Part V

EXTENSIONS AND INSPIRATIONS

Chapter 22

Evidentiality and the Epistemic Use of the Icelandic Verbs *Sjá* and *Heyra*. A Cultural Linguistic View

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1. Introduction[1]

The basic meaning of the Icelandic verbs *sjá* and *heyra* can be taken from the standard Icelandic dictionaries. The *Íslensk orðabók* (2007) provides the following definitions of *sjá*: (1a) *skynja með augunum* 'to perceive with the eyes;'[2] (1b) *horfa á, skoða* 'to look at, watch.' (2) *koma auga á, finna, uppgötva* 'to catch sight of; find; discover.' (3) *skilja, geta skilið, gera sér grein fyrir* 'to understand; to be able to understand; to realise sth.' As for the verb *heyra*, the only meaning in that dictionary that concerns us directly here is (1) *greina, skynja hljóð* 'to distinguish/discern, to perceive sounds.' But the *Stóra orðabókin um íslenska málnotkun* (2005) adds a reference to the domain of interest in our context, viz. *vitneskja* 'knowledge.'[3]

A comparison can be made with the meanings of the corresponding verbs in Danish, taken from *Den Danske Ordbog*; as this dictionary is much more detailed than the Icelandic ones, and as both languages – as we shall see – share the essential mechanisms analysed in this chapter (only those entries and senses are included that directly touch on the issues dealt with here):

1. *høre* 'to hear':
1. *(være i stand til at) opfatte lyd ved hjælp af hørelsen* '(to be in the position to) perceive sounds with help of the sense of hearing'

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2 All translations are the author's.

3 The *Stóra orðabókin um íslenska málnotkun* is a dictionary of usage and does not provide semantic definitions but the conditions of use, collocations, or, as here, the conceptual and semantic domains of use of the words.

1a. *udlede noget ud fra de lyde man opfatter* 'to infer something from the sounds perceived'
2. *rette sin hørelse opmærksomt mod noget og forstå eller fortolke det* 'to listen carefully to something and understand or interpret it'
2a. *gøre som nogen siger; opfylde en bøn* 'to do as someone says; to heed a request'
3. *få fortalt eller blive oplyst om* 'to be told or informed about'
4. *lytte til hvad nogen har at sige om en sag* 'listen to what somebody has to say on a topic'
5. *skaffe sig oplysning om noget ved at spørge* 'to get information about something by asking'

2. *se* 'to see':
1. *opfatte lys ved hjælp af synssansen og omdanne det til billeder i hjernen; sanse med øjnene* 'perceive light with help of the sense of sight and transform it into images in the brain; feel with the eyes'
1a. *danne et sanseindtryk af omverdenen som svarer til et synsindtryk, men med andre sanser end synet* 'build a sensory impression of the environment that answers to a visual impression with senses different from sight'
3. *gøre til genstand for særlig, ofte længerevarende eller indgående iagttagelse* 'make sth the object of special, frequently lengthy or attentive observation'
3a. *betragte eller overvære noget og derved erhverve sig en bestemt viden...* 'examine or watch something and obtain through it a certain knowledge...'
5. *forstå en sammenhæng eller problematik; erkende* 'understand a relation or a group of problems; comprehend'
5a. *erkende eller gennemskue en tilstand eller et forhold ud fra ydre tegn, fremtræden eller opførsel* 'recognise or understand in depth a situation or a state from external signs, conduct or behavior'
7. *undersøge nærmere* 'to investigate in depth'

As we see, the array of senses is wider in Danish. Also the meanings related to knowing are much clearer in *sjá/se* than in *heyra/høre*. A consideration of the Icelandic expressions, idioms and (the equivalent of English) phrasal verbs instead of the simple verbs changes the picture somewhat. The *Stóra Orðabókin um íslenska málnotkun* (2005) indicates the conceptual domains corresponding to such expressions. Interestingly, the presence of senses related to knowing or learning, i.e., getting information, are more numerous for *heyra* than for *sjá*.

2. Perception and Epistemic Senses

The relation between the "perception" and the "epistemic" senses is well known and has been analysed in the terms of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The usual interpretation takes the form of such metaphors as seeing is knowing and hearing is knowing although further ones are also recognised (Sweetser, 1990). But the status of the two verbs is different, as the first metaphoric interpretation is taken to have the priority, the second being secondary. The basic, "default" assumption is that humans use the metaphor seeing is knowing as their essential way to metaphorically express knowing.

This is clearly reflected in the main publications on the topic (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Sweetser, 1990). Matlock (1989, p. 222) writes that "[i]t is possible to posit another metaphor, e.g. hearing is knowing, but because *this mapping is not very productive* it is more feasible to posit a more general, higher level metaphor..." [emphasis added E.B.]. As we shall see, the Icelandic (but also Danish) data clearly contradict the lack of productivity of the hearing-metaphor.

"Seeing" as the main source of knowing is explained in terms of the embodiment of cognition. Most of the time, humans access the reality around them by means of their eyes. Thus nothing can be more natural than taking "to see" as the basis on which to develop – through metaphor and metonymy – our conceptualisation and linguistic expression of knowing or getting to know. Such is the explanation advanced in Sweetser (1990) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999). These latter authors include the seeing is knowing metaphor in the group of "primary metaphors" (pp. 49ff); no equivalent metaphor with hearing as its source domain is included, while other senses are only indirectly present among the "primary metaphors": understanding is grasping and seeing is touching. Sight, "seeing" is therefore given full priority: it has a clear primacy in how we access the world and consequently the metaphor linking vision and understanding or knowing is viewed as primary.

But are things as clear as they may seem? Whereas Lakoff & Johnson (1999) do not enter into the crosslinguistic analysis of the issue, Sweetser (1990) does. Section 2.3. (pp. 32-37) of her book is devoted to the analysis of "sense-perception verbs in English and Indo-European." The results of this analysis are usually considered the standard Cognitive Linguistics stance on the topic. Sweetser writes that "vision verbs commonly develop abstract senses of mental activity" (p. 33). She repeats the main explanatory assumption behind this fact: "This metaphor has its basis in vision's primary status as a source of data." She then adds, to reinforce her argument, a brief reference to evidentiality and the basic meaning of vision verbs associated with this category: studies of evidentials in many languages show that direct visual data is considered to be the most certain kind of knowledge.

Of course, this fact has been very well known for over a century and a half. The Germanic *praeterito-praesentium* verb represented by Old English *witan*, Old and Contemporary German *wissen*, Old and Modern Icelandic *vita*, etc., is a development from an IDE root meaning 'to see,' in such a way that OE *wát*, German *weiss* and Icelandic *veit* meaning 'I know' go back to the form **woida* (Greek *οιδα*) of a verb meaning 'to see.' Thus, "I have seen" was reinterpreted as "I know." But the point in Sweetser's proposal has a wider scope: it is supposed to represent a general, maybe universal, at least extremely basic form of conceptualisation of knowing in terms of seeing, which is also reinforced by the metaphoric development physical vision ⇒ mental "vision," a development based on "the strong connection between sight and knowledge, and also on the shared structural properties of the visual and intellectual domains – our ability to focus our mental and visual attentions, to monitor stimuli mentally and visually" (p. 33).

In contrast to the rather detailed analysis of seeing, the other senses are dealt with rather fleetingly. Sweetser points out that "verbs of hearing ... often come to mean 'listen, heed' [...]. From 'heed' we have a further semantic shift to 'obey' – Dan. *lystre* 'obey' also descends from the **k'leu-s* root" (p. 35). It may seem strange that she should include only a reference to a Danish word that is absent from the colloquial language, as shown in the *Ordbog over det Danske Sprog* (the 27 vol. historical dictionary) and *Den Danske Ordbog*. The latter does not include the meaning 'to obey' except in a few idiomatic expressions. Moreover, it may sound strange to use as piece of evidence a word borrowed from another language: *lystre*, as well as its Swedish equivalent *lystra*, are all descended from Middle High German *lüstern*, and their basic, nowadays nearly exclusive meaning is 'heed to, listen carefully to.'

It can be added that Icelandic also has a verb meaning 'to obey' derived from the same Indo-European root meaning 'sound'; but while the verb meaning 'to listen' is *hlusta*, 'to obey' uses a historically very different form of the same stem: *hlýða*, in such a way that the connection is probably lost for the average Icelandic speaker. In these and the previous cases, the development to 'obey' seems to have passed in Icelandic and MHG through a derivative with an intensive meaning: to listen in a specially careful or attentive way.

The domains of smell, taste, and feel are reviewed together in Sweetser's section 2.3.3. (pp. 35-37). Reference is made to "Lat. *sapere*, meaning both 'be wise, know' and 'taste.' The sense of taste is here evidently connected not merely with general experience or perception, but with mental experience as well." French *savoir* only has the epistemic meaning, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian use both meanings, as in Latin. It is rather odd that this possible counterexample to the author's proposal – as knowing seems to be more directly linked to tasting than to seeing, at least in this group of languages – is cursorily dismissed without further justification. Sweetser (pp. 36-37) goes on to say that "[i]n general, the target domains of smell and taste are not the intellectual domain of *savoir*, however." After a brief consideration of English expressions of taste, she concludes that "[t]aste, however, is a physical sense

which seems universally to be linked to personal likes and dislikes in the mental world. Lat. *gustis* and Fr. *goût*, like English taste, may indicate a 'taste' in clothing or art as well as in food" (p. 37). No mention is made of the relation of this sense of taste with the main topic of her discussion.

Similarly, "the sense of touch is not only linked with general sense perception, but is also closely tied to emotional 'feeling'" (p. 37) but the author's comments do not go any farther.

It may seem very strange indeed that such a cursory and tattily constructed analysis of a few verbs in a few languages, lacking any systematicity, may have become the basis for most discussions on the topic. It has even become a kind of "dogma" that languages conceptualise knowledge metaphorically by means of the metaphor seeing is knowing, all the others being dismissed as secondary and probably uninteresting; as Matlock wrote, the equivalent metaphor with hearing instead of seeing is not very productive. Or is it?

Since the publication of the works we have discussed – much too briefly – a number of studies have shown that the assumed universal value and primacy of seeing is knowing has too many counterexamples to be retained as such. Evans and Wilkins (2000, p. 546) studied ca. 60 Australian aboriginal languages and found that "Australian languages recruit verbs of cognition like 'think' and 'know' from 'hear', but not from 'see'" and, consequently, they considered as disproved Sweetser's suggestion that "vision has primacy as the modality from which verbs of higher intellection, such as 'knowing' and 'thinking,' are recruited, and proposes that verbs meaning 'hear' would not take on these readings, although they often extend to mean 'understand' or 'obey'." They add an additional point of special interest for the purposes of this chapter:

> We argue that the same semantic domain can have its universal and its relativistic side, a foot in nature and a foot in culture, and conclude by demonstrating that there are good social and cultural reasons driving the extension of "hearing", but not "seeing", to "know" and "think" in Australian Aboriginal societies. (Evans & Wilkins, 2000, p. 546)

Evans and Wilkins, therefore, favour the consideration of culture in the study of this topic, something Sweetser did not pay any attention to.[4]

Ibarretxe-Antuñano (2008; 2013) adds other languages that also favour hearing over seeing: Suya, Desana (both in South America), Ommura (New

4 Sweetser's book (1990) bears the subtitle *Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure* but a treatment, even minimal, of culture cannot be found anywhere in the book; the term *culture* does not even appear in the index.

Guinea), Sedang Moy (Indochina). More can be added. For instance, the ENW Ecuadorian language Cha'palaachi has a verb base *mi-ha-* meaning 'to know', whose root is the same as in *me-(ra)-* 'to hear, listen' and bears no relationship with the verb for 'to see,' i.e. *que-(re)-* (Lindskoog & Lindsksoog, 1964; Bernárdez, in preparation). Guerrero (2011) presents new results on the importance of hearing vs. seeing in the whole Uto-Aztecan language family.

There does not seem to exist any reason for considering the sense of hearing as less significant than that of seeing in the human acquisition of knowledge; strangely enough, results proving this point are usually readily dismissed. This reminds us of the tendency to refer to phenomena not fitting in the standard, "accepted" framework, as being "culture-specific," an expression devoid of any meaning, as shown in Bernárdez (2013).[5] In other languages, a preference towards touching or smelling is visible: Ibarretxe-Antuñano (2008; 2013) reports on the role of smell among the Ongee Andamanese and the Johai from Malaysia, whereas the Central-American Tzotzil favour touch and the Shipibo-Konibo from Peru use a whole array of senses to make sense of the world.

Ibarretxe-Antuñano (2013) raises an extremely important point that is seldom discussed: the presence of a metaphor in a language, e. g. seeing is knowing, is not just a matter of yes or no: the same metaphor can exist in two different languages but with much higher frequency in Language A than in Language B; that is, holding a higher position (in linguistic and cultural terms) in A than in B. Through a corpus analysis, Ibarretxe-Antuñano shows that this metaphor is much more frequent and pervasive in English than in Spanish or Basque.[6]

One of Ibarretxe-Antuñano's (2013) conclusions is very similar to Evans and Wilkins' proposal:

> Based on the general (wrong) belief that some primary metaphors such as understanding is seeing are universal, it has been shown

5 This reminds the author of the use of *ethno-* as a prefix pointing to what does not fit in the standard, dominant model: whatever kind of (pop, rock etc.) music which does not follow the patterns of Anglo-Saxon pop music is termed *ethnic* (from Flamenco to Pygmy, classical Hindu or Balinese music!). Any kind of food not following the patterns of Western, mainly Anglo-Saxon types of food (especially the kind usually termed "fast food") is characterised as *ethnic food*, whether it is Greek, Scandinavian, Indian or whatever. Another consequence of *la pensée unique* (Bernárdez, 2008; Hagège, 2012).

6 Similar results turn out in Materinskaja's (2005) analysis of terms related to body-parts in English, German, Ukrainian and Russian. Metaphoric extension was far more frequent in English than in any of the other languages. In fact, English seems to have a very special liking for figurative language that deserves special consideration: it is probably a cultural feature.

that other languages do not necessarily rely on vision but on other senses such as hearing or smell for cognition metaphors, and therefore, proving the need of culture in conceptual metaphor theory.

3. Conceptual Metaphor and Culture

Although our preceding discussion is much too short and general, as the complete analysis of the positions involved is not the main topic of the present chapter, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) The absolute primacy of the metaphorical extension seeing is knowing, as opposed to hearing is knowing, etc., does not hold cross-linguistically. (2) The reason has to lie in the cultural co-determination of meanings, meaning-change and, most importantly in this context, metaphoric extension and conceptual metaphor.

From many fronts the evidence is constantly mounting: conceptual metaphor and metaphoric extension cannot be properly understood in the absence of cultural considerations. It may seem odd – and of ideological, philosophical and sociological interest – that some very significant cognitive linguists have apparently changed their minds from a previous view of metaphor+culture to a purely neural approach, as Guignard (2012, p. 89) points out. This neural-shift is clearly visible in the proposal of "primary metaphors" that was made reference to above.

4. Seeing, Hearing, and Evidentiality

Evidentiality is one of those linguistic terms that have suffered the tendency to change the well-established meaning of words in linguistics by assigning them new meanings that topple down everything previously known on the corresponding topic. It was first used to mark certain grammatical, mainly morphological constructions in verbs, especially in Amerindian languages. Nowadays, it is seen as a purely conceptual category found in most, if not all languages. The original meaning of the term has been altered with the result that all languages now seem to express evidentiality.[7] The "traditional" definition can be found in Aikhenvald (2004, p. 3): "Evidentiality is a linguistic

7 Which is fine, of course, although it might have been clearer to create new terms for new notions instead of sticking to the old one in a now unrecognisable sense.

category whose primary meaning is source of information." Peterson, Déchaine, and Sauerland's (2010, p. 1) definition is a bit different: "Broadly speaking, evidentiality is the expression of the source of evidence for a proposition. Cross-linguistically, different morphological means are used to express evidentiality." Boye & Harder (2009, p. 9) interpret evidentiality in a merely conceptual way: "We argue that evidentiality should be understood basically as a functional-conceptual substance domain."

The following definition, by Diewald & Smirnova (2010, p. 40), is closer to Boye and Harder's than to Aikhenvald's: "It is common ground among linguists[8] that evidentiality is a semantic and functional domain, which, like temporality or modality, may be expressed by lexical or grammatical means" and "The term *evidential expression* is a neutral label (a hypernym) used to denote any kind of linguistic string with evidential meaning in a particular context, regardless of its linguistic structure and degree of grammaticalization" (p. 41). This definition is at the basis of the papers included in Diewald & Smirnova (eds., 2010b), on the linguistic realization of evidentiality in European languages. The situation is rather sad, as terms that are relatively – or quite – stable acquire new meanings in an indiscriminate way, thus adding to the persistent terminological confusion that plagues linguistics. A solution could be found if "dimensions and continua" like those proposed by Hans-Jakob Seiler are used instead of the all-or-none approach still favoured among most linguists.

Thus, a view of evidentiality could be proposed where morphological evidentiality would occupy one end of the continuum, purely lexical evidentiality the opposite one, the morphology-syntactic-semantic (but also pragmatic) distinctions occupying different positions within the continuum. Unfortunately linguists do not usually seem to like proposals advanced by members of other schools of thinking.

Aikhenvald (2004, p. 360) specifies the entrenchment of evidentiality in languages where the category is morphologically and systematically marked:

> Having obligatory evidentials implies being precise in stating one's information source. [...] Failure to demonstrate one's competence in the use of evidentials or a breach of evidential conventions may inflict a blow to the speaker's reputations and stature as a responsible and valued member of the community. [...] Those who speak a language with evidentiality find it hard to adjust to the vagueness of information source

8 We think this type of statement should be avoided unless adequately qualified. Who, how many, and where are those linguists?

> in many familiar European languages – such as English, Portuguese, and varieties of Spanish other than those spoken in the Andes.[9]

Accordingly, evidentiality is not at all the same in Quechua and in English: in the first language you just cannot leave it out and if you do, your partners will feel a bit at a loss: "how do you know?" might be an immediate reaction.

Anyway, as evidentiality – in its new definitions – can be found everywhere, in any language, books and articles have been and are being published on the topic in the most diverse languages; suffice it to mention such collections of papers as Aikhenvald & Dixon (2003), Diewald & Smirnova (2010b), Marín-Arrese (2004), Peterson & Sauerland (2010).

We cannot deal with even a minimal part of the theoretical and descriptive problems of evidentiality in this chapter. We touch on it here because the opposition of hearing vs. seeing verbs in their epistemic sense, as a consequence of metaphoric extension, has been related to evidentiality. That is the case e.g. of Matlock (1989, p. 215):

> Languages generally distinguish between *direct* versus *indirect* experience. Direct experience includes a speaker's direct visual, auditory or other sensory experience of a situation. Indirect experience includes *reported* information (typically hearsay), and *inferred* information (typically observation of end results). Crosslinguistically, there is natural hierarchy of evidentials which correlates directness of experience to certainty of knowledge: direct experience corresponds to a high degree of certainty, indirect experience of the reported type corresponds to less certainty, and indirect experience of the inferred type corresponds to even less certainty.

Everything in this quotation seems more or less true although the statement is marred by the absence of any quoted evidence supporting such expressions as "languages generally distinguish" or "cross-linguistically." Again, we are not going to enter into a theoretical discussion that would lead us away from the central purpose of the paper. Suffice it to say that the central notion in an

9 In fact, the Spanish Pluperfect is systematically used in Andean Spanish as the equivalent of the Quechua *-sqa* suffix, marking mirativity, a category related to evidentiality. The extended use of *dizque* and similar forms to mark information as indirectly achieved is another example of how speakers of language with clearly morphologically marked, obligatory evidential systems used Spanish constructions, altering their meaning to reproduce the evidentiality they "felt" was absent in Spanish, i.e., to fill a gap they identified in the European language.

explanation like that, viz. knowledge, is very far from being as obvious and well-defined as it is usually thought to be (a conviction reflected in it not being defined). McCready (2010) analyses the topic in connection with evidentiality, whereas Starmans and Friedman (2012) theoretically and experimentally investigate the difference between the "philosophical" view of knowledge and its folk counterpart, which functions in a very different way.

Cognitive linguists use philosophical and scientific definitions much too frequently, thus going back in many cases to an "objectivist" view of language and meaning contradicting some of the main tenets of the discipline (as stated especially in Lakoff, 1987). In this case, using a philosophical understanding of knowledge risks leading linguists astray: speakers are no philosophers. Nichols (2004, p. 514) makes a similar point; according to her,

> Analytic philosophers have long used *a priori* methods to characterize folk concepts such as *knowledge*, *belief* and *wrongness*. Recently, researchers have begun to exploit social scientific methodologies to characterize such folk concepts. One line of work has explored folk intuitions with cases that are disputed within philosophy. A second approach, with potentially more radical implications, applies the methods of cross-cultural psychology to philosophical intuitions. Recent work in this area suggests that people in different cultures have systematically different intuitions surrounding folk concepts.

It is unfortunate that cognitive linguists, who are sometimes a bit careless with the definition of their scientific terms, usually ignore such problems, i.e., they tend to take very complex, disputed terms as if they were crystal-clear and undisputed. Of special interest for us in this paper is the following argument by Aikhenvald (2004, pp. 361-362):

> Each evidential is associated with a certain information source. Different types of traditional knowledge and experience come to be associated with conventionalized sources. For instance, dreams can be treated on a par with directly witnessed observed reality [...]. Or they can be represented as being outside conscious reality, and cast in reported or in non-firsthand evidential [...]. The choice of evidential in a dream may depend on who the dreamer is: dreams by ordinary humans in Tucano and Tariana are cast in non-visual evidential [...]. However, shamanic dreams are couched in visual evidential. Shamans are traditionally considered omniscient and they "see" what other humans do not. [...] In Shipibo-Konibo, shamanic visions under the influence of *ayahuasca* [...] are cast in direct evidential – unlike dreams experienced by humans. Such visions are part of a tangible reality: the shaman "sees" what others do not.

It is obvious that Aikhenvald sees the question of knowledge from an anthropological perspective, i.e., one that sees culture – in the senses in which the word is understood in anthropology – as an inextricable part of the linguistic phenomenon termed evidentiality. Her view coincides thus with the ones expressed by both Ibarretxe-Antuñano and Evans and Wilkins. And we should also include many other linguists within the already well-established field of "cultural linguistics."

All this is explicitly recognized and developed by Bartmiński (2009/2012) in his Cognitive Ethnolinguistics, which sets its focus on the spoken language and makes widespread use of real-language corpora, complete texts, and text fragments, instead of constructed, isolated sentences. Of course, if only the standard, written language is taken into account, it may be impossible to obtain access to the worldview of its speakers, in the same way that it will be at least very difficult to analyze the relationship between language and culture. Such an essential concept in Cognitive Ethnolinguistics as *value* is pervasive in the common language and thus provides access to the culture: "By values I mean that which in the light of language and culture people consider precious. [...] [M]y understanding of values is that of folk philosophy" (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 39).

5. Questions to Be Answered

The discussions above have provided us with a few tools that should be useful for the analysis of the Icelandic verbs *heyra* and *sjá* and the roles and peculiarities of their so-called metaphoric extensions. The following questions will have to be answered:

(1) Does the difference between *sjá* and *heyra* correspond to the proposals, or predictions, of the – let us call it thus – standard theory summarized above? Is *sjá*, "seeing," prioritized? Does *sjá* express direct perception and knowledge while *heyra* expresses indirect perception? And, even more importantly, does the corresponding correlation hold, viz. direct (*sjá*) → higher certainty, indirect (*heyra*) → lesser certainty?

(2) Is it necessary – and/or inevitable – to use conceptual metaphor to understand and to explain the epistemic meaning of these two verbs? In other words, is the lexical analysis in terms of a – let's call it thus for the sake of brevity – prototypical core and a number of metaphoric and/or metonymic extensions inescapable?

(3) Does culture play any role in the process? And if this is the case, how can cultural elements be integrated in the analysis and what is gained in doing so?

To try to answer these questions, the uses of both verbs were observed and analyzed in a considerably large and varied Icelandic corpus.[10] No quantitative analysis was carried out, as it would not add anything of special interest to the purpose of this chapter, which is of a qualitative nature.

6. The Analysis of *Heyra* and *Sjá*

The basic meaning of the two verbs we are considering was briefly introduced above for Icelandic.

6.1 Basic Meaning

There is no need to discuss the "non-figurative use" of the verbs in any detail. Suffice it to recall that the basic meaning of both is the physical, real perception of objects, events etc. That is, cases like the following (from *Íslensk Orðabók*, 2007): *ég sé flugvélina* 'I see the airplane' and *hann sá mig koma* 'he saw me come.' Instances like *sjá vel* 'to see well' (i.e. to have good sight) are also included here. Similarly for *heyra*: *heyra song* 'to hear a song' and, although not included in *Íslensk Orðabók*, also *hann heyrði hann koma* 'he heard him come' and *heyra vel* 'to hear well.'

It is important to bear in mind, however, that the dictionaries provide us with all the "figurative" senses; this means that they are fully entrenched. Given this, does it really pay, or is it really sensible, to posit a "core meaning" that is then metaphorically developed? From a historical point of view, such a view is obviously valid, as a way to trace the evolution from one "concrete" meaning to more abstract senses. But from a synchronic perspective, it seems that metaphor

10 As no electronically standardized corpus exists, the following partial corpora were used: (a) the *Íslenskt Textasafn*, the biggest corpus in existence, by the University of Iceland and the Árni Magnússon Foundation, which includes written texts but also, differently from all other corpora, spoken conversations. It includes texts from all periods and genres (http://www.lexis.hi.is/corpus/leit.pl); (b) the whole text of all the Icelandic sagas and *þættir*, as accessible in electronic form through snara.is; (c) the text of fourteen novels by Halldór Laxness, also in snara.is.; (d) the electronic texts from different periods and genres in *Netútgáfan* (http://www.snerpa.is/net/); (e) sundry texts from different periods and genres consulted in their printed form, usually in a partial form only. The dictionaries used are mentioned in the corresponding places, but the main ones are those referred to in the first section of this paper. Also, and in order to allow for a comparative element, Danish was also considered, although not to the same depth as Icelandic. In addition to the dictionaries mentioned above examples taken from materials in printed form were considered. Additionally, the new Old Norse Dictionary in the Net was checked (www.onp.humku.dk), which provides large numbers of citations.

does not play any role at all: the speakers have at their disposal a number of senses, or maybe different words.[11] While we will not enter into a detailed discussion here, we will make reference to the Career of Metaphor Hypothesis (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), which provides a path to a correct understanding of this problem.

What may be clear is that for the speakers, the different senses of *heyra* and *sjá* are internally coherent. We can say that for the Icelanders, there exists a link between the physical process of hearing/seeing and the process of acquisition of knowledge. We shall come back to this.

6.2 The Epistemic Senses of *Heyra*

The most frequent use of *heyra* is of course the physical process of hearing. In a number of cases the physical process is not explicit but just inferred or altogether out of the question. The meaning is then epistemic, usually 'getting to know.'

Heyra is used to indicate that something has been heard of, that some information has come to our ears; that is, that our knowledge is indirect and that the spoken word is the medium.

(1) *"Þetta var það skrítnasta sem ég hef nýlega heyrt," sagði systir mín*
(Benedikt Gröndal, *Grasaferð*)
"This was the strangest that I had recently heard," said sister mine.[12]

The information can be inferred from what has been said; in (2)-(4) reference is made to some persons' mood from the sound of their voice:

(2) *Hann hafði heyrt í hvílíku uppnámi hún var í gegnum símann.* (Óttar M. Norðfjörð, *Sólkross*, p. 250)
He had heard in which commotion she was in through the-telephone.[13]

11 The issue of polysemy in connection with the verbs of perception is dealt with in detail by Ibarretexe-Antuñano (1999, 2003).

12 The English glosses are not translations proper so they lack any idiomaticity. Their only function is to allow the reader to understand the Icelandic sentence, which is reproduced literally, word-by-word. When proper understanding is difficult, a real "translation" is added.

13 The hyphenated articles, as in *the-telephone*, reflect the Icelandic postposed suffix: *síma-nn* (the Nordic languages use definite suffixes instead of definite articles as English, Spanish etc.).

(3) *Erlendi brá að heyra örvæntinguna í röddinni.* (Arnaldur Indriðason, *Vetrarborgin*, p. 114)
Erlendur was-shocked to hear the-desperation in the-voice.

(4) *"Já, eflaust," sagði læknirinn og var ekki að heyra að hann legði trúnað á þetta* (Yrsa Sigurðardóttir, *Auðin*, p. 103)
"Yes, certainly," said the-doctor and was not to hear that he put confidence on this.
"Yes, certainly," said the doctor, and it could he heard that he had no confidence in it.

In (5)

(5) *ég er búin að heyra svo mikið um Ekvador ég væri alveg til í að fara þangað* (Textasafn: Spoken language)
I am finished to hear so much about Ecuador I would-be absolutely for in to travel there.
I have heard so much about Ecuador that I would be in favour of going there.

it is at least doubtful that the information has been acquired through hearing, i.e., from other people's telling.

In other instances of the epistemic sense 'to get information,' it can be *assumed* that such information will probably be gained through someone else's spoken words, although it is not necessarily so:

(6) *Ég heyri að hann er vel að sér.* (Auður Ava, *Afleggjarinn*, p. 218)
I hear that he is good at himself. (i.e., that he is competent)

No indication as to the precise source of information is given, although it is assumed that this type of personal information is usually acquired through the spoken medium; or at least, through letters, text messages, etc. Other examples of personal information having been "heard," i.e., known, are (7)-(9):

(7) *Þú hefur heyrt um Marion, sagði maðurinn* (Arnaldur Indriðason, *Kleifarvatn*, p. 88)
You have heard of Marion, said the-man.

(8) *Hefurðu heyrt í Þorláki? spyr ég.* (Auður Ava Ólafsdóttir, *Afleggjarinn*, p. 179)
Have you heard of Þorlákur? ask I.

(9) *Elínborg var að gefa út kokkabók, þú hefur kannski heyrt af því* (Arnaldur Indriðason, *Kleifarvatn*, p. 139)
Elínborg was to give out cookbook, you have perhaps heard of it.

The "hearing" can be secondary, even doubtful, as in (10):

(10) *Þjóðin á rétt á að heyra fréttirnar*... (Óttar M. Norðfjörð, *Sólkross*, p. 75)
The-people have right on to hear the-news.

This does not only refer to hearing but to acquiring information through the media, which can happen through written or audiovisual media, as is also the case of (11):

(11) *ég hef aðeins heyrt um það í fjölmiðlum* (Yrsa Sigurðardóttir, *Þriðja táknið*, p. 17)
I have only heard about that in (the) media.

where the word *fjölmiðill* (here in the dative plural) can refer to printed or audiovisual media.

The meaning of 'getting to know' is clear in the following instances, independently of the existence of audition:

(12) *Ég efast um að þú myndir vilja heyra það, sagði Andrés. Ég efast um að nokkur vilji heyra neitt um svoleiðis lagaðan djöfulskap.* (Arnaldur Indriðason, *Vetrarborgin*, p. 127)
I doubt about that you would like hear that, said Andrés. I doubt about that anyone like hear anything about such characterised madness.

(13) *Ég hef heyrt fjöldann allan af sögum af fjölskyldum sem hafa farið í rándýra sólarlanda* (Textasafn: spoken language)
I have heard the-multitude all of stories of families that travelled to extremely-expensive sunny-countries.
I have heard lots and lots of stories about families who travelled to those incredibly expensive sunny countries.

(14) *Ég hef heyrt að ekki sé hægt að fara hraðar en á ljóshraða.* (Textasafn)
I have heard that not is possible to travel faster than on speed-of-light.

The following are rather extreme, as hearing is absolutely out of the question; the meaning is only 'get to know':

(15) *Hannes segir ekkert. En ég heyri hann hugsa hratt.* (Árni Þórarinsson: *Tími nornarinnar*, p. 208)
Hannes says nothing. But I hear him think quickly.

(16) *Ég heyri hvernig hann veltir vöngum.* (Árni þórarinsson: *Tími nornarinnar*, p. 310)
I hear how he mulls-over-it.

What is heard need not be "audible"; in (17) reference is made to ideas, thoughts, and the only way to "hear" it is indirectly:

(17) *og aldrei áður heyrt þvílíkar skoðanir.* (Halldór Laxness, *Brekkukotsannáll*, p. 226)
and never before heard such views (i.e., points of view)

Sometimes, the difference between *heyra* and *sjá* is explicitly stated:

(18) *Ég sá það ekki, ég bara heyrði það, sagði hann.* (Arnaldur Indriðason, *Vetrarborgin*, p. 207)
I saw it not, I only heard it, said he.

(19) *Það sama á við um það sem við sjáum og heyrum.* (Textasafn)
The same is on about that which we see and hear.
The same holds for what we see and hear.

A contrast between *heyra* and *vita* 'to know' is apparent in (20); the opposition is between the "state of knowing" and the "source of knowledge", which, in the case of *heyra*, is not guaranteed (this is a clear case of "hearsay"):

(20) *Ég veit það ekki, sagði Raggi. Ég bara heyrði þetta.* (Arnaldur Indriðason, *Vetrarborgin*, p. 207)
I know that not, I only heard that, said he.

A triple contrast, *sjá*, *heyra* and *vita* exists in (21):

(21) *Ja, eitthvað sér hún, heyrir eða veit meira en við* (Árni þórarinsson: *Tími nornarinnar*, p. 99)
Well, something sees she, hears or knows more than we.
Well, she sees, hears or knows more than we do.

(22) on the other hand offers an example of two different sources of knowledge: to read and to hear:

(22) *Allt sem þau höfðu lesið, allt sem þau höfðu heyrt, var satt.* (Arnaldur Indriðason, *Kleifarvatn*, p. 23)
Everything that they had read, everything that they had heard, was true.

6.3 A Brief Digression on 'to Hear' in Danish

Danish shows some uses similar to those in Icelandic, as evidenced by the following examples:

(23) *Jeg kan sletikke se, at der er nogen Grænse mellem Naturen og Mennesket.* (Karen Blixen, *Breve* 1931-1962, Vol. II, p. 213)
I can absolutely-not see, that there is any limit between the-nature and the-person (human being).

This is of course inaccessible to vision as such, so the meaning is simply 'understand.'

The source of knowledge can be something unrelated to hearing and sound, as when reference is made to written materials:

(24) *Som vi siden skal høre, stemmer denne datering også overens med...* (P. V. Glob: *Mosefolket*, p. 36)
As we later shall hear, coincides this dating also completely with...

The author is referring to a point in his book, where the dating is mentioned anew.

(25) *Jeg har tænkt meget paa Dem og var glad ved at høre fra Dem.* (Karen Blixen, *Breve* 1931-1962, Vol. II, p. 289)
I have thought much of you and was glad with to hear from you.

As she is referring to letters and information obtained through that medium, there is no real "hearing" here. As in Icelandic, source information of a personal nature is usually referred to with 'to hear.'

Again, as in Icelandic, 'to see' and 'to hear' can be contrasted explicitly:

(26) *Mangen En har enten selv seet, eller hørt gamle Folk tale om Pæle, staaende hist og her...* (P. V. Glob, *Mosefolket*, p. 60, quoting a newspaper article from 1839)
Many one has or self seen or heard old people talk about stakes standing here and there...
Many people have seen with their own eyes or heard old people talk of stakes that stand here and there...

Finally, it has to be added that the non-literal or more precisely "non-auditory" use of *heyra* is of low frequency if compared with the equivalent use of *sjá*. For instance, in a contemporary novel like Jón Kalman's *Himnaríki og helvíti* there are

only four instances of non-auditory *heyra* in its over 200 pages. Even these four occurrences can be interpreted as referring – although not in an explicit manner – to things being said. Something similar happens in Auður Ava Ólafsdóttir's *Afleggjarinn*: eleven instances in 272 pages. In the sagas it is difficult to find examples of *heyra* not connected with audition. We may venture that the explanation lies in the objectivity of the style and especially in the saga authors' limitation to what was the object of direct perception and experience for the characters in the narrative.

6.4 Some Conclusions from the Lexical Analysis

This short analysis, centred on *heyra*, allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions.

(a) The priority of *sjá* with the sense 'to get to know,' 'to understand,' etc. seems clear. Both its frequency (which has not been the object of scrutiny in this chapter, though, so this is only a general impression) and the range of its occurrences show that it is seen as the main medium for acquiring knowledge.

(b) There exists a clear "division of linguistic labor" between *sjá* and *heyra*, in accordance to the standard proposals in the domain of evidentiality. *Heyra* is used to signal information acquired in an indirect way, independently of the existence or sound: it can be acquired from sounds, from our inferences on the basis of sounds, but also from the media, i.e., from written or spoken texts. What is important here is the fact that we access the information in a *mediated* way, not directly. This confirms most proposals made within the domain of evidentiality, as summarised above. On the other hand, *sjá* stands for information that is, or may have been, or may be (e.g. through inference) acquired directly, *without the need for any mediation*.

(c) This division of labor does not imply, however, that the information gained from seeing is in any way better or more precise than the information expressed with *heyra*. The verb of hearing, however – as evident in (18) and (20) – includes a certain idea that the source can be less reliable than we thought. But the same can happen with *sjá*, as in

(27) *hann þóttist sjá að Gísli taldi sér vísan* dauðann (Þorgill Gjallandi, *Við sólhvörf*)
he thought (he) saw that Gísli considered himself really dead

where *þóttist sjá* indicates doubt on the reliability of the character's vision. This construction, by the way, is extremely frequent, both with *sjá* and with *heyra*: *hann þóttist heyra* 'he thought that he heard' introduces a clear hint of uncertainty: maybe he heard wrong. This means, by the way, that the unreliability

of perception is equally possible in both verbs; the only "negative advantage" of *heyra* in this sense is that a double possibility of error exists. But it cannot be said that, as an essential part of their difference in epistemic meaning, *heyra* marks *per se* less reliable information. The second part of Matlock's proposal above seems thus disconfirmed in the case of Icelandic (and Danish).

7. *Heyra* and *Sjá* from a Cultural Perspective

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, metaphoric extension has to include a cultural component. This is true, in fact, not only of metaphor but of everything having to do with meaning, as language is essentially a cultural product (Bernárdez, 2008b). This should also be true of such apparently "neutral" concepts as seeing and hearing. An adequate framework for the incorporation of cultural elements in the study of meaning – and of language at large – is formed by the views that can be termed "socio-historical," ultimately based on the seminal work of Lev Vygotsky and his school from the 1920's and 30's. Bernárdez' (2007b; 2008a; 2008b) proposal of *synergic* or *collective cognition* incorporating culture and history in the study of cognition and language goes in this same direction.

A useful notion in the same tradition is that of the "linguistic worldview" as proposed by a number of authors.[14] We shall use this concept as defined by Bartmiński (2009/2012, p. 23) in the framework of Cognitive Ethnolinguistics:

> Linguistic worldview is a language-entrenched interpretation of reality, which can be expressed in the form of judgements about the world, people, things, or events. It is an interpretation, not a reflection; it is a portrait without claims to fidelity, not a photograph of real objects.

As Kopińska (2009, p. 64) writes, "[t]he linguistic view of our world is a recording of all the possible interactions of human beings with reality: the establishment of the hierarchies, organisation and classification of the world around us."

14 Kopińska (2009) is a useful review of the concept as used in different linguistic traditions in Europe and the U.S. On the other hand, Zinken (2004) compares Conceptual Metaphor Theory and cognitive linguistics with the main tenets and methods of cognitive ethnolinguistics. (Incidentally, Zinken uses the term *linguistic picture of the world*, not *linguistic worldview*. This term corresponds better to both the Polish and Russian terms, although here we follow the established term in English. For a discussion of terminology, cf. Tabakowska this volume.)

If we consider the senses of the Icelandic verbs *heyra* and *sjá* as sketched above, the possibility of looking at them from the vantage point of the "Icelandic worldview" comes to mind. In fact, *heyra* does not only refer to the physical process of perceiving sounds, but also to the listener's making sense of those sounds, i.e., interpreting them. The same holds for *sjá*. Now, culturally there are many ways of making sense of sensorial inputs and they are culturally marked. A beautiful illustration was provided by Aikhenvald as reproduced in the quotation above (Section 4), where the differences in such an apparently straightforward notion as "visual evidence" depending on the "seers" and their socio-cultural status. Even the distinction of hearing and seeing seems not to be universal, as Maslova (2004) shows for the case of Kolyma Yukaghir, where the historically basic verb is 'hearing,' later developing to the meaning of 'seeing.' What seems natural and not in need of any further qualification may seem significantly cultural, as has also been shown through experimental research (Davidoff, Fonteneau, & Goldstein, 2008).

In the case of Icelandic, the split of *heyra* and *sjá* as markers of respectively mediated and non-mediated acquisition of knowledge brings to mind two essential features of the Icelandic language that are firmly entrenched in Icelandic culture: (3) the specification of the "degree of certainty" in knowledge and (2) the sources of action. The first point is reflected in the vast array of expressions marking whether something is seen as sure, just possible, improbable, etc. There is no room here to enter into this topic – but consider example (26) above – which will be the subject of a future paper. As to the second point, Icelandic even has a special construction, termed "the unconscious, irresponsible construction" (Bernárdez, 2007a) to signify the situation in which someone carries out an involuntary action that leads him/her to a certain perception or a certain idea (i.e., a physical-sensorial or a mental interpretation of the world), as in:

(28) *Rétt áðan varð mér litið í spegil, og VOILÀ! ... sá mig. Mér alvarlega varð litið í spegilinn og sjá brjálaðar krullur prýða mitt fagra höfuð.* (googled example)
Just a minute ago I happened to look at the mirror and VOILÀ! ... (I) saw me. I really happened to look at the mirror and saw some crazy curls decorating my beautiful head.

The speaker did not intend to look at the mirror: there is no entity responsible for that action, which leads Bruno Kress (1982, p. 150) to define this very little studied construction in the following terms: "sie deutet an, daß die betreffende Aktion *von einer magischen Kraft ausgeht*" (it indicates that the corresponding action *goes out from some magic force*; emphasis E.B.). This is perfectly possible in a traditional culture where belief in elves and trolls is still alive, but we prefer to appeal to some uncontrolled force in general – be it some magical being or

just sheer chance. This construction is mainly – nearly exclusively – used with only a few verbs, basically *líta* 'look,' *huga* 'think,' *bregða* 'be startled,' *ganga* 'go,' especially the first two. The corresponding processes, led by that "mysterious" force, bring about a situation where something of special interest is perceived or thought, or a place is trodden.

A similar example (also googled) is (29):

(29) *Okkur varð hugsað til Stebba Páls.*
We came/happened to think of S.P.

The process of thinking was not intentional: Stebba Páll just "flew into our minds."

Also in (30):

(30) *Á ítalíuárunum varð mér oft hugsað*: ... (Guðbergur Bergsson, *Lömuðu kennslukonurnar*, p. 115)
In my Italian years, I often happened to think: ...

There was a recurrent but always unprovoked and unexpected thinking.

All this forms part of the Icelandic linguistic worldview. It was a traditional society that underwent significant changes only in the second part of the 20th c.; atmospheric conditions made people stay practically isolated for long periods of time, and lack of light during the winter months limited the value and especially the reliability of visual perception. At the same time the only way to know about things happening out of visual reach was through somebody else's information, which frequently – but not always – took place through the oral channel. In the same way that it was necessary to specify the reasons for one's own actions, it was essential to specify the source of one's knowledge. And even in the Middle Ages, reading sagas and telling stories was a part of Icelandic everyday life: written texts read aloud for the benefit of the members of the household.

A large system of epistemic nuances, including the medial voice, the so-called impersonal expressions, etc., allows a speaker to know whether the information received – directly *or* indirectly – is reliable and to which extent. Another system is devoted to specifying the source of knowledge. Both together enable the Icelanders to feel as safe as possible in their lives. Both processes allow them to interpret the reality that surrounds them (to retake Kopińska's words above) and be able to behave in the most adequate way possible, and also to move around safely – in all senses, literal and figurative.

This leads us to a final point, which is the "cognitive definition" of *heyra* and *sjá* in terms of Cognitive Ethnolinguistics. It is defined as follows: "The cognitive definition aims to portray the way in which an entity is viewed by the *speakers* of a language, to represent socio-culturally established and linguistically

entrenched knowledge, its categorisation and valuation. [...] The defined entity is a 'mental object', a projection, not a reflection of the real-life artefact..." (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 67; emphasis E.B.).

We can then define the two Icelandic verbs as follows:

Heyra is 'the process of extracting the information available in a set of sounds, etc., provided by a different person, natural being or force, etc.' In the case of humans (and of animals in the world of fairy-tales) the information is transmitted by someone who may, but need not, have (had) personal access to it and who transmits it faithfully. The information may be transmitted by someone else through some other, non-auditory, channel. The basic meaning is then to receive information through the mediation of someone else who is supposed to know, and who usually, but not always and not necessarily, transmits it through an audible channel. Of course, in Icelandic culture this was extremely important and frequent, as everything having happened away from the speaker had to be acquired in such mediated form.

On the other hand, *sjá* is 'the process of extracting the information available in a set of visual stimuli.' Mediation is here excluded.[15]

Are these meanings – or senses – of the two verbs a case of metaphoric extension? As shown above, they are fully entrenched, are of common occurrence and can be considered as the main epistemic verbs marking the source of knowledge. More detailed research has to be carried out including all the derivatives, all other forms of expression of the notions 'seeing' and 'hearing,' and their use in complete texts.

8. Conclusions

We must now try to answer the questions posed at the beginning. Let us reproduce them here, in an abbreviated form, together with the answers provided by the research in this chapter.

(1) Does *sjá* express direct perception and knowledge whereas *heyra* expresses indirect perception? Does the corresponding correlation hold, viz. direct (*sjá*) → higher certainty, indirect (*heyra*) → lesser certainty? The *priority* of *sjá* seems *confirmed*; a quantitative analysis would make it clearer, but there seems to be no doubt that 'seeing' is a "better source" for knowledge than 'hearing,' as there is no danger of double distortion, as in *heyra*, which refers to knowledge transmitted by someone else (distortion can be double: the teller

15 Compare Bartmiński's (2009/2012: 96-116) detailed analysis of SEEING in Polish: also in this language, SEEING is much more than merely 'perceiving light through one's eyes.'

learned about the fact in an incorrect way, and/or the receiver may understand the message incorrectly). But *the difference in certainty is disconfirmed*; if such difference exists, it plays a very secondary role. The important point is the type of source, not the degree of confidence.

(2) Is it necessary to use conceptual metaphor to explain the epistemic meaning of these two verbs? As has been shown above, *metaphorical extensions are just a matter of language history***.** Synchronically, the "metaphoric" meanings or senses are so well entrenched that it makes no sense to try and see them in metaphoric terms. A lexical analysis in the terms of the cognitive definitions and the stereotypes as defined in the Lublin School of Cognitive Ethnolinguistics[16] seems much more useful and fits the mental reality of the speakers much better.

(3) Does culture play any role in the process? As we have had the opportunity to see, *culture does indeed play a very significant role*, to such extent that neither 'seeing' nor 'hearing' are simple "physical and physiological phenomena." They occupy a position in the "Icelandic linguistic worldview" forming a vast system that organises the Icelanders' need to know the source of knowledge and actions, as well as the degree of certainty in what they learn, *irrespective of the source*.

Icelandic is not alone in this organisation of vision and audition in its culture. We had a brief opportunity to consider some similarities in the use of these two verbs in Danish; it could also be extended to other Germanic languages... probably with the partial exception of English. There remains much research to do on this topic in the Northern European languages and elsewhere.

16 Zinken (2004, p. 116) on stereotypes: "Stereotypes are the 'building blocks' of the linguistic picture of the world. [...] Stereotyping is regarded a general mechanism of organising knowledge about entities (objects, acts, relations) in the world."

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Chapter 23

Self-Presentation of the Speaking Subject. Selected Interviews with Ex-Chancellors of the Marie Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin

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1. The Concept of Self-Presentation

The concept of self-presentation used in the title of this chapter has been borrowed into colloquial language from social psychology. It is understood, with some degree of simplification, as a picture of oneself encoded in the message sent in an interaction to an individual or collective receiver (Stach, 1989, p. 85). Researchers of self-presentation[1] believe that it is one of the most frequent of people's behaviors and results from their natural need to establish and maintain interpersonal relations: people are, in short, social beings.

Andrzej Szmajke treats self-presentational actions as natural instruments of social influence in interaction:

> A natural consequence of social contacts is the mutual influence that the participants in interactions exert on each other. One of the instruments or measures of social impact are self-presentational actions, directed at controlling the image of the self, the image that emerges in other people's minds during interaction. When we contact other people face to face or only symbolically – when "the others" are present merely in our mind – we usually modify our actions to present

1 Among well-known models of self-presentation there are: Erving Goffman's (1959) sociological model with his famous "theater of life" metaphor, the ideas of social psychologists (especially American), such as Edward E. Jones and Thane S. Pittman (1982) (the notion of "strategic self presentation"), Barry R. Schlenker (1975) ("natural self presentation" as a process automatically activated in the process of interaction) and his students (e.g. Mark Leary, 1996). Among Polish researchers of self presentation, Elżbieta Stojanowska (1998) and Andrzej Szmajke (1999, 2001) deserve special recognition.

> to "the audience" the specific image of the self. In other words, in real and symbolic meetings with other people we perform actions that help us make an appropriate impression, although often we do so unconsciously. (Szmajke 1999: 9)[2]

Szmajke claims that every type of action can be treated as self-presentational action, including verbalization (descriptions of internal dispositions, plans, expectations, results of actions and their interpretations, interests, attitudes and views), non-verbalization (smile, posture, gesture, appearance), and behavior (demonstration of views, beliefs, attitudes, and skills) (Szmajke, 2001, p. 166). He further claims that the public character of interaction, defined as the presence of an audience who observe the actor's behavior, undoubtedly facilitates self-presentational actions: "It is essential that with regard to the 'public' conditions of a situation, the individual needs to be convinced that some audience (an individual or a group) can connect his/her behavior with the person" (Szmajke, 2001, p. 147).

The concept of self-presentation is connected with the concept of viewpoint, for the understanding of which I follow Jerzy Bartmiński:

> [Viewpoint is] a subjective-cultural factor, decisive for the way an object is referred to, including its categorisation, the choice of the onomasiological basis for creating its name and the selection of features attributed to the object in specific utterances and entrenched in meaning. (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 77)

Viewpoint thus

> ... involves a mental aspect, prototypically connected with the human subject, who not only observes but also conceptualises (identifies, categorises and interprets) the object, in order to finally name it. (p. 107)

This broad attitude to the concept of viewpoint that connects it to an interpretation of phenomena by the speaking subject is basically a cognitive approach. Elżbieta Tabakowska comments on it in the following way:

> In this approach [broad, colloquial, A.N.] *viewpoint* has become identical to *worldview*, and the role of an ordinary viewer (the subject who automatically records what he/she sees) has turned into the

2 All quotations and examples from Polish translated by A.N.

> role of a conscious observer who not only chooses the object of observation but also enriches the observation with commentary (e.g. with axiological assessment). In this sense perception becomes interpretation. *Mutatis mutandis*, this assumption is also accepted by cognitive linguists, who claim that 'what enters consciousness is not a faithful replica of the stimulus, but an interpretation of it' (Sakita, 2001, p. 377). (Tabakowska, 2004, p. 49)[3]

In this way, the notion of viewpoint discussed in this chapter on the basis of specific data is linked with the notion of the linguistic worldview.

2. The Database

The present study derives from the oral history project "The people and the life of the Marie Curie-Skłodowska University (UMCS) in Lublin in accounts of its former chancellors," carried out at the university's Department of Polish Philology and initiated by Jerzy Bartmiński. Interviews with UMCS's ex-chancellors were conducted between 2008 and 2010 during an M.A. seminar for students of journalism. Most of the interviews were recorded during the seminar but some were later continued as individual meetings between the students and the chancellors. Both the chancellors and the students were enthusiastic about the project. Seven ex-chancellors were interviewed: Prof. Zdzisław Cackowski, Prof. Kazimierz Goebel, Prof. Marian Harasimiuk, Prof. Wiesław Kamiński, Prof. Wiesław Skrzydło, Prof. Józef Szymański, and Prof. Stanisław Uziak. The interviews are stored as part of the oral history collection (Archive of Oral History, abbreviated AOH/UMCS), a section of the more comprehensive Ethnolinguistic Archive of the Department of Polish Philology, UMCS.

The collected accounts can be called "stories of recollection," concerning the university's academic and scientific life, although in formal terms they fulfil the requirements of the genre of "conversation."[4] Their characteristic feature is a duality of the temporal plane: "now" (when I am speaking) and "then" (the time of the events being retold). In the archived collection, there are two types of

3 Tabakowska quotes Sakita, who in turn attributes the view to Wallace Chafe (1994).

4 I follow Żydek-Bednarczuk's view of conversation, defined as "a communicative event in a *face to face* encounter, verbally realised, involving at least two participants anchored in socio-cultural and situational conditions. The participants choose the theme for their conversation and try to realize their specific intentions. Success of the communication depends on the interaction between the participants, cooperation between them, and the theme of the conversation" (Żydek-Bednarczuk, 1994, p. 32).

recordings: semi-official conversations, in the presence of students, between Jerzy Bartmiński and the chancellors (equal partners, and co-workers), and individual interviews with the chancellors conducted by the students without a third party – the character of these meetings was rather private.[5]

3. The Analysis

While analyzing the data, I refer to individual speakers anonymously and follow the chronological order in which they held the office of chancellor.[6]

The first of the cited chancellors, Chancellor A, held his office in the years 1972-1981. He was nominated for the office by the Minister of Education. He portrays the role of the chancellor in the following way:

(1) The university was our common good. It should be important for all of us that we sail on board this ship and that the captain has to command the ship wisely, and if he commands it wrongly, he must be replaced, and all of us have to perform our duties properly to help the ship reach the harbor. That's how I see it. (AOH/UMCS, Tape 1655[7])

Chancellor A claims that the head of the university is like a ship captain, who commands, leads, has authority and makes decisions. The captain is also responsible for his crew. The speaker, one may guess, refers to himself. The passage contains many deontic modal verbs and plural forms of personal and possessive pronouns: *the university was our common good, it should be important for all of us, we sail, all of us have to*. This emphasizes the responsibility of the whole community: the university is a higher good that calls for collective effort, work, and sacrifice. Collective pronoun forms bring associations with the time of the People's Republic of Poland[8] and its distinctive idiom. In that period, homeland was viewed as the society's "collective duty" that required a joint effort to develop and be economically strong and stable.

5 As is confirmed by psychological evidence, the presence of a third-party audience plays a crucial role in communication and acts of self-presentation. The same rule applies to the relationship between the host of a meeting and his/her interlocutors. The host (thanks to his status, his knowledge, or his lack thereof) can prompt or obstruct the self-presentational acts of the other participants (cf. the quote from Szmajke (1999, p. 9) above).

6 Not all recordings contain memories of the "speaker-as-chancellor"; therefore, the analysis here pertains to recollections of six out of the seven chancellors interviewed. A fuller version with an analysis of all the interviews will appear in Niderla (forthcoming).

7 The numbers here are those in the Ethnolinguistic Archive catalog.

8 I.e., 1952-1989.

Chancellor B held his office in the years 1982-1984, which covered the period of Martial Law, a difficult chapter in Polish history.[9] Importantly, Chancellor B was nominated by the Ministry of Education, although he was politically independent. He emphasizes problems that he had to face during his term in office:

(2a) It was an atmosphere [suspension of voice], in this atmosphere it was necessary to salvage the honor and dignity of the university, people's dignity. In my report from that time, hidden deeply, I attack the Party, where the Party tries to take issue with me that it did everything right, etc., and only people were bad. Nobody looks into that report. It was not like that. Not like that. [cough] It wasn't true and it was necessary to rescue dignity. Nobody wants to remember today that there were only three universities in Poland where nobody was fired: it was the university in Warsaw, whose chancellor was a "collaborator" too, it was the university in Cracow, whose chancellor was later labeled a "collaborator," and it was UMCS. (AOH/UMCS TN 1614).

In the cited account, Chancellor B uses lofty-style words, evokes "high" values, such as honor, dignity (mentioned three times in this short excerpt) and juxtaposes them with lexis related to war and defense (*I attack*, *to rescue*, *to take issue*, *collaborator*). The speaker presents himself as someone who fought and rescued the dignity of the university and of its people. He uses the word *collaborator* twice and in presupposition he also uses it in relation to himself (*it was the university in Warsaw, whose chancellor was a "collaborator" too*) although he bears a grudge against the academic milieu for being, in his opinion, spitefully and wrongly judged as *collaborator* (cf. *Nobody looks into that report*, *Nobody wants to remember today*). The man accepted the chancellor's office from the hands of a communist minister and argues nowadays that his motive was to rescue the university, its *honor and dignity*, the dignity of its *people*, in a very difficult time. Denial is expressed three times: *It wasn't true*, *It was not like that*, *Not like that* – this makes the account dramatic and shows the speaker's disagreement with cursory interpretations of past events.

9 Martial Law in Poland lasted from December 13, 1981 to July 22, 1983. Strict measures and regulations were introduced, several public organizations including the trade union Solidarity were delegalized, strikes and demonstrations were prohibited, several large factories were militarized, telephone connections were disrupted, personal liberties severely restricted, a curfew was imposed, and many opposition activists were detained. Authority was handed over to the Military Council for National Rescue, led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski (Chmaj, Sokół, and Wrona, 2005, p. 322). For English-language in-depth accounts, see e.g. Paczkowski & Byrne (2007) or Russell & Cohn (2012).

However, Chancellor B also exposes his dislike and criticism of the intellectual level of the university's faculty and shows his lack of respect for their achievements:

(2b) I think that the office did not do me any good because for example I had always thought that our biologists were world-class people, broad-minded and everything... (AOH/UMCS TN 1614)

(2c) Thus I always claimed that the Faculty of Chemistry was good to make shoe polish. [cough] They were angry because of that and rightly so because of waveguide optics, because of this and that... After all waveguide optics was pure coincidence... (AOH/UMCS TN 1614)

When he sums up his term in office, Chancellor B concludes: *I think that the office did not do me any good.* And elsewhere:

(2d) So I think it was too bad that I was a chancellor because then I found out the shallowness of this university and how much it needs investment and modernization. (AOH/UMCS TN 1614)

That final statement is unequivocally negative: one can sense in it a certain distaste, bitterness, and a sense of failure. It is a failure as a chancellor and as a human being, misunderstood (in his opinion) by the academic community.

The next speaker, Chancellor C, was elected to the office by the university's Senate for the years 1984-1987. He declares that as an independent chancellor, chosen by the community, he was aware of the problems he would have to face dealing with the country's authorities. He knew he could not count on any support in his endeavor to make the university develop. The chancellor's role, he thought, was different: it was important to maintain the stability and the political independence of the university, as much as this was possible at the time.

(3a) I couldn't and I didn't count on any investments! But this wasn't my major goal. My priorities were completely different: to hold regular classes, to help the faculty work normally, to let them work in peace, without fear that, well, that they might be dismissed suddenly for some reason; this was my major goal. And one more thing: to become a little independent from the "mother-Party," as one of the party comrades said. (AOH/UMCS TN 1582)

(3b) ...the point was to make the university work normally, to make people feel safe – it was my fundamental, let me say, my primary role and my task... (AOH/UMCS TN 1656)

(3c) So I had a bit of help here... but also problems, as I said, because they wanted to fire some people, but in general I managed to maintain political independence from the authorities, you know. (AOH/UMCS TN 1656)

The structure of the excerpts above is based on such key words as *normally*, *safe*, *without fear*, *work*, *fire*, *independence*/*independent* (*from the authorities*/*mother-Party*). Chancellor C emphasizes his role as a defender of normality, the security of academic life and its uninterrupted work. He reassures the listeners that he strove with great determination for the political independence of the university. It is known from other sources[10] that his declaration is true. Chancellor C did not agree to the (socialist) Party's directives, and this move had grave consequences, e.g. many of the chancellor's initiatives, also investment initiatives, were blocked by the authorities. Nevertheless, the chancellor's account expresses satisfaction with a fulfilment of his duty during a peculiar time of political pressure. The speaker also alludes to the axiological dimension of his work: in his opinion, the chancellor's role was to protect, secure peace and a safe workplace for the employees. In his own eyes, he coped with the task well.

In accounts of the chancellors who held the office later, in democratic times, entirely different issues are stressed. For example, for Chancellor D (1993-1999), the material and economic aspects of university life come to the fore:

(4a) I suppose my biggest success was a high number of investments. [...] In that period I managed to obtain funds for a modernization of the university and I think that over the six years there was occasionally a minor budget deficit but generally it worked out. (AOH/UMCS TN 1627)

The chancellor concentrates on investments and economic matters (*my biggest success*, *investments*, *obtain funds*; *deficit*) and the narrator shows himself as an investor in a company, i.e. the university. In his view, modernization and enlargement of the "company's" capital are the measure of success achieved by its manager (*my biggest success*; *I managed*).

Chancellor D's assessment of his performance *qua* chancellor is also marked by self-satisfaction:

(4b) I do not consider that time as a lost time; it was an adventure, it was my great adventure! (AOH/UMCS TN 1684)

10 Jerzy Bartmiński (p.c.).

(4c) I think that the time when I was the chancellor was one of the coolest periods in my life and I had great fun... Sometimes I say impertinently, I had an amazing time with the university; I mean it: it was an adventure, I treated it as a great, six-year-long adventure. (AOH/UMCS TN 1684)

Chancellor D talks about being a chancellor as a period in his life that was light and enjoyable: his individual, *great*, *amazing adventure*, when he could test himself, his abilities and skills. His account reveals the individualism, personal ambitions, and self-confidence of a man satisfied with his achievements. The interview shows signs of egocentrism and undisguised satisfaction. One can even surmise that Chancellor D "creates himself" as a person of success or an "academic celebrity."

In the opinion of the next speaker, Chancellor E (1999-2005), the management of the university has a somewhat different character: it requires a broad perspective and a penetrating insight into university life:

(5a) I still maintain that the chancellor should be an enlightened ruler, which means seeing absolutely everything! [...] Here I suppose this enlightenment is a matter of a very broad perspective, the chancellor mustn't walk with his blinkers on and only see what's right in front of him; the chancellor must see, he must have a vision, he must see a long way in front of him. (AOH/UMCS TN 1629)

Chancellor E claims that the head of university's far-reaching and creative purview should embrace the whole university, not only the units or departments closest to him or her. Moreover, in his opinion the chancellor should be a visionary with specific ideas about the university and with plans for their implementation. The speaker uses a number of modal verbs (*should*, *must* x 3, *mustn't*) that stress the obligatory character of what is required of a chancellor.

Interestingly, the same speaker constructs another model that underscores different aspects of his work:

(5b) If I were to say a couple of words about my own personal experience, I walked just along that path because altogether I served in the university administration for eighteen years: I was a vice-dean for three years, then I was a dean for three years, later a vice-chancellor for six years and the chancellor for another six years – altogether that's eighteen years of continuous work. It was a path from the level of vice-dean, at the basic level of university structure, the faculty. One can say I was doing an apprenticeship that helped me become familiar with the university and I can immodestly say that when I was taking up the position of chancellor I thought I knew the university. But then I realized

> I must learn the university all over again because it is an entirely different perspective when you look at it from the position of a dean, vice-chancellor and finally from position of a person with full, one-hundred-percent, one-man responsibility for everything that happens at the university. This is the chancellor's situation, he has thousands of people under him, in our case it's 1800 academics and as many in other areas but the responsibility falls to one person. It is important to remember that there's a problem of trust, a certain confidence in the team that the chancellor has at his disposal, in the people, and, in my opinion, this is an essential condition of the good management of a university. A good team and confidence in people, the belief that the people you entrust with duties will fulfil them in good faith and to the best of their ability. And I think that it functioned this way. (AOH/UMCS TN 1629)

In this excerpt, Chancellor E says that the office of the university head is preceded by a long *path* to the top in the course of which you become familiar with the university but you *must learn it all over again* when the office is assumed. In his view, being a chancellor is a service with huge responsibility with two very important aspects: cooperation with people and confidence in them. In his own assessment, he managed to build this tripartite model: service – cooperation – trust. In this way, the chancellor could effectively manage the large community that the university is.

The last speaker, Chancellor F (2005-2008), when asked about his motives to accept the office, said:

> (6) There were some motives, when we talk about personal motives there was, maybe modest or maybe immodest, an assessment of my experience, because as I mentioned I had been for a long time in the community, inside this academic community, so at first the experience of almost thirty years of being within this community on the one hand, and on the other hand the experience I gained in academic institutions abroad... I wanted to make use of it for our community's sake because I believed that there are a couple of matters that are worth doing here, taking advantage of my experience for the sake of our environment, and it was a part of my program that I formulated then. [...] As for running for chancellor, in fact there were two reasons: on the one hand there were matters connected with the functioning of our academic community, let me say, with its functioning in the economic sense, and also with the structure of the community's management. There were some, let me say, past coincidences that caused financial problems we then had to cope with as a community. The goals that our university

> had always had was the desire to make this academic community a true community, aspiring to be one of the best universities in Poland, with appropriate scholarly impact, an appropriate educational offer, and not only that but in fact a realization of this offer – and this is one group of demands, that is, to implement some changes in the functioning of the university and to secure the financial conditions to realize this mission.
> *Speaker 2:* I understand that you judged them as not good enough?
> *Chancellor F:* Correct. Anyway, there was a formal basis for the judgment, that is, there was simply not enough money to introduce many of these programs that would raise the quality of teaching and research. Sometimes we painfully felt the lack of finances, the university had to take external loans and, you know, with a financial millstone round one's neck our big plans collided with reality, and in a natural way they had to be trimmed down. (AOH/UMCS TN 1635)

In this excerpt, we receive a picture of a chancellor who took his office with high aspirations and big expectations of himself and the academic milieu, someone who would not settle for second best. The speaker uses expressions that indicate his competence and professionalism, as well as the high standards he sets for himself: *my experience*, *the experience I gained*, *taking advantage of my experience for the sake of our environment*, *my program*, *appropriate educational offer*, *appropriate scholarly impact*, *to implement some changes in the functioning of the university*, *to secure the financial conditions*, *to realize this mission*, *to raise the quality of teaching and research*. The speaker declares himself to have had a vision of the university, its reform and development, by raising the quality of teaching, studying and research. In the excerpt there is a distinct personal, first-person viewpoint of the narrator. The viewpoint is realized through personal and possessive pronouns: *my experience*, *my program*, or (in another part of the interview) *the problem I had when I took the office*, *my observation*, *the pain I felt when I was about to begin my service as chancellor*, *I observed*, *I remember*, etc. The high frequency of these forms is the hallmark of what might even be described as a narcissistic attitude of the speaker, almost totally preoccupied with himself.

On the other hand, Chancellor F emphasizes the role of the community. In the excerpt he uses the word *wspólnota* 'community' nine times on its own and the collocation *wspólnota akademicka* 'academic community' three times.[11] It is a specific community (*this community*), located *here* in Lublin.

11 The numbers pertain to the Polish original, in the English translation they might be somewhat different.

The speaker refers to other places as *academic institutions*, but when he talks about his own institution, he says *academic community* (*this community, our community*), *our environment*, *our university*. Characteristic of this speaker is a high frequency of the inclusive possessive pronoun *our* (*our community*, *our big plans*), which emphasizes his emotional bond with the academic community.

Chancellor F portrays himself as a reformer who, unfortunately, did not achieve the success he had planned. In the last sentences of the cited fragment, he attributes the unrealized plans to the difficult financial condition of the university: *with a financial millstone round one's neck our big plans collided with reality, and in a natural way they had to be trimmed down.*

4. Conclusions

From the analyzed material emerge individual visions of what kind of figure the chancellor of UMCS can be. The visions are largely connected with and determined by the socio-historical conditions in Poland in different periods. The chancellors who held the office in the People's Republic of Poland emphasized the axiological dimensions of their work and highlighted such values as dignity, honor, security, or the political independence of the university. For the younger chancellors, whose terms fell during the time of democratic Poland (after 1989), the most essential factor was the economic situation of the university, the level of research and teaching, modernization of the university and a development of its infrastructure. Thus, several self-presentational models of the chancellor can be identified. Some of the labels for these models are expressions actually used by the interviewees, others are my inventions:

Model 1. SHIP CAPTAIN (Chancellor A). In this model the chancellor heads and commands a ship. He expects from his subordinates conscientious work for the university as "common good."

Model 2. RESCUER AND DEFENDER OF DIGNITY *versus* COLLABORATOR. (Chancellor B). The most contrastive model, permeated with a sense of the narrator's total personal failure. The chancellor shows himself as a man who fought for the good name of the university but was unjustly judged as an ally of the political authorities.

Model 3. GUARD OF UNIVERSITY'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE (Chancellor C). The chancellor's goal is clearly specified: to maintain the political independence of the university even at the cost of big sacrifices (e.g. lack of investments).

Model 4. INVESTOR/ACADEMIC CELEBRITY (Chancellor D). In this model the chancellor plays the role of the main businessman at the university. His major task is to take good care of the university's business with an emphasis on the development of its infrastructure. Characteristic of the chancellor is preoccupation with himself, being content and satisfied with his achievements on many planes of his activity.

Model 5. AN ENLIGHTENED RULER (Chancellor E). This model portrays the chancellor as a ruler with a broad perspective and penetrating insight. He is willing to put his trust in his co-operators despite his one-man responsibility for the whole university.

Model 6. MEMBER OF COMMUNITY/UNFULFILLED MANAGER (Chancellor F). The model is characterized by ambition and activism, a desire to implement large-scale changes and innovations. The chancellor's partial failure in these endeavors makes his satisfaction incomplete.

As one can observe, each of the chancellors describes his work by formulating (directly or indirectly) a model of the chancellor's office that stems from his aspirations and personal experience. Certainly, none of the models in isolation is equivalent to the overall comprehensive picture of the office of university chancellor; rather, each highlights some of its aspects and downplays others. With some approximation to and extension of Langacker's (1987, pp. 162ff.; 2008, pp. 215ff.) network model, each may be understood as an "access node" to a broader and more extensive network of relationships, duties, tasks, demands, etc. that a chancellor must face. Each is a "micro-network" that covers only a portion of the whole picture, which, in turn, can always admit new extensions, elaborations, and interpretations of its structure from a potentially infinite number of speaking subjects.

In the present analysis I only concentrate on the most conspicuous models, the most clearly expressed by each speaker, and refer the reader to Niderla (forthcoming) for the complete version. In some cases one narrator constructs two models of the chancellor; however, none of the models appears to have been constructed by more than one speaker. In all interviews one can identify certain self-presentational techniques, such as showing oneself in the most advantageous light, downplaying one's shortcomings and mistakes, emphasizing one's assets, positive personality traits, and achievements.

Were these techniques effective, however, in obtaining the favor of the audience? Judging from the behavior of the students who participated in the meetings with former chancellors, they indeed were. The students constitute a peculiar audience, inexperienced and in some measure naive. Their young age, unfamiliarity with the details of university life, or with broader sociological

and political conditions, in a natural manner render them susceptible to self-presentational techniques and limit their ability to verify the picture thus obtained. It is especially noticeable in comparing the data obtained during seminar meetings, run by Professor Jerzy Bartmiński,[12] with the data from individual conversations between the students and the ex-chancellors. During the seminar meetings the chancellors tried to avoid difficult and debatable questions, they restrained themselves in talk, avoided direct assessment of themselves. It may have been caused by the awareness that their interlocutor knows them well and can easily notice inaccuracies in their reports or question the information they provide. In contrast, during individual interviews with students, the ex-chancellors did not refrain from praising themselves or conveying self-promotional messages.

The structure of the interviews in the two contexts was also different. When the host of the event was an equal conversational partner, the conversation was subject to thematic discipline controlled by the moderator. In individual interviews with students, the chancellors were much more relaxed and expansive. However, this is a broader issue, worthy of a separate study.

12 Professor Bartmiński was a vice-chancellor of UMCS in the years 1991-1993 and maintains personal relationships with all of the ex-chancellors.

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Chapter 24

Linguistic Views of Enslavement in Biographical Narratives of Poles in Kazakhstan

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1. Preliminary Remarks

According to Leszek Kołakowski (2004), freedom can only exist where some things are permitted and others forbidden. Freedom of choice can be discussed in the context of democratic societies, while in totalitarian societies even permitted things are forbidden. In this situation, the difference between freedom and its absence gradually fades; as a result, people often try to adjust themselves to the context and, as much as possible, live their lives to the fullest.

When planning, years ago, field research among the Polish community in Kazakhstan, I knew that my prospective interlocutors, being a minority, had been neglected in the social life of the Soviet Union, publicly humiliated due to their nationality and religion, and forced to consent to a life in conditions imposed on them. The biographical stories I collected, however, make one reflect more deeply on the position of an individual in Soviet society and its consequence to my informants' construal of their situation, namely a profound conviction of being deprived of freedom. It is mainly manifested in the fact that none of the narratives include words or expressions equivalent to "enslavement," "loss of freedom," etc. Does that mean that the Great Terror had never taken place? On the contrary, it shows how disastrous its consequences were to people's mentality.

2. The Oral Sources Used and the Methodological Context

My research concerns the Polish diaspora in Kazakhstan, mainly descendants of the victims of Stalin's 1930s mass-deportation from the border regions of pre-WWII Soviet Ukraine. During that decade, around 250,000 Poles from the

Ukrainian SSR were deported to the Kazakh SSR. Many of these Poles were placed in isolation far from each other to prevent contact. They were placed on the desolate outpost of labor colonies in Northern Kazakhstan with no food or shelter, forced to survive on their own. Despite the help received from ethnic Kazakhs, thousands died of starvation, sickness, and exposure during the first few years.

In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev decided to grant freedom to the deportees, who could then choose their place of residence for the first time. Many Kazakhstani Poles moved to the cities to start professions in business and education. Others, however, stayed and worked on farms. Thanks to their organizational skills and work ethic, many Kazakhstani Poles were soon leaders of industry, government, and educational institutions in the Soviet Union. Thus, some of them were a part of the Soviet society and tried to adapt to the communist system. Therefore, their attempts to preserve their national identity are especially interesting.

Nowadays 40,000 Poles live in Kazakhstan. Half of them (18,700) live in the Karaganda region, with another 2,500 in Astana, 1,200 in Almaty, and the rest scattered throughout rural regions (Poujol, 2007, p. 91). Kazakhstani Poles are one of the country's communities with their own experience of everyday life in the Soviet regime. Their life stories reveal diverse details that together constitute a collective memory of the regime.

The data collected for my research consist of fifty-one interviews conducted in the North Kazakhstan and Akmola provinces between July and August 2009. The interviews were recorded in the following localities: Ozernoye, Stepnoye, Pietropavlovsk, Tayinsha, Chkalovo, Krasnokiyevka, Novoberezovka, Podolskoye, Kellerovka, Dragomirovka, Donietskoye, Litovochnoye, and Shchuchinsk.[1] The research was carried out within the contemporary framework of oral history. This method allows the researcher to grasp key elements of the reports, individual ways of reasoning, features characteristic of the linguistic worldview of the narrators as well as personal interpretation by the narrator of his or her experience of the past (see Schütze, 1990, 1997; Riemann & Schütze, 1992).[2]

The narratives are interpretations of past experience and seem to be structured according to individual conventions. The question I address in my research is how individuals, societies, and cultures use texts to represent the past. I apply the study of language to the concerns of oral history and demonstrate the usefulness of interviews for discourse analysis. In this context, it is important to consider the originality of the language of Kazakhstani Poles

1 A copy of my collection has been handed over to the Oral History Archive of the KARTA Center in Warsaw and will soon be published on the Center's website: www.audiohistoria.pl.

2 For the question of multiplicity of research perspectives in modern oral history, see Kudela-Świątek (2011).

– a mixture of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish – and the expression of their past experience through biographical narration. In focus are the linguistic exponents of the interviewees' traumatic narratives of national identity, childhood, work on Soviet collective farms and everyday life in a totalitarian society.

In these biographical stories told by Kazakhstani Poles, I was not looking for confirmation of already well-known historical facts; rather, my aim was to reconstruct my narrators' views of enslavement. This is sought in the application of the concept of linguistic worldview, which allows one to grasp, through analysis of linguistic data, the way persons or whole communities perceive, categorize, and mentally organize the world (cf. Kopińska, 2009). Investigation of the linguistic worldview of my interviewees provides access to their construal of the past.

The notion of the linguistic worldview that I follow is that proposed by Jerzy Bartmiński, who defines it as "the interpretation of reality encoded in a given language, which can be captured in the form of judgements about the world. The judgements can be either *entrenched* in the language, its grammatical forms, lexicon and 'frozen' texts (e.g. proverbs) or *implied* by them" (2009/2012, p. 76). The linguistic worldview is a common interpretation of reality from the point of view of average language users, which reflects their mentality and complies to their needs and aspirations (2009/2012, p. 24; cf. also Bartmiński, 2006a, pp. 12-16). Analysis of the linguistic view of enslavement in the narratives of Poles from Kazakhstan reveals the point of view of the narrators, their emotional attitude towards the events they describe, as well as their judgments of the attitudes of the people they mention in their stories. Understanding these concepts is not, however, possible without explaining the socio-cultural context in which the narratives are grounded. It is therefore important to emphasize the issue of bilingualism and its types among my narrators, along with their level of education and their social position.

3. The Languages of the Narratives

According to Julia Kristeva (1984, pp. 47-48), language is a symbolic interpretation of social convention; it reflects the laws and rules of how the convention functions. In the context of the present study, the language used by the narrator is a tool for constructing an image of the past, for positioning oneself in a specific socio-cultural environment, and for presenting the narrator's attitude towards the events being described (Lenkiewicz, 2005, p. 193). Among my narrators there were speakers of Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, the diaspora variety of Polish, as well as bilingual persons. The last category deserves closer attention since the resources of more than one language allow a speaker to create richer descriptions of the historical context. However, the

language of the vast majority of narratives is Russian; it is also present in the remaining narratives as a supportive element, in the form of Russian influences on vocabulary and grammar. The issue of "Russian speakerness" of my narrators is also an important one.

Russian now has an official status in Kazakhstan as the language of mutual communication between the various ethnicities that inhabit the country (Аренов and Калмыков, 1995) – Kazakhstani society has been multinational from the very beginning of its existence. The enormous differences among Kazakhstani citizens were "reconciled" in the same way as in the rest of the Soviet Union: by imposing Russian culture, understood by ideologists as a "new native culture" (Макеев, 1999, p. 63). As a result of an internationalist social policy, a new type of linguistically-defined social group emerged, called "Russian speakers": these are people who use Russian for everyday communication but who do not always identify themselves with the Russian Federation as a country or with its citizens (Макеев, 1999, p. 67).[3]

Russian linguists do not regard Russian-speaking communities in post-Soviet countries as belonging to the "Russian language community" because the variety of Russian they speak is vulgarized. It is the result of a long-term process of vulgarization in the period when it was the language of communication between nations inside the Soviet Union (Landau & Kellner-Heinkele, 2001, pp. 139-141, 159-162, 178-184). In the former Union republics it has for now been preserved in a "mummified" form and is in this form passed on further, both in everyday communication and through school education. It is not, therefore, the Russian language of Lev Tolstoy or Alexander Pushkin, but a relic of the Soviet reality. The differences are visible at the level of phonetics, vocabulary, and style of the narrations.

At present in northern Kazakhstan, there are a few localities whose inhabitants have managed to preserve their own language, such as Ozernoye, Podolskoye, Khrechany or Beloyarka, mainly in the sacral and ritual sphere, but also in domestic use. Among the inhabitants of these villages, the vast majority are Poles. In Ozernoye, the conditions for preserving their language were more favourable: half of the families in this locality use the south-eastern dialect of Polish spoken in the rest of the territory of Kazakhstan (Werenicz, 2010, pp. 270, 276). Bilingualism can only be found in villages: in the cities, the language of the Polish diaspora has been ousted by Russian and Ukrainian due to social pressure and general policy as well as a higher proportion of intermarriage (Werenicz, 2010, p. 275). Even in rural monoethnic communities, however, the

3 Incidentally, an additional factor now integrating this heterogeneous group is their confrontation with a national and religious revival of Kazakhs (Макеев, 1999, p. 66).

language of Kazakhstani Poles has been preserved only in spoken, not in written form. Among scholars, the prevailing opinion is that the future of Polish in Kazakhstan is probably doomed because the younger generation and those who have moved to cities usually become full-fledged Russian speakers (Ананьева, 1990, p. 203). The majority of those of my narrators who speak the language of the Kazakhstani Polish diaspora are in fact bilingual: they use Russian for everyday communication and the local dialect of Polish for contacts with the representatives of their own group (cf. Werenicz, 2010, p. 265).

Bilingualism has in this case a post-colonial aspect. It has been found that the language of the Kazakhstani Polish community is characterized by extensive mutual interferences and deformations between Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish. In many cases, especially in plays on words or folk proverbs, metaphors have been automatically calqued from Russian (Peyrouse, 2008, p. 107). The result is to a large degree a hybrid, but it is precisely through that language that its speakers define not only the world surrounding them but also their past experiences. Their bilingualism is a linguistic but also a socio-psychological phenomenon: it reveals the complex nature of the group's identity. However, because their narrations have often met with a certain degree of insensitivity, Kazakhstani Poles tend to feel alienated both in Kazakhstan and in Poland. In both countries they face serious adaptation issues related to the language barrier and therefore also a psychological barrier.

The problem is aggravated by insensitivity to viewpoint differences between the Poles in diaspora speaking Russian, Ukrainian, or their own variety of Polish on the one hand, and the Poles in Poland on the other hand, especially so because the latter group treat citizenship and national identity as synonymous and do not experience problems with linguistic competence. Importantly, notions such as "enslavement" have a different meaning for the Poles in Poland than for those in Kazakhstan, separated from their historical fatherland. Their respective viewpoints have been shaped in different socio-semantic spheres and historical circumstances. My narrators often use words for such notions as "homeland" (Bartmiński, 2006b) or "freedom" in the sense imposed by the Soviet ideology, rather than in their general understanding. However, in the literature on the subject these words are often translated directly, which contributes to the non-realistic image of the Polish minority in former USSR countries (Kudela-Świątek, 2010).

These reasons, as well as an excessive use of the term "Poles in the East" in public discourse, make it difficult to realize that in fact there is no such group. The Poles in Kazakhstan, Russia, or Ukraine are autonomous groups, using different varieties of Russian, Ukrainian, or Polish. In spite of the common experience of repressions under the Soviet rule, they understand the idea of "enslavement" in different ways, as the result of their individual experiences of the past. My focus is on the understanding of this idea by Kazakhstani Poles.

Because the vast majority of my interviewees come from a rural background and still live in post-kolkhoz settlements, the emotionality of their reports is evident. Linguistic studies of rural communities show that in the rural vision of the world everything must be not only named, but also interpreted and subjected to social judgement, with very strong pressure from the society (Pelcowa, 1999, p. 258). The linguistic rural world is shaped according to its own needs, adjusted to a life in harmony with nature and religion (p. 259). There is on the one hand a visible tendency to simplify the world by giving everything a new name, but on the other – also to enrich and expand it through the richness of vocabulary, word coinage, or the use of local names. My narrators felt, therefore, a need to create their own names for the enslavement they had experienced. In this way, the narrator aims to present to the listener not only a point of view, but also their emotional attitude toward the events being described.

4. Key Words

To achieve this goal, the narrator can adjust words, through various semantic transformations, to fit his or her individual needs, to accurately reflect the feelings and emotions experienced in the times of enslavement.

I suggest that the following words were used by the narrators in this way: "oppression" (Russ. *угнетение*),[4] "coercion" (Russ. *гнет*, Ukr. *притискати*),[5] "persecution" (Russ. *преследование*),[6] "bullying" (Russ. *издевательство*).[7] They can be captured under the rubric of a "lack of freedom" since they show the importance of the spatial component in the Russian understanding of freedom (Wierzbicka, 1997, pp. 138ff). The repressions experienced by Poles in Kazakhstan, especially the inability to move outside the borders of the kolkhoz settlement and the obligatory residence registration, indicate the dependent social position of my interviewees, portrayed in their narratives through images referring to physical restraint by an unknown external force that is referred to with the 3rd person plural form (the unspecified "they"). The oppressor is therefore not an individual, the leader of the country, but an abstract evil, with features attributed in Russian folklore to diabolical powers. It makes it easier for the listener to understand how the narrators conceive of the common stem *гнет*. The Russian noun *угнетение* is translated into English as *oppression* and means

4 Interview with Nina (Jadwiga), Aug 7, 2009, Kellerovka, 7:44-10:13.
5 Interview with Vitaliya P., Aug 9, 2009, Kellerovka, 21:41-24:00.
6 Interview with Maria L., Aug 7, 2009, Kellerovka, 33:40-34:00.
7 Interview with Galina Z., July 29, 2009, Petropavlovsk, 10:00.

a state in which an individual feels totally dominated and abused by another person, group of people, or an external causative force (Ожегов and Шведова, 1990, p. 822). It indirectly refers to the concept of "slavery," as in the phrase *угнетать рабов* 'to oppress the slaves' (Мокиенко & Никитина, 1998, p. 124). Consider example (1) (emphasis WKŚ):

(1) [Wiktoria Kudela-Świątek:] Have you ever considered your nationality an obstacle?
[Interviewee:] Me? I have, especially in childhood. We lived in such a sovkhoz! [...] My patronymic is Nina Cezarievna. [My father's name was] Cezary – right? They were laughing, called a dog like that. Well, we were somehow *oppressed*. Even my name they had to change. *Bullying.*
(interview with Nina (Jadwiga), Aug 7, 2009, Kellerovka, 7:44-10:13)

This speaker treats enslavement as a lack of possibility to decide about herself, as constant control from an abstract oppressing force that uses fear as a tool for organising the socio-political life in the country, as being stripped of human dignity, as instrumental treatment of individuals and groups (such as Poles in the Soviet Union), and as complete resignation to their slavish situation. Cf. also example (2):

(2) [WKŚ:] When did your First Holy Communion take place?
[I:] I had my First Holy Communion in the year 1955. No, 1956. I remember that because Father Kuczyński was with us. He's gone now, passed away, died a long time ago. He was also judged here, a nephew reported on him...
[WKŚ:] (surprised)
[I:] Yes – he... people were coming to him... books, booklets for the church and he was selling them, what else. The church had to be maintained, and what about him? Soviet books, the thick ones were for twenty – thirty kopieykas and he would take more. So he was "branded" as a speculator and locked up for ten years. And when they wanted to get rid of him, they would induce taxes. [...] They induced eighty thousand in taxes – the people collected it. And at that time thousands was more money, not like nowadays. All the people collected the money and paid it. And on the days that followed they said ninety thousand, *such was the bullying*...
(interview with Galina V., Aug 3, 2009, Novoberezovka, 34:36-36:28)

It is puzzling that the word for "repression" was not used in any of the narratives, while the phrase for "we were not free," to which I return below, did appear. To explain the situation in the country at the time, the narrators used words for such concepts as "discipline" (examples (3) and (5)), "orders" (Russ. *порядки*) (example (4)), and "severity" (Russ. *строгость*) (example (5)):

(3) [I:] ... there were loans. They would come to you – sign up for a "loan." And what else can you sign for. They weren't paying the salaries, the tax was high. For a cow... from the farmer they required ninety eggs. Whether you have the hens or not, you must give away ninety eggs. Thirty six kilograms of meat, and the man would not have even seen that meat (laughing), so where should he get it from, and that's the way they were... they were [treating] us... just like we were nothing; there was hard *discipline* towards us, very hard *discipline* we had until the death of Stalin, and after Stalin's death it was better. And when the times of Gorbachev came, then freedom started. Then everybody could say what they wanted, do what they wanted. That would be all...
(interview with Galina V., Aug 3, 2009, Novoberezovka, 46:46-49:06)

In this example, one can see a change in the semantics of the word for "discipline" under the influence of Soviet ideology: this person uses it in the sense of strict obedience of every citizen to the rules of behaviour established by public legislation and to the orders and commands of his or her superiors (Мокиенко & Никитина, 1998, pp. 166-167). Similarly with the notion of "social order": order is maintained through a system of punishments and rewards for, respectively, breaching or enhancing the discipline. In its broad meaning the Russian word for "order" is defined as a harmonious and predictable distribution of things. When used in the plural, however, it means social order, where public law is obeyed unconditionally (Ожегов & Шведова, 1990, p. 565). See example (4):

(4) [I:] ... and the commander was commuting. He lived in the district city. He would commute, wouldn't sit in a Russian hamlet, he would commute
[WKŚ:] would only commute to you
[I:] He would commute, yes. There were Germans also, a few German families, and also my friend, also a Pole, in another village forty kilometres away. We had been studying together and we both ended up there. Well yes, honey, that was the *orders* we lived in...
(interview with Galina S., Aug 7, 2009, Kellerovka, 51:43-54:18)

The term for "severity" is used to clarify the nature of that order. It is therefore interpreted as strict, meticulous obedience to the rules and connotes severe punishment for breaking them (example (5)):

(5) [I:] I have told you what I knew; what was all of it like and what was this Soviet power like, how they were throwing us away [...] and there was *severity*... such *severity*, what *severity* it was! One would be afraid to say anything honestly to another. And if he did, that would be the end of it! He'd make up a report and that's the end of it, would write it down and all's over! That's how it was,

that's how it was [...] such a terrible *discipline* there was...
(interview with Anna B., July 27, 2009, Ozernoye, 106:18-107:26)

The instrumental treatment of an individual in the totalitarian society is emphasised by the use of Russian verbs *вытрясли* 'they shook [us] out,' *выгрузили* 'they unloaded [us from the train],' *высыпали* 'they poured [us] out [in the steppe],' when reference is made to the very act of deportation. The obligation of complete obedience and acceptance of the prevalent ideology, including a public manifestation of the acceptance, required recanting their individuality and point of view. The result is a fatalistic attitude towards one's own life.

All expressions used by the narrators are united by the overriding idea of an enslaving social order, which totally subjects citizens to the absolute power of the state in every aspect of life. In this way, the speakers underscore the totalitarian (military) character of the Soviet rule – indirectly, through the description of their own feelings as individuals and citizens of the Soviet Union. Enslavement is understood by the narrators as a permanent state that involves every aspect of an individual's life as part of the Soviet society.

5. Enslavement as "the Lack of Freedom"

A characteristic quality of the interviews I conducted was their traumatic character, identifiable through the performance of the narrators. Because they are reliving their traumatic experiences, a narrator may reveal negative emotions in a sudden and uncontrolled manner. They may cry, shout, weep, stop speaking, or leave the room, thus breaking the conversation. The latter reaction occurs when the narrator is anxious that his or her emotional state will not be understood and so prefers to remain silent rather than revealing him- or herself in front of a stranger. This is usually a turning point in the interview, after which the narrator asks for the conversation to end or through his or her behavior forces the researcher to do so. At such moments, my interviewees tended to use single sentences, without contributing much to what has already been said. Welzer, Moller, & Tschuggnall (2009, pp. 380-381) describe them as "singular recurring sentences", which in my data can be exemplified with "it was hard,"[8] "living was hard,"[9] "I don't remember anything good – there was nothing good,"[10] etc. Expressions or pause fillers of this kind are used to change the topic or to conclude the exchange.

8 Interview with Maria T., Aug 1, 2009, Tayinsha, 6:00.
9 Interview with Galina Z., July 29, 2009, Petropavlovsk, 3:00, 10:00, 18:00.
10 Interview with Maria S., July 27, 2009, Ozernoye, 3:47.

This category of expressions, together with several other characteristic ones, such as "now it is easier to live but there is no time"[11] or "all has been seen, the goodness and the badness,"[12] "we were not free" (Russ. *мы были несвободные*), reveal the way in which the notion of "enslavement" is understood by the narrators. My interviewees point in this way to coercion from the state, a restriction of civil rights and liberties, and an interference of the state with the private lives of individuals. In the Russian linguistic worldview, the term *свобода* 'freedom' defines a state where an individual does not feel restricted or limited in any way, especially spatially. This understanding of freedom assumes also that it is granted and taken away by an external causative force (Wierzbicka, 1997, pp. 138-140). For Kazakhstani Poles, being enslaved (Russ. *несвободным*) therefore means coercion form state authorities and a feeling of personal enslavement; it means being deprived of the right to choose one's own walk of life, place of residence, work or education.

It is important to note that my interviewees were granted "freedom" quite late, towards the end of their lives, when the ability to decide about one's own fate is minimal. Their narrations are bitter with the inability to change their traumatic experience and to benefit from the freedom they sought for so long, however it is manifested. Therefore, one has the impression that the majority of my narrators use the word for "freedom" automatically, without a deeper reflection on its meaning. A vast majority of them were born after the deportation and grew up enslaved: it was their permanent state. Only after the collapse of the communist system were they "freed from slavery," and freedom was bestowed upon them from the outside (as it was, incidentally, taken away from their ancestors by the Communist oppressors). Because they had never experienced freedom before, they find it difficult to describe it, merely saying it is a state that is different from what was before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it appears that for Kazakhstani Poles "freedom" simply means "lack of enslavement," by virtue of the logical proof of assuming the opposite. This is different from the understanding of freedom by the Poles in Poland, who relate to the notion even when talking about the oppressor because they know what is lost or taken away (Бартминьский, 2009, p. 22). Incidentally, they also assume that the understanding of freedom and enslavement is common to all Poles regardless of their place of residence.

11 Interview with Maria B., July 27, 2009, Ozernoye, 8:28.
12 Interview with Anna B., July 27, 2009, Ozernoye, 111:00.

6. Toward Conclusions

The goal of my research was to study the image or view of enslavement in the memory of Kazakhstani Poles, as manifested in the linguistic aspect of their biographical narrations. For this purpose, I used Jerzy Bartmiński's (2006a, 2009/2012) understanding of the concept of the linguistic worldview. In my opinion, traditional historical research methods are ineffective in reconstructing the everyday life of Soviet Poles, especially because the group did not leave any tangible intellectual legacy such as memoirs or other researchable texts. Only by reaching for "live" source material in the form of recorded interviews, by systematically highlighting questions of language, narration and their interpretation, is it possible to uncover the character of the repressions faced by Poles or other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. This tallies well with Bartmiński's (2009/2012, p. 88) stress on the importance of the conceptualizing and speaking subject, his/her type of rationality, intentions, viewpoint, knowledge of the word, or system of values.

When studying biographical narratives, it is important to be aware of the significance of the language, structure, form, and genre of specific reports. A consideration of mere facts in a decontextualized fashion is insufficient. To properly interpret oral narratives, it is essential to employ not so much historical but rather linguistic methodology. The oral history interview combines various disciplines and allows for a multi-layered interpretation of reports on the events being described. Thanks to ethnolinguistic methodology for reconstructing the linguistic worldview, analysis of oral history sources allows for discovering the way that Kazakhstani Poles interpret past reality or construct their mental portrait of enslavement. A combination of the perspectives specific to various disciplines facilitates a more convincing, truthful, and richer reconstruction of the portrait. By resorting to the concept of the linguistic worldview, one can see that the interviewees present reality through concrete images, characters, and situations, avoiding abstract thinking. The past in their autobiographical creations seems therefore factual and tangible, with a clear mark left on their individual biographies. The suffering and the feeling of social exclusion were part and parcel of everyday life, rather than something extraordinary. These aspects of the interlocutors' past are hidden in but also revealed through the linguistic layer of their biographical narratives, especially through their peculiar diction.

The concept of linguistic worldview reveals the differences between the understanding of certain notions (here: enslavement) by communities based in and outside their historical homeland, and thus using different varieties of their language. This has been illustrated with the case of the Poles in Poland vs. those in Polish minority communities in the post-Soviet reality of Kazakhstan.

In order to successfully conduct research among those communities, the scholar must meet certain requirements. First, because the informants have lived in a multilingual context and frequently are bilingual themselves, they may code-switch during the interview and their performance may bear all the signs of the mutual interferences between the languages at play. Therefore, the researcher has to be competent in each of the languages so as to be able to extract the speaker's message from lexical, grammatical, and stylistic errors or inadequacies. Second, the results of the research must be presented in the most successful manner. This is problematic because a purely academic account is of interest to a restricted number of scholars and does not affect the mentality of the general public. On the other hand, too popular an account risks losing much of the semantic nuancing inherent in the data. A golden means must therefore be found: I hope that the present chapter has achieved just that.

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