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“AND I QUOTE”: DIRECT AND INDIRECT POINT-OF-VIEW SWITCHES IN CLUSIVITY-ORIENTED DISCOURSE

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to approach the notion of speech/thought representation (cf. Vandelanotte 2004) from a pragma-cognitive perspective. The use of direct and indirect representation in political discourse allows the speaker to construe the speech situation from a perspective other than her/his own. The speaker normally occupies the focal position in relation to other discourse entities in a particular speech situation, and thus presents discourse events from her/his point of view, however, on some occasions she/he allows other “voices.” It is the distinction between the Speaker and the Sayer that provides means of capturing the phenomenon in question: the Speaker construes the actual/present speech situation presenting events from her/his own perspective, while in the represented speech situation the Speaker represents the words of the Sayer, i.e. the original speaker of the represented speech situation. Assuming the existence of the Sayer’s consciousness separate from the Speaker’s consciousness, it is clear that the Sayer’s perspective is independent of the Speaker’s perspective. The Speaker may employ a series of shifts occurring in spatio-temporal and axiological dimensions of the actual speech situation leading either to a full switch or to an apparent switch to the Sayer’s perspective. In both cases, the distance between the Speaker and a particular discourse entity may be reduced or increased to indicate its inclusionary or exclusionary status, as well as to include the entity in or exclude it from the “us” group. The data analysed and samples used for illustrative purposes have been selected from a corpus of 35 speeches delivered by Barack Obama between 10th February 2007, i.e. the announcement of his candidacy for the presidency of the USA, and 4th November 2008, i.e. the day of the election. The transcripts of the speeches have been downloaded from the official Obama’s website “Organizing for America” (available at <http://www.barackobama.com/speeches/index.php>).

Keywords

Clusivity, perspective, point-of-view operations, speech/thought representation.

1. Political discourse and conceptualisation of clusivity

One of the most fundamental human needs is the need to belong, therefore, naturally, people see themselves as belonging to (a) particular group(s) they would refer to as “us.” Inclusion and exclusion in political discourse involves and is expressed by means of such strategies as ideological polarisation, positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, emphasizing power of the self, discrediting the other, legitimising the self, delegitimising the other, etc. (cf. van Dijk 2005). Therefore, discursive construal of events through a particular perspective will constitute a salient factor for the interpretation and conceptualisation of belongingness. Lakoff and Johnson assume that “we conceive of ourselves as being here rather than there, [...] now rather than then” (1980: 132), and by extension, as belonging to “us” rather than “them.” It is no surprise, then, that in discursive representation of reality the speaker and the addressees impose “artificial boundaries” that mirror the way in which both physical and abstract notions are bounded by their “surface”:

Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces, [as] there are few human instincts more basic than territoriality. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 29)

However, the projection of the in-out orientation does not concern solely physical objects, but also abstract notions, such as values and beliefs. These seem to form the basis for categorisation into the polar oppositions of “us” vs. “them.” These notions, especially groups composed of various discourse entities (elements), thus possess elements of inclusionary and exclusionary status.

The distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary reference is the major concern of clusivity in its broad understanding. In a vast majority of clusivity-oriented papers, however, the notion in question is defined rather narrowly, e.g. as the distinction between the inclusionary and exclusionary properties of personal pronouns (see e.g. Cysouw 2005a,b,c; Simon 2005), as well as of deictic expressions (see e.g. Adetunji 2006). In the present paper, however, I shall largely concentrate on what has been neglected so far, i.e. clusivity exemplified in the use of indexical markers in political discourse and analyse the concept from a pragmatic perspective. Thus, the notion in question will be treated as constituting a general term for various linguistic devices expressing inclusionary and exclusionary statuses of discourse elements involved in the events (re)presented by the speaker.

If clusivity should be treated as a term to account for linguistic forms which express inclusion and exclusion of chosen discourse elements, each of these

elements has to be assumed to occupy a particular position in relation to the speaker. As far as the cognitive facet of clusivity is concerned, clusivity rests on conceptualisation schemata of both a container and a path. Entities in a particular discourse situation are cognitively located inside and outside the “us” category. Simultaneously, however, they may be manoeuvred inwards and outwards. The representation of reality as construed by the speaker is thus largely concerned with the storage of mental frames in which different actors and notions are distributed differently in relation to the speaker’s perspective.

To discuss cognitive mechanisms behind clusivity in greater detail, it is necessary to define the deictic centre as an underlying notion and a framework for conceptualisation of political discourse, which is largely dependent on the conceptual schemata of in-out orientation. Before I proceed any further, I shall introduce a key term to understanding the way clusivity is conceptualised in political discourse, i.e. the notion of deictic centre (DC), and the way it is approached in the present study. Assuming DC is the anchor point for conceptualisation of the speaker’s incoming messages (cf. Chilton 2004; Cap 2006), it is the speaker’s deictic centre that constitutes the anchor point for conceptualisation of any discourse situation. Naturally, the speaker who occupies the focal position constitutes the reference point according to which other entities are located on the three axes stemming from the deictic centre, i.e. spatial, temporal, and axiological (see Cap’s (2006) STA model and Chilton’s (2004) Discourse Space Theory). According to the STA model developed by Cap (2006), various discourse elements are conceptually distributed on these axes according to their spatiotemporal and socio-ideological “value,” which depends to a great extent on the speaker. The distribution on the spatial axis relates to the construed physical or geopolitical location of various entities, on the temporal axis to their construed historical location, and on the axiological axis to their construed values and dominant ideology or values and ideology they represent.

The spatiotemporal and ideological location of particular actors and notions in relation to the deictic centre is usually presented relative to the speaker. This results naturally from “the inherent asymmetry between the speaker and the addressee” (Cysouw 2005c: 13). The asymmetry is expressed directly by the speaker’s control over the speech situation as opposed to virtual lack of such control on the part of the addressees. Thus, the speaker frequently presents the events from her/his point of view and so she/he is unlikely to locate her/himself outside the deictic centre and thus classify her/himself as an out-group entity, which affects the way the addressees conceptualise incoming messages. The speaker is capable of creating a representation of the self (e.g. as a trustworthy and powerful leader), as well as of the remaining actors placing them either inside or outside the deictic centre in particular spatial, historical and socio-ideological circumstances. Political actors may thus assume, or more precisely, they may be

ascribed different roles in discursive representations of reality: of partners (with in-group reference and “us” status), adversaries (with out-group reference and “them” status), as well as potential partners and potential adversaries (referred to both inclusively and exclusively at different stages of the development of a particular discourse situation).

2. Point-of-view operations

As has been previously stated, the speaker occupies the focal position in DC and events are thus presented from her/his perspective. Therefore the pronoun “I” would normally designate the Speaker, “now” would designate the time of the utterance, and “here” would designate the location of the Speaker (frequently, along with the addressees). On some occasions, however, the speaker may report other “voices,” i.e. present discourse events from a different perspective than her/his own. These “point-of-view operations” involve presenting chosen actors as central figures, from whose point-of-view all events are now construed. Such a switch may be aimed at reducing or increasing the distance between the actual Speaker and the actors whose point-of-view is “made use of,” as well as at including them if previously they had an out-group status or excluding them if previously they had an in-group status.

Linguistic means which anchor an utterance in particular context (e.g. through assigning roles to participants of a speech event presented in discourse, as well as presenting the spatiotemporal, but most of all, axiological location of the participants and relevant ideological concepts) constitute salient devices for categorising discourse elements as having either in-group or out-group status. According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 118-1), deictic markers, almost exclusively, decide on the status and localisation of discourse elements in a particular representation of reality construed by the speaker. This paper, however, will aim at including all indexicals into the category of markers of inclusion and exclusion in discourse.

As has been already said, the pronoun “I” normally designates the Speaker, “now” designates the time of the utterance, and “here” designates the place the Speaker (frequently along with the addressees) is located in. On some occasions, however, the speaker may employ point-of-view operations presenting chosen actors as central figures, from whose point-of-view all events are construed. Such a switch may be aimed at reducing or increasing the distance between the actual Speaker and the actors whose point-of-view is “used,” as well as at including them if previously they had an out-group status and excluding them if previously they had an in-group status.

A (series of) shift(s) may take place along spatial, temporal, as well as axiological axes and come into being in the process of inferring spatial, temporal and axiological relations. A switch in the actors' physical/geopolitical location takes place along the spatial axis (e.g. from "here" to "there"). By the same token, a switch in their historical location takes place along the temporal axis from the present to the past or future, but possibly also from the future to the present or from the past to the present, e.g.:

- [1] There's a young, 23-year-old woman, a white woman named Ashley Baia, who organized for our campaign in Florence, South Carolina. [...] And Ashley said that when she was 9 years old, her mother got cancer. And because she had to miss days of work, she was let go and lost her health care. [...] (a) She knew that food was one of their most expensive costs, and so Ashley convinced her mother that what she really liked and really wanted to eat more than anything else was mustard and relish sandwiches – because that was the cheapest way to eat. That's the mind of a 9 year old. (b) She did this for a year until her mom got better. And so Ashley told everyone at the roundtable that the reason she had joined our campaign was so that she could help the millions of other children in the country **who want and need to help their parents too.** [...] (c) Anyway, Ashley finishes her story and then goes around the room and asks everyone else why they're supporting the campaign. They all have different stories and different reasons. Many bring up a specific issue. And finally they come to this elderly black man who's been sitting there quietly the entire time. And Ashley asks him why he's there. And he doesn't bring up a specific issue. He does not say health care or the economy. He does not say education or the war. He does not say that he was there because of Barack Obama. He simply says to everyone in the room, "I am here because of Ashley." "I'm here because of Ashley." (18.03.2008)

For the sake of convenience, the excerpt above is divided into three sections, of which the section (a) will be discussed as the last one. Sections (b) and (c) constitute purely descriptive accounts of a past event. However, toward the end of (b) a temporal shift from the past to the present occurs. In case of normal reported speech, the Speaker would say *And so Ashley told everyone [...] that she could help the millions of children in the country who want[ed] and need[ed] to help their parents*, however, through the tense switch, the clause in bold may be treated as implicitly referring to the present situation alike. In section (c), a general tense shift occurs from the past to the present, thus shifting the speech situation along the temporal axis. There is yet another shift, i.e. along the spatial axis, as the adverbial of place *there* is tied to the point of view of the Speaker "here" and "now" (*And Ashley asks him why he's there, He does not say that he was there because of Barack Obama*). Yet as the events are anchored to the original Speaker, i.e. no axiological shift occurs, the time (not tense) referred to is essentially past. Thus, in this case, a spatiotemporal shift occurs, which allows the original Speaker to

“show” past events from his, present point of view, yet cognitively reducing spatial and temporal distance between other in-group members and Ashley, who was absent at the time the speech was delivered. Section (a), however, constitutes quite a unique instance of an apparent axiological shift, as there is no additional deictic centre. Although the representation is tied to the Speaker’s deictic centre, the following entailment specifies the person who held the beliefs reported: *That’s the mind of a 9 year old*.

The following excerpt, addressing the controversy around Obama’s connections with Reverend Wright, will provide some insight into cases in which an apparent axiological shift from the Speaker to an out-group member occurs (cf. Wieczorek 2009):

- [2] [S]o many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of Reverend Wright’s sermons [...] But the anger is real; it is powerful. [...] For the men and women of Reverend Wright’s generation, the memories of humiliation and doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and the bitterness of those years. That anger may not get expressed in public, in front of white co-workers or white friends. But it does find voice in the barbershop or around the kitchen table. At times, that anger is exploited by politicians, to gin up votes along racial lines, or to make up for a politician’s own failings. (18.03.2008)

First, two parties in the affair are indicated, i.e. “many people,” whose identities are implicit/hidden, yet may designate (some of) the addressees, and Reverend Wright. The Speaker locates them on the axiological axis inside and outside the deictic centre, respectively. A point-of-view shift along the axiological axis, presenting events from the Reverend’s point of view, serves as a means of legitimising Wright’s stance. Thus, the Speaker reduces the distance between Wright (still an outside entity, though) and in-group members, which facilitates legitimisation of his actions later in the speech. Again, the shift is apparent, which means there is no separate anchorage for the conceptualisation of this particular speech event. Other shifts occur on the implicit level alike: an apparent shift along the temporal, and spatial axes, as the Speaker refers implicitly to atrocities committed against Afro-Americans, which took place in America of the past and affected the entire generation of people, who probably share the Reverend’s views. The following figure provides a graphic illustration of a model of conceptual structure of the apparent point-of-view shift which diminishes the distance between the elements of the deictic centre and Reverend Wright:




Figure 1: A graphic representation of the notion of point-of-view shifts in the excerpt [2].

The speaker thus reduces the distance between Wright and the deictic centre. The Reverend is still located outside the deictic centre, however, by the borderline, which may not be sufficient a means to provide Wright with “us” status, yet surely constitutes a foundation for further legitimising strategies. Thus, employing point-of-view operations the speaker allows other “voices,” often (but not exclusively) accepting the entities as “us” or rejecting the entities as belonging to the opposing party, i.e. “them.”

2.1. The Speaker and the Sayer

Point-of-view operations involve presenting another political actor, not the Speaker her/himself, as the central figure in a particular speech situation, from whose perspective all events are construed. In case of all types of point-of-view-operations, it is crucial to distinguish between the actual (present) speech situation, in which the Speaker speaks from her/his perspective and the represented speech situation, in which the Speaker represents the words of the Sayer, i.e. the original speaker of the represented speech situation. Following Vandelanotte:

the speaker associated with the actual speech situation [is] simply the Speaker; and the ‘consciousness’ being represented in the represented speech situation [is] the Sayer/Cognizant. (2004: 490)

Assuming the very existence of the Sayer’s consciousness and the Speaker’s consciousness, it is clear that the Sayer’s DC is independent of the Speaker’s DC. Shifts in the location of various discourse entities occur in the process of inferring spatial, temporal and axiological relations. Thus, a switch in the actors’ physical/geopolitical location occurs along the spatial axis (e.g. from “here” to “there”), a switch in their historical location along the temporal axis (e.g. from the present to the past or future), a switch in social/ideological location along the axiological axis (e.g. from “us” to “them”).

The axiological dimension of a speech situation is probably the most salient for clusivity-oriented studies of point-of-view operations. Any axiological switch from the Speaker’s to the Sayer’s perspective, resulting in a construal of a new DC independent of the Speaker’s DC, is a full axiological shift. On the other hand, an apparent axiological shift involves only the Speaker’s DC and occurs on the implicit level in a message comprehension process.

2.2. STR revisited

All point-of-view operations, involving a full or an apparent axiological shift, have the potential to reduce/increase the distance between the Speaker and a particular actor to: indicate the actor’s inclusionary status, indicate the actor’s exclusionary status, include the actor, as well as exclude the actor. One salient subtype of point-of-view operations that enables a full (but not apparent) shift along the axes of DC has been so far discussed under the name of speech/thought representation (STR) (see Vandelanotte 2003, 2004, 2007) or, more commonly, reported speech (e.g. Bednarek 2006; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Groom 2000; Martin and White 2005). What Halliday (1994) called *projection*, concerns distinguishing a particular represented situation belonging to another part of reality from the reality of linguistic entities in a given discourse situation. Vandelanotte claims that the Sayer, having her/his own DC independent of the Speaker’s DC, is a deictic notion (2005: 62), or more aptly an indexical marker. As such, the Sayer, and the Speaker alike, may be located in a particular speech situation by means of a set of three coordinates: spatial (“here” coordinate as opposed to “there” coordinate), temporal (“now” coordinate as opposed to “then” coordinate) and axiological (“I/we” coordinate as opposed to “they” coordinate).

Due to the constraints of the present paper, apparent-axiological-shift cases have been excluded from this study. I shall therefore focus exclusively on the

instances involving a full axiological shift and discuss them on the basis of STR theory proposed by Vandelanotte (2004). As has been said before, I define the notion of STR itself as a subtype of point-of-view operations that enables a full shift along the axes emanating from DC. STR consists of two fully separate categories: Direct Speech/Thought (DST), as well as Indirect Speech/Thought (IST). Vandelanotte suggests two non-canonical categories, which I consider to be subcategories of IST, namely Free Indirect Speech/Thought (FIST) and Distancing Indirect Speech/Thought (DIST), which, however, exceed the focus of the present paper. For purely illustrative purposes, the categories of DST and IST will be presented and discussed on the basis of excerpts selected from a corpus of 35 Barack Obama's pre-election speeches. The Obama Clusivity Corpus (OCC) consists of speeches delivered between 10th February 2007, the day his candidacy was officially announced and 4th November 2008, the day of the election.

2.2.1. DST and IST

Direct and indirect speech/thought are two basic and most widely discussed categories of what has been referred to as either "reported speech" or "speech/thought representation" (Vandelanotte 2003, 2004, 2007). In DST the Speaker

dramatically yields the floor to the Sayer/Cognizant [, i.e.] the vantage point is shifted from the Speaker to the Sayer/Cognizant, resulting in two separate and fully operational deictic centres. (Vandelanotte 2004: 491)

Thus, when Barack Obama says the following:

[3] His [McCain's] campaign actually said, and I quote, "if we keep talking about the economy, we're going to lose." (8.10.2008)

he is the actual Speaker, who distances himself from his opponents, while the presupposed "they" are the Sayers. In the example above, the clause "His campaign actually said, and I quote" is the reporting clause construing the actual speech situation where the spatial, temporal and axiological axes are tied to the Speaker, while the clause "if we keep talking about the economy, we're going to lose" is the reported clause construing the represented speech situation where the axes are tied to the Sayer. Quoted utterances, thus, cannot be attributed to the Speaker, since the conceptualisation of the actual speech situation ties the reported speech situation to the Sayer, whose referent is presupposed. In other words, the Speaker's actual DC is shifted to the Sayer's represented DC.

According to McGregor (1997), the very term “represented speech” stresses the Speaker’s active role in reconstructing particular utterances. In such a case, then, we need to account for the possibility of imposing interpretations. The following illustration would constitute a graphic representation of a DST speech event based on Vandelanotte’s view of DST, in which the Speaker’s and the Sayer’s DCs are fully separate.




Figure 2: A graphic representation of DST based on Vandelanotte’s (2004) approach to DST.

The Speaker and the Sayer, however, are normally located on the same axiological axis, irrespective of their being ideologically close or distant entities. In DST the two DCs mentioned above are by no means separate, however, they constitute largely independent constructs. In DST, the Sayer’s perspective obviously dominates over the Speaker’s DC, as events are presented relative to the Sayer’s DC.




Figure 3: A graphic representation of DST involving a full axiological shift.

The full axiological shift from the Speaker to the Sayer occurs along the axiological axis, and, simultaneously, two other shifts may potentially occur along the spatial and temporal axes.

In IST, on the other hand, the Speaker's perspective is imposed on the Sayer's utterance: "the vantage point remains that of the Speaker throughout and all deictic categories are normally related to the Speaker's deictic centre" (Vandelanotte 2004: 491). This is not to say, though, that there is no DC tied to the Sayer. Vandelanotte (2003, 2004) claims that it is evident, e.g., in tense interpretation. Let us, then, consider the following example of IST from the Obama clusivity corpus:

[4] What he forgets is that just a few years ago, he himself said those Bush tax cuts were irresponsible. (23.10.2008)

The present in past "were" constitutes the Sayer's present and it is plotted according to the time in the Sayer's utterance, time which is equivalent to the Speaker's past and the Sayer's present. In the very same fashion, the determiner "those" is tied to the Speaker and refers back to the Sayer's DC to facilitate interpretation.

Interestingly enough, Vandelanotte (2003, 2004) argues that DST involves a shift from the Speaker to the Sayer, while IST has no such a shift, since any subsequent change in pronouns is often erroneously assumed to be equivalent to a deictic shift. The claim, however, seems to have been based on a rather simplified assumption that pronouns, and perhaps other indexicals, determine whether a shift occurs or not. In fact, in both DST and IST a shift occurs mainly in the axiological,

but also in the spatial and temporal dimensions of the speech situation. Such a shift is regulated by the extent to which the Speaker imposes her/his perspective on the utterance reported; in DST the Speaker’s imposition is lesser, while in IST the imposition is variable, yet far greater than in case of DST, in which case the Speaker may manipulate the context, yet not the utterance represented.

Therefore, in IST the shift occurs along the axiological axis from the Sayer to the Speaker, whose perspective dominates the representation of the original speech or thought. Graphically, the speech situation may be presented as follows:




Figure 4: A graphic representation of IST.

The shift is normally affected by a varying extent to which the Speaker imposes her/his perspective on the utterance reported.

In some instances of IST, but also DST, the interpretation may be largely imposed by the projection of the Speaker’s perspective. This concerns especially “hypothetical, fictive, counterfactual and ‘non-verbal’ representations” (Vandelanotte 2004: 493). It is, however, the reporting clause that gives STR the hypothetical character. Fludernik (1993 in Vandelanotte 2004: 493) claims that such practices create an illusion of somebody else’s utterance on the basis of typification. The following excerpt from OCC exemplifies the practice in question:

- [5] Despite what our opponents may claim, there are no real or fake parts of this country. (30.10.2008)

- [6] What we can say is that we are ready for something new and something bold and something principled. (12.09.2007)

2.3. The reporting clause

It is the reporting clause in both DST and IST that is tied exclusively to the Speaker's DC. The basic assumption taken is that it is not the reporting verb that interacts with the reported clause, but rather the entire reporting clause. Thus, the reporting clause "leaves its mark on [the reported clause] indicating how the latter is to be taken interpersonally" (Vandelanotte 2007: 2).

Vandelanotte (2007) has shown that the reported clause is not simply a complement or the object of the reporting verb, as in case of e.g. *What he said was "It's going to rain soon."* Contrary to complementisers, reporting clauses, like direct quotes in DST or clauses in IST, occur in a number of positions in the reported clause (cf. Vandelanotte 2007). Moreover, the reporting clause constitutes "a reportative frame," which assigns to the reported clause "a special semiotic status" (Vandelanotte 2007: 8). To illustrate the statement above, let us consider the following instance of IST:

- [7] People tell me I haven't spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington. (02.05.2007)

The reporting clause (*that*) *I haven't spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington* constitutes the content of the speech act *people tell me*. Thus, the former exists on the basis of the latter having been said. According to Vandelanotte (2007: 8-9), there would also be reported clauses which do not give the content of the speech act expressed by the reporting clause, but rather state pre-existing propositions. Following his account, the existence of what the reported clause says is independent of the reporting clause, e.g. in

- [8] He regretted that the freelance photographer involved in this case was not aware of these new provisions. (Vandelanotte 2007: 8)

Here, the reported clause does not provide the content of *He regretted*, but rather specifies "the 'occasion' for his 'regretting'" (Vandelanotte 2007: 8). Thus, in case of the reported clause representing the content of the speech or thought act expressed in the reporting clause, the actual speech situation and the reported speech situation are construed as two independent "spaces," while in case of pre-existing propositions there is no represented speech situation, as only the actual speech situation and "the pre-existing proposition interacted by the speaker" occur (Vandelanotte 2007: 10). Moreover, within the category of IST, there are instances

of non-agentive IST, whose reporting clauses do not reveal the agent-utterer explicitly, but rather point at the causer(s), e.g.:

- [9] [...] indifference that says some schools can't be fixed and some kids just can't learn [...]. (02.05.2007)

Such non-agentive IST does not provide the content of *indifference that says*, but it specifies the “circumstances” or the “situation” observed by the Speaker.

As has been said before, the reporting and the reported clauses interact, as the former specifies how the latter is to be interpreted. One of the roles the reporting clause plays is to subjectivise the reported clause and to indicate “the feature of modal performativity” (Vandelanotte 2007: 10). The speaker’s commitment to the truth value of the reported speech or thought is best exemplified by the first person present tense reporting clauses, as well as the second person in questions (cf. Vandelanotte 2007: 10), such as the following instances taken from OCC:

- [10] But I also know that I can't do it without you. (19.06.2007)

- [11] But you and I know that the struggle we share goes far beyond immigration. (22.07.2007)

- [12] We know we need a new direction. And that change begins with an end to the Bush-Cheney Administration. (03.09.2007)

The reporting verb “to know” seems to possess the highest level of certainty assigned to the reported clause by the Speaker. All the instances given above, apart from stating the Speaker’s level of conviction, also refer to the addressees’ presupposed certainty about the reported proposition. STR strategies rely heavily on the common ground claim the Speaker uses to impose or instil in the addressees the aura of inclusion as regards common purposes, attitudes, ideology, etc. In the corpus used, *I know*, communicating the Speaker/Sayer own conviction about the state of affairs in the country, was most prominent a few weeks before the primaries and continued surging in January 2008 (the beginning of the primary elections), and was going steadily up until June 2008, when Hillary Clinton lost to Obama and conceded her defeat. The OCC instances of the reporting clause in question are employed by the Speaker to refer to such topics as Bush’s unpopularity, Iraq, the economy crisis and health care policy, among others. A similar surge repeated toward the end of the presidential election, with the highest frequency from September to November 2008. Apart from these moments the reporting clause in question hardly ever occurred in STR.

At the very beginning of the primaries, another reporting clause increases in frequency, i.e. *we know*, which differs to some extent only from the previous one.

With this reporting clause, the Speaker communicates the stance he represents as being shared with the addressees, by which means he increases the modal strength of the represented speech or thought. Thus, the frequency of this reporting clause coincides with the beginning of the primaries, i.e. between January and March 2008, and the ending of the presidential election, i.e. from August 2008 on till 4th November 2008, slightly decreasing in frequency in September 2008.

Interestingly enough, shortly after the official announcement of Obama's candidacy, as well as in September 2007, when Obama's campaign suffers a major setback, the Speaker avoids voicing his stance via reporting clauses indicating him as the Sayer/Cogniser. With *you know* the Speaker is well able to instil in the addressees a conviction that the original speech or thought he reports as the Speaker belongs to the addressees as Sayers. Thus, STR seems to illustrate the objective reality experienced by the members of the audience, rather than the candidate's personal observation. Thus, another period of slightly increased frequency of the reporting clause in question occurs at the beginning and at the end of the primaries.

The reporting verb "to think" is lower on the scale of certainty, however, it has the potential to deal not only with reporting thoughts as in the previous case, but with reporting speech as well (though, there are no such first or second person instances in OCC). Let us consider the following excerpt:

- [13] But then I came to realize that to this bunch, only the years you spend in Washington count. Only time in Washington translates into wisdom. I think they are wrong about that. (03.09.2007)

The very nature of *I think* as a speech act leaves room for potential disagreement, but also partially removes responsibility for the claims from the Speaker/Sayer. The clause occurs most frequently toward the end of the presidential campaign, between September and November 2008 and is used to address primarily the issues concerning Obama's objectives for the future (in clauses like *I think it's time...*), as well as to criticise the Republican opposition in a way that would not discourage potential Republican voters.

With second person reporting clauses, as well as third person reporting clauses, the reported clauses do not get subjectivised and the modal performativity effect is inevitably lost (cf. Vandelanotte 2007:11). What is left is a purely descriptive account of speech/thought reported, e.g.:

- [14] Senator McCain likes to talk about judgment, but really, what does it say about your judgment when you think George Bush has been right more than ninety percent of the time? (28.08.2008)

Here, *you* does not refer directly to the audience, but rather to Obama’s political opponent. However, through typification some addressees may be implicitly referred to by association of their stance with that represented by McCain himself, thus, they risk being excluded and categorised as an out-group member supporting widely unpopular policy represented by Bush.

Only a slight difference in modal performativity occurs between *I think* and *I believe* and it is largely a matter of a subjective interpretation. “To think” represents particular opinions, observations, stance, etc., while “to believe” has the potential to construe the aura of the Speaker’s hope and trust in American people, as well as in their ability to make good decisions. Therefore, the reporting clauses organised around this reporting verb prevail throughout the campaign, with the highest density. The following instance has been chosen for illustratory purposes:

- [15] I believe that we must be as careful in ending the war as we were careless getting in. (13.03.2007)

The frequency of *I believe* shows a tendency to increase in the second half of the primaries and goes steadily down toward the end of the campaign, when it gives way to *we believe*, which implies common expectations and needs the Speaker shares with the addressees, rather than his personal views:

- [16] [...] because we believe that the challenges we face are bigger than the smallness of our politics. (22.04.2008)

This reporting clause occurs frequently from June 2007, the campaign’s early stage of development and lasts until the first major setback in October 2007, when Hillary Clinton’s popularity keeps her in the lead. The peak surge in the occurrence of *we believe* reporting clause, however, coincides with the controversy aroused by Obama’s relationship with Reverend Wright. The speaker construes the aura of common ideological background presenting values the addressees identify with, as opposed to those represented by Wright. The speaker then resorts to this strategy until the very end of the campaign, however, without such intensity.

As has already been said, in second person reporting clauses, their modal character is lost and STR gains a purely descriptive quality:

- [17] In the face of war, you believe there can be peace. In the face of despair, you believe there can be hope. (10.02.2007)

Interestingly enough, the highest frequency can be observed in February 2007 speeches, just after the official announcement of Obama’s candidacy, as well as those delivered in October and November 2008, in the weeks preceding the

elections. On the one hand, being an assertive speech act, thus hardly deniable, and having a descriptive function, the reporting clause in question serves as a device establishing particular expectations toward whatever follows. In this case, the message the speaker intends to put across is that the speaker is perfectly aware of the addressees' views, expectations, and beliefs and is well able to specify them. Even if these are not what the addressees actually think, expect or believe in, the values like peace or hope, axiologically belong to DC. Thus, any potential act of denial would put an individual at risk of losing the in-group status. Furthermore, as a device forming expectations, second person modal reporting clauses have a tendency to affect following STR to maintain consistency of incoming messages in the addressees' minds, thus imposing on them the represented reality.

Following Vandelanotte, IST, but not DST, allows subjectivisation, as in this category the reported clause can be the Speaker's own speech act to which a modal qualification can be added (2007:10).

The reporting clause as such, i.e. the verb along with the subject, interacts with the reported clause playing the role of "a conceptually dependent head" (2007: 7). I shall argue, however, that the claim is largely limited in its scope, as it eliminates a possibility of a reporting clause built otherwise than 'subject + verb'.

DST, but not IST, allows the reporting clause to occupy clause-initial, clause-medial, as well as clause-final slots, e.g.

[18] DST: But the one question I'd get from people more than any other was "You seem like a nice young man. You've done all this great work. You've been a community organizer, and you teach law school, you're a civil rights attorney, you're a family man - why would you wanna go into something dirty and nasty like politics?" (19.06.2007)

[19] "I can't breathe," she said. "I want to know when I am going to be able to breathe again." (12.09.2007)

[20] "To suggest otherwise," the President said, "is to hope against the evidence." (12.09.2007)

3. Conclusions

The use of any clusivity-driven strategies changing the location of chosen political entities, especially point-of-view operations, presupposes that both the speaker and the addressees are directly involved in the occurring events. Adopting the other's point of view allows the speaker to reframe their perspective and impose, at least to some extent, the addressees' interpretation of incoming messages. It is thus the

interpretation of indexicals that largely determines whether the Speaker’s or the Sayer’s DC is involved in a particular speech situation.

Summing up, the basic difference between DST and IST lies in the fact that in the former the point of view is entirely shifted from the Speaker’s to the Sayer’s DC, i.e. from the actual to the represented, or original, speech situation. In the latter case of IST, the Speaker construes both the reporting clause and the reported clause, i.e. the content of a particular speech or thought reported. The perspective is spatially, temporally and axiologically shifted from the Sayer to the Speaker. In both cases, a deictic shift occurs along the spatial, temporal, and most importantly axiological axes, and events are plotted relative either to the Sayer’s DC (DST) or to the Speaker’s DC (IST), which provides a chance for point-of-view imposition.

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