robertson, March 9, 1794.

the Indians on the authorities' behalf (E 5). (Willcocks turned out to be an "odd selection," as one writer has put it,⁷ for he later collaborated with the foe, actually organizing a band of guerrillas, the "Canadian Volunteers," who harassed the defenders during the closing stages of the conflict.) As most observers soon perceived, it was not so much Willcocks' mission—carried out honestly and with some effect, it seems—as Britain's triumphs at Michilimackinac and Detroit that stirred the banked enthusiasm of the Six Nations. By September, 1812, Brock's equanimity and good humour had partially returned with the news that upwards of 500 Indians, who apparently wished "to whipe away the disgrace into which they have fallen," had offered their services to the officers at Fort George (E 6). Nevertheless in words reminiscent of Claus' commentary on the alleged duplicity of the Iroquois,⁸ Brock expressed the fear that unless his forces succeeded in holding the various fronts the latter would "begin to study in what manner they can most effectually deceive us" (E 7).

As if to quiet the commander's misgivings, Indian warriors shortly gave a meritorious account of themselves at the storied battle of Queenston Heights in October, 1812 (E 8). Led by John Brant, a son of the "Pine Tree Chief," John Norton, and William Johnson Kerr—who had married one of Joseph's daughters—they suffered an impressive number of casualties during the fray,⁹ including two Cayuga chiefs, one Onondaga sachem, and several tribesmen killed and wounded. Late in 1813 William Claus, in his capacity as Deputy Superintendent General, prepared a detailed account of all the "Transactions since the 15th October . . . at which period [he considered] the War to have commenced in this part of the Country" (E 17). In this account he faithfully chronicled the Indians' exploits, although using the opportunity to vindicate his opposition to John Norton, whom he accused of deliberately belittling the wartime work of the Department in order to enhance his own standing in the Confederacy. Following Queenston most of the Six Nations combatants, under the leadership of Major Givins, Kerr, and Norton, took part in the fighting at Fort Erie,

⁷G. F. G. Stanley, "The Indians in the War of 1812," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXI (1950), 155.

⁸P.A.C., Claus Papers, XI, 65–6, Claus' "Remarks and Observations upon Indn. Politics . . . as to their *Political Maxims* in Time of War between White People," 1804.

⁹An interesting eye-witness account is preserved in J. H. Land, "Tales of the War: Queenston Heights," *Wentworth Historical Society, Papers and Records*, VI (1915), 59–63.

where they defeated enemy attempts to breach the British positions (E 9). This task completed, the Indians and the other troops involved repaired in triumph to Fort George where, to quote one informant's colourful report, they "encamped on the skirts of the woods back of the town [and kept] us alive with their war dances, and [made] the dark cedar woods echo with savage yells."¹⁰

Within a short time, however, the excitement of victory was dissipated by the foe's recovery from his initial reverses and by the setbacks the British suffered in turn at York, the Head of the Lake, and Fort George.

Late in April, 1813, the province's capital was attacked, seized, and occupied for nearly a week by a marine force of some 1,700 men¹¹ landed from the ships of Commodore Isaac Chauncey, the American commander on Lake Ontario who enjoyed a marked superiority over his British adversary, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo.¹² Then in mid-May, continuing their hit-and-run operations, the enemy conducted a raid on the western end of the lake. "The Yankeys," an eyewitness reported, "visited . . . the Beach . . . with two schooners and . . . about 200 men . . . [they] burnt the Government House [the King's Head Inn], but did no other mischief, they sailed the next day."¹³ Finally, on May 27, the long-awaited American offensive was launched on the Niagara peninsula when the forces of General Henry Dearborn assaulted Fort George. After several hours of sharp fighting, the British were compelled to yield, falling back first on Queenston, then to the Forty Mile Creek, and ultimately to the refuge of Burlington Heights. Despite dire predictions to the contrary, a substantial body of Indians held ranks during this crisis and took part in the fairly orderly retreat to the Head of the Lake.

Notwithstanding appeals that he continue to withdraw, preferably to the security of Kingston, Major-General John Vincent resolved to dig in at the Heights and await a decision with the Americans. Not only was this narrow neck of land admirably defensible but the British wished to assure their allies in the Confederacy that they were not to be abandoned to the mercy of the invaders. Vincent rightly attached a good deal of importance to this matter, for at least one observer had already concluded that if left in such a situa-

¹⁰M. Edgar, *Ten Years of Upper Canada in Peace and War, 1805-1815, Being the Ridout Letters* (London, 1891), p. 167.

¹¹See Edith Firth, ed., *The Town of York, 1793-1815* (Toronto, 1962), pp. xc-xcii.

¹²This aspect of the conflict is explored in G. N. Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History. I. Origins and Early Years* (Ottawa, 1952), 37-9.

¹³P.A.C., Hamilton Papers, Samuel Hatt to Colonel Land, May 15, 1813.

tion the Six Nations would "purchase peace of the enemy by the massacre of the population."¹⁴ Although no Indian warriors appear to have participated in Lieutenant-Colonel John Harvey's dramatic and successful night attack at Stoney Creek on June 6, 1813, those assembled in that vicinity did pursue the stricken invaders and, according to the British officer's statement, commandeered their discarded baggage and supplies (E 17).

Heartened by Vincent's bold stand and in a position to afford assistance, the authorities in Lower Canada managed to recruit and despatch to the upper province a detachment of more than 300 Indians to expedite the pursuit of the retreating enemy. Made up primarily of Caughnawagas, these reinforcements (E 12) together with approximately 100 Mohawks under the joint command of Kerr and the chief's son dealt the enemy another severe blow in an engagement late in June at Beaver Dam (E 10-E 13). The Americans, who had deployed a respectable reconnaissance in the neighbourhood only a few days before, were obliged to surrender to the British and Iroquois attackers. Although the regulars and militia brought in under the command of Lieutenant James Fitzgibbon consolidated the gains made by the tribesmen, the victory achieved in this instance was essentially an Indian one. But there were some who accused that British officer of exaggerating his own contribution, John Norton, for one, uttering the classic statement that the "Cognauaga [*sic*] Indians fought the battle, the Mohawks got the plunder, and Fitzgibbon got the credit."¹⁵

In any case, the Indians again suffered fairly heavy casualties for five principal chiefs and a considerable number of the rank and file fell in the action. Despite these losses, the Indians, particularly the Six Nations, were obviously exhilarated by their accomplishments, actively continuing their harassment of the beleaguered American forces, who were now confined to the perimeter of Fort George itself. More than once the invader acknowledged his respect for the fighting prowess and, with some notable exceptions, the battlefield behaviour of his adversaries (E 14).

For Indian, Briton, and Upper Canadian alike, by far the most critical turn of events occurred in the last year of the border war. Stung by the defeat of France overseas, which threatened to free powerful contingents of British veterans for the North American theatre of operations, the United States, taking full advantage of

¹⁴E. A. Cruikshank, "The Public Life and Services of Robert Nichol," Ontario Historical Society, *Papers and Records*, XIX (1922), 31.

¹⁵Capt. W. H. Merritt's Journal, 1812-1815, in W. C. H. Wood, ed., *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812* (3 vols., Toronto, 1920-8), III (ii), 584.

what time remained, launched yet another assault on the Niagara frontier. Advancing in strength to the Chippawa River, the American troops encountered Major-General Sir Phineas Riall and a force including approximately 300 Indians, two-thirds of whom were Norton's Mohawk followers (E 24). The battle at Chippawa constituted the last occasion on which the Confederacy exerted any real influence on the outcome of the campaign. Most of the braves involved in that indecisive engagement returned a short time later, by one means or another, to their settlements on the Grand; only a few scattered groups fought at Lundy's Lane or took part in the siege of American forces at Fort Erie late in July, 1814.

Opinions varied about the contribution of the Indians to the British cause. There were those observers who invariably denigrated the Indians' role as competent allies, claiming that the latter's main aim was to plunder defeated armies once their British confederates had carried the field¹⁶ (E 30, E 31). On the other hand, many officials, regulars, and militiamen acknowledged their indebtedness to the Six Nations in the several campaigns on the Niagara, while the Indians, for their part, contended that while they had been busily engaged in fighting for the King, their families and dependents had often been left exposed to enemy raiding parties (E 16).

The region to which the dispersed and weary tribesmen returned had, like the Niagara country, been ravaged by the protracted fighting. Though initially unmolested because of General Hull's ineptitude in the Northwest, the security afforded by the stout defence put up at Queenston Heights, and the successful British foray at Stoney Creek a year later, the Valley of the Grand had none the less intruded on the strategic calculations of the British as early as October, 1812. Major-General Sir Roger Sheaffe, Brock's successor as commander-in-chief, urged at that juncture the establishment of stronger defences at Long Point and the mouth of the Grand, among other places on the north shore of Lake Erie, an ambitious scheme that attracted a good deal of support after the Americans established control of the lake with their victory at Put-in-Bay on September 10, 1813. Sheaffe and others responsible for the security of the community had held that if such measures were not taken, the United States, capitalizing on its maritime supremacy, would be encouraged to use the Grand to penetrate to the very heart of Upper Canada, and to intercept British and Indian forces either advancing into or

¹⁶"The Indians on all occasions," a typical report complained, "behave in the most cowardly and shameful manner and undoubtedly murder many of our wounded officers for the sake of plunder." C. P. Stacey, ed., "Upper Canada at War, 1814: Captain Armstrong Reports," *Ontario History*, XLVIII (1956), 42.

withdrawing from the western part of the peninsula. Closely related to the project for strengthening the approaches to the upper Grand was the one, inspired primarily by Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey in March, 1814, to assemble mobile forces in the vicinity of Burford and Ancaster as a means of defeating any combined enemy attack from Detroit, Long Point, and Niagara (E 20).

While these plans were still being discussed, Colonel Duncan McArthur, the American commander in Michigan, seized the initiative and on October 23, 1814, launched a whirlwind invasion of the colony.¹⁷ Carrying virtually all before him, McArthur had by November 6 penetrated as far as Brant's Ford, with little apparently standing in the way of his crossing the Grand and sweeping on to the Head of the Lake. Although he beat off an attack by British regulars and defeated a detachment of militia at Malcom's Mills near Burford on November 7,¹⁸ the American general was soon made painfully aware of his dangerously extended lines of communication and the near exhaustion of many of his troops. Moreover, finding the turbulent river impassable he was content to lay waste the surrounding countryside, ordering small parties to destroy mills, homesteads, and other facilities that might prove useful to the defenders, and to carry off whatever was plunderable (E 26, E 27). Only the prompt intervention of a squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons prevented further deprivations in the Burford area and halted the wholesale carnage graphically described in the commanding officer's reports.¹⁹ Granted, McArthur shortly withdrew to Detroit but his scorched earth tactics and the casualties he inflicted held up the British counter-attack, confounding plans to pursue and trap his retreating army. Much to the colonists' relief, McArthur's swiftly executed and destructive sortie proved to be the last significant offensive against the western flanks of Upper Canada. A little over a month later the war was brought to a close by the Peace of Ghent, and the Indians on the Grand River began once more to build up their settlements after the upheaval of war (G 13, G 14).

II

For more than twenty years there was peace on the Grand. Then in December, 1837, the calm was abruptly shattered by rebellion

¹⁷An account of this campaign may be read in A. R. Gilpin, *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest* (Toronto, 1958), pp. 256-7.

¹⁸For a colourful version of this engagement see R. C. Muir, *Early Political and Military History of Burford* (Quebec, 1913), pp. 228-30.

¹⁹Major Peter Chambers' Report on the destruction in Burford, Cruikshank, "The Public Life and Services of Robert Nichol," 49.

and rumours of an impending invasion from the south. All was scurry and alarm in the Valley for, despite the defeat suffered at Montgomery's Tavern by William Lyon Mackenzie's followers, it was well known that his confederate, Dr. Charles Duncombe, a vocal opponent of the Family Compact, was gathering a large force of rebels in the region between the Grand and the Thames. To meet this threat and to destroy the rebel force before it could consolidate its hold on the country, Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Napier MacNab and his "Men of Gore," the blooded veterans of Montgomery's Tavern, were despatched to Brantford. Here they were jubilantly greeted by 150 well-armed townspeople and over 100 Mohawks led by William Johnson Kerr, a local supporter of the Family Compact and a veteran of the War of 1812.²⁰ As the defenders on the Grand soon discovered, however, there was little need for such lavish military preparations, since Duncombe on receiving news of Mackenzie's defeat had hastily dispersed his forces and fallen back on the Thames. Accordingly, when MacNab launched his attack on December 15 the rebels had already taken flight, abandoning their poorly planned siege of the Valley. Convinced that danger still lurked in the western sections of Upper Canada, MacNab and his forces, including heavily painted warriors from the reserve, remained in the field, hunting down rebel sympathizers and innocents alike. Meanwhile other Grand River Indians were serving on the Niagara frontier where an American attack was feared (E 32-E 34).

As in 1812, the Mohawks and the Six Nations generally had been quick to react when their own communities had been menaced by an invader who threatened to destroy the constituted authority to which, in spite of all their own misgivings about its efficiency and good will, they had traditionally looked for support and guidance. Their own innate conservatism and respect for established conventions,²¹ combined with their conviction that a considerable number of Duncombe's supporters would, if successful in battle, rob the Indians of their ancient privileges and expropriate what remained of their lands, prompted them to don their paint and revive the bloody tactics of the warpath during the crisis of 1837-38.

²⁰W. R. Riddell, ed., "George Coventry's Concise History of the Late Rebellion in Upper Canada," Ontario Historical Society, *Papers and Records*, XVII (1919), 145-6.

²¹See J. A. Noon, *Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois* (New York, 1949), pp. 17-18.

F. CHRISTIANITY IN THE LONGHOUSE

THE CONTROVERSIES OF LAND TENURE AND WAR often obscured the task of preparing the Six Nations for a productive role in a Christian community. To this question—when they could salvage time from the many hours spent on routine administrative matters—nearly every official, responsible citizen, and churchman in the colony devoted some thought. Even before they migrated to the Grand, according to Daniel Claus, those Iroquois refugees already converted to Christianity had expressed an overwhelming desire to receive their accustomed “Instruction” (F 1). Claus’ personal interest in their plight was reflected, among other ways, in his wish to arrange a new edition of the Mohawk Prayer Book, first published in 1714. Joseph Brant, himself a communicant of the Church of England—although the genuineness of his religious faith has been questioned (B 31)—and ever anxious to accelerate the cultural progress of his people (G 1), actually supervised work on the edition during his brief sojourn in Britain in 1786 to publicize the claims of the Confederacy.¹ Completed in the following year, it was printed in alternate pages of English and Mohawk and contained, in addition to the chief’s own translation of the Anglican Book of Common Prayer and the Gospel of St. Mark, a number of suitable engravings and a frontispiece depicting the Indians receiving copies of the original Prayer Book from the King and Queen.

Meanwhile, the Governor, Sir Frederick Haldimand, in his statement on the “Means Suggested as the Most Probable to Retain the Six Nations . . . in the King’s interest,” stressed the importance of providing them with sufficient spiritual direction and adequate educational facilities (B 20). In this matter, as in so many others, Haldimand honestly practised what he preached, personally arranging, before his departure from the colony in 1784, for the construction of a church and schoolhouse and offering further to subsidize the schoolmaster (B 18). While dutifully admiring the newly completed church (F 4, F7) built by Brant’s friends, John Smith and John Thomas, Sir John Johnson voiced a general opinion when he remarked, characteristically, that it would serve as an admirable political instrument for holding the Confederacy to their British

¹W. L. Stone, *Life of Joseph Brant* (2 vols., New York, 1838), II, 287; M. L. Bonham, “The Religious Side of Joseph Brant,” *Journal of Religion*, IX (1929), 418.

allegiance (F 6), indicating that the policy once pursued by Frenchmen in Huronia and Englishmen along the Hudson was to be followed still in what remained of Britain's empire after the American War of Independence.

Before the church edifice was completed it was suggested that the Rev. John Stuart, an Anglican missionary sent to Upper Canada by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts who had first made Brant's acquaintance in 1770 at Canajoharie in the Mohawk Valley, should be despatched to Niagara so that he might care for the Six Nations in that quarter. Faced with the difficulty of finding a suitable replacement at Cataraqui to which Stuart had originally been assigned, the authorities merely requested him to undertake periodic visits to the western country. The demands of "Kenti" and sundry other problems, most notably the lack of effective communications with Niagara, repeatedly forced Stuart to put off his long awaited visitation to the Valley where, in addition to pastoral duties, he had hoped to assist Brant in scriptural translations into the Mohawk² (F 3, F 5).

The opportunity finally came in the late spring of 1788 when, after making the necessary preparations, he set out from Kingston in the company of the chief and several other Indians, reaching the western end of the lake after a strenuous voyage of nine days (F 7). Travelling overland by horseback the party shortly arrived at their destination, the Mohawk Village referred to by Stuart as "New Oswego." Apart from preaching the Word and administering the sacrament to a reportedly delighted group of some seventy Indians, the missionary, much to the satisfaction of his new communicants, presented them with most of the plate and furniture which had once graced their original church at Fort Hunter in the Mohawk Valley (F 2). These ornate refinements to the otherwise rustic simplicity of the chapel on the Grand had long been sought after by members of the Brant family and included, according to Daniel Claus' inventory (F 4), not only the highly prized communion service presented to the Six Nations by Queen Anne but a richly embroidered pulpit cloth and two handsome black tables inscribed with the Lord's Prayer and the Commandments. Their assignment to Brant's church by Stuart was doubtless a bitter pill for the Quinte Mohawks to swallow, for they had been allowed to retain only three pieces of "Queen Anne's Plate" for their own use. In awarding the lion's share of the "Ornaments" to the Valley the authorities were moved perhaps by the need for appeasing Brant and making up in some way

²See J. W. Lydekker, *The Faithful Mohawks* (Cambridge, 1938).

for the failure to provide permanent services in the western settlements established by the Six Nations refugees.

Unfortunately Stuart's own advancing years, the uncertainties and hazards of frontier travelling, and his time-consuming duties at the eastern end of Lake Ontario ruled out the possibility of his directing a regular programme of missionary work on the Grand, a situation which he very much regretted (F 7). He was therefore greatly relieved in the spring of 1792, when the S.P.G. succeeded in recruiting an additional missionary in the person of the Rev. Robert Addison who duly arrived at Niagara the following July, charged with the responsibility of furthering the church's work in the western section of Upper Canada. The summer and winter passed, however, before the reputedly "industrious" Addison, who frequently complained of "indifferent health," actually visited the Mohawks and their fellow Christians in the Valley. In the autumn of 1793, while soliciting the Society for an additional stipend to compensate him for his exertions at the Mohawk chapel, Addison disclosed that Brant preferred quarterly visitations to the preaching of a resident missionary, an aside that may have betrayed the chief's fear of a potential rival or critic (F 7).

Addison, like his predecessor, was frustrated by his inability to care for the Indians "as much as they deserve," reporting in the summer of 1795 with ill-disguised relief, though perhaps with some spiritual misgivings, that a Presbyterian minister had arrived in the neighbourhood and was sharing his arduous toil (F 14). John Norton sympathized with Addison's plight and, fearful that Roman Catholics and "others" might enlist many Indians by default, appealed for the organization of "some association" overseas that would sponsor the work of additional missionaries (F 17). Late in 1797, discarding his earlier objections to the appointment of a resident clergyman, Brant wrote that such an appointment "would be highly promotive of morality and the Christian Virtues among our people."

Though appearing to acknowledge the difficulties that beset the S.P.G.'s endeavour to meet the needs of all the scattered communities in Upper Canada, Brant abruptly disclosed that it was his "most ardent wish" that a personal friend, Davenport Phelps, be ordained as a missionary to the tribesmen (F 8). Warmly commended by his patron as a person of liberal education and high literary qualifications—though, as Brant confessed in a somewhat bewildering afterthought, not "so conversant with Books . . . as he could have wished"—Phelps was put forward as a fit and proper person for ordination at the hands of the Bishop of Quebec. When

the matter was brought to the attention of Sir John Johnson, that officer disclaimed any knowledge of Phelps, while the Bishop, though most anxious to station "a resident Missionary in every Indian Village," came to the conclusion, shared by such cautious informants as President Russell (F 9), that Phelps' qualifications left altogether too much to be desired (F 10). Not only had he been implicated on one occasion in some "dangerously seditious" proceedings, but as a native of the United States his loyalty was generally suspect. Moreover, in Russell's view, whatever professional training he had acquired seemed to fit him more for law than for holy orders. As a consequence Phelps' appointment was set aside. Thereupon the chief, in a fit of pique, promptly announced his intention to seek what he realized no responsible person, least of all his close associate, John Norton, was prepared to condone, the services of a "Romish priest" (F 11). This somewhat waspish proposal, much to every one's relief, came to nothing.

Meanwhile, despite the hardships under which he laboured and the burdensome demands of his charge, Addison began to sound a more hopeful note in his reports, announcing on one occasion that his "Indian Mission, as far as he can attend to it, goes on well" (F 11). Among the several improvements he proudly noted were the spread of sobriety among the Mohawks (F 14, F 15), the interest shown in his services by members of other tribes such as the Cayugas and Tuscaroras, and the advance of education in the various Indian settlements. The unpleasant fact remained, however, that notwithstanding the progress of which Addison made so much, "drunkenness" and other forms of vice, Indian misgivings about the objects of European schooling, and devotion to "pagan" rituals and mythology continued to plague the work of the missionary. Thus, while William Claus was complaining of the activities of rum-runners and the debilitating effect of the traffic on its Iroquoian customers (G 2), his colleagues were remarking how in some quarters the white man's education had been denigrated as a wholly unsatisfactory substitute for the hunt and the chase (F 18). Still other observers were lamenting the durability of "heathenish superstitions" among the Six Nations and the degree to which they were modifying or actually emasculating Christian teachings (F 12). These and other complaints were echoed by a number of Baptist clergymen (F 16) who, though they visited the Indian lands on several occasions in the years 1804 to 1808,³ made no real attempt for a generation to evangelize the people of the Confederacy, con-

³Stuart Ivison and Fred Rosser, *The Baptists in Upper and Lower Canada before 1820* (Toronto, 1956).

cluding that in view of the latter's abject paganism any such plan would prove abortive.

All too often the early European missionary either dismissed the aboriginal religion as a subject unworthy of serious study or, to quote one authority, subscribed "to that part of Christian theology which accounted for savage cultures as the result of postlapsarian degradation." As many students of Indian lore had already discovered, however, the Iroquoian peoples had fashioned principles approximating a moral code, recognizing the existence of and conflict between good and evil forces (A 8). "They predicated a dualism in nature, like the ancient Persians," asserts one scholar, "and in various elaborate myths described how two rival spirits, one good and one evil, fought for the mastery of the universe, and how the good spirit finally overcame his adversary without being able to undo all his mischievous creations."⁴

Furthermore, even while Addison was preparing his optimistic reports for the S.P.G. at the turn of the century, a religious movement of far-reaching significance was under way among the Iroquois in New York and Pennsylvania. Lord Selkirk, in an entry made in his diary in 1804, reported that about two years before a new "sect" had appeared in the Indian country, preaching, among other things, the "renunciation of liquor." The founder of the movement was Handsome Lake (Ga-ne-o-di-yo), believed to have been the half-brother of Cornplanter, the Seneca sachem (F 13). Experiencing when well past middle age a supposed supernatural visitation, Handsome Lake had immediately embarked on a sacred mission, exhorting all Indians, and particularly the Six Nations, to forsake the ways of the white man and return to the ancient paths of the tribal religion.⁵ Though his mission smacked of the nativistic, there is little question that his conflict with Christianity served to throw into sharper relief the rather vague monotheism which the Iroquois had always embraced. Throughout his career Handsome Lake continually referred to the injunctions of the "Great Spirit" who had sent him forth to expound the message of temperance and morality. According to one recent study of the tribes on the Grand,⁶

The Message has all the symptoms of a messianic creed, and, historically, Handsome Lake was indeed one of the prophets so prevalent at the beginning of the nineteenth century. . . . He shares traits not only with

⁴Diamond Jenness, *The Indians of Canada* (3rd ed.; Ottawa, 1955), p. 172.

⁵New York State Library (N.Y.S.L.), MSS # 13350-51.

⁶Annemarie Shimony, *Conservatism among the Iroquois at the Six Nations' Reserve* (New Haven, 1961), p. 203.

the prophets of other nativist . . . Indian movements, but also with the intellectual climate of northeastern America of his day. His creed promises eternal happiness to his followers and punishment for all others. . . . Furthermore, the prophet and his following are declared intrinsically superior to the white man and the white man's prophet. . . . Handsome Lake . . . implies that all those who conscientiously follow his teachings will be allowed into heaven, and those are, of course, all Indians. . . .

This gospel, which may have betrayed, ironically enough, the influence which Christianity had already exerted on Iroquoian rites, gained many adherents in the early years of the nineteenth century and established a bridgehead in the Valley which no amount of Christian missionary activity and European cultural pressure was able to erase.⁷

In spite of the problems raised by the cult of Handsome Lake and the diverse rivalries to his own cause, Addison persevered in his missionary enterprise, undeterred by the pessimism of those who maintained that genuine Christianity was making little or no progress on the Grand. Following the somewhat belated appointment of the Rev. Ralph Leeming in September, 1816, as the first resident clergyman at Ancaster, Addison obtained the much needed relief he had long sought and some leisure time in which to explore problems beyond those concerned with ministering the sacraments to his Indian communicants. He had for some time showed a special interest in translating all the Gospels into Mohawk, an exercise first undertaken by Brant in collaboration with the Rev. John Stuart. But after the chief's death in 1807 the project had fallen into abeyance. A little over a year later, however, the missionary reported fully on a "very extraordinary young man" who, while serving as Brant's interpreter, had volunteered to assist in the translation of the Scriptures. In this way was the prowess of John Norton brought to the attention of the Society overseas; for over a decade churchmen on both sides of the Atlantic hoped that Norton—or others like him—would bring to completion the work launched by Stuart and Brant. At the outset Norton appeared to welcome the task of translation as an appropriate part of his general purpose of gradu-

⁷"The prophet who would succeed among the Iroquois," still another authority remarks, "must speak in ancient tongues . . . and he must relate his program to old ways. He is a conservator at the same time that he is a reformer. It will become apparent as one traverses the course of Iroquois culture history that its several reformations have been accomplished by such prophets. This is one of the reasons that Iroquois culture has endured so long; theirs is a tough tradition and a remarkably stable one. . . ." W. N. Fenton, "This Island, The World on the Turtle's Back," *Journal of American Folklore* (1962).

ally winning over the tribes to the settled habits of a European community. Yet by the early months of 1822, very much distracted by personal difficulties and other projects, he was questioning the wisdom of the venture as an aid to the cause of Christianity, arguing that since most of the Mohawks readily understood English there was little or no need for Indian texts. There the matter seemed to rest though periodically missionaries and other interested parties would hopefully announce the preparation, if not the actual printing, of translations into the Mohawk language (F 27).

With respect to education Addison and his colleagues and successors seemed in their reports to err on the side of excessively rosy expectations. Shortly after he assumed his duties in Ancaster the Rev. Ralph Leeming established a school at the Tuscarora Village (F 19). By the spring of 1820 it boasted thirty pupils, the Indians supposedly deriving "much benefit from it";⁸ but within five years prospects were rudely shattered when it was learned that enrolment had dwindled to "three scholars only."⁹ Still later, for want of a white teacher, an inexperienced Indian was placed in charge of the school; since he was shortly dismissed on serious moral charges and no one appointed in his place, the school for a time ceased to function and the pupils were reportedly "running Wild" in the community.¹⁰

Greater though still circumscribed success attended the efforts of those missionaries who ventured to Upper Canada in the 1820's under the auspices of the venerable New England Company, an organization described by one scholar as "without exact counterpart in the earlier spread of Christianity, or of any other religion,"¹¹ having been formed in the mid-seventeenth century for the express purpose of ministering to North America's aborigines. Following the outbreak of the American War of Independence the Company shifted its attention and personnel to the Loyalist colonies. In 1826, the Rev. John West was sent on a reconnaissance tour of the Grand River Valley; his report to the Company stressed the Indians' evident need and desire for religious instruction and educational facilities (F 27). The following year the Rev. Robert Luger was appointed the first resident missionary on the Grand (F 29). During the ten years in which he worked among the Indians he

⁸P.A.C., Claus Papers, XII, 49-50, Leeming to Claus, April 11, 1820.

⁹*Ibid.*, 247-50, Rev. Charles Stuart to Claus, June 8, 1825.

¹⁰P.A.C., Indian Affairs, Civil Control, V (1830), 446-48, Luger to unknown correspondent, June 27, 1830.

¹¹K. S. Latourette, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*. III. *Three Centuries of Advance, 1500-1800* (New York, 1939), 44.

planned the construction of no fewer than four schools for the Mohawks and their confederates. According to the map¹² which he compiled early in 1828 two schools were built directly east of Brant's Ford, the first serving the Oneidas and Cayugas and the second the Mohawks, later known as the Mohawk Institute. The remaining institutions were projected further down the watercourse, one to meet the needs of the Onondagas and Senecas, the other those of the Delawares who occupied a tract adjoining the Sherbrooke Naval Depot at the mouth of the river. Luger's energy and enthusiasm suitably impressed visiting ecclesiastical and secular dignitaries who seldom hesitated to comment favourably on his mission. For example, one John Richards, commissioned in 1830 to make an official investigation of the province's land-granting system, took time out from his lengthy perambulations to examine, to his obvious satisfaction, the classroom activities of several young Indians under Luger's direction at the Ford.¹³

It was fitting, in view of his achievements, that this missionary should be the first occupant of the newly completed parsonage in the Mohawk settlement, a very respectable residence by frontier standards authorized by the Confederacy in the summer of 1825 and built on an expansive estate of 200 acres with funds provided by the Indians and donated by friendly patrons.¹⁴ The schoolmaster whom Luger employed was also provided with accommodations and grounds, albeit not so lavish as those assigned to the missionary.¹⁵ These improvements were crowned by the repairs made to the original Mohawk Chapel—an edifice measuring some fifty-two feet in length and twenty-eight in width—which over the years had fallen into a "ruinous state" of repair. In the early autumn of 1830 leading Mohawk chiefs implored the Bishop of Quebec to dedicate and consecrate the renovated building, a solemn act duly performed by that dignitary on October 17, 1830 (F 31).

Meanwhile, Richards' glowing commentary on Luger's educational efforts to the contrary, another articulate observer, the Rev. George Ryerson, remarked that although the Indians were attentive enough in a missionary's presence they seemed incapable of comprehending the real meaning of Christianity (F 26). Writing that they all too often succumbed to the vicious habits of Europeans, he pointed out that the Cayugas, the leading devotees of the cult of

¹²See Figure 2, facing p. lxxxvi.

¹³G. W. Spragge, ed., "A Visit to Upper Canada in 1830 by John Richards," *Ontario History*, XLVIII (1956), 120-1.

¹⁴Clause Papers, XII, 253, George Martin to Claus, June 14, 1825.

¹⁵He received a tract of 50 acres.




FIGURE 2. PLAN OF THE GRAND RIVER, 1828, BY THE REV. ROBERT LUGGER. [Public Archives of Canada.]

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Handsome Lake, were forcibly repelled by the antics of the Christianized Mohawks, though conceding that the Tuscaroras and Onondagas, still largely "heathen," were desirous of receiving Christian guidance and instruction. Toward the end of his account he noted that members of another religious community, the Methodists—much to the disgust of those Indians who supported the missions of the Church of England—had for some time been making progress among a "few Mohawks," Chippewas, and Delawares.

The Methodist circuit-riders who paid their first visit to the Valley in the summer of 1821 were almost exclusively from the United States, representatives of the Genesee Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Long suspected of harbouring subversive notions, Methodist immigrants from the republic and converts in Upper Canada had experienced a particularly harrowing ordeal during the War of 1812. Moreover, no sooner had that crisis passed than the colony was visited by a contingent of British Wesleyans who, being much more urbane and conservative than their American brethren, sharply questioned such local practices as the colourful camp meeting and the thundering sermon on "hell fire," the stock-in-trade of Methodist preachers on the frontier. At the same time the visiting Wesleyans repudiated the episcopal structure of the colonial church and its association with the Genesee Conference. Open conflict was averted by the British group's decision to confine their activities, at least temporarily, to Lower Canada—although in time they too established Indian missions (F 33)—thus enabling the Methodists to make plans in 1824 for creating their own Conference in the upper province. Four years later the necessary steps were taken, in a move that should have destroyed one of the principal points at issue between the two parties, to free that newly created body from its connection with American Methodism.

Against the backdrop of these developments, Upper Canada's Methodists, while not neglecting the white inhabitants of the colony, were turning their attention to the immediate needs of the Indians, particularly those in the Valley of the Grand.¹⁶ As early as the summer of 1822 it was announced that the Genesee Conference had appointed a "Brother" Alvin Torry as its first missionary to that part of the province. Some months later the Rev. William Case, the presiding elder of the Methodist district of Upper Canada, whose own comments were fully recorded, enclosed with a letter to his

¹⁶G. S. French, *Parsons & Politics: The Rôle of the Wesleyan Methodists in Upper Canada and the Maritimes from 1780 to 1855* (Toronto, 1962), pp. 135-6.

superiors a communication from Torry on the progress of the western mission¹⁷ (F 20). Fully acknowledging the work already done by the Church of England at the Mohawk Village—where, it appears, he actually preached—Torry reserved the greater part of his message for an account of the so-called “churching” activities of certain Cayugas and Onondagas who, in resisting the Christian Gospel, preserved their own ethical system, based presumably—though the missionary had no way of knowing this—on the teachings of Handsome Lake. Torry was convinced, following his own investigations, that the Delawares, who were then residing near the mouth of the Grand, would be the most responsive to a concerted and sustained missionary endeavour.

Most of the reports sent off in the next few years by Case, Torry, and the latter’s assistant, the Rev. Seth Crawford (F 21, F 23, F 24, F 28) echoed the overly optimistic phrases which had inspired the hopeful communications of their Anglican predecessors, Stuart and Addison. None the less they included references to the singing of hymns in the Mohawk, favourable accounts of the “exhorting” skills of converted tribesmen and the encouraging progress made in the mission schools, and statements on the need for enrolling more “native teachers” who might preach the simple “*Kingdom of God* to their brethren in [their own] tongue.” Furthermore, the Methodists could look with pride on their protégé, the Rev. Peter Jones—the half-breed son of Augustus Jones—who had, following his conversion from Anglicanism at a camp meeting in 1823, embarked on a missionary career among his own people.

While Methodist and Anglican clergymen continued to labour on the Grand, a Baptist mission was established among the Tuscaroras in 1842,¹⁸ with some success (F 35, F 36).

Despite the various missionary activities through the years, a large majority of the Cayugas, Onondagas, Senecas, and some of the Delawares were still unconverted in 1842 (F 37). Major Winnett, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs on the Grand River, attributed this to Indian prejudice against the white man’s religion, a prejudice “much increased and strengthened, by the Inconsistency which they observe between the profession and practice of many professed white Christians.” Thus, from the time of Joseph Brant (G 1), the white man’s poor example remained a continuing impediment to the Indians’ adoption of his religion.

¹⁷See John Carroll, *Case and His Contemporaries, or, The Canadian Itinerant’s Memorial* (Toronto, 1867), II, 401–16.

¹⁸J. P. Pryse, “Pioneer Baptist Missionaries to Upper Canada Tuscaroras,” *Canadian Baptist Home Missions Digest*, VI (1963–4), 273–82.

G. A STOCK-TAKING

THE SENSE OF ACHIEVEMENT that coloured the reports and utterances of those who laboured among the Six Nations carried little weight, however, with certain public officials and members of the Church of England hierarchy. Indeed before the 1820's had run their course those in positions of authority on both sides of the Atlantic were taking a long and critical look at what had actually been accomplished with the Indians over the span of a quarter century.

On the administrative side, a symbolic change occurred in the Indian Department in 1830, entailing the transfer of supervision from the military to the civil authorities, a decision inspired by Sir James Kempt, then Administrator of Canada.¹ Since the threat of hostilities with the United States had receded, observers argued, there was no longer the imperative need for cultivating the Iroquois solely as prospective allies on the battlefield (G 17, G 18). The awarding of presents, accordingly—the time-honoured device for sealing the Indians' allegiance—and for that matter, the customary activities of the Department itself, were apparently to be relegated to a secondary place in the calculations of the authorities (G 21). Presumably in future greater attention was to be paid to the role of officials as "executors of a humane and progressive plan for the civilization of the aborigines."²

This assignment was cherished by those articulate and influential persons who in the early years of the century had sustained the humanitarian crusade against the evils which had accumulated in the long course of imperial expansion. In the interval following the appointment of missionaries to western Quebec, Britain and her colonies had been profoundly affected by the triumphs of the Evangelical movement. With the assistance of liberally disposed politicians, its leaders had in 1807 brought about the abolition of the slave trade; again, through vehicles like the Church and London Missionary Societies, they had combated the less desirable effects of European contact with aboriginal peoples as far afield as the Cape Colony and New South Wales. The period also witnessed the forma-

¹The Indian Department of Upper Canada was also separated from that of the lower province. P.A.C., Indian Affairs, Indian Claims, 1790-1857, DCCV, "Brief History of the Indian Department."

²Grenfell Price, *White Settlers and Native Peoples* (Melbourne, 1950), pp. 69 ff.

tion of those organizations which in 1833 achieved the abolition of slavery itself, and, aided by the Aborigines Protection Committee of the House of Commons, set out to expedite the general improvement of "native subjects."³

Among the humanitarians' more inspiring contributions to the debate on the country's obligations to the aborigine were the reports of the Select Committees appointed by the House of Commons in 1836 and 1837 to study the present and the future of the native races within the empire.⁴ In documents which should have enlisted as much support as Lord Durham's famous *Report on the Affairs of British North America* they stirred the conscience of at least some of their listeners with an appeal for greater vigilance on behalf of the Cape's Bantus, Australia's Blackfellows, New Zealand's Maoris, and North America's Indians and Eskimos. In the process these reformers hoped to demonstrate that the granting of responsible government to overseas colonies, though praiseworthy in itself, would lead to the Europeans' exploitation and suppression of the aborigine. Though their eloquent arguments were almost engulfed by the wave of support that carried the "systematic colonizers" of the Wakefield and Durham school into positions of prominence, they nevertheless sharply etched the profound moral implications of European expansion and the need for the civilized world to champion those who could not, under the circumstances, readily defend themselves against the inroads of an unsettling and alien culture.

The humanitarians' connection with Indian affairs generally and with the problems of the Six Nations particularly had been forged in part by the relationship established between William Wilberforce⁵ and the ubiquitous John Norton, whose views on these matters—seldom neglected when Indian policy was discussed overseas—struck a responsive chord in the Evangelical leader. As early as 1804, according to Selkirk and others equally well informed of Norton's activities, the adopted Mohawk had recommended the removal of all or part of the Confederacy to the extreme western

³V. T. Harlow and F. Madden, eds., *British Colonial Developments, 1774-1834: Select Documents* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 525-614.

⁴Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Select Committee appointed to consider what measures ought to be adopted with respect to the Native Inhabitants of Countries where British Settlements are made, and to the Neighbouring Tribes, in order to secure to them the due observance of Justice and the protection of their Rights; to promote the spread of Civilization among them, and to lead them to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the Christian Religion, *Reports, 1836, 1837*.

⁵See Reginald Coupland, *Wilberforce* (London, 1945).

borders of Upper Canada (G 5) where, virtually free from the "pernicious" excesses of the white man's world, they could enjoy, or so it was hoped, every opportunity to further their agricultural development and be trained leisurely in the arts and crafts of a European community. Some years later Norton was still pursuing this object, urging the authorities to reserve for those Indians who desired the change of scene a tract on Lake Huron where they could receive instruction in "Agriculture and Letters" (G 8). Though no action was taken on this particular recommendation, those in high places did not lightly dismiss Norton's ideas on the civilization of the Six Nations. Among the reforms he stressed was the one which had occasioned so much controversy during the several crises over the landed rights of the Indians on the Grand River—his suggestion that the tenure of their lands there be changed to that of free socage, which would have had the effect of conferring on the Iroquois farmer a clear title to the plot of ground he occupied (G 4, G 7). He aroused the ire of William Claus who insisted that the reserve should be held in trust for the whole tribal group.⁶ Buried in the debate, however, was what appears to be one of the principal motives behind Norton's proposition: namely, to infuse in the Mohawk and his confederates a sense of property and the incentive to labour on their own holdings (G 9).

Then in 1809 no less a personage than Lord Castlereagh ordered a full investigation of this question, impressed as he was by the information that "some people of a most respectable description" in Britain had come down strongly on Norton's side of the argument (G 10). These respectable individuals included such dignitaries as Wilberforce and Lord Percy with whom the Scot had frequently corresponded after his visit overseas in 1804 to plead the cause of the Six Nations' rights on the Grand (G 3). The letters indicate that Norton had thoroughly delighted them with his accounts of the history and culture of the Six Nations. In spite of his imposing credentials and Castlereagh's lively interest, this early essay in reformation came to nothing. Britain's protracted war with France, the difficulties of reconstruction after 1815, and the influence enjoyed by the Indian Department, which clearly distrusted Norton and feared that its own vested interests might be endangered by reforms that would render the Indians less dependent on its ser-

⁶"The term which best describes the condition of individual ownership," writes one authority, "is that of real chattels which may be defined as that degree of ownership less than ownership in freehold." J. A. Noon, *Law and Government among the Grand River Iroquois* (New York, 1949), p. 88.

vices (G 6)—all of these factors deferred decisions on important matters affecting the Six Nations. And this was unfortunately at a time when the Confederacy was stricken with near famine conditions (G 13) and when many, in consequence, were seriously contemplating a migration far to the westward (G 15, G 16).

Once the problems of peace and war were resolved or at least reduced to manageable proportions, however, responsible people again turned their thoughts to Indian affairs. Several documents, at least one of which came from the pen of the Rev. John Strachan, were prepared which candidly examined the history of Christian missions among all the Indians of Upper Canada.⁷ Not only did Strachan complain about the lack of tangible results but went on to decry the methods so long employed. Although many of the arguments contained in this statement had occurred to Stuart, Addison, and Leeming and to Indian spokesmen such as Brant and Norton, they were here set forth with an urgency that commanded the respect of all those concerned with the Six Nations' welfare.

Well armed with precedents supplied by the early Christian experience, the author observed that missions in antiquity had triumphed only when they had been conducted amongst relatively advanced peoples who had already adopted a settled way of life and become "acquainted with many of the arts, the duties and conveniences of social life." The "fierce barbarians," who closed the door on the Christian message because it could not be comfortably accommodated within their nomadic culture, were bypassed by St. Paul, the document continued, in favour of the more "learned cities of Greece, where the public character had been strengthened by reflection and nurtured by philosophy." Again, the author cautioned against wishful thinking—too often indulged in by missionaries in the colony—and the view that the Indians could be speedily converted and civilized. Rather, he argued, patience, hard work, ceaseless persuasion, and the tireless setting of good examples would yield the only truly enduring results. One of the means suggested to achieve an environment favourable to the attainment of this civilizing process was reminiscent of Norton's proposals for it sought the congregation of the Six Nations into larger settlements wherein they might be more effectually instructed in the arts of husbandry and agriculture. Having gained by these advantages a greater stability, the Indians would, according to the argument, be more responsive to the labours of dedicated missionaries.

⁷E.g., T.P.L., Arthur Papers, Strachan's "Religious State of the Indians in Upper Canada," May 7, 1838.

As he himself readily admitted, Strachan was not the only responsible person who formulated such thoughtful proposals on the subject of Indian affairs: indeed he paid fulsome tribute to, among others, the suggestions advanced by Sir Peregrine Maitland, the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada from 1818 to 1828. For the convenience of Lord Bathurst, then Colonial Secretary, Maitland in 1821 had called attention to the need for concentrating the Six Nations in a few, large villages in order that they might become "less erratic" and "more amenable to real improvement." In addition, he hoped that in each such village a trustworthy individual, preferably a missionary, would be appointed to serve as an agent of government and guardian of the inhabitants' interests (G 19).

These ideas, in turn, had been heartily welcomed by Maitland's successor, Sir John Colborne, who, as noted earlier, had sought ways and means—for example, through the involvement of the Confederacy in the fortunes of the Grand River Navigation Company (G 30)—of ultimately merging their affairs more effectively with those of the white communities in the Valley. Echoing the statements made earlier by Norton and others, Colborne had urged the Indians to emulate the white man's ways in agriculture and husbandry and thereby stimulate the productivity of their reserve (G 22). In addition, he recommended that clearer divisions be made among the holdings of the respective nations, a proposal that fell foul, however, of the close ties established among the tribes over two generations through intermarriage and migrations throughout the Valley (G 23). Sir James Kempt, who served from 1828 to 1830 as Administrator of Canada, elaborated on the thoughts of both Maitland and Colborne, referring frequently to the necessity of providing Indian villages with "*active and zealous*" missionaries, qualified to instruct the mind as well as the spirit.⁸ At all times Kempt and his colleagues received the active support of such well-placed humanitarians as Sir George Murray and Lord Glenelg who aimed at according the "Amerind" the sort of guidance already prescribed so lavishly for the Blackfellow and the Bantu.

Notwithstanding the forcefulness with which such programmes were pursued, certain officials, notably Sir Francis Bond Head, Upper Canada's Lieutenant Governor from 1836 to 1838, were openly critical of the schemes advocated by his predecessors. Convinced that further exposure to civilization would only compound their degradation, Head urged the creation of reserves far removed

⁸An outline of Kempt's proposals is presented in G. R. Mellor, *British Imperial Trusteeship, 1783-1850* (London, 1951), p. 385.

from the white man's frontier where the Indians could practise their traditional habits and pursuits,⁹ a blunt proposal that was instantly rebuked by the reformers. Though Sir Francis was addressing himself not so much to the Six Nations as to those less acculturated tribes on the borders of the colony, it may be assumed that he was not entirely satisfied with what he had observed at the admittedly more sophisticated communities on the Grand.¹⁰

The outcome of all these deliberations was the organization in October, 1842, of a commission to examine the entire state of Indian affairs in Canada. Among other points elaborately covered in their report, which was duly issued on January 22, 1844,¹¹ the Commissioners pronounced against wholesale removals of Indians to distant reservations and, guided perhaps by the accomplishments and the moral improvement of the Six Nations, endorsed the policy of raising all the tribes to the level of their white neighbours. This would entail, in their view, a concerted programme of acquainting the Indians with the responsibilities associated with the expenditure of funds, the management of property, and the performance of public duties at the township level. They felt, moreover, that the time had arrived, almost half a century after the innovation had been sponsored by Brant and Norton, to grant those Indians suited by education and experience regular patents for the lands they cultivated as a device for encouraging their less favoured fellows to acquire the prerequisite skills (G 31). This suggestion, among others offered by the Commissioners, was subsequently acted upon by their superiors.

Though the report recommended the temporary retention of presents, its authors looked forward to the day when the money spent on dress, ornaments, and weapons of the chase would be devoted exclusively to education and moral development. When the custom of awarding such gifts was finally abandoned in 1858 much needed financial assistance was thereby released for such schools as the one organized more than thirty years before by the Rev. Robert Lugger and the New England Company at the Mohawk Village (G 29). There, in addition to the "three Rs," a varied schedule—including carpentry, horticulture, and the caring of stock (F 29)—had already been introduced in the wake of the recommendations

⁹Head, *A Narrative* (London, 1839), Appendix A, Memorandum on the Aborigines of North America.

¹⁰For a criticism of Head's views by Egerton Ryerson, see J. G. Hodgins, ed., *Historical Educational Papers and Documents of Ontario, 1792-1853* (Toronto, 1911), III, 102-3.

¹¹P.R.O., C.O. 42, v. 515-16, "Report on the Indians in Canada, 1844."

made by Strachan, Glenelg, and Murray. The year which witnessed the discarding of presents also saw, appropriately enough, the construction of a new building to house the activities of the school—known after 1850 as the Mohawk Institute—and its some sixty male and female boarders. This enrolment represented a quadrupling of the small group trained under Luggar.

Whether or not contemporaries were aware of it, the abolition of presents not only terminated a colourful ceremonial around which Indian-white relations had long revolved but dramatically symbolized the ending of an era, at least in respect of the education of the local Iroquois. So far as that area of activity was concerned, the Six Nations tribesman of Joseph Brant's generation, for all the changes which had influenced the Confederacy from its inception to the American War of Independence, appeared to have more in common with his remote forebear of the seventeenth century than with his grandson of the mid-nineteenth. Yet, despite the progress made in the civilization of the nations on the Grand and particularly the improvements made in their educational system, still another commission of enquiry reported as late as 1858 that "any hope of raising the Indians as a body to the social or political level of their white neighbours is yet but a glimmering and distant spark."¹² By mid-century observers were also remarking that while the Indians' agricultural techniques had improved considerably and closely approximated those of the whites in the district, the undeniable fact remained that their crops and livestock were not as abundant as they had been a generation before (G 32). Furthermore, in a disclosure reminiscent of statements made after the War of 1812 (G 17), it was reported that the Confederacy's farmers were still unable to stockpile sufficient grain and food against the evil day of drought and crop failures. Again, although a few resourceful yeomen had succeeded in establishing small productive estates of fifty and even one hundred acres, the average plot for Iroquois families consisted of fewer than twenty. Nor in the 1840's were those visitors who were mindful of the sizable funds allegedly deposited to the credit of the Six Nations slow to wonder at the meagre amenities of the principal settlements in the Valley—the Mohawk, Tuscarora, and Cayuga villages—where most of the Confederacy's population of some 2,200 was located. The attention of even the most casual traveller was also drawn to the fact that the reserve was dwindling rapidly and that most of its occupants were already preparing to

¹²Canada, Special commissioners appointed on the 8th of September, 1856, to investigate Indian affairs in Canada, *Report* (Toronto, 1858).

leave the eastern banks of the Grand and gather on the western, on a tract that constituted but a small fraction of the original grant.¹³

Thus, in spite of the ideas formulated and the sincere effort made by personalities as diverse as Sir Frederick Haldimand, Joseph Brant, Sir Peregrine Maitland, John Norton, and the Rev. Robert Lutter, and in spite of the experimentation of more than half a century, the fond hopes voiced for the Six Nations' future in the months following Haldimand's award of October, 1784, were far from redeemed. Distractions, greed, ignorance, retrenchment, and the almost insatiable demands of a white man's world foiled many a plan of improvement even before it had been applied (G 33).

¹³Today the Six Nations reserve, located entirely on the western banks of the river in Tuscarora and Onondaga Townships of Brant County, occupies an area of approximately 72 square miles and accommodates between 6,000 and 7,000 Indians. See Annemarie Shimony, *Conservatism among the Iroquois at the Six Nations Reserve* (New Haven, 1961), pp. 11, 18.