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Marta Dynel
University of Łódź

ON "REVOLUTIONARY ROAD": A PROPOSAL FOR EXTENDING THE GRICEAN MODEL OF COMMUNICATION TO COVER MULTIPLE HEARERS[1]

Abstract
The paper addresses the problem of multiple hearers in the context of the Gricean model of communication, which is based on speaker meaning and the Cooperative Principle, together with its subordinate maxims, legitimately flouted to yield implicatures. Grice appears to have conceived of the communicative process as taking place between two interlocutors, assuming that the speaker communicates meanings, while the hearer makes compatible inferences. A thesis propounded here is that this dyadic account must undergo a number of fundamental modifications to cover a variety of hearer types, both ratified and unratified, partaking in polylogic interactions.

Keywords
Addressee, Cooperative Principle, eavesdropper, Gricean model of communication, intention, overhearer, ratified hearers, speaker meaning, third party, unratified hearers.

1. Introduction

The Gricean model of communication (Grice 1989b [1975], 1989c [1978]), premised on the Cooperative Principle and the subordinate maxims, is frequently regarded as one of the central theories of pragmatics. This framework is grounded in the tenet that the rational speaker intentionally communicates meanings (either literal or implicit) to the hearer. Albeit focused primarily on the speaker's perspective and the notion of speaker meaning, Grice's theory may be viewed as subscribing to the canonical *dyadic* model, which assumes that meanings are produced by the sender (speaker or writer) and interpreted by the receiver (hearer or reader). However, as evidenced by any empirical conversational data, both

[1] This paper was submitted before the author took over as the co-editor. A version of this paper has also been submitted to another journal.

natural and fictional, human communication tends to be much more complex, transcending the dyadic model. Outside pragmatics, several authors have observed the need to distinguish more participants, namely speaker and/or hearer roles (Hymes 1972, 1974; Goffman 1981a [1976], 1981b [1979], 1981c; Bell 1984, 1991; Levinson 1988; Thomas 1986; Clark and Carlson 1982; Schober and Clark 1989; Clark and Schaefer 1987, 1992; Clark 1996; Verschueren 1999; Dynel 2010a, 2010b).

The primary objective of this paper is to advocate a classification of hearer types and to propose an extension of the Gricean framework by conceptualising multiple ratified and unratified hearers/listeners (addressee, third party, overhearer and eavesdropper) who make inferences based on the meanings conveyed by the speaker. It will simultaneously be argued that one utterance may carry many a meaning (albeit sometimes related), each of which is directed to each of the respective hearers.

This pilot research on the main hearer roles in the light of the Gricean model is illustrated with examples taken from Sam Mendes's film entitled "Revolutionary Road". Film discourse is deliberately chosen for the purpose of the present study. Although fictional, conversations held by characters are based on the same participation framework as everyday interactions (see Dynel 2010b, forth). Contrary to natural conversations, interactions in films are designed to be understood by outside observers, i.e. film viewers, which is why they also lend themselves perfectly to academic analysis. This is of crucial importance when speaker-intended meanings are discussed and when the aim is to present a bird's eye view of an interaction (inclusive of unratified participants). On the other hand, the choice of the particular film is not guided by reasons other than the author's personal interest.

2. Intended meaning communication and recognition according to the CP model

Grice's (1989a) major contributions to linguistic pragmatics reside primarily in intentional meanings (Grice 1989d [1969], 1989f [1957], 1989g [1982]) and in a communicative model pivoting on the *Cooperative Principle (CP)* and *maxims*, together with the notion of implicature (Grice 1989b [1975], 1989c [1978]). Albeit discussed independently in distinct lectures, the two strands of research are by no means incompatible and can be merged, without causing any frictions (e.g. Neale 1992; Levinson 2000, 2006a; Davies 2000, 2007; Gauker 2001; Haugh 2008; Wharton 2009; Dynel 2009). These two topics intersect under the "Logic and Conversation" heading (Grice 1989a). In the Gricean philosophy, the notion of intention serves as a basis for distinguishing between *non-natural* intentionally

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

conveyed meanings and *natural meanings*. Secondly, the concept of intention is of crucial importance to the dichotomy between *what is said* and what is implicated. Words constituting the speaker's "what is said" are not always equivalent to what the speaker genuinely intends to convey. As Levinson rightly observes,

> The capacity for Gricean intentions (as in Grice's 1957 theory of meaning), that is intentions driving behaviours whose sole function is to have the motivating intentions recognised (…) is what makes open-ended communication possible. (2006a: 97)

Non-natural by nature, *speaker meaning* (also called the *utterer's*/*speaker's meaning*) is conceptualised in terms of the utterer's intention to produce a particular belief in the hearer on the strength of the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention. In Grice's own words, "'A' uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention" (Grice 1989f [1957]: 219). Grice (1989d [1969]: 92) adds that the utterer means something if he/she intends to produce a particular response in the audience and wants the audience to be aware of this intention. The fulfilment of the latter is the sine qua non for the fulfilment of the former intention. The utterer's intention is *reflexive*, for it necessitates that the audience recognise the utterer's intention by taking account of the fact that they are intended to recognise this intention. This view, regarded as the iterative approach, appears to have come in for heavy criticism (e.g. Strawson 1964; Searle 1969; Schiffer 1972). On the other hand, as Bach (1987, 2001) asserts, Grice's conceptualisation is by no means contingent on iterative intentionality, which would entail an endless series of nested intentions, viz. the speaker intends to convey a meaning and intends this fact to be recognised ad infinitum.

Additionally, although it is the speaker's intentional action that is in focus, the emergence of meaning is co-dependent on the hearer, whose appreciation of the speaker's intention is the reason for the meaning's surfacing. As Levinson puts it,

> communication involves the inferential recovery of speakers' intentions: it is the recognition by the addressee of the speaker's intention to get the addressee to think such-and-such that essentially constitutes communication. (Levinson 2000: 29)

Needless to say, this perspective on meaning neglects a wide range of meanings communicated. Firstly, it fails to embrace cases of unintentionally communicated meanings, which emerge accidentally, regardless of the speaker's intent (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 2002; Bach 1994; Gibbs 1999). Secondly, the reflexivity aspect cannot account for communication when the speaker intends to communicate a meaning and have it gleaned by the hearer, while not having this intention appreciated, as typified by manipulation. Therefore, when there is no

intention recognition, communication proceeds as planned by the speaker. In addition, several authors question the necessity of recognising the speaker's intentions as the sine qua non for the hearer's inferential processes (e.g. Gauker 2001, 2003; Marmaridou 2000; Arundale 1999, 2006, 2008; Haugh 2008). This problem is related to epistemological ambiguity of intentions, i.e. whether hearers consciously ascribe intentions to speakers when inferring implicatures (Haugh 2008). In defence of Grice, it may be contended that the speaker's intention to communicate a meaning is normally assumed by default at the level of subconsciousness and will be consciously pondered only in the case of utterances which pose problems in the inferential process and provoke the interpreter's careful analysis of the speaker's intent. To reformulate, a claim can be ventured that the hearer normally holds the speaker accountable for an utterance, entertaining a backgrounded assumption that the latter intends to communicate it. This subscribes to the prevalent opinion that intentions underlying actions and utterances show degrees of consciousness, ranging from fully conscious to entirely subconscious ones (e.g. Stamp and Knapp 1990; Hample 1992; Gibbs 1999). Admittedly, the same can be applied to the hearer's perspective and the act of intention probing.

The hotly debated issue of reflexivity aside, speaker meaning may be interpreted as serving intentional and rational communicative purposes captured by the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1989b [1975], 1989c [1978]). In other words, the speaker's intention underlies the model of communication anchored in the Cooperative Principle, together with its *maxims* and *implicatures* consequent upon *maxim flouts* (1989b [1975], 1989c [1978]).

The CP as such is presented against the backdrop of the speaker's intentionality. In Grice's words, "if the Cooperative Principle is to operate, I must intend my partner to understand what I am saying" (Grice 1989b [1975]: 36). The utterer's intention to communicate a meaning (whether what is said or implicature) underpins the CP. Therefore, as argued elsewhere (Dynel 2009), the Gricean notion of cooperation is equivalent to the speaker's intentionality and rationality, which the hearer acknowledges (Davies 2000, 2007). On the assumption that the CP holds, the hearer computes literal meanings and implicatures, by making rational inferences, based on his/her recognition of the speaker's communicative intentions.

The Gricean CP model, together with the notion of speaker meaning, is an attempt at transcending the simplified version of the encoding-decoding structure of communication. It is not so much what words conventionally mean as what the speaker intends them to mean. Therefore, speaker meaning underlies the distinction between what a word or an utterance seems to convey and the utterer's meaning in the form of what is said (i.e. literally) and what is implied (via implicatures). The underlying premise of the distinction between what is said and an implicature is that an utterance produced literally and intentionally, i.e. what is said, does not

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

need to exhaust or even correspond to the speaker's intended meaning. However, both what is said and what is implied contribute to the realisation of the CP and feed in the utterer's meaning (Grice 1989d [1969]: 86).

While a few authors (e.g. Saul 2001, 2002; Davis 1998) claim that Grice does not present conversational implicatures as being dependent on the speaker's intentions[2], in the light of a closer examination of Grice's work, it transpires that he does indeed suggest that conversationally implicating something is reliant on the speaker's intentions to communicate meanings and to have those recognised by the hearer. This is because implicatures are generated from maxim flouts, which are rooted in the utterer's intentional action. The dependence of various implicatures on the utterer's intentionality can be appreciated on the basis of Grice's statements, such as:

> the presence of the implicature depends on the intentions of the speaker, or at least on his assumptions, with regard to the possibility of the nature of the implicature being worked out (Grice 1989c [1978]: 49)
>
> intending the hearer to reach first the metaphor interprétant (Grice 1989b [1975]: 34)
>
> ambiguity that is deliberate, and that the speaker intends or expects to be recognized by his hearer (Grice 1989b [1975]: 35)
>
> the speaker's intentions are to be recognized, in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (indeed my account of nonconventional implicature depends on this idea). (1989d [1969]: 101)

All the quotations above testify to the claim that it is the speaker's intentionally communicated meaning that is central to the model of communication. However, it is by no means the case that the hearer's role in the communicative process is marginalised. The problem of speaker's and hearer's vantage points looms large in the re-conceptualisation of implied meaning that appears to have taken place in literature over the past decades. The term *implicature* is Grice's neologism for implying, while *implicatum* stands for the meaning implied (Grice 1989b [1975]). As Grice (1989d [1969]: 86) proposes, "'Implicature' is a blanket word to avoid having to make choices between words like 'imply', 'suggest', 'indicate', and 'mean'". Although, in Grice's original parlance, "implicature" refers to the process of implicating leading to implicatum, it is the former that is used to denote the inference made in neo- and post-Gricean literature. This can be explained on the strength of Grice's idealistic vision of communication, i.e. that the hearer's

[2] Several authors (e.g. Davis 1998; Gauker 2001; Levinson 2000) maintain that meanings can be computed independently from deciphering the speaker's intentions.

inference should coincide with the speaker's (implied) meaning. The general pattern for computing a conversational implicature is based on the speaker's intentionally conveyed meanings which are to be appreciated by the hearer. From the hearer's perspective, the inferential pattern can be presented as follows:

> He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q. (Grice 1989b [1975]: 31)

The framework of communication based on the Cooperative Principle predicts that although it is the speaker that is responsible for the production of meanings, the hearer will be able to draw adequate inferences, as intended by the speaker, and to preserve the default assumption of rationality encompassed by the notion of cooperation (Davies 2000, 2007; Dynel 2009). Hence, the concept of implicature, even if originally proposed as the speaker's meaning (together with what is said), can be viewed from the hearer's perspective, encompassing inferences that he/she is capable of drawing in the light of mutually accepted speaker's intentionality and rationality.

The hearer's comprehension of the speaker's implied meaning depends on his/her understanding that what is said is not what the speaker means or solely what the speaker means (in the case when the speaker conveys what is said, with an implicature piggybacked on it). In other words, on the understanding that the CP obtains, the hearer assumes that the utterance is anchored in the speaker's intentional maxim flouts so that a meaning is rationally conveyed. As Levinson (2006b: 48) rightly observes, "the heart of the matter is intention attribution: given the observed behaviour, the interaction engine must be able to infer likely goals that would have motivated the behaviour."

3. Grice's model and the hearer

Although Grice does not explicate this, in his discussions in various lectures (Grice 1989a), he appears to be preoccupied with communication between two *participants* (Grice 1989a: 28-31, 45) in a conversation, which he also calls a *talk exchange* (Grice 1989a: 26-30, 40). The participants conflate the *speaker/utterer* (rarely also called *communicator* 1989a: 297, 351) and the listening party, whom Grice refers to by dint of various terms, viz. *recipient* (Grice 1989a: 93, 352), *addressee* (Grice 1989a: 268, 281), *hearer* (Grice 1989a: 27, 30, 31, 33-38, 60, 107, 111, 123, 361), *listener* (Grice 1989a: 103, 113), *auditor* (1989a: 113) or

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

audience (Grice 1989a: 29, 34, 36, 46, 92, 93, 99, 102, 103, 107, 112-115, 122-125, 129, 168, 219, 347, 348).

Given the diversified modes and channels of communication which Grice acknowledges, these words should be treated as theoretical terms, which are broader than the lexical items suggest when interpreted according to their dictionary definitions. For instance, Grice illustrates his postulate of maxim flouting which generates an implicature with an example of a written testimonial (Grice 1989b [1975]: 33). Also, Grice allows for meanings communicated by means of non-verbal stimuli, i.e. "'utterance' (my putting down the money)" (Grice 1989d [1969]: 94), arguing that "the normal vehicles of interpersonal communication are words, this is not exclusively the case; gestures, signs, and pictorial items sometimes occur" (Grice 1989h: 354). In the light of the above, it is assumed that the scope of the notions "utterer/speaker" and "hearer/listener/recipient/addressee/auditor/audience" should be extended to cover both spoken and written forms of communication, couched in verbal and non-verbal means.

Most importantly here, variegated as the terms quoted in the two paragraphs above are, Grice appears to conceptualise the hearer as a single individual to whom the speaker's utterance is addressed. Grice's view of communication, albeit possibly multi-modal, hardly appears to allow for a number of hearers, let alone diversified hearers, who assume different interactional positions and interpret the utterer's meaning in divergent ways. Nonetheless, at some point, Grice does acknowledge that the speaker's utterance may be heard by two individuals who do not enjoy the selfsame participant status in a conversation.

> Suppose that A and B are having a conversation in the presence of a third party, for example, a child, then A might be deliberately obscure, though not too obscure, in the hope that B would understand and the third party not. (Grice 1989b [1975]: 36)

It emerges, therefore, that Grice does take into account the case of concealing meanings from a hearer of whose presence the speaker and the hearer are aware. Such a hearer is meant not to glean any meanings, based on the interlocutors' dyadic interaction. Consequently, in each utterance, the speaker's implicature directed to the hearer is meant to be unavailable to the unratified hearer.

Additionally, Grice addresses the notion of "utterances by which the utterer could correctly be said to have meant something" (1989d [1969]: 113) while there is "no actual person or set of persons whom the utterer is addressing and in whom he intends to induce a response" (Grice 1989d [1969]: 113), dividing those into three groups. Firstly, there are utterances with potential, present or future, audience (including the utterer), such as a diary entry. The second category embraces cases when the utterer pretends to be addressing his/her words to an audience, such as a speech rehearsal. Thirdly, Grice distinguishes utterances, such as silent thinking,

which the speaker produces to "induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly indefinite kind of audience were it the case that such an audience was present" (1989d [1969]: 113). Simultaneously, Grice dissociates this situation from verbal thoughts passing through an individual's head, in which case the latter is more of a listener than a speaker.

Save the two situations presented above, however, Grice does not appear to acknowledge utterances by which the speaker intentionally communicates distinct meanings, whether based on what is said or on implicatures, to different hearer types. Therefore, the Gricean framework of communication appears to subscribe to the canonical dyadic model (Saussure 1974 [1916]; Shannon and Weaver 1949; Jakobson 1960). Nonetheless, human communication transcends the dyadic model, with various hearers partaking in a conversation, as already acknowledged in the literature.

4. Hearer typology

Several authors have observed the need to distinguish a number of participant (speaker and hearer) roles, proposing a few competitive proposals, which do share a number of similarities (Hymes 1972, 1974; Goffman 1981a [1976], 1981b [1979], 1981d; Bell 1984, 1991; Thomas 1986; Levinson 1988; Clark and Carlson 1982; Schober and Clark 1989; Clark and Schaefer 1987, 1992; Clark 1996; Verschueren 1999; Dynel 2010b).

Based on a critical overview of earlier taxonomies of hearers (Dynel 2010b), an independent classification is advanced here. The *participant* is any individual who partakes in a *turn* within a conversation, whether or not legitimately (in social or legal terms) and whether or not contributing to it verbally. Participant roles are constantly negotiated and shifted from one party to another, according to *turn-taking* procedures (e.g. Argyle 1969; Yngve 1970; Schegloff and Sacks 1973). Also, one role may be simultaneously performed by a number of individuals. On the other hand, a *nonparticipant* is someone absent or simply oblivious to a turn (or even a whole interaction taking place) or someone physically present but not able to hear it, or someone engrossed in a different activity, or for other reasons, not paying heed to the verbal (or non-verbal[3]) turn (cf. Dynel 2010b).

Participants are divided into *unratified participants* and *ratified participants*. The latter term is used synonymously with *interlocutors*, *conversationalists* or

[3] Sometimes a verbal turn may be substituted with a non-verbal signal.

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

interactants, who embrace the *speaker* and *ratified hearers/listeners*[4]. Ratified hearers/listeners further bifurcate into the *addressee* and another interactant, called the *third party*, who is a participant entitled to listen to the speaker and draw inferences, not being the primary party addressed, i.e. the addressee. The addressee is picked from among other hearers thanks to verbal and non-verbal cues, such as eye contact or the use of pronouns (cf. Dynel 2010b).

Unratified hearers, coinciding with *overhearers*, are defined as participants who listen to a turn without the speaker's and, prototypically, also ratified hearers' authorisation. A division into *bystanders* and *eavesdroppers* is contingent on the speaker's (lack of) awareness. A bystander is an overhearer of whose presence (or being in earshot, in general) the speaker is aware, in contrast to an eavesdropper, whose participation the speaker does not acknowledge. Sometimes the speaker's and the ratified hearers' attitudes to overhearers may be divergent, for not all ratified participants must unanimously authorise or be aware of/oblivious to overhearers. Nonetheless, it is assumed that it is the speaker's attitude that matters, since the way an utterance is formed and to whom it is directed is essentially the speaker's responsibility, while all hearers interpret it as they see fit. Frequently, ratified conversationalists' perspectives match. Should the addressee's (or the third party's) attitude to an overhearer not be compatible with the speaker's, this mismatch will show when the former assumes the position of a speaker and contributes his/her utterance.



Fig. 1. Participants in a single turn within an interaction

[4] The difference between the semantic (dictionary) meaning of "hear" and "listen" is immaterial to the two concepts, which are thus treated as being synonymous. What is important, in the model put forward here, to be classified as participants, hearers in particular, individuals must actually listen, rather than merely be able to hear.

A crucial development in the classification of the hearer types proposed here (cf. Dynel 2010b) is that a hearer who may initially be regarded as an overhearer but is intentionally communicated to should be conceptualised as a ratified hearer, namely the third party. This stands in stark contrast to what other authors (e.g. Goffman 1981a [1976]; Clark and Carlson 1982; Schober and Clark 1989; Clark and Schaefer 1992; Levinson 1988; Bell 1984, 1991) propose, perceiving such hearers as overhearers or bystanders. Indeed, in non-theoretic terms, a physical context (e.g. being in a different room) or social context (e.g. being a stranger in a train compartment) will, by default, grant a participant an unratified status in a conversation held by ratified conversationalists. A claim is here ventured, however, that such alleged overhearers can be ratified participants, usually third parties, as long as speakers not only are heedful of them, but also intend them to listen, which is what the latter actually do, whether or not taking the speaker's intention into account. A shiny example of such a case is a pep talk a mother gives to her son about his unsatisfactory results in mathematics, while her husband is sitting within earshot, not interfering with the dialogue and trying to keep a low profile. At some point, the mother says, "I'm very poor at maths but your dad is brilliant. He will help you". Thereby, the woman communicates her inefficiency and literally asserts that the boy's father will usher in help, possibly implicitly suggesting that her son ask his father for help. On the other hand, knowing that her husband can hear her and may actually be listening, she also implicitly ingratiates herself with him, requesting him to help their offspring. Not having officially participated in the interaction, the man is invited to assume the position of the third party. Nonetheless, since the woman does not indicate her communicative intention to anybody else but the addressee, the newly ratified third party may deny having heard or, at least, recognised the import of the utterance.

The speaker's intention to communicate meanings to, and (to an extent) be understood by, a given party is propounded as the primary criterion for the differentiation between ratified and unratified hearers (cf. Clark and Carlson 1982[5]; Schober and Clark 1989; Clark and Schaefer 1992). The speaker thus has every intention of communicating meanings to ratified hearers, while not displaying this intention to overhearers (Clark and Schaefer 1992). According to Clark and Schaefer (1992), the attitudes towards overhearers can be grouped into four categories: *indifference* (whereby speakers pay no heed to whether overhearers can grasp the meanings conveyed), *disclosure* (speakers design utterances with a view to being understood by overhearers), *concealment* (via which speakers overtly hinder overhearers' understanding, which the latter acknowledge), and

[5] Interestingly, despite propounding the intentionality criterion, Clark and co-researchers choose to view the listening party as an overhearer, towards whom speakers do not communicate meanings, which will be discussed in the next section.

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

disguisement (disclosure of a misrepresentation; speakers covertly prevent overhearers' comprehension, as a result of which the latter draw ill-advised inferences). Nonetheless, a postulate propounded here is that treating hearers as unratified ones, the speaker prototypically assumes the attitude of concealment or indifference (Clark and Schaefer 1992) to them, hiding meanings from them, or not caring whether they can generate any meanings. On the other hand, if the speaker chooses to relay a message to a hearer who may have initially been (and who actually may still consider him/herself) unratified, the attitudes of disclosure or disguisement come into play. Thereby, the speaker intentionally communicates chosen meanings to the hearer, authorising his/her participation in the role of the third party.

5. Hearer types and intention-based Gricean account of communication

Grice's original account of conversations anchored in the CP may be viewed as being based on the speaker – addressee dyad. The Gricean model needs to be developed to cover various hearer types partaking in multi-party conversational interactions and inferring meanings communicated by speakers. The primary types of hearers, who make inferences, will now be discussed and illustrated with examples of polylogues from Sam Mendes's film entitled "Revolutionary Road".

Two methodological provisos must now be made. Firstly, given the theoretical orientation of this paper, the qualitative analysis below is conducted with a view to exemplifying the workings of the participation model entwined with the Gricean framework of communication. A claim is ventured that the classification of the primary hearer categories proposed is exhaustive, while the list of particular interactional phenomena is open-ended. As future quantitative (corpus) studies may corroborate, one interaction (and a turn therein) can involve diversified numbers of hearers performing any of the main roles, who may infer multifarious meanings, literal or implied, whether or not intended to do so by the speaker.

Secondly, regardless of its twofold layering (Dynel 2010a), film discourse is considered to be reminiscent of everyday interactions (cf. Dynel forth).Conversing characters bear resemblance to conversationalists in real-life interactions, the most significant difference being that the former's interactions are, by nature, available to an outside hearer, i.e. the film viewer, and lend themselves to linguistic analysis (cf. Coupland 2004). This is the underlying goal of the film production crew who design film discourse for the audience's benefit. Based on all information provided on the screen, the viewer, notably viewer-researcher, can then conjecture (albeit not with full certainty) the import of characters' utterances and even their

underlying intentions. This is why film discourse appears to be methodologically useful.

5.1. Addressee and third party

With a minor modification, the Gricean dyadic model of conversation will easily embrace the position of a non-addressed but authorised hearer, i.e. the third party. Interestingly, as the example shows, meanings the speaker aims to relay to ratified hearers by dint of one utterance may be divergent. This fact also sheds new light on the notion of speaker meaning in the Gricean account, necessitating the introduction of yet another parameter, i.e. to whom from among ratified hearers an utterance is directed. In essence, whether an addressee or a third party, a ratified hearer will make inferences in accordance with Grice's original proposal.

(1) Having left their children with a babysitter, April and Frank (a married couple, the main protagonists) are enjoying a night out with their friends, Milly and Shep. At some point, Milly feels sick, which is why the four leave the pub. Shep supports Milly who is now falling down drunk. April walks alone a few paces behind... They reach Shep's car, which is trapped behind several other cars.
1. APRIL (looking at Frank): Look - why don't you take Milly home, then go home yourself and that would take care of both sitters. Then Shep can take me home later.
2. SHEP: All right with me.
3. FRANK: (to April) You'll be alright?
4. APRIL: Sure.

In the context of the verbal and non-verbal means April (1) uses, it can be gathered that she addresses her utterance to her husband and assumes Shep to be the third party. Her utterance contains a suggestion for Frank about the course of action he should take, as well as an assertion still addressed to her husband, which carries an implicit request towards the third party. Albeit not addressed, Shep appears to generate the implicature that April wants him to give her a lift and responds affirmatively, admittedly the addressees being both April and Frank. These two contributions are followed by Frank's response to both of them, yet addressed to April. He acknowledges the agreement reached by the other two interlocutors. Frank's question may be read as a what-is-said request for a confirmation if she is willing to stay (which April chooses to favour) or an implicature that he is concerned about her, which is a meaning the third party can also arrive at. Admittedly, the utterance may act as an implicit request to the third party, Shep, that he should take care of April. It should also be added that, given Milly's intoxication, the interlocutors appear to treat her as a verbally inactive

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

bystander and if she is honestly incapable of grasping any meanings, she may even be regarded as a non-participant.

5.2. Overhearer (bystander or eavesdropper)

While speakers typically intend to communicate meanings towards ratified listeners, they do not towards unratified hearers. What is more, overhearers are supposed not to understand speakers (Clark and Carlson 1982), who "are responsible for making themselves understood to the other participants but not to overhearers" (Schober and Clark 1989: 212). Therefore, as Schober and Clark (1989) rightly note, overhearers are at a disadvantage, for they normally fail to share the common ground between the speaker and the ratified hearer (Clark and Schaefer 1987). Therefore, the bystander's gleaning meanings is consequent upon the speaker's indifference or insufficient concealment. The bystander's inferential processes and their yield, therefore, transcend the Gricean account, in the sense that the meaning intentionally communicated to one hearer is simultaneously unintentionally communicated to another hearer. Although the bystander cannot hold the speaker accountable for what the latter has said, he/she may regard the emergent meanings as intentionally directed to the ratified hearer. On the other hand, meanings inferred by ratified and unratified hearers happen to be divergent. This may be because the initially unratified party cannot possibly grasp the same meaning as a ratified hearer can or because the speaker does not allow for the knowledge a bystander does have, being thus able to infer more. Essentially, the same will hold true for eavesdroppers, excepting that the speaker does not even know that there is an unratified hearer present. In conclusion, the speaker directs meanings neither to the eavesdropper nor to the bystander, not intending to communicate any meanings to them. On the other hand, either type of the unratified hearer does make inferences, perceiving the meanings conveyed as being based on an intentionally and rationally produced utterance, or reflexive attribution and accountability (cf. Arundale 2008).

(2) Frank has watched a play featuring his wife in the lead role, April, as one of the main protagonists. Frank applauds her loudly and looks around the auditorium only to hear a stranger behind him produce a comment about the theatrical performance and his wife.
A WOMAN TO HER HUSBAND: Thank God *that's* over... And *she* was very disappointing.

The woman produces an utterance conveying an implicature that the play was difficult to watch, and literally communicated the message that the actress was disappointing, thereby criticising both. Expressing her negative evaluation of the performance towards her addressee, the woman must be cognisant of bystanders, viz. other members of the audience, yet unabashedly failing to ascertain that they

will not hear her utterance. She thus assumes an attitude of indifference to all bystanders within earshot. On the other hand, she must not know that one of the hearers is the lead actress's husband, whom she appears to treat as any other bystander. Although she may not intend to offend any bystander or put him/her ill at ease, this is the effect her utterance appears to foster, beyond conveying her intentional meaning, at which the bystander also arrives. This example clearly indicates the insufficiency of the Gricean model to account for intended meanings unintentionally directed to unratified hearers, in this case also carrying unintended interpersonal meanings.

5.3. Third party (and not overhearer)

The most problematic is the case of an overhearer who is acknowledged by the speaker as a ratified participant. Although, as argued earlier, such a hearer will coincide with the third party, a provision must be made as regards the intentionality aspect, already discussed by Clark and Schaefer (1992). Albeit supportive of the speaker's intention as the central criterion for differentiating between ratified hearers and overhearers, the authors are adamant that

> Disclosing to an overhearer may look at first just like informing a side participant [here the third party], but it isn't (…) [When informing a side participant, the speaker] intends the listener to infer what he means by recognizing that very intention (Grice 1957, 1968) (…) [the speaker] leads a listener to think she is guaranteed to have everything she needs to understand him, he is treating her as a side participant. If he gives her any reason to doubt this guarantee, he is treating her as an overhearer. (Clark and Schaefer 1992: 265)

It is difficult to determine what "having reason to doubt the guarantee" of speaker-intended meaning actually indicates. It might mean that any hearer can question the speaker's contribution if it entails too much implicitness or is otherwise unavailable. Essentially, Clark and Schaefer's (1992) disclosure towards the overhearer is premised on the assumption that the latter is not well aware that the speaker does have every intention of communicating meanings to him/her. In other words, the Gricean reflexive utterer's meaning is not operative. This claim can be challenged on the grounds that whilst regular bystanders, let alone eavesdroppers, should presuppose that the speaker does not intend to communicate meanings to them, initially unratified participants may appreciate that meanings are intentionally communicated (also) to them, even if the speaker should fail to make it transparent for them. This suffices to protest that such hearers are then ratified, as long as there is the speaker's intention to communicate a meaning to a chosen

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

hearer. This conceptualisation does not embrace the philosophy-based reflexive aspect, which is doubt-provoking and empirically non-verifiable.

Actually, even Clark and Schaefer's (1992) examples of the alleged disclosing to overhearers appear to subvert the authors' non-intentionality claim, since utterances do display intent on the speaker's part. One of the examples is a man asking his wife if he could use her fork, making sure that his request was within the waitress's earshot, as he intended her "to hear him without recognizing that he had intended her to hear him" (Clark and Schaeffer 1992: 270) on politeness-related grounds. Similarly, having conversed with a son in German, a woman queuing to be served at a post office suddenly exclaimed in English, and thus notified the clerk, that she did not have her wallet. Both of these examples testify to the fact that speakers actually intend to be heard and understood not only by addresses but also by the alleged bystanders.

In essence, the speaker need not make his/her communicative intention overt to the hearer, which is why the latter may remain oblivious to the fact that the speaker intends to communicate meanings to him/her, and yet will make inferences, based on what he/she listens to. On the other hand, even if the speaker's intention is not overt, the hearer may rightly infer that he/she is meant to glean some meanings. Moreover, the hearer may even nurture a belief that the speaker is not aware of his/her presence, finding him/herself an eavesdropper, while the speaker appreciates the presence of such a participant and wants him/her to glean meanings. Neither of these cases subscribes to the reflexivity tenet central to Grice's notion of the utterer's meaning.

(3) The family are intent on leaving for Paris, to let Frank resign from the position he loathes and fulfil his dreams, while April takes up a post, assuming the role of the breadwinner in the family. April, Frank and their two children (Jennifer and Mike) are in the living room. Frank is frowning into his French phrase book. Mike is watching TV. April is sewing. Jennifer is standing beside her, holding a stuffed giraffe and a list of toys to take for the journey.
1. JENNIFER: I'm going to take my doll carriage and my bear and my three Easter rabbits and my giraffe and all my dolls and my doll house.
2. APRIL: I thought maybe we'd give the doll house to Madeline.
3. JENNIFER: No! I don't want to give it to Madeline.
4. APRIL (she has to stop to re-thread and she's transparently losing patience, which also shows in her raised voice): I already *explained* to you, the big things are going to be hard to pack.
5. FRANK lowers the book. He has a pensive look.
6. JENNIFER: But Madeline can have my bear and my Easter rabbits…
7. APRIL: *No!* Just the big things. Look. Wouldn't you rather go outside and play with Michael.
8. JENNIFER: I don't feel like it.
9. APRIL: You've been inside all day.

10. JENNIFER: I don't *feel* like it!
11. APRIL (shouting): Well, I don't feel like explaining everything fifteen times to somebody who's too bored and silly to listen!
Jennifer runs up the stairs.
12. FRANK: What's the matter?
13. APRIL (angrily): Nothing.
14. FRANK: I don't believe you. Did something happen today or what?
15. APRIL: Nothing happened today that I haven't known about for days and days.
16. FRANK: What?
17. APRIL: Oh God, Frank, please don't look so dense. Do you mean you haven't guessed or anything?
18. FRANK: What are you talking about?
19. APRIL: I'm *pregnant*, that's all.

Holding the dyadic conversation with her daughter (1-4, 6-11), who displays puerile naïvety and obstinacy typical of a child at her age a mother should be used to, April loses her patience very easily. Her indignation and temper, which she does not even attempt to conceal, show both in her verbalisations and non-verbal communication (primarily her failure to thread a needle and her raised voice). Her annoyance is hardly commensurate with the evoking stimulus, for it manifests itself after only one refusal on the daughter's part (3) to obey her implicature-based suggestion (2). Surprisingly, April shows resentment (7) even when the child decides to give up a few of her toys in a benevolent gesture (6). Upon Jennifer's refusal to play outside (8, 10), April vents her anger even more vehemently by echoing the childish utterance her daughter has produced and by abusing her verbally.

It is here averred that Frank is not merely a bystander to the mother – daughter interaction. On the strength of the forthcoming part of the exchange, it may be gathered that his wife has earlier granted him the status of the third party. Albeit swayed by emotions, April appears to be intentionally directing to him an implicit message in each utterance she produces. Her underlying, covert intention is that he should recognise the message that she has a vexing problem, which is why she is cantankerous. On the other hand, she does not necessarily mean him to appreciate her intention to communicate this piece of information, as if it only happened to seep through. The third party duly makes inferences as the speaker wishes him to and appreciates that her irritability, indicative of her anxiety and apprehension, is provoked not by their daughter's persistence but a different problem. Having registered the importance of April's implicature piggybacked on the utterances directed to the addressee, Frank signals non-verbally his interest in the interaction (5), whereby he marks his acceptance of the ratified hearer status. Consequently, once the mother – daughter interaction terminates, Frank assumes the position of the speaker and engages in a dialogue with her, directly asking her a question (12).

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6.2 (2010): 283-304
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-010-0014-x

Initially, April is taciturn and produces a response (13) which can be interpreted as a lie which is meant to be discovered. Therefore, this is not a violation of Quality maxims, but a flout of maxims, promoting an implicature that something is the matter. In the light of the subsequent exchange, it emerges that April has indeed wanted Frank, in the third party role, to glean the rationale/implicature of her utterances saturated with anger and addressed to their daughter and to enquire about the worry she had been racked with for the past few days. The emergent revelation (19) sheds new light on April's preceding interaction with Jennifer, the underlying reason being that April's pregnancy puts paid to the family's travel plans.

6. Conclusions

The article argued in favour of the necessity of extending the Gricean model of communication to cover polylogues. When more hearers participate in an interaction, the role of the addressee, which is central to the Gricean account of conversation, does not suffice. Therefore, a few hearer categories were introduced, viz. the addressee, the third party and unratified hearers/overhearers, dichotomised into the bystander and the eavesdropper. Additionally, it was posited that the speaker may grant an initially illegitimate listener the status of a ratified hearer, irrespective of whether the latter appreciates this fact or holds a belief of his/her unratified participation status. This extension carries significant consequences.

Firstly, since one utterance happens to be simultaneously interpreted by a number of hearers, different inferences may be made from distinct vantage points at the level of what is said and/or implicatures. There may be only partial overlap between meanings communicated to, and inferred by, different hearer types. Moreover, the meanings those arrive at may be entirely independent.

Secondly, the Gricean model is in need of extension as regards intentionality, even if attention is paid only to speaker intended meanings directed to (at least) one hearer, with purely unintentional messages being marginalised, as stipulated by Grice. When the speaker intends to communicate meanings to more than one ratified hearer (the addressee and the third party), his/her intentions are twofold if the meanings diverge. On the other hand, purposefully conversing with a ratified hearer, the speaker has no intention of communicating meanings to overhearers, whether they are bystanders or eavesdroppers. Moreover, the speaker does not even take cognisance of the latter. The speaker does not bear any conversational responsibilities to overhearers and does not wish them to glean any meanings. However, listening to an utterance and making inferences (whether or not apt), an unratified hearer holds the speaker accountable for the messages relayed, the speaker's (lack of) intention notwithstanding. To reformulate, the overhearer

knows that he/she is not intended to derive meanings from the speaker's utterance but appreciates that the speaker has produced it intentionally, with a view to communicating meanings to the ratified hearer(s). The issue of the speaker's intention is the most complex in the case of the third party ratified by the speaker from the initial position of an overhearer. Having recognised the presence of a bystander, the speaker intends the latter to glean meanings, albeit not overtly letting this intention be known to the party concerned.

These developments upon the Gricean dyadic account appear to be the prerequisite for applying the theoretical model of communication in analyses of polylogues. The paper thus adduces evidence that although the Gricean philosophy has been known and discussed for a few decades, we may still find ourselves on the revolutionary road.

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About the Author

Marta Dynel, Ph.D., is an assistant professor (adiunkt) in the Department of Pragmatics at the University of Łódź, where she completed her doctoral thesis (2006) devoted to the pragmatics of conversational humour. Her research interests are primarily in pragmatic, cognitive and sociolinguistic mechanisms of humour, im(politeness), neo-Gricean pragmatics, participation format, as well as media studies, notably the methodology of research on film discourse. She has published internationally in linguistic journals and volumes, contributing nearly 30 articles in the space of the past five years. She also published a book on the workings of humorous one-liners and witticisms, *Humorous Garden-Paths: A Pragmatic-Cognitive Study* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, 2009).