

Part III

THE SYSTEM AND BEYOND

Chapter 12

Linguistic Categories in Onomasiological Perspective. The Category of Quantity in Contemporary Polish

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1. Linguistic Categories and Ethnolinguistics

In Polish linguistics, the term *linguistic categories* is understood broadly and has a number of meanings. In the popular Encyclopedia of General Linguistics (EJO, 1999), a linguistic category is defined as “a set of elements with the same function in the language system” (p. 290). A distinction is made between categories that function in different language subsystems, such as phonological categories (not identified in a separate entry), grammatical,¹ lexical,² syntactic,³ or semantic categories,⁴ as well as morphological categories⁵ (word-formational⁶

1 “A set of mutually exclusive grammatical functions inherent in all segments of a given part of speech and realized by means of specific morphological exponents, e.g. the category of case, gender, number, person, tense, mood, etc.” (EJO, 1999, p. 290).

2 “A class of words with the same semantic features, e.g. the category of animateness (a class of nouns denoting living creatures), color (a class of adjectives expressing the quality of color), masculinity, femininity (in animate nouns), action, state (in verbs, e.g. *go* vs. *sleep*)” (EJO, 1999, p. 290-291).

3 “A set of expression with the same syntactic value, i.e. characterized by the same potential syntactic applications” (EJO, 1999, p. 292-297).

4 “The term used in logic in two meanings. In a broad meaning, a semantic category is the same as a syntactic category. In a narrow meaning, it is defined – in extensional logic – in terms of a set of denotata of a given expression” (EJO, 1999, p. 291-292).

5 “A grammatical category identified through functional oppositions, signaled by the set of morphological exponents characteristic of a given morphological category” (EJO, 1999, p. 291).

6 “A unit of classification in the word-formational system, marked by: 1. the grammatical characterization of the world-formational base (e.g. de-nominal, de-verbal structures); 2. the functional relationship between the base lexeme and its derivative (action – the doer of the action; name – diminutive; a property in attributive function (*a white house*) – a property in predicative function (*the house whitens*)); 3. a set of word-formational means in structures that are identical from the point of view of both conditions above (e.g. a set of suffixes characteristic of Polish deverbal names of action doers)” (EJO, 1999, p. 292).

and inflectional⁷) as a subtype of grammatical categories. An analysis of the *EJO* entries under the rubric of “linguistic categories” (admittedly, written by various authors, such as Kazimierz Polański, Roman Laskowski, Stanisław Karolak, and Zygmunt Saloni) reveals, to say the least, a certain incoherence in how these categories are understood, identified and defined. For example, the definition of morphological categories makes no reference to the fact that they carry meanings rather than being semantically empty. Word-formational categories fall outside morphological categories thus understood, although new meanings are expressed by word-formational morphemes. Lexical categories, in turn, have been defined as if they had no typical morphological or syntactic exponents. This isolationist method of identifying and defining categories within a single language subsystem, representative of Polish linguistics of the latter half of the twentieth century, does not reflect the nature of language and the way that it operates. Above all, it seems to overlook the fact that language is a human product whose structure and functioning are inextricable from its speakers. As language creator and user, the human speaker does receive due attention in contemporary anthropological and cognitive linguistics, which assumes that categorization (i.e. seeing similarity in diversity) is an aspect of general human cognitive capacity and as such cannot be dissociated from natural language. In the process of cognizing the world, humans create concepts that facilitate an ordering of the reality being experienced. Some of these concepts find their way to language as the basis for diverse linguistic categories (Dirven & Verspoor, 2004; Grzegorzczkova & Szymanek, 2001). A major philosophical problem arises at this juncture: do concepts express real-world properties or do they reflect arbitrary linguistic convention? Grzegorzczkova (1996) reconciles the two extreme positions of objectivism and subjectivism by proposing that in the linguistically fragmented objective world, there are phenomena dependent on language to various degrees.

The study of language with a view to people’s interaction with reality embraces all three vertices of Ogden and Richards’ (1923) semiotic triangle: reality, its conceptualization and the corresponding linguistic forms (cf. Bartmiński, 2006; Kardela, 1990; cf. Gład & Prorok, forthcoming, for an elaborated view). Such is the approach proposed in cognitive linguistics, whose cornerstone is the assumption that language is both a creation and a tool of human cognition. Apart from the now classic examples of the cognitive linguistic enterprise (e.g. Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1987), its assumptions can also be found in the work of those contemporary linguists who – without calling themselves cognitivists –

7 “A regular opposition between the grammatical forms of a lexeme, found in many lexemes of the same type” (*EJO*, 1999, p. 290).

extend their focus beyond language itself and investigate its mental and cultural context. This attitude can be found in anthropological-cultural linguistics (e.g. Wierzbicka, 1988, 1996), and the ethnolinguistics practiced by contributors to the Lublin-based journal *Etnolingwistyka*. In the first issue of the journal, its editor-in-chief Jerzy Bartmiński wrote:

[the goal of ethnolinguistics] is to reconstruct the folk worldview that underlies language use and that is called upon as an informational substrate, the worldview that constitutes the basis of linguistic and cultural communication. ... [We aim to] directly or indirectly address the questions of how folk communal awareness, in its linguistic and non-linguistic behavior, dissects reality into elements and names them, from what viewpoint and with what degree of granularity the division is made, what relations are established between objects or events, what is the position of the human speaker, how are people's behaviors modeled depending on their social roles, etc. In short, the question is how language categorizes the world within the cultural frame. (Bartmiński, 1988, p. 16)

In a related account, the author writes that ethnolinguistics

deals with manifestations of culture in language. It investigates linguistic structure in relation to the history and culture of specific communities, especially with the mentality of the group, its behaviours and value systems. It attempts to discover the traces of culture on the very fabric of language, in word meanings, phraseology, word formation, syntax and text structure. It strives to reconstruct the worldview entrenched in language as it is projected by the experiencing and speaking subject, *homo loquens*... (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 10)

In Bartmiński's program of cognitive ethnolinguistics, the study of linguistic categories occupies an important position. The assumptions of ethnolinguistics endorse both the linking of all specific category types under the general term of *linguistic categories* and their hierarchical organization with *conceptual* or *semantic* categories at the top. Linguistic categories embrace both *grammatical* ones (including *syntactic* and *morphological* – *word-formational* and *inflectional* categories), as well as *lexical* and *phonological* categories. As has been said, the highest position in the hierarchy is occupied by *conceptual* or *semantic* categories (e.g. actions, processes, states; properties, animate and inanimate entities: person, animal, thing; quantity, size, time, space, etc.). Bartmiński follows Anna Wierzbicka in assuming that these are the most important both

for understanding language and for its functioning. But one may further ask what concepts are coded in language and how? This onomasiological research perspective, contrasted with the semasiological one,⁸ allows the linguist to (i) take note of the human subject as the one who – while experiencing and interacting with reality – constructs concepts and expresses them linguistically; and (ii) consistently describe diverse linguistic categories that function as exponents of the same content. From this perspective one can notice the isofunctionality of word-formational, inflectional, lexical, and syntactic categories. None of these constitutes an autonomous sphere; indeed, in communication they are used interchangeably and in connection with one another. The adoption of the onomasiological approach yields in effect a holistic (integral) description of language; in particular, it allows one to link phenomena from different language levels, e.g. lexis and grammar (syntax, word-formation, inflection). The theoretical bases of this method of description were laid out by Wierzbicka (1988) in her radically semantic approach to syntax and morphology. According to the author, numerous meanings are coded in languages not only in lexical units but also through grammatical (i.e. syntactic and morphological) means. The claim that all linguistic forms are semanticized or motivated is also a fundamental tenet of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 2008). In the Lublin team, this descriptive method has been applied in studies of space (Adamowski, 1999), sex and gender (Nowosad-Bakalarczyk, 2009), the subject (Majer-Baranowska, 2005) and time (Szadura, 2012). I propose now to look at the category of quantity from the same perspective.

2. Quantity: General Remarks

The category of quantity is one of the basic categories imposed on the world by the human mind. It is one of the ten categories recognized by Aristotle (e.g. Aristotle, 1975) as those used to describe the world. Also Kant's (1952, [1781/1787]) categories of the mind that condition the cognitive interaction with the world include quantity as one of the four primary respects in which one can classify a judgment.

⁸ *Onomasiology* comes from Greek *onomazó* 'I call/name', *logos* 'knowledge, science.' The term was introduced to linguistics by Tappolet (1895) with reference to comparative lexicology. Then, under the influence of Zauner (1902), it began to be used with reference to the branch of linguistics concerned with the study of word meanings, similarly to semasiology. The difference between onomasiology and semasiology is the directionality of semantic inquiry: from meaning to form in the former case, the reverse in the latter case. The onomasiological perspective is used by Dokulil (1962) in a description of word-formational categories.

People measure and count in continual attempts to determine the size, quantity or number of nearly all aspects of the world they experience. All kinds of ontological entities are subjected to these attempts:

- a) objects: concrete objects (including people, animals, and plants), inanimate objects (both natural ones and artifacts), and abstract objects;
- b) events (activities, processes, states);
- c) properties of objects and events;
- d) space and time, the necessary environment of all being.

I assume that the category of quantity is a human (mental and linguistic) means of capturing the quantitative relations identified by humans between the real and the imaginary entities around them. The quantitative characteristics of the world (the relations being identified) are constructed within the frame of specific parameters (mainly spatial but also temporal), attributed to object and phenomena in the (mainly material) world. The parameters result from the cognitive interpretation of reality performed by humans on the basis of their multigenerational and communal psychological, social, and cultural experience. In other words, they result from the human perception, observation, and categorization of the world, the ability to recognize similarities and differences, to abstract away commonalities and arrive at generalizations. Comparisons of these parameters represent a quantitative procedure (cf. Bogusławski, 1973, p. 10; Feleszko, 1980, p. 20).

For a quantitative parameter to be applied to an object, that object must have a positive ontological status, i.e. it simply must exist (in the real or a mental world). This, according to Rudzka-Ostyn (2000, p. 208), is in itself a form of quantification that pertains to the parameter of "existence – non-existence." The author further notes that non-existence is in fact one of the points that limit the scale range from maximum value to zero. Zero values on appropriate scales indicate the non-existence of objects, their temporary absence or non-participation in a given event.

An assessment of quantity results from comparisons made at various levels of abstraction. According to Krumova (1989), the exponents of cognitive operations on a lower level of abstraction are elements such as *one*, *many/much*, *more*, *less/fewer* and *the same (number/amount)*, used when "the precise quantitative characterization is either redundant or unattainable" (Krumova, 1989, pp. 27-28).⁹ A high level of abstraction, in turn, is connected with counting and measuring, which allows one to arrive at a number and so characterize the world with precision. This is because the linguistic exponent of this operation

⁹ Wierzbicka's (1996) set of semantic primes contains the units ONE and MANY (MUCH) but also TWO. The primes used for direct comparisons contain the element MORE.

is the numeral: a linguistic category that has emerged “as the highest case of quantitative abstraction,” for it facilitates an expression of quantity totally dissociated from quality (Krumova, 1989, p. 28).

Quantitative characterization is linked with how the quantified entities exist and with human communicative needs.¹⁰ By saying “how they exist” I mean both objective properties of the world and their subjective perception by language speakers (Grzegorkzykowa, 1996). The real or mental mode of existence influences both quantification as such and its linguistic expression. The key role is played here by such aspects of quantitative relations as countability/uncountability (on the basis of divisibility/non-divisibility) and quantitative definiteness/indefiniteness. These dichotomies give shape to the field of the *semantic category of quantity* and introduce a peculiar hierarchical structure within it. In the center of the category there is a quantitative characterization of countable objects, events, and their spatio-temporally defined properties. The peripheries contain a quantitative characterization of uncountable but measurable objects, phenomena, and properties.

Quantitative relations are coded linguistically through a variety of means. At the sentence level, quantitative characterization can be found both in the noun and the verb phrase. I will consider these separately, although – and I say more on this below – (quantitative) conceptual structures/schemata imposed on the conceptual archetypes of things and events that correspond to the two types of phrase are essentially the same.

3. Quantifying Things

We count entities that are limited spatially (the usual situation, pertaining to material objects) or temporally (in the case of events or abstract entities), that have a defined shape against their background, and that are discrete or “morphous” (Bogusławski, 1973, p. 8). According to Feleszko, counting consists in

specifying how many times within a given segment of reality one can find objects that have a certain size and that are linked with the same predication (e.g. to say *two chairs* or *three chairs* is to state that objects linked to the predication of ‘being a chair’ are located within a given segment of reality two or three times). (Feleszko, 1978, p. 5)

10 Attention to the context of language use, to “who and why verbally and non-verbally interacts with others by using language in communicative acts, how they formulate their thoughts with the help of the linguistic resources available and how they interpret whatever is directed to them” is the foundation of communicativism (Korzyk, 1999, p. 11).

The distinct natural or artificially delimited shapes of the objects against their background make them capable of being located in a given segment of reality *n* times.

The morphous aspect of entities does not, however, decide their countability, since some morphous objects are categorized as unique: no sets composed of identical elements are possible here. Such is the case with objects referred to by means of proper nouns: *London*, *John Smith*, *Oxford University*. These are juxtaposed with common nouns, which can label sets of elements considered identical (homogeneous), e.g. *cities*, *people*, *universities*.¹¹

The names of countable objects are subjected to *numerical quantification*, which in the noun phrase is closely connected with *referential quantification*. Both types pertain to the reference of the information in the sentence (cf. Feleszko, 1987; Karolak, 1989; Roszko, 1993; Topolińska, 1976). As shown by Anna Wierzbicka (1969, p. 99), the Polish quantifiers such as *niektórzy* 'some,' *wielu* 'many,' or *dwóch* 'two' occupy the same position in sentence structure: the indefinite quantifier *niektórzy* 'some' may be substituted with the definite quantifier, i.e. a numeral, as in *Niektórzy chłopcy/kilku chłopców/dwaj/dwóch chłopców bawiło się/bawili się na podwórku* 'Some boys/two boys played in the backyard.' As evidence for a strict correlation between information of quantification and definiteness in Polish and other Slavic languages, consider the opposition between the Genitive and the Accusative cases as direct objects: the partitively unmarked Genitive is also unmarked with regard to definiteness (*Daj mi chleba* 'Give me bread-GEN,' i.e. 'Give me some bread, any amount of bread that there is'), whereas the Accusative case is non-partitive, "holistic" and marked with regard to definiteness (*Daj mi chleb* 'Give me bread-ACC,' i.e. 'Give me the bread/all the bread that is here').

The morphological center of exponents in numeral quantification is the grammatical category of number. This category serves to express information about the number of objects named with a given noun, in contemporary Polish the number being one (*Wychowuję dziecko* 'I'm raising a child,' *Mam psa* 'I have a dog,' *Oddaj mi książkę* 'Give the book back to me') or more than one, without the need to specify the number precisely (the elements of the set are homogeneous and the set is infinite). Thus the grammatical category of number in connection with nouns, and more specifically the subcategory of *pluralis*, expresses the meaning of an *indefinite divisible set* (*Dzieci bawią się w ogrodzie* 'The children are playing in the garden,' *Psy biegają po podwórku* 'The dogs are running around

¹¹ Of course, as extended cases, there may be sets of many Londons (cities called *London*) or John Smiths (people called *John Smith*) but the elements of these sets are not "identical"; indeed, they are only grouped thanks to their common name.

in the backyard,' *Książki oddałam do biblioteki* 'I have returned the books to the library'). Moreover, the elements of the set are viewed as the same: we cannot count objects that we consider heterogeneous, e.g. *krzesło* 'chair,' *stół* 'table,' *szafka* 'cabinet' are not **trzy meble* 'three furnitures' but just *meble* 'furniture' (without numeral quantification but with a possible partitive quantification, as in *zestaw/komplet mebli* 'furniture set') or *umeblowanie* 'furniture'.¹² Besides, the set contains an infinite number of elements (can collocate with any numeral) and any number of identical items can be isolated within it. Depending on our communicative needs, we can indicate how numerous the set is or how far it departs from a norm: this can be achieved by means of quantifiers (*dużo/wiele* 'many,' *mało* 'few'), nouns with a quantitative meaning (*masa* 'mass,' *góral/kupa* 'heaps/piles'), numerals expressing an order (*setki* 'hundreds,' *tysiące* 'thousands,' *miliony* 'millions,' *miliardy* 'billions' (of people)). At the syntactic level, the set's approximate boundaries can be indicated by means of the following structures:

- a) the lower limit: *ponad* 'over' / *co najmniej* 'at least' / *nie mniej niż* 'not fewer than' + numeral + noun (e.g. *ponad/co najmniej/nie mniej niż dziesięć książek* 'over/at least/not fewer than ten books');
- b) the upper limit: *do stu* 'up to a hundred' / *najwyżej* 'at the most' / *nie więcej niż* 'not more than' / *mniej niż* 'fewer than' (e.g. *nie więcej niż/mniej niż sto osób* 'not more than/fewer than a hundred people');
- c) a quantitative interval: numeral + numeral + noun (*dwie-trzy godziny* 'two to three hours'), *od* 'from' + numeral + *do* 'to' + numeral (*od piętnastu do dwudziestu osób* 'from fifteen to twenty people/between fifteen and twenty people');
- d) an approximate value: *około* 'about/around' + numeral (*około stu osób* 'around a hundred people'); also with the numerals *kilka* 'a few' (3-9), *kilkanaście* 'a dozen or so' (11-19), *kilkadziesiąt* 'a few dozen' (20-90) (Duszkin, 2010).

The size of the divisible set can also be precisely identified thanks to the special lexico-grammatical category of the numeral. As names of universal entities, i.e. numbers, numerals can express, in connection with nouns, a *definite divisible set* with quantitative specification (*pięć książek* 'five books').

¹² The fact that a language has regular numeral forms does not decide the countability of objects. Wierzbicka (1985, p. 288) shows that the use of a numeral with a noun does not mean that the object being denoted is countable and discrete: in *I like only three vegetables: spinach, broccoli and celery*, the expression *three vegetables* refers not to three objects but three kinds of "material." Counting here pertains to kinds, not individual items. In Wierzbicka's view, *vegetables* is a "material" noun, not a count noun.

With countable objects, a partitive quantification is also possible: *ćwiartka jabłka* 'a quarter of an apple,' *fragment wiersza* 'a fragment of a poem,' *odcinek drogi* 'a section of a road.' Countable objects can also be linked into closed sets: *zbiór książek* 'a collection of books,' *kolekcja znaczków* 'a collection of stamps,' *zespół tancerzy* 'a troupe of dancers.' The sets are in partitive relation with regard to an indefinite divisible set (expressed with a plural form) as a closed subset, which can then be subjected to numerical quantification: *dwa zbiory książek* 'two collections of books,' *pięć zespołów tancerzy* 'five troupes of dancers,' etc.

In opposition to concepts sharply delimited in space, there stand concepts that appear as continuous without definite spatial criteria and therefore uncountable, non-amenable to numerical quantification, e.g. *woda* 'water,' *piasek* 'sand,' *ryż* 'rice,' *trawa* 'grass,' *mięso* 'meat,' *powietrze* 'air.' The only possible quantification here is of the partitive type, when a portion of a given substance is delimited, e.g. *kropla/szklanka/litr/tyk wody* 'a drop/glass/liter/gulp of water,' *ziarno/wiadro/tona piasku* 'a grain/bucket/ton of sand,' *ziarno/woreczek/kilogram ryżu* 'a grain/bag/kilo of rice,' *kęs/porcja/kilogram mięsa* 'a bite/portion/kilo of meat,' *haust powietrza* 'a lungful of air,' etc. The measurement requires that discreteness be imposed on the substance by means of (i) conventional units (*metr tkaniny* 'a meter of fabric,' *tona piasku* 'a ton of sand,' *kilogram cukru* 'a kilo of sugar,' *litr wody* 'a liter of water'), (ii) the names of natural forms of existence (*główka/ząbek czosnku* 'a clove of garlic,' *kolba kukurydzy* 'a corncob,' *kiść/grono winogrona* 'a bunch of grapes,' *żdźbło trawy* 'a blade of grass'), (iii) the form of production or storage of a given substance (*tabliczka czekolady* 'a bar of chocolate,' *kostka masła* 'a slab of butter,' *motek wełny* 'a skein of wool,' *zwój drutu* 'a roll of wire,' *ryza papieru* 'a ream of paper,' *bela materiału* 'a bale of fabric'), (iv) the names of containers used for wrapping or measuring portions of a given substance (*butelka/lampka wina* 'a bottle/glass of wine,' *wiadro/szklanka/łyżka wody* 'a bucket/glass/spoonful of water,' *karton/woreczek mleka* 'a carton/bag of milk'). Artificially introduced discreteness allows one to arrive at a precise numerical quantification, e.g. *dwie szklanki wody* 'two glasses of water.' Naturally, what is measured is not the amount of the substance but the number of its portions (meat + meat + meat are not **trzy mięsa* 'three meats' but *trzy porcje mięsa* 'three portions of meat'). Bednarek (1994) identifies 107 unconventional units of measurement, which due to their peculiar collocability and semantics he calls "classifiers." For example, the word *kropla* 'drop' can only occur with liquids, *garstka* 'handful' or *szczypta* 'pinch' only with dry goods, whereas *łyżka* 'spoonful' with either type; *rulon* 'roll' only occurs with materials that can be rolled, *motek* 'skein, hank' only with *wełna* 'wool,' *włóczka* 'yarn,' or *nici* 'thread.' An analysis of these units reveals a criss-crossing of the categories of quantity and quality. Some units (e.g. containers) demonstrate broad collocability, others narrow collocability (e.g. *tabliczka (czekolady)* 'bar (of chocolate)'); some indicate the shape of the portion (*motek* 'skein,' *rulon* 'roll,' *warkocz* 'plait'), size, number

or amount (*szczypta* 'pinch,' *kapka* 'smidgen,' *okruch* 'crumb,' *ździebko* 'speck,' *kupa/góra* 'heaps,' *chmara* 'swarm'), or the substance's nature (*ktąb dymu* 'cloud of smoke' – a volatile or airy substance).

The difference between countable (morphous) entities and uncountable ones (substances) is obliterated, for example, in the case of countable objects with a clear shape (whose names have a regular numerical paradigm) but used as substances in the production of other objects. An obvious case are foods used as a "material" for making dishes: vegetables (*jem marchewkę*, lit. 'I eat carrot,' although it is usually more than one; *pęczek rzodkiewki* 'a bunch of raddish'), fish (*lubię dorsza* 'I like cod,' *ryba po żydowsku* 'fish Jewish style'), fruit, especially small kinds, rarely handled in small numbers (*Truskawka jest po 7 złoty za kilogram* 'The strawberry is 7 złoty a kilo' (in wholesale)). The use of the singular form underscores the material side of the entity and neutralizes its morphous nature. And, as has already been mentioned, the reverse process of delimiting a portion of a substance endows the latter with a specific shape, defined spatially or temporally (cf. Kardela, 1996).

Uncountable names, non-amenable to numerical quantification, also include the names of collective sets. A *collective set*, in contrast to a *distributive set*, which is unfinished, divisible, and homogeneous, is finished, indivisible and heterogeneous. A qualitative characterization of the set is not tantamount to the individual characterizations of its elements and cannot be derived from their sum. The basic linguistic exponent of collective sets is the category of collective nouns (*nomina collectiva*), which can be viewed in a narrow or broad perspective (cf. Habrajska, 1995). In the narrow understanding, collective nouns are derived forms, in opposition to both singular and plural forms, which contribute certain semantic elements only found in collective contexts, perceived and identified by humans: they point to the totality of the "object" (*dziecko – dzieci – dzieciarnia* 'child – children-PL – children-COLL';¹³ *adwokat – adwokaci – adwokatura* 'lawyer – lawyers – the Bar') or to spatial concentration, distinctiveness against the background, or internal ordering (*ptak – ptaki – ptactwo* 'bird – birds-PL – birds-COLL (birdlife)'; *robak – robaki – robactwo* 'bug – bugs – bug-COLL (buglife)'; *mebel – meble – umeblowanie* 'a piece of furniture – furniture-PL – furniture-COLL'). In Polish, the meanings are expressed by several suffixes, e.g. *-stwo* (*nauczycielstwo* 'teachers-COLL'), *-ina/yna* (*brzezina* 'birch wood,' *buczyna* 'beech wood'). With these nouns an additional means of expressing the collectivity of the set (multitude captured as unity) is the singular form: the nouns in this group are predominantly *singularia tantum*.

The broad understanding of collective nouns embraces a few subgroups. For example, the meaning of a *quantitatively indefinite collective set* with an

¹³ For "collective."

approximate number of elements can be expressed with such nouns as *stado* 'herd, pride, pack, flock,' *grupa* 'group,' *tabun* 'herd (of horses),' *rój* 'swarm,' *sfora* 'pack (of dogs/wolves),' *oddział* 'unit, squad, troop,' *zespół* 'team,' characterized by considerable syntactic dependency. They nearly always occur in a noun phrase in which a set is named with a different noun, e.g. *grupa studentów* 'a group of students,' *oddział żołnierzy* 'a troop of soldiers,' *sfora psów* 'a pack of dogs' (Feleszko, 1980, p. 48). The meaning of a *quantitatively definite collective set*, in turn, is expressed by nouns containing in its meaning a specific number of elements, e.g. *para* 'couple,' *trio* 'trio,' or *kwater* 'quartet.'

In addition, the semantics of a collective set can be found in some *singularia tantum*, namely those that name objects of different kinds but that are linked by a common function or location, e.g. *odzież* 'clothing,' *obuwie* 'footwear,' *żywność* 'food.' They are not subject to numerical quantification because they embrace divers objects; a partitive quantification is sometimes possible, e.g. *część żywności* 'a part of (the) food (we have).' Finally, the semantics of a collective set is also found in those *pluralia tantum* that, as Wierzbicka (1985, p. 275) says, are for the same reason located in the same place at the same time, e.g. *leftovers*, *nuts-and-bolts*, *odds-and-ends*. The author notes that the collective-set semantics can be also assumed by some nouns that usually enter into a regular numerical paradigm, e.g. *dishes* in *Mary asked Bill to do the dishes* does not denote an open distributive set (dishes of the same kind counted separately) but a closed set of different kinds of dishes that are here and now for the same reason. Similarly, *shoes* in *I got myself new shoes* denotes a single pair (the left and the right shoe) designed to be worn on my feet (cf. Wierzbicka, 1985, pp. 283-285).

4. Quantifying Events

A quantitative characterization of events includes information on whether a given event is punctual and temporally located, a-temporal, without a fixed value on the time's arrow, or perhaps iterative or durative over a stretch of time (cf. Grzegorzczkova, 1973). Quantification in the verb phrase thus indicates how many times, over what period of time and/or for how long a predication characterizes a given argument.

The expression of the number of events is linked with seeing them as discrete (divisible) or non-discrete (indivisible). In the case of events, discreteness usually has a temporal nature, although spatial discreteness is also occasionally found, as in the case of actions composed of several simultaneous but spatially dispersed individual acts, e.g. *napaść Szwedów na Polskę w XVII wieku* 'the Swedish invasion of Poland in the 17th c.' Countable events are those whose beginning and end are located in time and which are linked with the subject at a point in time (e.g. *Raz spóźnił się na wykład* 'He was late for the lecture

once,' *Pięciokrotnie wyjeżdżał nad morze* 'He went to the seaside five times'). Uncountable events, in turn, are perceived as states characterizing the subject over a long period of time, always, or beyond time (e.g. *Zna literaturę francuską* 'She knows French literature,' *Lubi filmy Woody Allena* 'He likes Woody Allen's films,' *Ziemia kręci się dookoła Słońca* 'The Earth revolves around the sun,' *Dwa plus dwa równa się cztery* 'Two and two make four').

The basic quantitative opposition in discrete events is that between single-actionality and multi-actionality, which basically expresses the individuality or the multiplicity of the action being performed. Most of the time quantification is approximate and numerically indefinite; the need for the exact number of individual actions arises rarely (Krumova, 1989, p. 36).

A single-act action is expressed by an individually quantified verb phrase, a multi-act one by a universally or existentially quantified group. Single-actionality and multi-actionality are above all expressed at the morphological level by means of the verb's aspect (perfective, as in *odwiedził matkę* 'he paid his mother a visit,' *pojechał do szkoły rowerem* 'he cycled to school,' or imperfective, as in *odwiedzał matkę* 'he would/used to visit his mother,' *jeździł do szkoły rowerem* 'he would/used to cycle to school') or the type of the activity. Single-act actions are expressed by "individuating" verbs, e.g. the punctual *runąć* 'collapse,' *pisnąć* 'make a squeal,' whereas multi-act actions are expressed by "multiplying" verbs, e.g. by the iterative *pisywać* 'write regularly,' *jadać* 'eat regularly,' etc.

A multi-act action may consist of distinct sequentially performed acts, e.g. *zarządzać* 'manage, administer,' *leczyć* 'treat, cure,' *popiskiwac* 'squeal from time to time.' It may also consist of individual acts performed by many subjects (the so called multi-subject verbs), e.g. *Uczniowie pisali sprawdzian* 'The students were writing a quiz,' or of individual acts performed by one subject on many objects (multi-object verbs), e.g. *Lekarz zbadał pacjentów* 'The doctor examined the patients.'

An important role in expressing quantitative information is played by additional lexical means, which at the syntactic level may complement or modify a given quantitative characterization contained in the verb's meaning. For example, an activity expressed with a "multiple" verb may be marked as individual thanks to the use of lexical exponents of individuality: adverbial expressions such as *jeden raz/jednokrotnie czytał tę książkę* 'he read the book once,' time adverbs such as *wczoraj/dzisiaj grał na gitarze* 'he played the guitar yesterday/today,' nouns that denote a certain period of time such as *zimą jedzie w góry* 'in winter he's going to the mountains,' prepositional phrases that contain time-denoting nouns such as *w poniedziałek idzie do kina* 'on Monday he's going to the cinema,' adverbial expressions containing a specific number or a marker of definiteness, denoting points in time, e.g. *tego wieczora/ostatniej nocy/10 stycznia/o piątej dzwonił do matki* 'he called his mother that evening/last night/on Jan 10/at five o'clock.' Also the reverse is true: an activity expressed with an individuating verb may be

classified as multiple through the use of lexical means (*rzadko* 'rarely,' *od czasu do czasu* 'from time to time'), which also make it possible to express deviations from a norm, e.g. *Od czasu do czasu przeczytał jakąś książkę* 'He would read a book from time to time.'

Both an indefinite and a definite multiple activity can be expressed by means of quantitative exponents of frequency. In the case of indefinite activities, these are adverbs and adverbials of the type *często* 'often,' *codziennie* 'every day,' *przez cały dzień* 'all day long,' *całodobowo* 'round the clock,' *co godzinę* 'every hour,' *cały miesiąc* 'the whole month,' *co miesiąc* 'every month,' etc., e.g. *Co godzinę sprawdzam wiadomości* 'I check my e-mail every hour.' In the case of definite activities, these are the adverbs of the type *dwukrotnie* 'twice,' *trzykrotnie* 'three times,' *pięciokrotnie* 'five times,' etc. (e.g. *dwukrotnie odwiedzał matkę* 'he visited his mother twice'), as well as adverbials containing numerals, e.g. *trzy razy* 'three times,' *pięć razy* 'five times' (*przełynął basen* 'he swam the length of the pool').

Non-discrete events are measured. The measure employed is the duration of the activity defined through a comparison containing the elements *mniej* 'less,' *więcej* 'more,' *tyle samo* 'the same, equally long' (*Dzisiaj spałam więcej/mniej/tyle samo co wczoraj* 'Today I slept shorter than/longer than/as long as I did yesterday') and a reference to a norm (e.g. *dużo/mało spać* 'get a lot/little sleep'). This kind of comparison facilitates an expression of indefinite quantity. Among the exponents of this operation there are also additional lexical resources (exponents of durative activity) at the syntactic level, e.g. adverbs: *dużo* 'much, long,' *mało* 'little, short,' *wystarczająco/niewystarczająco* 'enough/not enough,' *długo* 'long,' *krótco* 'short'; adverbials: *całe dni* 'for days,' *całe noce* 'for many nights,' *cały czas* 'all the time,' etc. In these cases we are dealing with an indefinite quantity above a norm (*dużo* 'much,' *długo* '(for a) long (time),' *wieki* 'for ages,' *wielokrotnie* 'many times') or below the norm (*mało* 'little,' *krótco* '(for a) short (time),' *niewystarczająco długo* 'not long enough').

Indefinite quantity, in the case of events, can also be expressed by indicating the lower or the upper limit by means of expressions such as *od dawna* 'since long ago,' *od soboty* 'since Saturday,' *od wczoraj* 'since yesterday,' *od tygodnia* 'for a week,' *od niedawna* 'since not long ago' or *do jutra* 'until tomorrow,' *do wieczora* 'until the evening,' *do soboty* 'until Saturday.'

An expression of definite quantity, in turn, requires that discreteness be imposed on the given event and the latter's part be isolated in time from the whole. Juxtaposition with a unit of time allows for a precise measurement of the event's duration. Structures of the type numeral + time unit + verb (*Spię pięć godzin* 'I sleep five hours (a day),' *Czekam pięć minut* 'I'll wait five minutes for you') are used to express definite indivisible quantity within the verb phrase. As in the case of substances, to arrive at a precise measurement means to introduce numerical quantification into the picture.

5. Final Remarks

A quantitative characterization of the world seems to be based on a peculiar schema imposed by speakers on the linguistic representation of that world. For a quantitative grasp of both things and events, the countable/uncountable opposition seems crucial. Countable things and events are those perceived as having a definite spatial and/or temporal contour. Things and events without such contour are perceived as measurable, i.e. amenable to quantitative characterization, only after a spatial and/or temporal segmentation is imposed on them (a portion for substances, a unit of time for events). Next, quantitative characterization of things and events, both countable and not, may be very precise (numerically expressed, e.g. *dwie książki* 'two books,' *czytać dwukrotnie* 'read something twice' – this is typical mainly of things) or approximate, with the limits of the set being indicated for things (e.g. *kilka książek* 'a few books,' *od dwóch do dziewięciu książek* 'from two to nine/between two and nine books,' *co najmniej/co najwyżej/około dziesięciu książek* 'at least/not more than/about ten books') and temporal limits being indicated for events (e.g. *spać do południa/około ośmiu godzin* 'sleep until noon/for about eight hours'). In the latter case, a deviation from the norm may also be indicated (*dużo/moło książek* 'many/few books,' *dużo/moło spać* 'sleep a lot/not too much'). For events, deviations from the norm may also be expressed by means of frequency adverbs, such as *rzadko* 'rarely,' *często* 'often.' For countable things and events, the opposition one/many is important: multiplicity is further internally structured for things but rarely specified for events.

The above characterization of the category of quantity, although necessarily schematic, reveals its clear relatedness to other linguistically expressed conceptual categories, mainly definiteness, but also aspect and time (correlated with tense in various ways) for events. The exponents of a quantitative characterization of the world are divers means at various levels of language. To simplify things, these are: morphological means (number, aspect), lexical means (numerals, quantitative nouns, adverbs), syntactic means (structures expressing quantity: quantitative attributes and adverbials of measure). None of these types constitutes an autonomous sphere; on the contrary: they are used interchangeably, they complement or modify one another. How a quantitative characterization of an object or event will be performed in a specific case depends on the speaker's communicative needs. The same object, e.g. books, can be quantified as *books*, *a few books*, *five books*, *a pile of books*, etc., profiling in each case a somewhat different aspect of that object. It seems that an adequate account of language structure and functioning is best achieved from the onomasiological perspective: in a single descriptive model one can thus capture the totality of the linguistic means used by speakers to code and express their mental quantitative characterization of the world.

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Chapter 13

The Polish Linguistic View of Oral and Written Text

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1. Introductory Remarks

The contemporary theory of the linguistic worldview, whose roots can be traced directly to the work of German and American scholars (cf. e.g. Humboldt, 1903-1936; Sapir, 1964; Whorf, 1956), assumes that every natural language encodes a worldview characteristic of the community that speaks it:

Linguistic worldview is a language-entrenched interpretation of reality, which can be expressed in the form of judgements about the world, people, things or events. It is an interpretation, not a reflection; it is a portrait without claims to fidelity, not a photograph of real objects. The interpretation is a result of subjective perception and conceptualisation of reality performed by the speakers of a given language; thus, it is clearly subjective and anthropocentric but also intersubjective (social). It unites people in a given social environment, creates a community of thoughts, feelings and values. It influences (to what extent is a matter for discussion) the perception and understanding of the social situation by a member of the community.

(Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 23)

An inquiry into the linguistic worldview (LWV) aims to describe the linguistic mechanisms and judgments that show how members of a given community think about a certain fragment of reality: how they categorize, organize, model, and evaluate that fragment. The differences between worldviews entrenched in languages derive from different needs of the respective communities. Culture, society, geography, religion: these are but a few of the factors that influence the views of the world contained in different languages.

The present chapter is an attempt to treat a limited but significant fragment of the LWV so understood: it investigates the concepts ORAL TEXT and WRITTEN

TEXT, i.e. it studies the portraits or images¹ of oral and written text entrenched in the Polish language. As the portraits are rich in detail and cannot be presented in their totality, only selected aspects will be discussed. The choice of these aspects, as well as the choice of the object of investigation, has been influenced by several factors.

In the first place, oral and written text are two fundamental forms of human communication; it is thus interesting to investigate how these forms are portrayed through language and what kinds of judgments about them are linguistically encoded.

Secondly, oral and written texts, as the most important forms of communication, have frequently been at the center of linguists' attention as complex, multi-aspectual phenomena, abundant in diverse dependencies.² Of interest here is a juxtaposition of their scientific and colloquial portrayals, grounded in different types of rationality (cf. Bartmiński, 2009/2012; Kępa-Figura, 2007; Maćkiewicz, 1991, 1999; Piekarczyk, 2006; Tokarski, 1993). It is usually concluded that the LWV is a simplified, naive view of the world. Can we arrive at the same conclusions regardless of which elements of the world are being studied?

Thirdly, in contemporary linguistics the processual, interactional, and functional understanding of text predominates, even if the older, formal understanding is still present. The processual approach emerged in the 1970s mainly among American discourse analysts who were interested in oral texts (cf. surveys in van Dijk, 1997; Duszak, 1998; Shiffrin, 1994). Against this background, it is interesting to see whether traces of this kind of thinking can at all be identified in everyday Polish or whether the idea of text as a product (cf. Bartmiński & Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska, 2009; Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska, 2007) is the only one to be found. In other words, it is interesting to see if the notions "product" and "process" are both linguistically entrenched modes of looking at oral and written text.

I have adopted the onomasiological approach. ORAL TEXT and WRITTEN TEXT are thus treated not as lexemes but as concepts that can be realized linguistically in manifold ways. My data, however, contain systemic units that refer directly to oral or written texts, but also those that refer to oral or written communication in

1 In this chapter, the terms *linguistic view*, *portrait*, and *image* are treated as synonymous, mainly for stylistic reasons. However, cf. Tabakowska (this volume) for a discussion of the differences between these and other terminological issues.

2 Of the rich literature on the subject, let me mention only a few fundamental (mainly Polish) studies: Abramowicz & Bartmiński (1986), Bartmiński (1989), Bartmiński & Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska (2009), Gilson (2003), Godlewski (2003), Grabias, Mazur, Pisarkowa, & Skubalanka (1978), Lalewicz (1972), Nieckuła (1993), Ong (1982), Ożóg (1993), Tolstaya (1986), Wilkoń (1982). A comprehensive survey and bibliography can be found in Bakula (2008); cf. also Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska (2007).

general. An attempt to limit my focus to the former seemed ineffective or even infeasible because, in the first place, it would exclude from analysis the broad and indispensable context and, in the second place, because texts are, in the speakers' awareness, integrated with more general communicative phenomena and can be isolated from the latter only in an arbitrary manner.

2. The Substance of Oral and Written Text

According to linguists, the basic and in fact the only property that necessarily distinguishes oral from written text is their respective substance. The number of linguistic units that testify to the importance of the same property in the LWV is also huge. The acoustic-cum-motor substance of the spoken word figures prominently in the semantics of the basic lexemes of speaking: *mówić* 'speak,' *gadać* 'speak, chatter, prattle,' *odezwać się* 'speak, say,' *rozmawiać* 'talk,' *powiedzieć* 'say'; words and collocations expressing loudness, timbre, or manner of speaking: *szeptać* 'whisper,' *krzyczeć* 'shout,' *mówić cicho/głośno* 'speak quietly/loudly,' *mówić półgłosem/przez nos/przez zęby/szeptem* 'speak in a hushed voice/through the nose/through the teeth/in whisper'; and in particular the expressions which primarily denote other auditory phenomena: *warczeć* 'growl, snarl,' *grzmieć* 'thunder,' *stękać* 'groan,' *ryknąć* 'roar,' *mruczeć* 'purr, growl,' *jęczeć* 'moan,' *skomleć* 'whine,' etc. The words imply that the reception of oral communication is aural in nature. The addressee's aural perception is directly reflected in expressions such as *czyjeś słowa dzwieczą komuś w uszach* 'somebody's words ring in one's ears,' *szeptać/powiedzieć coś do ucha/na ucho* 'whisper/say something into someone's ear,' *śłuchać jednym uchem* 'listen with only half an ear' (lit. 'with one ear').

The nature of the substance of written text, in turn, is reflected in such units as *pisać* 'write,' *napis* 'inscription,' *opisać* 'describe,' *notować* 'take notes,' *notes* 'notebook,' *drukować* 'print (v),' *druk* 'print (n),' *podpis* 'signature,' *bazgrać* 'scribble'; or in collocations that indicate the manner of writing down a text, the tools used, or the surface on which something is written: *pisać kredą/piórem* 'write in chalk/ink,' *pisać na papierze/w zeszycie* 'write on paper/in a notebook,' *pisać na maszynie* 'type' (lit. 'write on a typewriter'), *przybory do pisania* 'writing utensils,' *nakreślić kilka słów* 'write a few words,' *druk drobny/tłusty* 'small print/bold type,' *słowo drukowane* 'the printed word.' The fact of pointing to the graphic subcode of text also assumes a characteristic mode of its reception, implied by such units as *składać litery* 'be able to read (albeit poorly)' (lit. 'put characters together'), *czytelnik* 'reader,' *czytać od deski do deski* 'read from cover to cover,' *zajrzeć do książki* 'have a look into a book,' *przejrzeć notatki* 'go through one's notes,' *litery skaczą komuś przez oczami* 'one can hardly read' (lit. 'letters jump before one's eyes').

The examples show that the features 'communicated with voice' and 'received through hearing' that pertain to oral text, as well as the features 'written in symbols' and 'received by means of eyesight' that pertain to written text, are treated in Polish as essential and obligatory. Evidence comes from the *but*-test: in each of these units, if information about the subcode is negated, a contradictory sentence results: **Mówiła do mnie, ale nie wydała z siebie żadnego dźwięku* 'She spoke to me but did not make a sound'; **Zanotowała mi adres, ale nie napisała żadnej litery* 'She noted down the address for me but did not write a single letter.'

This obvious characteristic of oral text and written text, however, entails a number of specific judgments that shape the linguistic views of both modes of communication.

3. Properties of Texts' Substance

The acoustic aspect of oral text and the graphic form of written text are the most conspicuous of their respective features: unsurprisingly, these characteristics are richly documented. However, the units characterizing oral text clearly dominate.

In general awareness, there is a strong conviction that the oral message is transmitted through voice, which consists of sounds: *wydać głos* 'give voice,' *dojść do głosu* 'take the floor, have one's say' (lit. 'get to the voice'). In communication, therefore, it is not only words that are important but also the following: loudness (*podnieść/zniżyć głos* 'raise/lower one's voice,' *wydzierać się* 'yell,' *krzyczeć* 'shout,' *ryczeć* 'roar,' *szeptać* 'whisper'), pitch and timbre (*mówić szorstkim/słodkim głosem* 'speak in a harsh/sweet voice,' *piąć* 'speak in a shrill voice,' *szczebiotać* 'twitter,' *buczeć* 'boo'), tempo, rhythm of speaking (*mówić jak katarynka* 'chatter,' *pytlować* 'jabber,' *chlapać językiem* 'wag one's tongue'), the clarity of articulation (*mówić wyraźnie* 'speak clearly,' *mamrotać/mruczeć* 'mutter, mumble, murmur,' *mówić przez zęby* 'speak through one's teeth'). The sheer number of the linguistic phrases that evoke, directly or indirectly, the sound aspect of the utterance testifies to the significance of this characteristic. They are exponents of the judgment relating to the physical side of speaking: physical characteristics carry additional information, often unexpressed directly but built upon the basic sense of an utterance. The general feature of speaking they imply is: 'an important role in speaking is played by the qualities of voice, the way words are pronounced.'

In many cases, references to the sound aspect of speech contain unambiguous information on whether the speaker consciously produces utterances in a given manner (*mówić słodkim głosem* 'speak in a sweet voice,' *mówić zdecydowanym głosem* 'speak decisively,' *grzmieć* 'thunder,' *krzyczeć na kogoś* 'yell at someone') or reveals something without being aware of the fact (*śpiewać cienkim głosem* 'sing small' (lit. 'sing in a thin voice'), *mówić nie swoim głosem* 'speak in a

strange voice,' *mówić z (obcym) akcentem* 'speak with a(n) (foreign) accent'. This is an important distinction because subconscious transfer of information only motivates linguistic manifestations of the following types: 'voice qualities indicate the speaker's emotions' (*mówił tamiącym się głosem* 'his voice was breaking up,' *wyjąkać coś* 'stammer something out'), 'they indicate the speaker's origin' (*zaciągać* 'drawl,' *mówić z akcentem* 'speak with an accent'), 'they point to the speaker's inborn traits or personality' (*seplenić* 'lisp,' *mówić piskliwym/niskim głosem* 'speak in a squeaky/low voice'). On the other hand, the connotation that 'the speaker purposefully capitalizes on the qualities of voice and articulation' justifies the feature 'physical qualities of speaking characterize and contribute to the utterance,' whose manifestations are galore, e.g.:

- 'physical qualities of speech point to the speaker's emotional state': *szczebiotać* 'twitter,' *gruchać* 'coo,' *mówić przymilnym głosem* 'speak in an ingratiating voice,' *jęczeć* 'moan,' *rzucać pioruny* 'storm,' *wrzeszczeć/krzyczeć na kogo* 'yell/shout at someone,' *zawodzić* 'wail,' etc.;
- 'physical qualities of speech point to the speaker's attitude toward their utterance or the thing to which the utterance relates': *jęczeć* 'moan,' *sarkać na coś* 'grumble at something,' *mówić z (pełnym) przekonaniem* 'speak with (full) conviction,' *powiedzieć coś dobitnie* 'say something emphatically,' *mówić żartobliwym/ironicznym tonem* 'speak in a jocular/ironic tone,' etc.;
- 'physical qualities of speech point to the speaker's attitude to the hearer': *krzyczeć na kogo* 'shout at someone,' *warczeć* 'growl, snarl,' *ryknąć* 'roar,' *podnosić głos* 'raise one's voice,' *drzeć się* 'bawl,' *buczeć* 'boo,' *mówić oziębłym/szorstkim/cieplem/serdecznym/tonem* 'speak in a cold/brusque/warm/cordial tone,' *mówić z przekąsem* 'speak sneeringly,' *nawcisnąć komuś* 'bawl someone out,' *opieprzyć* 'chew someone out,' *ofuknąć* 'scold,' *syczeć* 'hiss,' *wyskoczyć z gębą* 'bawl someone out,' etc.;
- 'physical qualities of speech indicate that the speaker is unwilling to engage in contact with the hearer': *bąknąć coś/mruczeć/mamrotać/mówić pod nosem* 'mutter/mumble/murmur' (lit. 'under one's nose'), *cedzić słowa* 'drag out, pronounce slowly,' etc.

Since involuntary signals are typical of any human behavior, it is the connotations associated with the feature 'the speaker purposefully capitalizes on the qualities of voice and articulation' that decides the distinctive image of oral text. When marked expressions are replaced with unmarked, neutral ones, the original sense disappears: *Jęknęła, że pracuje dziś do późna* 'She moaned she had to work till late that night' is different from *Powiedziała, że pracuje dziś do późna* 'She said she had to work till late that night.' Also, some of the terms that primarily denote the qualities of voice have begun to characterize the content of the whole message: *Przestań szczebiotać* 'Stop twittering,' *Nie mów do mnie takim tonem* 'Don't speak to me in this tone.' Thus, in Polish, the physical qualities of voice are treated as more than a mere additional, external, or complementary

element of the message: they co-constitute, along with the lexical material, the meaning of that message. In the spirit of Anna Wierzbicka,³ one can say that in the speakers' view, what is said cannot be distinguished from how it is said.

Moreover, in the linguistic worldview a role is played not only by actual words and the way they are pronounced but also by lack of speech, as well as by gesture, facial expressions, etc. Silence, pauses, and body language thus have a semantic function; consider the following expressions: *dyskretnie/wymowne milczenie* 'discreet/telling silence,' *pominąć/zbyć/skwitować coś milczeniem* 'keep one's silence over something, ignore it,' *śłuchać w milczeniu* 'listen in silence,' *słowa zamarty na czyichś ustach* 'the words died on someone's lips,' *mówić po dłuższej pauzie* 'speak after a longer pause,' *mówić coś z przymrużeniem oka* 'say something jocularly' (lit. 'with one's eye winked'), *mówić z uśmiechem na twarzy* 'smile when saying something,' *przyrzekać/obietcywać z ręką na sercu* 'promise something in good conscience' (lit. 'with the hand on one's heart'), *mówić gestykulując* 'speak and gesticulate.'

These judgments also contain one of the most essential differences between the images of spoken and written text. Characteristics of written text are above all motivated by:

- letter size: *pisać dużymi/małymi/drukowanymi literami* 'write in small/capital/block letters,' *pisać wersalikami* 'write in capitals,' *pisać drobnym maczkiem* 'write in a tiny hand,' *ściubić wyrazy/stawiać robaczki* 'write in a tiny hand,' etc.;
- letter shape: *pismo ręczne/odręczne* 'handwriting,' *pismo własnoręczne* 'one's own handwriting,' *pismo zamaszyste/drukowane* 'sprawling/block handwriting,' *stawiać kulfony* 'scribble';
- the legibility, neatness and correctness of writing: *czytelne/nieczytelne pismo* 'legible/illegible handwriting,' *kaligrafować* 'calligraph,' *pisać na kolanie* 'scrawl hastily' (lit. 'on one's knee'), *bazgrolić* 'scrawl,' *pisać jak kura pazurem* 'scrawl' (lit. 'write like a hen with its claw'), *pisać ortograficznie/nieortograficznie* 'spell/misspell one's words when writing,' etc.

However, none of the expressions above is used to describe the content of the message; it may perhaps (but only in the case of handwriting) be used as a comment on the situation when something was written or signal the writer's personality. Both these situations have their linguistic exponents: *pisać na kolanie* 'scrawl hastily' (lit. 'on one's knee') and *charakter pisma* 'style of handwriting,' *poznać kogo po piśmie* 'tell what kind of person one is judging from

³ Wierzbicka obviously refers to natural language itself, not to people's opinions about it. She writes: "It is true that in natural language, what can be said cannot be fully separated from the way in which it is said, but in natural semantic metalanguage the 'what' can be separated from the 'how'." (Wierzbicka, 1992, p. 21)

their handwriting.’ Thus, the role of the features implied by these expressions is comparable to the following feature of ORAL TEXT: ‘the speaker reveals something to the hearer without being aware of the fact.’

It appears that the different status of the physical qualities of speech and writing also has another basis. The qualities of speech are perceived as natural in the sense that they are not guided by any formalized principles, whereas the qualities of writing (except when they signal the situation or the personality of the writer) do follow such principles, cf. *pisownia/zasady pisowni* ‘rules of orthography,’ *zasady interpunkcji* ‘rules of punctuation,’ *zasady użycia małej i wielkiej litery* ‘rules of capitalization,’ etc. The qualities of writing, then, are not perceived by average speakers of Polish as constitutive of the message content: they can merely modify the meaning expressed by the message’s verbal component.

This image of written text also explains why in Polish the literal meaning of written messages is a conventionalized feature, why the intentions and expectations of the sender are thought to be expressed directly, cf. *litera prawa* ‘letter of law,’ *powoływać się na literę czegoś* ‘cite the letter of something, such as regulations,’ or *literalny* ‘literal,’ from *litera* ‘letter, character.’⁴ Another trace of the conviction that typographical properties of writing do not play the same role as physical properties of speaking is the expression *czytać coś między wierszami* ‘read between the lines.’ Finally, some of the uses of the word *tekst* ‘text’ suggest that it is understood as the content of the message but not as the way it is written, eg. *tekst depeszy/piosenki/ustawy* ‘text of a telegram/song/legal act.’

4. Spoken and Written Texts: Events or Products?

A very deep, linguistically rooted conviction is that a written text, being an inscription on some surface, is ready, finished, and given as total. Therefore, it can be subjected to various kinds of reading and action. Consider the following expressions, a mere sample of what can be found: *czytać tekst od deski do deski* ‘read a text from cover to cover,’ *oddać tekst do druku* ‘submit a text to print,’ *schować tekst do szuflady* ‘write for one’s own pleasure’ (lit. ‘put a text to the drawer’), *dać komuś zaproszenie* ‘hand someone an invitation,’ *wysłać list* ‘post a letter,’ *odebrać pismo* ‘receive a formal letter,’ *przechowywać listy* ‘store/keep letters,’ *wypożyczyć książkę* ‘borrow a book,’ *rozlepić ogłoszenia* ‘put up advertisements,’ *oprawić pracę* ‘have one’s thesis bound,’ etc. Subjected to actions like those, a written text reaches the receiver and thus begins to really

⁴ From Latin *littera* ‘alphabetic character,’ *litterālis* ‘concerning letters.’

function as written text. Its nature is also preserved in other actions, such as copying (*skserować* 'photocopy,' *przepisać* 'rewrite') or writing over it (*nanosić uwagi/komentarze na marginesie* 'introduce notes/comments on the margin,' *podkreślić fragment tekstu* 'underline a fragment'). Some actions, however, do destroy the text as an object: *spalić rękopis* 'burn the manuscript,' *wyrzucić list* 'throw the letter away,' or *skasować plik* 'delete a file' denote actions that bring an end to a written text. Thus, written text is understood here as a product, a physical object, a result of the action of writing; it exists independently of either its producer or receiver.

The spoken word receives a very different portrayal. If it is transmitted through voice, which is inseparable from the action of speaking, then speaking cannot be dissociated from what is said. A message is never given in its totality but it is an event, a process, which takes place between the speaker and hearer. An orally transmitted message has all the properties of speech as behavior: it starts when the speaker begins talking, it breaks when the speaker stops (*otworzyć usta* 'open one's mouth (to speak),' *dojść do głosu* 'take the floor,' *dukać* 'stammer,' *tracić głos* 'lose one's voice'), and changes in the manner of speaking entail changes in the text (e.g. *zniżyć ton* 'lower one's voice,' *wpaść w jakiś ton* 'adopt a certain tone'). For language users, speaking is tantamount to sending a message, while hearing equals reception, therefore the order of reception is constituted by the order of speaking. For example, consider the collocability of *słuchać* 'listen' and *przerwać* 'interrupt' or 'stop': they occur with words denoting the speaker and the utterance (*słuchać kogoś/tego, co ktoś mówi* 'listen to someone/to what someone says,' *przerwać komuś/czyjś wypowiedź* 'interrupt someone/someone's speech'), whereas *czytać* 'read' and *przerwać czytanie* 'stop reading' only occur with terms denoting texts. This means that oral text in everyday understanding does not exist outside the situation of speaking, does not function independently but only as being simultaneously uttered and heard. Therefore, actions other than speaking and listening "destroy" oral text: when something is reported by a third person, it is not the same text that is reported (cf. **Powiedziałem jej o spotkaniu za pośrednictwem kolegi* (I told her about the meeting through a friend)). When oral text is written down, what changes is not a mere substance of the message but its mode of existence: it becomes a full-fledged, "real" text (cf. *Możesz mi to dać na piśmie?* (Can you give it to me in writing?)).

It is precisely due to the idea of oral text being different in its very nature from written text that speakers of Polish are so reluctant to refer to the former as *tekst*. In its basic meaning, *tekst* denotes a body of typographically fixed words that constitute a whole (cf. *przeczytać/przepisać/skserować tekst* 'read/rewrite/photocopy a text'). The word *tekst* in reference to oral communication is only used in a few contexts, e.g. *wyskoczyć do kogoś z jakimś tekstem* 'come up with some silly words' (lit. 'with such and such text'), *mówić otwartym tekstem* 'say openly' (lit. 'in an open text').

These judgments, however, do not concern all spoken and written texts, for there exist written texts that are perceived as designed for oral delivery, and oral texts that can be reproduced without compromising their essence. The former are signaled by the lexemes *wygłosić* 'deliver,' *odczytać* 'read out,' *deklamować* 'declaim,' *recytować* 'recite,' which contain the component 'say something that has been written down.' To the latter category belong above all texts perceived as anonymously produced for the common good, created for general and frequent reproduction – these are introduced by the verbs *opowiadać* (*dowcip/bajkę*) 'tell (a joke/story)' and *odmawiać* (*modlitwę*) 'say (a prayer).' The second group also contains texts produced orally but with the intention of writing them down (*dyktować* 'dictate') as well as those that must be preserved for a certain reason (*protokołować* 'take minutes,' *stenografować* 'take down in shorthand').

Thus, in Polish, various judgments on the spoken and written word have been encoded. Both of these conceptual categories are internally heterogeneous. Their central features are 'is an event' (ORAL TEXT) and 'is a product' (WRITTEN TEXT), so that the central positions in the categories are occupied by texts that are, respectively, primarily spoken and primarily written. The peripheries of the categories, in turn, contain texts that are secondarily spoken (prepared for formal delivery and/or read out) and secondarily written (dictated and written down).⁵

Additional arguments supporting the portrait thus delineated come from an analysis of the linguistic portrayal of the sender-receiver relationship in both kinds of text. Speaker judgments in this area deserve a more comprehensive treatment in a wider perspective, to which I now turn.

5. The Communicating Parties

The way in which language portrays the sender-receiver relationship in communication is apparently straightforward. Linguistic communication occurs when one person communicates something verbally to another: "[O]ne of the most firmly entrenched properties of text is that there is a subject behind it, a *creator, author, sender*; [also,] it is usually directed towards someone, a receiver, i.e. a *reader or listener*" (Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska, 2007, pp. 25-26, emphasis in the original; cf. also Bartmiński & Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska, 2009, p. 26). However, a closer look at linguistic phenomena, with their regularities but also irregularities, reveals that the relationship is portrayed as much more complex.

⁵ I am obviously invoking here the prototype model of categorization (e.g. Rosch 1975, 1978; cf. Taylor, 2003). The classical model does not recognize an internal diversification of category membership.

A characteristic feature of Polish is that it lacks terms denoting participants of a communicative situation as such; instead, the Polish lexicon contains names of specific communicative roles. Participants in oral communication are referred to as: *referent/prelegent/mówca* 'speaker,' *przedmówca* 'preceding/previous speaker,' *stuchacz* 'listener,' *audytorium* 'audience,' also *rozmówca* 'interlocutor,' *dysputant* 'debater,' *dyskutant* 'discussant,' *adwersarz* 'adversary,' *oponent* 'opponent.' They all, however, pertain to public communicative situations. The sender of oral text cannot be called its *autor* 'author,' *twórca* 'creator,' or *nadawca* 'sender.' Although the words *autor* and *twórca* (though not *nadawca*, cf. below) may collocate with names of oral texts (*autor kazania* 'the author of a sermon,' *twórca przemówienia* 'the author [lit. creator] of a speech'), they refer to the person who has constructed the given text, not the actual speaker. Such is the portrayal one finds in the common awareness of the speaker of colloquial Polish.

It might seem that the portrayal of the sender and receiver of written text is simpler. However, the simplicity is misleading, for one need only realize that the words *autor* 'author,' *nadawca* 'sender,' *twórca* 'author/creator,' *czytelnik* 'reader,' *adresat* 'addressee,' *odbiorca* 'receiver' collocate anyway but freely with terms for kinds of written text. The strictest limitations are imposed on such items as *nadawca*, *adresat*, and *odbiorca*, as they only collocate with words like *list* 'letter,' *pismo* 'official letter,' *depesza* 'telegram,' or *mail* 'e-mail': the limitations result from the component of their meaning 'communicate something through e-mail or the Internet.'⁶ The widest range of collocations, on the other hand, can be established for the lexeme *autor*, which co-occurs with the names of all kinds of literary texts (*autor wiersza/ballady/powieści* 'the author of a poem/ballad/novel') as well as scientific ones (*autor monografii/podręcznika/artykułu* 'the author of a monograph/textbook/article'). With other kinds of text, the matter is more enigmatic. *Autor* can co-occur with such words as *dziennik* 'memoir,' *list* 'letter,' or *kazanie* 'sermon' but *protokół* 'minutes,' *życiorys* 'biography,' or *wizytówka* 'business card' are not normally included among its collocations.

The reasons for the peculiar *status quo* can be sought in the polysemy of *autor*. In its basic meaning, *autor* is above all 'the creator of a literary or scientific work' – the meaning more clearly invokes a social rather than a communicative role, cf. *spotkanie z autorem* 'meeting with an author,' *wieczór autorski* 'author's soiree.' The second meaning, derived from the first, definitely activates a communicative role (*autor listu/komentarza* 'the author of a letter/commentary') but because associations with the creative process are still strong, collocations with names

⁶ I omit here, naturally, the senses and collocability of those items as technical terms in scholarly discourse.

of non-creative texts are blocked. A similar explanation can be found for the collocability of *twórca* 'creator.' Its very strong semantic component of 'creation, producing texts of artistic value' makes it a poor candidate to collocate with such words as *życiorys* 'biography' or even *list* 'letter.' In common awareness, the receiver of texts produced by *autor* and *twórca* is *czytelnik*, which does not denote any person who happens to be reading something but one that above all reads books and/or magazines.

Thus, Polish contains terms that allow us to name both sides of the communicative act and at the same time clearly differentiates between the communicative roles depending on the kind of text. The names of these roles relate to specific kinds of public behavior, e.g. speeches, correspondence, literary communication, but none has a broad application. However, the existence of the lacunae does not mean that Polish lacks a more general model of the sender-receiver relationship (a lack of a lexical exponent is not tantamount to a lack of linguistic manifestation). Indeed, the model implies the existence of a "deeper" layer of language: the predicate-argument structures of verbs.

All Polish verbs that contain the component 'communicate orally' are exponents of a three-argument predicate (cf. Greń, 1994; Kozarzewska, 1990; Marcjanik, 1980; Pajdzińska, 1983). The predicate induces two noun phrase (NP) arguments and one sentential argument.⁷ The NP arguments are represented by names that point to the communicating parties: the first argument, the person who utters a text, plays the role of the sender; the second argument, the person who perceives the text aurally, plays the role of the addressee. A third complement is a sentential argument that is expressed by means of direct speech, indirect speech, nominalization, or the name of the kind of text. In textual usage, the predicate-argument structure may assume the shape shown in Figure 13-1.



Fig. 13.1 Semantic structure of Polish verbs of oral communication. DAT – dative case; GEN – genitive case; OR – oratio; loc – locativus

⁷ NP arguments denote persons or objects, sentential arguments denote events or situations. Therefore, sentential arguments can also be called event arguments.

A somewhat different structure is associated with discourse-naming predicates but also those require complementation through NP arguments (Fig. 13.2).




Fig. 13.2 Semantic structure of Polish discourse-naming predicates. INS – instrumental case

The two structures show that Polish overtly and conspicuously codes the relationship between the communicating parties as an important aspect of the image of text. The predicate with its arguments constitutes a syntactic and semantic whole, and the *verba dicendi* structures show that that whole is a communicative situation with three elements on which it relies for its existence: the sender, the text, and the receiver. Moreover, the structures indicate that two different portraits of the speaker-hearer relationship exist in Polish. In one of them, evoked by “monologic” verbs, an active role is attributed only to the speaker, whereas the hearer is passive and subordinated. In the other portrayal, evoked by discursive verbs, communication is viewed as an activity in which both sides are engaged to the same extent: they switch the roles of speaker and hearer and thus maintain an equal-rank relationship.

Much more complex and difficult to grasp is the relationship between written text and its sender plus receiver. This is mainly due to the polysemy of the verbs of writing, especially *pisać* ‘write.’ In their basic meaning, i.e. when they denote the action of writing graphic symbols, the verbs only require one personal complementation, as well as an indication of the product of the action, the instrument, and the writing surface (Fig. 13.3).




Fig. 13.3 Semantic structure of *pisać* ‘write’

A different structure is associated with the verbs of text production (*pisać* 'write,' *tworzyć* 'create, compose') (Fig. 13.4).




Fig. 13.4 Semantic structure of *pisać*, 'write.' P – product

The verbs open three argument positions. Because these verbs denote an action whose end product is a communicative text and because the second argument (P) is realized only by the name of that product (the name of the text or its part), the first personal argument is identified with the sender of the message. However, the third argument need not be the receiver, for its manifestations may be such expressions as *do druku* 'for publication,' *do gazety* 'for/to a newspaper,' *na konferencję* 'for a conference.' Indirectly, these expressions relate to a certain characterization of the addressee (*do gazety* – for the readers of the newspaper) but above all point to the goals of the agent. Therefore, an important element in their semantics is the component 'create a text with the aim of its public distribution.' Against this backdrop, it is easier to see why the exponent of the receiver (if realized overtly) always denotes a rather vague body of people (*pisać dla dzieci/dla odbiorcy masowego* 'write for children/for the mass reader'). The properties of these verbs can be captured thus: of the whole sender–text–receiver relation they only express its part. They do denote the sender–text relation but the reception and the actual receiver they only "envisage" – they suggest that it may obtain once the text is publicly available. Let us also note that the predicate not only fails to imply the sentential argument, so characteristic of *verba dicendi*, but in fact rules it out (cf. **Pisał do druku, że badania amerykańskich uczonych potwierdziły jego tezy* 'He wrote for publication that the research of American scholars corroborated his hypotheses'). This restriction appears to be rather important: the fact that the verbs of writing only imply the product and

not the process that leads to the product shows that written text is conceived of as a product. It also shows that for language users the creation of written text does not mean that the sender informs the receiver about anything. Writing, in contrast to speaking, is not perceived as part of the communicative act.

Similar requirements, but only in the formal sense, exist for the predicate that denotes preserving something in writing, whose exponents are e.g. *pisać*₃ 'write,' *zapisać* 'write down,' *notować* 'take notes,' *protokółować* 'take minutes.' Sentences with these verbs, however, inform about the existence of special kinds of texts: those that are created not in order to communicate something but in order to preserve what has been communicated orally or at least what has been thought. The verbs point to texts that have arisen as a result of speech (or of thought) being transferred into the written form. Due to their "dual nature" it is impossible to establish a kind of relationship between the sender, the text, and the receiver: the sender and receiver of oral text need not coincide with the sender and receiver of written text. If with some texts one can point to their receiver as a concrete person for whom it has been uttered or written down (*Zanotuj sobie, co masz kupić* 'Take down what you need to buy'; *Pielęgniarka zapisała pacjentowi adres przychodni* 'The nurse wrote down the address of the health center for the patient'), in the case of other verbs this is impossible, e.g. the verbs *protokółować* 'take minutes' or *stenografować* 'take down in shorthand' block the receiver argument. In the case of a text written down, one can only talk about the sender when the first argument denotes both the speaker and the person who does the actual writing.

A semantic structure that approximates that of *verba dicendi* can only be identified with the verb *pisać*₄ 'write,' which means 'inform/communicate about something' (Fig. 13.5).




Fig. 13.5 Semantic structure of *pisać*₄ 'write'

The left-hand-side argument denotes the text's sender, the second personal argument denotes its receiver, and the non-personal arguments denote the text itself and the medium of the message (or the text's location). Text is understood here as a message (the most typical argument is an event, although it can also

be a product, e.g. *list* 'letter'). The receiver is usually a specific person to whom the message is directed. However, the verb's semantics contains the component 'there is no direct contact between the person who writes and the one who reads' (cf. *Mówię ci, mieliśmy z tego niezły ubaw* 'I'm telling you, we had a good laugh,' vs. **Piszę ci, mieliśmy z tego niezły ubaw* 'I'm writing you, we had a good laugh'), also indicated by the locative argument (e.g. *w liście/gazecie/książce* 'in later/paper/book'). Thus, the structure of *pisać*₄ captures the communicative situation *ex post*, as something completed.

6. Recapitulation

The analysis presented here concerns relatively small portions of the portraits of oral and written text in Polish, but even so it reveals several regularities. First, it shows that the language is a repository for rather distinct portraits of both categories of text as well as of various situations in which they occur. The diversity means that both concepts have a prototypical structure. Second, language-entrenched observations are often strikingly accurate and profound. Usually, they converge with ideas on the spoken and written word proposed in linguistics. Third, the view of text as an event, which appeared in linguistics as late as in the 1970s, is not merely signalled but constitutes the very essence of how oral and written text is portrayed in Polish. Written text, too, although generally perceived as a material product, acquires certain features of a process if seen in the context of the act of communication.

The analysis hopefully shows that the methodology of Lublin ethnolinguistics facilitates a verbalization of human experience entrenched in language. It also shows how and to what extent the Polish language "imposes" a certain way of thinking about reality on its speakers. The reconstructed images are not universal: they are characteristic of Polish only. However, the ethnolinguistic methodology allows one to investigate images, portraits, or views encoded in any language and thus to compare them, to reveal what they share and what is peculiar to each.

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Chapter 14

"Who is Doing the Thinking?" The Concept of the THINKING SUBJECT in Polish

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1. Preliminaries

In this study I will focus on a small fragment of the linguistic worldview entrenched in contemporary Polish: the interpretation of the THINKING SUBJECT. First, a brief theoretical introduction will locate my research within the methodology of research on the linguistic worldview in connection with other assumptions of cognitive linguistics. Next, I will analyze linguistic data relating to several elements of the linguistic conceptualization of thinking: the analyses are not grounded in the objective (e.g. scientific) description of mental processes but illustrate the way in which thinking is interpreted in language. In the chapter's title I use the term *concept* because the analysis of linguistic data is preceded by onomasiological assumptions. Importantly, the analysis is merely a narrow fragment of a broad and complex problem: I will focus on the idea that, as linguistic data show, thinking is subjective, i.e. it requires a thinking subject. This issue is broad and complex, and the discussion below will be limited to selected and narrowly defined conceptual patterns, as well as to a condensed characterization (a "skeletal" identification) of the subject of thinking as it is pictured in the "naive psychology" of Polish.

2. Theoretical Foundations of the Analysis

Contemporary cognitive linguistics, drawing on findings in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind, maintains that a comprehensive, integral semantic description of language requires conceptual background. Ronald Langacker uses the term *conceptual semantics*: he assumes that linguistic meaning reduces to conceptualization, i.e. "a meaning consists of both conceptual content and a particular way of construing that content" (Langacker, 2008, p. 43).

The conceptual background of language and the ways of expressing it are the focal points of interest in research on the linguistic worldview. The conceptual structure entrenched in language does not entirely reflect non-linguistic reality; rather, it is an interpretation or a projection of the latter, motivated anthropocentrically through experience, culture, biology and people's comprehensive knowledge of the world. Jerzy Bartmiński says that:

Linguistic worldview is a language-entrenched interpretation of reality, which can be expressed in the form of judgements about the world, people, things, events. It is an interpretation, not a reflection; it is a portrait without claims to fidelity, not a photograph of real object. The interpretation is a result of subjective perception and conceptualization of reality performed by the speakers of a given language; thus, it is clearly subjective and anthropocentric but also intersubjective (social). It unites people in a given social environment, creates a community of thoughts, feelings and values. It influences (to what extent is a matter for discussion) the perception and understanding of the social situation by a member of the community. (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 23)

Consider also Ryszard Tokarski's definition of the linguistic worldview:

[It is] a set of regularities "contained" in categorial grammatical relations [...] and semantic structures of lexis that show characteristic ways of perceiving individual components of the world and a more general understanding of the world's organization, its hierarchies and values accepted by a linguistic community. (Tokarski, 2001, p. 358)

The two definitions, despite some differences, emphasize, first, the conceptual order of the judgments about the world expressed in language or implied by language units and their forms, second, the cultural and social grounding of language. Crucially, they underscore a subjective interpretation of the world by the members of a given linguistic and cultural community.

Central in the studies on the linguistic worldview is the understanding of culture as a phenomenological and an ideational order. Says Ward Goodenough:

Culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, behavior, or emotions. It is rather an organization of these things. It is the form of things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them. (Goodenough, 1964, p. 36)

The conceptual aspect of meaning, the subjective, anthropocentric and cultural way of interpreting the world, and, above all, verification of meaning through analysis of linguistic data (grammar, lexis, texts) are the elements that I regard as significant distinctive features of the theory of the linguistic worldview. The methodology makes use of the terms developed by contemporary cognitive semantics, e.g. conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), conceptual/semantic frames (e.g. Minsky, 1980; Fillmore, 1984), ICM (Lakoff, 1987), story schemas and scripts (Mandler, 1984), image schemas (e.g. Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Hampe 2005), prototype theory (beginning with research by Eleanor Rosch, see Taylor, 2003); it has also been inspired by Ronald Langacker's (1987; 2008) Cognitive Grammar. In studies on the linguistic worldview, these notions are found to be relevant and inspiring.

In this study I refer to a theory of narrative schemas. Certainly, many other theoretical models offer important insights into the linguistic modeling of the concept of THINKING and allow for systematic description of the same: the analyses presented here only constitute a narrow fragment of a broad and complex issue.

3. Some Basic Conceptual Patterns in the Linguistic Conceptualization of Thinking

The category of THINKING does not have strictly defined language-imposed boundaries, yet commonsense rationality does not seek classical, strict definitions. In everyday communication people rarely conceptualize the process of thinking as a neural network activity or interpret it at the level of symbols (properties of the abstract mind) – these do not belong to the established colloquial linguistic view of thinking (although many speakers know about them).

Indeed, to define thinking is a challenge for the linguist. Anna Wierzbicka writes:

"Thinking" is one of the fundamental human concepts. It is impossible to define it. Pseudo-definitions of this concept abound, of course, but they do not make it any clearer; on the contrary, they obscure its intuitively clear meaning. One example should suffice: here is the definition offered by *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* [...]:

to think – "to have a thought"

thought – "the act or process of thinking; cogitation"

cogitation – "1. thoughtful consideration; 2. a serious thought"

(Wierzbicka, 1998, p. 297).

The examples of definitions that Wierzbicka cites are not only vague but also circular and a way out of the vicious circle must be sought. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) propose to analyze ontological metaphors (e.g. THE MIND IS A MACHINE; THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT; THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS; IDEAS ARE FOOD / PEOPLE / PLANTS / COMMODITIES). Jäkel (1997) offers a presentation of the abstract domain of MENTAL ACTIVITY by analyzing a complex Idealized Cognitive Model MENTAL ACTIVITY IS MANIPULATION and a series of cognitive metaphors (*inter alia* the ontological metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, or the metaphors IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, THE MIND IS A WORKSHOP, THE MIND IS A TOOL, THINKING IS WORKING ON A PROBLEM-OBJECT WITH THE MIND-TOOL, and many others).

In etymological studies (cf. ESRY, 1973), the Polish verb *myśleć* 'think' is treated as a Slavic lexeme, originating from the Proto-Slavic root *umъ* (*uměti*), possibly meaning 'reason, intellect, wit, mind, sense, thought.' In many Slavic languages the root has survived and retained its association with the original meaning, e.g. the Russian *ум/ъ* means 'reason, intellect.' In Polish, the root can be found in, among others, *umysł* 'mind,' *rozum* 'reason, intellect, mind,' *umiejętność* 'ability, skill,' *dumać* 'ponder, muse.' These linguistic data point to the conceptual connection between thinking and the mind, reason, abilities.

3.1 Narrative Conceptualization of Thinking

Certain aspects of linguistic conceptualization may be represented by the schematic forms of narrative organization. Although narration is not the only means of understanding the world, it is a very important and natural one (cf. Trzebiński, 2002). One of the fundamental ways of analyzing cultures is an analysis of narrative models that they create (Bruner, 1987, p. 15). The universality of a narrative understanding of the world along the narrative structure of human knowledge also finds expression in the structure of stories as vehicles for expressing thoughts.

I assume here that linguistic conceptualization of thinking may be viewed as a narrative structure. Conventional utterance schemas such as "X is thinking about...," "X is thinking that..." suggest that in language we may interpret thinking as a kind of story created in the mind of the one who thinks. The story proceeds as a continuation of these schemas.

According to psychological research, narrative schemas obligatorily consist of a number of constituents, e.g.:

- (i) characters of a story [...]; (ii) their values [...], repertoires of major intentions of these characters and attendant plans for realization; (iii) possible complications that await characters during the realization of their intentions and plans; (iv) opportunities to overcome complications and to realize these intentions. (Trzebiński, 2002, p. 23)

I propose here a narrative model that I hope captures the linguistic conceptualization, view, or image,¹ of thinking. The model consists of five constituents that together compose the image of “someone thinking about something” or “someone thinking that something”:

1. SUBJECT (the one who thinks), the “narrator of the story”;
2. INTENTIONS, GOALS, VALUES attributed to the subject;
3. OBJECT, CONTENT, PROBLEM, “the matter of narration,” the realm of reality with which the thinking is concerned;
4. PROGRESS, ADVANCE, COURSE, STAGES of thinking understood as a sequence of ordered mental events; possibly overcoming complications and difficulties;
5. RESULTS, EFFECTS of thinking.

The model is only partly connected with the narrative schemas proposed in psychological research. It has a preliminary shape and I assume that detailed and wide-ranging research will help verify and add precision to some of its elements. I would like to focus now on the first constituent of the model, the *subject of thinking*. The problem itself is very broad and cannot be exhausted here: I will only attempt to outline the issue and present some essential directions for analysis.

3.2 Approaches to the Subject

In the introduction to a volume on the subject in linguistics, Bartmiński and Pajdzińska say:

The problem of the subject and subjecthood has been discussed for centuries within various [...] paradigms. The idea of the individual “I,” in which the subject is grounded, cannot be considered universal or even fully understandable beyond our cultural sphere. It originated in Ancient Greece. [...] With time, people have come to better realize the fundamental nature and enormous complexity of the issue. The difficulties inherent in the notion of the subject were already recognized by classical philosophers; the 20th century brought a radical crisis of subjecthood, but it also brought theories in which the notion is considered crucial. (Bartmiński & Pajdzińska, 2008, p. 7)

¹ Although these terms are by no means equivalent (cf. Tabakowska this volume), I will treat them as such for convenience.

Psychological approaches to the subject have been emerging gradually. For example, cognitive psychology

... concentrated on the process of the emergence and the functions of the SELF's structure, locating the SELF in autobiographical memory. Although it may seem that knowledge about the origin, function, and structure of the subject is now substantial, since the 1990's the SELF has again appeared to be ever more problematic, which is largely due to research on so-called automatic processing and the achievements of cognitive neuropsychology. (Francuz, 2008, p. 71)

In cognitive science, a subject is usually required to meet two conditions, the condition of naturalism and the condition of individualism:

A subject meeting the two conditions is recognized within the representational model, which derives from research on artificial intelligence. However, the model is criticized and an alternative one is proposed: the eco-phenomenal model of the subject, based on the concept of embodiment. (Muszyński, 2008, p. 85)

I will not discuss various aspects of general theoretical issues related to research on the concept of the subject in philosophy or psychology. Of several theories, Johnson's (1987) notion of embodiment and the resultant experientialist approach seem directly relevant.

The fundamental role of subjectivity in language is conspicuous in the research on linguistic worldview. The crucial notions of linguistic worldview are subject-oriented categories (rationality, system of values, perspective, point of view). Referring to the ideas of Ryszard Tokarski, Jerzy Barmiński (2009/2012, p. 89) writes: "They belong to a high level of linguistic organization, on which there is obligatorily the figure of a human being as an interpreter and 'organiser of the scene.'"

The fundamental role of language in the conceptualization of subjectivity also appears in Émile Benveniste's approach: "It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a *subject*. [...] "Ego" is he who says 'ego'" (Benveniste, 1971 [1958], p. 224). The reconstruction of the linguistic image of the thinking subject may thus begin with the statement that in linguistic conceptualization *the thinking subject is the one that we say is doing the thinking*.

I am going to reconstruct a fragment of the linguistic view of thinking on the basis of systemic data, conventionalized texts, and creative ones (aphorisms and poetry). Although creativity is a distinctive feature of aphorisms and poetry, "the

latter do not lack what is entrenched in language system (Pajdzińska & Tokarski, 1996)" (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 37).²

3.3 The Subjective Character of Thinking

The naive, colloquial image of thinking is to some extent consistent with Descartes' maxim "I think, therefore I am": if thinking occurs, there must exist someone who thinks. The image of thinking established in language implies the existence of a thinking subject. The semantic and grammatical structure of the verb *myśleć* 'think' obligatorily requires the assumption of the subject. This is confirmed both by sentences indicating a specified subject of thinking (cf. (1) below) and by those in which the subject is not clearly specified (2). The existence of the thinking subject is obvious even if we do not know or cannot see him or her but we notice only the "results of thinking" (3). Contexts in which the verb *myśleć* is accompanied by the pronoun *nikt* 'nobody' do not evoke the image of "subjectless thinking" but introduce different implications, e.g. "no one but me/no one but he who is saying this," "no one but he who is being talked about" and the like (4). The fact of speaking about thinking obligatorily introduces an existential presupposition:³ "thinking occurs because *there exists someone who thinks*."

(1) *Anna* myśli o egzaminie.

'Anna is thinking about an examination.'

(2) *Niektórzy* myślą, że wzrost cen jest dotkliwy.

'Some think that the rise in prices is painful.'

(3) Wygląda na to, że *ktos* o tym pomyślał.

'It looks like someone has thought about it.'

(4) *Nikt* nie pomyślał, że Adam jest samotny.

'It occurred to no-one [no-one thought] that Adam is/was lonely.'

Just as every instance of language use implies the existence of the speaking subject, so too the concept of THINKING cannot be expressed without assuming

² Cf. Vaňková this volume for a more in-depth account.

³ Grzegorzczukowa (2001, p. 147) notes that existential presuppositions were first identified by logicians (e.g. Frege).

the thinking subject. This fundamental thesis is facetiously capitalized on by the Polish aphorist Stanisław J. Lec, who suggests that it is too obvious to verbalize:

(5) Do myślenia potrzebny jest mózg, nie mówiąc już o człowieku.
'It takes a brain to do the thinking, to say nothing of a human being.'
(Lec, 2006, p. 33)

For someone to think, they must have an efficient brain that does what it is supposed to. However, the brain as the organ of thinking is not the ultimate subject of thinking: thinking requires "a complete human being," with all the subjective features associated with the word *człowiek* '(a) human (being)'.⁴ In the analysis below I seek a fundamental language-entrenched characterization of the subject of thinking, i.e. the features that language "attributes" to the one who thinks.

As a result of the anthropocentric organization of language, the verb *myśleć* 'think' is above all associated with humans. However, animals as subjects of thinking are also acceptable (6).⁵ In contrast, a sentence that associates thinking with plants appears to be acceptable only in a metaphorical sense (7), while an advertisement that grants the ability to think to an inanimate object (8) is definitely a kind of language game, a creative metaphor.⁶ The Polish language allows for the subject of thinking to be first of all a person (and, by extension, most animals).

(6) *Piesek myślał, że chcesz go pogłaskać.*
'The doggy thought you were going to pet it.'

(7) *Roślinka myślała, że ją podlejesz.*
'The little plant thought/was hoping you would water it.'

(8) *Krzesełto, które myśli za Ciebie – ćwiczysz siedząc prawidłowo.*
'The *chair* that *thinks* for you: you actually exercise as you sit in the correct position.'

⁴ This is just a possible interpretation, the most likely one in my opinion. The aphorism is certainly ambiguous, as, by definition, are all the aphorisms cited here.

⁵ The question of which animate beings and under what circumstances are attributed with the ability to think by popular judgment will not be dealt with here (the problem is interesting but requires a separate treatment).

⁶ Another issue worthy of a separate account is certainly the question of how the category of similarity determines the conventional attribution of human mental activities to objects (*thinking machines, intelligent houses, etc.*).

3.4 “Where” Does Thinking Occur?

Lec’s aphorism (5) points to the brain as the organ used in thinking. However, the brain (Pol. *mózg*) is found relatively seldom in the colloquial Polish “naïve anatomy” of people. Rather, etymological considerations suggest that there are linguistic and conceptual ties of thinking with *umysł* ‘mind, intellect, reason.’⁷ *Umysł* is understood as a certain ‘set of features and cognitive functions,’ ‘a person’s non-physical sphere,’ e.g. *praca umysłowa* ‘white-collar work, intellectual work’ is ‘work in which the mind is actively employed, non-manual labor’; *rozwój umysłowy* ‘mental/intellectual development’ is the development of a person’s non-physical abilities and functions; *genialny* / *przenikliwy* / *badawczy* / *chłonny* / *głęboki* / *wybitny umysł* ‘brilliant / astute / inquiring / receptive / insightful / outstanding mind’ are positive assessments of someone’s intellectual abilities, while *ciasny* / *leniwy* / *ograniczony* / *płytki* / *tępy umysł* ‘narrow / idle / shallow / dull mind’ are negative judgments.⁸ But the meaning of *umysł* is limited to functions associated with thinking. As the English *mind*, the Polish word pertains to many other non-physical human properties, e.g. personality traits (*SFJP* 1985). The linguistic image of thinking is therefore an element of the linguistically established image of the whole of people’s non-physical, mental sphere.

It can be said that the linguistic image of thinking contains the belief that “thinking occurs in beings that have the mind,” and it is in the mind that “thinking takes place.” However, the mind is portrayed in language as an abstraction that defies simple verification, which is why Polish does not admit (in the literal, non-metaphorical or non-creative sense) of word collocations such as **zobaczyć umysł* ‘see the mind,’ **dotknąć umysłu* ‘touch the mind,’ or **usłyszeć umysł* ‘hear the mind.’ Nor does Polish interpret in any concrete way the “location” of the mind; it thus does not provide a simple answer to the question of which beings possess the mind and therefore can – in their linguistic portrayals – be subjects of thinking.

Therefore, when reconstructing the linguistic view of thinking, I have sought another term – a basic-level term as the best candidate – that could name and characterize, in a cognitively and linguistically distinct way, “that in which thinking occurs” and “he who thinks.” That other Polish lexeme, etymologically related to *myślenie* ‘thinking,’ is *rozum* ‘reason, sense, wit, intellect.’ In Polish, *rozum* denotes ‘that element of the mind that is responsible for thinking,

⁷ See Vasmer’s *ESRY* (1973). In contemporary Polish lexis the connection between the lexemes *umysł* ‘mind’ and *myśleć* ‘think’ is found in e.g. *umyślić* ‘think up, plan (in the mind).’

⁸ These expressions can also be used metonymically: *Poznał Pan Profesora X? To genialny umysł!* ‘Have you met Professor X? He is a brilliant mind!’

knowing, seeking logical connections and relationships.' The verb *rozumieć* 'understand something' can best be defined as 'know what something is all about, what the problem is,' or 'see sense or logic in something.' The word *rozumowanie* 'reasoning' can be regarded in some contexts as synonymous to *myślenie* 'thinking.' Another meaning of *rozum* is 'the ability to cope in life,' therefore *rozumny człowiek* 'a sensible / reasonable person' is 'a person who acts sensibly/reasonably and can foresee the consequences of their actions.'

Like *umysł*, the noun *rozum* also occurs in many collocations with words that characterize its features,⁹ e.g. *jasny / przenikliwy / dojrzały / otwarty / wielki rozum* 'lucid / insightful / mature / open / great mind/intellect' (positive characteristics) or *krótki / ograniczony / pospolity rozum* 'narrow / dull / ordinary mind/intellect' (negative characteristics).¹⁰ Similarly to the linguistic image of the mind, the linguistic image of reason (sense, intellect, wit) contains the features of 'abstraction' that 'defies direct (physical) verification.' However, there do exist conventionalized Polish expressions that "locate" reason in a specific body organ: *ktoś ma rozum w głowie* or *nie ma rozumu w głowie*, lit. 'someone has sense/reason in their head' or 'has no sense in their head'; *komuś brakuje rozumu w głowie*, lit. 'someone lacks sense in their head'; *ktoś idzie/skacze/sięga po rozum do głowy*, lit. 'someone goes/jumps/reaches for sense into their head' (i.e. 'uses their brains'). Consider also the proverb *Co głowa to rozum* 'So many heads, so many minds,' i.e. 'Everyone has their own sense or judgment.' We are dealing here with the metaphor THE HEAD IS THE CONTAINER FOR SENSE, THOUGHTS, REASON, INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, or Jäkel, 1997). Clearly, mental processes are portrayed in Polish as occurring in this specific location.

Consider also, to the same effect, the following colloquial collocations, well-established metaphorical expressions, or derivatives from the noun *head* 'głowa': *głowić się/główkować* 'rack one's brains' (lit. 'head oneself'); *tamać sobie głowę* 'rack one's brains, think of something intensely without being able to find the solution' (lit. 'break one's head'); *ruszyć głowę* 'think' (lit. 'move one's head'); *pracować głowę* 'do intellectual work' or 'think seeking a solution' (lit. 'work with one's head'). When someone is thinking about something intensely, we say that *ktoś ma głowę pełną myśli o czymś* 'someone has their head full of thoughts about something' or *ma głowę nabitą myślami* 'has their head crammed with thoughts.' When *komuś rozjaśnia się w głowie* 'somebody's head clears up,' it means that 'someone has understood, grasped the sense of something' and therefore can think clearly – *jasno myśleć*.

⁹ Skorupka's *SFJP* (1985) records 61 collocation groups (some of them containing several synonymous units) with the word *rozum*.

¹⁰ Cf. also *mieć kurzy rozum* 'be a birdbrain,' lit. 'have a hen's reason.'

Only sometimes is the “location” of thinking in Polish other than the head, e.g. the soul or spirit. When we speak of thoughts hidden before other people, we use expressions *w głębi duszy* ‘deep in one’s soul’ or *w duchu* ‘in spirit.’ While reason is linguistically conceptualized as something that is in the head, the soul is not assigned to any part of the body in its linguistic portrayal – rather, it resides in the whole of the body: *W zdrowym ciele zdrowy duch* ‘A sound mind in a sound body’ or *Wielka dusza w małym ciele* ‘A great soul in a small body’ (THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE SOUL).

3.5 Symptoms of Thinking

Apparently, there exist certain symptoms or external manifestations of the process of thinking. These are various features of someone’s appearance, signals of thinking, e.g. facial expressions (the appearance of the face or eyes), verbal behavior, gestures, motor activities of the body, and calculated actions.

The head is a kind of container for thoughts, ideas, the mind, sense, or intelligence, while the front part of the human head, *twarz* ‘face,’ has the ability to express what is going on “inside the container.” Thus, we say that people have *myślące / inteligentne / mądre twarze* ‘thinking / intelligent / wise faces’ or *twarze bezmyślne / tępe* ‘thoughtless / blank / dull faces,’ which means that their faces can show their ability or inability to think profound thoughts (9). *Zamyślona twarz* ‘a pensive/contemplative face, lost in thought’ or *wyraz zamyślenia na czyjejs twarzy* ‘the contemplative look on someone’s face’ are expressions that refer to a person who is pondering over something at the moment (10). Polish enables us to talk about situations in which the human face shows an effort connected with a difficult mental operation (11). Other linguistic expressions show the belief that facial expressions manifest someone’s inability to understand a situation, certain ideas or thoughts (12).

(9) *Ona mi się podoba: ma bystrą, myślącą twarz.*
‘I like her: her face is clever, thinking.’

(10) *Z wyrazem zamyślenia na twarzy pochylił się nad listem.*
‘He bent over the letter, a pensive/contemplative expression on his face.’

(11) *Zmarszczyła czoło, zamknęła oczy; na jej twarzy malował się wyraz głębokiego namysłu.*
‘She wrinkled her forehead, closed her eyes, an expression of intense consideration on her face.’

(12) *Bezmyślny uśmiech zdradzał, że nic nie rozumiała.*
‘Her thoughtless smile revealed that she did not understand anything.’

The linguistic image of thinking particularly emphasizes the role of the eyes as the element of the face that most directly expresses human intellectual conditions and intellectual predispositions. Another person's eyes or gaze can be described as *myślące* 'thoughtful,' *skupione* 'focused,' *zamyślane* 'pensive, contemplative,' *pełne zrozumienia* 'full of understanding' or as *bezmyślne* 'thoughtless' or *tępe* 'dull.'

The semantic potential associated with indications of symptoms of thinking is also contained in names for certain gestures, e.g. rubbing one's forehead or propping up one's head, although in Polish there are no lexical units that would directly associate the names of these gestures with thinking. However, the potential can be easily recognized in colloquial utterances (13) and in creative texts that make full use of the semantic load of language units (14).

(13) Siedziała z głową podpartą rękami i głęboko nad czymś myślała.
'She was sitting with her head propped up with her hands, lost in thought over something.'

(14)

Palec wskazujący podpira skroń,
dotyka opuszką zmęczonego miejsca
pod czaszką,
w tej akurat półkuli mózgowej,
która jest bliższa oczom czytelnika,
więc skwapliwie myśli.

The index finger supporting the temple,
touching the tired spot with its tip
beneath the skull,
in the hemisphere
that is closer to the reader's eyes,
so he is eagerly thinking.
(Stanisław Barańczak, *Fotografia*
pisarza ["A Writer's Photo"] transl.
from Barańczak, 1993)

The excerpt from Barańczak's poem in (14) ironically describes a posed photograph in which a person is trying hard to make an impression of someone lost in thought. The person's gestures are referred to with *palec wskazujący podpira skroń* 'the index finger supporting the temple,' and *dotyka zmęczonego miejsca pod czaszką* 'touching the tired spot below the skull,' therefore *skwapliwie myśli* 'he is eagerly thinking.'

The linguistic image of thinking also entails a connection between thinking and speaking: verbal behavior can give clues about the thinking process. This is directly referred to in the collocations *wypowiadać myśli* 'express one's thoughts, opinions,' *wcielać myśli w słowa* 'translate thoughts into words,' or in the proverb *Co w myśli, to i na języku* 'Whatever's in the mind, it's on the tongue.' However, there are also expressions testifying to the contrary: *pleść, co ślina na język przyniesie* 'talk off the top of one's head' (lit. 'whatever saliva brings forth on

the tongue'), *pleść trzy po trzy* 'talk rubbish' (lit. 'three by three'), *gadać bez sensu* 'talk nonsense' and many others. Someone's words, utterances, and actions can be assessed for their connection to thinking. In linguistic interpretation, what is well-considered is generally valued higher and judged as better than what we refer to with the word *nieprzemyślane* 'ill-considered, ill-judged.' An even more negative judgment is contained in the word *bezmyślny* 'thoughtless,' which can collocate with *czyn* 'deed,' *krok* 'step,' *zachowanie* 'behavior,' *działanie* 'action,' *wypowiedź* 'statement.' The Polish language therefore contains the belief that thinking can have "pragmatic value": it generally serves well those who think, on condition that they preserve the order of thinking first, then speaking or acting (cf. the popular saying *Pomyśl dwa razy, zanim coś powiesz (zrobisz)* 'Think twice before you say (do) something'). A humorous observation that this order is not always maintained can be found in another aphorism by Lec (15):

(15) Czyn dogania myśl. Biada, gdy ją przegoni.
'Deed catches up with thought. Woe when it overtakes it.'
(Lec, 2006, p. 164)

This provokes another question: does Polish contain an established general belief that all of us think?

3.6 Do All of Us Think?

The Polish language contains the belief that thinking occurs when certain conditions have been fulfilled. There has to be *someone* (an animate being, primarily a human, also an animal) who acts as the subject of thinking. This subject has to have "that which thinking occurs in": the mind/wit/intellect, soul, brain – although the basic-level term for the "location of thinking" is *głowa* 'head.' Third, we can say that someone is thinking if we see specific symptoms of thinking (facial expression, verbal behavior, actions).

However, do we believe that – in accordance with the interpretation established in language – all beings capable of thinking *really* think? In particular, do they think "to the same degree"? A similar question is asked by Lec with characteristic irony (16):

(16) Czy w określeniu *to człowiek myślący* kryje się komplement dla ludzkości?
'That is a thinking person. Is there a compliment to humanity in that description?'
(Lec, 2006, p. 19)

People are thinking beings, as it were by definition (*Homo sapiens*). Should not the statement that someone thinks entail that they are human? Potentially,

every person is capable of thinking. But the sentence: “That is a thinking person” isolates *one person* who implements this ability. The analysis of Lec’s wordplay may serve as an introduction to reconstructing language-entrenched judgments.

The Polish data portray the ability to think as dependent on many factors. The objective ones are age, partially gender, and illness. *Myśleć jak dziecko* (*mieć dziecinny umysł*) ‘think like a child (have a childish mind)’ means ‘to think less efficiently, more naively than an adult does.’ *Dojrzałe myślenie* ‘mature thinking’ emerges as a positive result of the passage of time. In Polish culture, age is associated with wisdom; nevertheless, in the linguistic image it is not always interpreted as conducive to effective thinking, cf. the proverb *Nie każda głowa siwa mądra bywa* ‘Not all grey heads are wise.’¹¹ The gender criterion with regard to assessing the ability to think is not conspicuous in the colloquial structures of Polish; it is stressed at most in the expression *męski umysł* ‘manly mind’ (i.e. logical, “matter-of-fact”) or in the proverb *Włos długi, rozum krótki* ‘Long on hair and short on brains’ (i.e., stereotypically, women have long hair but little brain). In contrast, this criterion can be found in popular thinking (jokes, films, and other texts of culture). The factors that reduce the ability to think also include illness: cf. *choroba umysłowa* ‘mental disease,’ *człowiek umysłowo chory* ‘a mentally ill person,’ *niedorozwinięty umysłowo* ‘(mentally) retarded,’ *niepełnosprawny umysłowo* ‘mentally disabled’ – the expressions denote people who, from the medical point of view, do not equal average healthy persons in mental efficiency. Interestingly, similar colloquial phrases *chory na głowę*, lit. ‘head-sick,’ or *chory na umyśle* ‘brain-sick’ denote persons who say or do something very stupid or unreasonable.

Age, gender, or illness are objectively ascertainable factors but the assessment of how others think can be also more subjective. Polish contains many expressions that involve positive or negative judgments of someone’s thinking or intellectual capacity. A negative assessment may use the metaphor of “an inadequate container for thoughts,” e.g. in the expressions *ciasna / pusta / zakuta / tępa głowa*, lit. ‘narrow / empty / dull / obtuse head,’ which metonymically describe people with very little ability to think. The expressions *ośla głowa* ‘donkey head’ (lit. ‘donkey head’), *barania głowa/teb* ‘muttonhead,’ *ptasi/kurzy mózdzek* ‘birdbrain,’ *ptasi rozum* ‘birdbrain’ (lit. ‘bird-mind’) are, in turn, descriptions of people who are poorly assessed in comparison with those who have “human” heads and therefore “adequate” minds. The anthropocentric organization of language attributes to humans a higher value than to animals.

¹¹ There is an additional problem with the phrase *być mądrym* ‘be wise,’ whose meaning is related to that of the verb *myśleć* ‘think’ but complete synonymy certainly does not obtain.

Therefore, if Polish endows animals with the ability to think, its quality is nevertheless lower than that attributed to people: some persons are rated so low that their ability to think equals that of animals. Furthermore, *kapuściana głowa* 'numskull' (lit. 'cabbage head') compares the content of the human head to cabbage leaves. Next, *człowiek bez głowy* 'a headless person' designates someone devoid of the ability to think; *tracić głowę* 'lose one's head' means 'lose the ability to think, lose common sense.' Interestingly enough, the expression *ktoś stracił głowę* 'someone lost their head' may denote a transient condition, with the reverse meaning being coded by *ktoś odzyskał zdrowy rozum* 'someone regained their common sense.' In Polish, we most often say that *ktoś stracił głowę dla kogoś* 'someone lost their head for somebody' (fell in love with them) or *w jakiejś sytuacji* 'in some (difficult) situation.'¹²

Some expressions interpret thinking as a process that occurs only when the thinking subject makes a specific effort. Some people make this effort, others do not. In the linguistic conceptualization, thinking is therefore a kind of consciously performed action. One of the metaphors well-established in Polish compares thinking with work, which is illustrated with collocations of the type *praca umysłowa* 'intellectual (non manual) work,' *pracować głową* 'work with one's head' (intellectually), *główka pracuje* 'thinking in progress' (lit. 'head-DIM is working') and the like. As is the case with any action, the subject may consciously stop thinking (17), find the action of thinking impossible to do (18) or may consciously refrain from it (19). When, however, the "work" is progressing effectively, its objective and product is a thought, idea, concept, conviction, belief, conclusion, etc. (20). The thought thus understood has its "owner/creator," the subject who brought it into being and gave it a shape. Therefore, the noun *myśl* 'thought, idea' and its synonyms are combined with possessive pronouns/ adjectives or with other markers of the "owner" of the thought (21).

(17) Nie będę o tym dłużej myśleć, teraz zajmę się czymś innym.
'I will no longer think about it; now I'm going to do something else.'

(18) Dziś po prostu w ogóle nie mogę myśleć.
'I simply can't think at all today.'

(19) Nigdy nie zamierzałem i dalej nie zamierzam tracić czasu na myślenie o tym.
'I have never intended to and I still do not intend to waste my time thinking about this.'

¹² These are only selected examples of judgments on the human ability to think: the Polish lexis contains many more, omitted here because of space constraints.

(20) Długo myślał o tym, aż w jego głowie zrodził się ten pomysł.
'He had been thinking about it for a long time until this idea was conceived in his mind.'

(21) Nie zgadzam się, że to tylko jej pomysł; to *wspólna myśl całego zespołu*.
'I refuse to say it's only *her* idea; it's *the whole team's* idea.'

However, in Polish there are many well-established metaphors expressing the belief that thought is not always an outcome of a conscious thinking process. Thought is sometimes conceptualized as an element of the external world, which, independently of the human will, can *wpaść/przyjść/strzelić komuś do głowy*, lit. 'fall into/come/shoot into someone's head' (22); we also say that *natrętna myśl powraca/nurtuje/nie daje komuś spokoju* 'a nagging thought/idea returns/bothers/does not leave someone alone' (23) or that *ktoś nie może opędzić się od natrętnych myśli* 'someone cannot get rid of nagging thoughts.' The "initiator" of thinking is thus not the subject him- or herself but an external element that "finds" someone, "attacks" them, "makes itself be felt" by them or accidentally "falls" into their head.

(22) Odkąd przyszła mi do głowy myśl o nowym domu, nie mogę myśleć o niczym innym.
'Since the idea of having a new house occurred to me, I can't think about anything else.'

(23) Ciągłe prześladowuje mnie myśl, że o czymś zapomniałam.
'I have been constantly bothered by the thought that I have forgotten something.'

However, despite the "passivity" of thinking so conceptualized, *someone who thinks* still remains the only subject of thinking. The ostensibility of the conviction that thoughts "come from the outside" by "themselves," without anyone's participation, is exposed by Lec in (24):

(24) Do głowy wpadają pomysły od wewnątrz.
'It is from the inside that ideas fly into the mind/head.'
(Lec, 2006, p. 125)

Lec questions the language-entrenched belief that a person is "subordinate" to their thoughts: ideas do not come to the mind from the outside, as the colloquial metaphor has it, but they do so "from the inside," from within the thinking subject, even if the latter is not aware of it. The aphorist opposes the popular belief that in some situations people can be absolved from responsibility for their thoughts; instead, he assigns full responsibility to the thinking subject.

4. Conclusion

The remarks above open a broad research area pertaining to how the process of thinking is conceptualized in language – many interesting problems have not been dealt with in the analysis. My main goal has been to show the linguistic conceptualization of the subject of thinking, as it is entrenched in the Polish language. The conclusions derived from linguistic data relate to popular judgment. To speakers of Polish (but also English and probably many other languages), they may seem obvious: this in fact is an argument in favor of the coherence of language and the human conceptual world. The two domains “absorb” the totality of people’s knowledge of the world, biologically determined experiences, and culture.

In order to reconstruct the judgments entrenched in the Polish language, I began with well-established lexical-semantic data: words and their meanings, collocations, and lexicalized metaphors. I then referred to texts: both to conventionalized examples and to creative uses (aphorisms and poetry). Texts have a special value for showing the semantic potential of words, emphasize meanings embedded in experience and culture, meanings that are understood by language users but are not always discernible from an analysis of lexis alone (cf. Vaňková, this volume).

I would like to treat the image of the thinking subject, an inextricable part of the linguistic conceptualization of thinking, as one of the five elements in a dynamic, narrative model of thinking (section 3.1). The thinking subject is the first – and the key – component of the model.

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Chapter 15

The Concept of NIEWOLNIK 'Slave' in Polish: an Ethnolinguistic Panchronic Reconnaissance

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1. Introduction

The aim of this study is to abstract, from broadly understood linguistic data, a set of common propositions about the category of people denoted by the Polish noun *niewolnik* 'slave.' In other words, my general goal is to reconstruct the stereotype of the slave entrenched in the Polish language. My approach is consistent in its methodology with the tradition of the Lublin School of Ethnolinguistics.¹ A constitutive element of this tradition is the attention it pays to the worldview of a given community, which is reflected in the lexical units and grammatical structures of its language and which comes to the fore in a variety of contexts in which the units of language are used.²

The concept of NIEWOLNIK is particularly interesting as an object of research on the relationships between language and other components of culture (Polish, in this case), for at least two reasons. First, it is strongly linked with the category

1 The main object of interest in this model of linguistic description are not lexical or grammatical units themselves but their "conceptual correlates" or the stereotypes that lie at the interface between words (or syntactic structures) and the portions of the external world to which they refer (Bartmiński, 2006, p. 82).

2 The cultural and cognitive approach that this school represents has its origin in German and American anthropological linguistics (Humboldt, Sapir and Whorf, Malinowski, and others) and in Russian semiotic and cultural studies (cf. Bartmiński, 1980, 1986, 1998, 2006, 2009/2012; Bartmiński & Tokarski, 1993; Pajdzińska & Tokarski, 1996; Pajdzińska, 2004; Tokarski, 2001). It should also be mentioned that (despite having been developed independently) the methodology in question has many points of convergence with American cognitive linguistics. The distinctive characteristics of the research model developed in Lublin seem to be the focus on the culture-specific components of the linguistic worldview and the caution it takes in formulating hypotheses about the cross-cultural or universal nature of observed phenomena. An important inspirational role is played here by Anna Wierzbicka (1992, 1996).

of FREEDOM, which is a crucial value in Polish culture.³ Second, the political situation of the Polish people throughout the 19th century resembled that of a colonized nation. The period between 1795 and 1918, when Poland was divided between Prussia, Russia and Austria, is very deeply rooted in Poles' collective memory.⁴ The time when Poland was absent from maps of Europe is commonly referred to as *niewola* 'enslavement,' and the picture of the enslaved nation has served as a point of reference in public discourse about – variously understood – autonomy at different moments of Polish subsequent history.

Researchers interested in linguistic worldview need to consider different types of data. Investigation of lexis and grammar (the language system) is a good starting point, but other sources of information are also required. First and foremost, there are texts, in which common propositions are presupposed or expressed explicitly (the latter applies in particular to conventionalized texts with a broad circulation, such as proverbs or jokes). Additionally, knowledge about the beliefs and customs of a linguistic community is taken into account, in accordance with

3 Bartmiński (2009/2012) relates to the ideas of Głowiński (1986), and notes that according to the latter, a community rests on "specific practical, cultural and moral values, so called 'entrusted values.' For example, the entrusted values for Poles and many other European nations are freedom and sovereignty, peace and well-being, democracy and solidarity. Values bridge over language and culture. They lie at the core of culture; they constitute the very foundation of language and the basic component of all speech" (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 12).

4 An interesting reflection on this issue is offered by Ryszard Kapuściński, who describes his futile attempts to overcome the African stereotype of "white people" by showing the internal diversity of Europeans and the special status of the Polish nation among them:

I could not adequately resolve the question of guilt. In their eyes, I was guilty. Slavery, colonialism, five hundred years of injustice – after all, it's the white men's doing. The white men's. Therefore mine. Mine? I was not able to conjure within myself that cleansing, liberating emotion – guilt; to show contrition; to apologize. On the contrary! From the start, I tried to counterattack: "you were colonized? We, Poles, were also! For one hundred and thirty years we were the colony of three foreign powers. White ones too." They laughed, tapped their foreheads, walked away. I angered them because they thought I wanted to deceive them. I knew that despite my inner certainty about my own innocence, to them I was guilty. These barefoot, hungry, and illiterate boys had a moral advantage over me, the sole advantage an accursed history bestows upon its victims. With rare exceptions, they, the black men, had never conquered anybody, hadn't occupied, hadn't enslaved. They could regard me from a position of superiority. They were of black race, but a pure one. I stood among them weak, with nothing more to say. (Kapuściński, 2002 [1998], pp. 40-41)

In this context consider also the etymology of the word *Slavs*, the name of the ethnic group that Poles belong to. The endogenic ethnic name *Słowianin* comes from Proto-Slavic **slovo* 'speech' (Boryś, 2005), but its equivalents in many European languages (among them the English words *Slav* and *slave*; cf. *Oxford Dictionaries*, 2013) are, directly or indirectly, derived from the Latin noun *sclavus*. The association between Slavs and slaves is not only a matter of linguistic history and a trace of the distant past of Slavs: even today this etymology is invoked in public discourse (it is enough to browse websites containing the pun *Slavus-sclavus*).

Sapir's claim that "[t]he understanding of a simple poem, for instance, involves not merely an understanding of the single words in their average significance, but a full comprehension of the whole life of the community as it is mirrored in the words, or as it is suggested by their overtones" (Sapir, 1929, pp. 209-210). The methodology of the Lublin School of Ethnolinguistics also includes experimental methods, such as questionnaires, but these will not be used here.

In keeping with what has been said above, let us begin with systemic data. The Polish lexeme *niewolnik* is morphologically divided as: *nie•wol•nik*. Unlike its English counterpart, *slave*, it does not come from Latin but is derived from an indigenous adjective *wolny* 'free.' The prefix *nie-* expresses negation, and the suffix *-nik* denotes 'a person of a certain kind.' The stem *-wol* has its roots in Proto-Indo-European **wel* and is also present in the Polish abstract noun *wola* 'will' (as well as in its English equivalent). Thus, the structural meaning of the lexeme *niewolnik*, which is still clear to native speakers, can be elucidated as 'someone who is not free' or 'someone who is deprived of their will.'⁵ In actual use, however, the word *niewolnik* names a narrower category, and, in fact, Polish does not distinguish lexically the entire class of people who are not free (there is no single noun to designate such a category), yet it does distinguish some subcategories. Dictionaries of synonyms (SWB, 1995; DSS, 2004) list several lexemes with the generic semantic component 'someone who is not free': *więzień* 'prisoner,' *osadzony* 'prisoner' (lit. 'someone who has been placed in jail'), *skazany/skazaniec* 'convict,' *aresztant* 'arrestee,' *jeniec* 'prisoner of war,' *internowany* 'detainee,' *zaktadnik* 'hostage,' *porwany* 'kidnappee,' *zestaniec* 'deportee,' *braniec* arch. 'captive, especially someone held prisoner for ransom by Turks or Tatars.'⁶ They are to some extent synonymous, although none of them is an exact semantic equivalent of *niewolnik*.

The feature that differentiates *niewolnik* from other nouns in the semantic field of 'people who are not free' is 'being owned, belonging to somebody': the lexeme implies the existence of an economic system in which the relation of ownership between one person and another is possible. The idea of ownership as a constitutive semantic component is mentioned in lexicographic definitions of *niewolnik* in each of the dictionaries of the Polish language I have consulted, from Linde's early 19th-c. *SJPLin* (1807-1814)⁷ to the modern *USJP* (2003).

⁵ The latter definition appears in the first dictionary of the Polish language, Linde's *SJPLin* (1807-1814).

⁶ The feminine form *branka* is much better known and more frequent. The nouns *braniec* and *branka* could also be considered hyponyms of *niewolnik* 'slave' and *niewolnica* 'female slave,' respectively.

⁷ Linde, in his definition of *niewolnik*, both evokes and downplays the idea of a person being "owned": "*niewolnik* – a person who *as if* belongs to somebody else" (emphasis A.W.). The attitude of the lexicographer can be explained given the inspiration that he drew from the ideas of the Polish Enlightenment.

This brief review of lexicographic data makes it possible to propose the general category (*genus proximum*) 'not being free' and the distinguishing feature (*differentia specifica*) 'being owned' for the lexeme *niewolnik*, at which point the classical procedure of defining would probably terminate. In this study, however, it is only the first step towards a definition because the knowledge of the definitional characteristics alone does not suffice to predict what *niewolnik* can mean in creative contexts, or what it is that speakers of Polish have in mind when they use this word. Why have certain propositions entered this concept? What role have history, customs, and the system of values played in shaping its semantic structure? To approach the answers to these questions, I am going to analyze three types of data: lexicographic definitions of *niewolnik*,⁸ lexical units that are formally or semantically related to it, and selected texts in which the noun is used. Admittedly, the selection of representative texts is to some extent subjective: the study is a reconnaissance rather than a complete semantic description. I have taken into consideration some items from the canon of school reading and two types of stereotyped texts: proverbs and jokes (these genres are based on common knowledge, which makes them valuable sources in ethnolinguistic research).

2. Historical and Cultural Circumstances that a Typical *Niewolnik* is Commonly Associated With

2.1 Africans in the Colonial Era

Unsurprisingly, there is considerable lexical and textual evidence suggesting that a typical *niewolnik* is a person of a particular race: a black person. Dictionaries of general Polish and its social varieties list lexicalized metaphors that corroborate this: *Murzyn* 'a Negro' is defined as (i) a 'slave,' (ii) 'somebody who does another person's job without revealing their participation,' (iii) 'somebody who does a particularly hard and unrewarding job,' (iv) 'somebody who is illegally employed.'⁹ These semantic derivatives clearly show a strong link between the

⁸ They not only reveal the semantic components abstracted by the lexicographers from their databases, but each definition can also unveil the worldview of its author as well as the categories characteristic of the humanistic discourse of the time, as in the case of Linde's dictionary (see previous note).

⁹ The metaphor is probably motivated by the belief that an illegal worker usually does hard and unappreciated work. Illegal workers of this kind are also referred to in Polish with the word *gastarbeiter*, of German origin: this shows that members of the Polish community think of themselves as employees rather than as employers (the latter are Germans).

concepts NIEWOLNIK and BLACK PERSON. Both concepts contain propositions of 'working for somebody' and 'doing the job someone else does not want to do.' These propositions are reflected in most of the lexicographic definitions of *niewolnik*. They motivate such idioms as *pracować jak Murzyn* 'work very hard' (lit. 'like a Negro'), or *zdawać egzamin na Murzyna* 'to take an exam in someone else's place, pretending to be them' (lit. 'to take an exam Negro-style'); one can also be *biały Murzyn*, lit. 'a white Negro,' i.e. 'somebody who does a hard, unrewarding, and poorly-paid job, although they are white.' The propositions are also reflected in the offensive nickname for black persons, i.e. *niewolnik* (not listed in dictionaries but sporadically appearing in usage, cf. Passent, 1987), in jokes about black people¹⁰ and in the proverb: *Murzyn zrobił swoje, Murzyn może odejść*, lit. 'The Negro (Moor) has done his job, the Negro (Moor) can go' (used ironically, when someone who has done something for somebody else meets with ingratitude, is unappreciated and no longer needed¹¹).

Documentary literature also makes use of the link between the concepts of NIEWOLNIK and BLACK PERSON, which is illustrated by the following passage about the situation in Eastern Africa at the end of the 19th century, when slavery had officially been abolished but was still being practiced. A Polish traveler reports with great indignation:

On a visit to the part of the city [Zanzibar] inhabited by Negroes, it will not even cross your mind, when you see all those people, equally black, equally naked, living in equally poor houses, that one of them is the owner and another is a thing, one has all the rights and another has none. But it actually is so – *Negroes own their Negroes*, too, *slaves own their slaves* – and all of them find the relationship as natural as the fact that one person is stronger and another is weaker, one is tall and another is short. (Sienkiewicz, 1956 [1890], p. 86; trans. A.W., emphasis added)

The wordplay *Negroes own their Negroes, too, slaves own their slaves* is based on two polysemous lexemes: *niewolnik* 'slave,' metonymically 'a black person,' and *Murzyn* 'Negro,' also metonymically 'a slave.' This is another confirmation of the fact that *niewolnik* is commonly associated with Africans in the colonial period.

10 Consider the following example: "What is white that a black man should have? – His master." The joke, based on the conceptual connection between 'being black' and 'being a slave,' contains a wordplay on the antonyms *black–white* and the relational antonyms *master–slave*.

11 The source of this proverb is Friedrich Schiller's *Fiesco: Der Mohr hat seine Schuldigkeit getan, der Mohr kann gehen* (Markiewicz & Romanowski, 1990, p. 578).

2.2 Ancient Times

A representative ancient, pre-Christian figure of a slave, whose image has been preserved in Polish culture, is Spartacus. The image is, however, rather inconspicuously manifested in the Polish lexicon: its only trace is the derived noun *spartakiada* 'a kind of sports competition' (SWO, 1980, p. 694; SMTK, 1997, p. 1092). The noun, however, is a Russian borrowing and is not listed in the dictionary of Polish eponyms (SEWO, 2006). Nevertheless, the image of Spartacus the gladiator and the leader of slave uprising is preserved in literary works, such as Cyprian Kamil Norwid's¹² poem *Spaktakus*, or Halina Rudnicka's novel *Uczniowie Spartakusa* ("The Disciples of Spartacus", 1951), for a few decades compulsory school reading. In the 1930s, there was also an organization of young Polish socialists called *Spartakus*, named so to reflect their rebellious tendencies. This image of Spartacus can serve as common ground in literary communication, as illustrated by the following passage from Ryszard Kapuściński's *Gdyby cała Afryka...* ("If the Whole of Africa..."):

Also in the Algerian Sahara there had been, until recently, the biggest slave market in the world. Ben Bella closed this market and gave out to slaves the land and the date palms that had belonged to slave traders. Today In Salah has the world's only dictatorship of slaves, formerly called "harratin" (pack animals). This way Ben Bella *made Spartacus' dream come true*. (Kapuściński, 2011 [1969], p. 198; trans. and emphasis A.W.)

The association of slavery with antiquity also finds its confirmation in classical texts, cited by lexicographers.¹³ As an example, consider a passage from an important counter-reformation text by Piotr Skarga, *Kazania sejmowe* ("Sermons to the Parliament"): "Old Christians, who, during pagan times, had bought their slaves, gave freedom to all of them, as brothers in Christ" (*SJPLin*, 1807-1814; *SJPZdan*, 1861; *SJPWar*, 1900-1927). It is clear that in Skarga's view, slavery and Christianity contradict each other.

2.3 Non-Christian Cultures

The view that Christianity excludes slavery seems characteristic of Polish culture. It was implied in the political speeches of the Enlightenment opposing personal

¹² One of the most outstanding Polish Romantic poets (1821-1883).

¹³ They can be found mostly in dictionaries from the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, as a result of the then-practiced tradition of finding illustrative examples.

serfdom of peasants, and in the 19th-century works of Henryk Sienkiewicz: not only in *Quo Vadis*, but also in his African reports, where paganism and Islam were blamed for slavery:

Sulimue, who carries my rifles, has the flaw of being afraid of us. Especially at the beginning, when I beckoned for a rifle, he ran to me with noticeable anxiety. *He must have been a slave of an Arab* in childhood, and his docility probably dates from those times. (Sienkiewicz, 1956 [1890], p. 201; trans. and emphasis A. W.)

Niewolnictwo 'slavery' is also associated with another Islamic culture: the Ottoman Empire and its tributaries. *Jasyr*, i.e. being held captive by Tatars and Turks, became the fate of many Polish gentry and peasants. The practice lasted from the Middle Ages until the 17th century.¹⁴ Other words in the same field are Arabic loanwords *haracz* 'ransom or tribute'¹⁵ and *harem*.¹⁶ The last concept is connected with sexual slavery, and the motif of Polish women kidnapped into Turkish and Arab harems has appeared in Polish literature at least since the Renaissance.¹⁷ References to these aspects of Polish history can be found in the illustrative parts of the lexicographic entries for *niewolnik* and *niewola*:

So said black slaves [*niewolnicy*], the *infidel* guardians of their masters' harems. (*SJPLin*, 1807-1814; *SJPZdan*, 1861; *SJPWar*, 1900-1927)

The slavery [*niewola*] under the Turk is not as hard as in our painted freedom,¹⁸ I would pay the *haracz* [ransom] and be free, and safe with my property. (*SJPLin*, 1807-1814; *SJPZdan*, 1861; *SJPWar*, 1900-1927)

14 "Beginning in the Middle Ages, Poland was being invaded by the warriors of Islam – Tatars, and since the 15th century, the country also had to struggle against the aggressive Ottoman Turkey. [...] There were continuous forays of Crimean Tatars and other hordes (dependent on the Sultan) into the territory of the Republic. They left ashes and deserted land behind them. Thousands of people taken in *jasyr* were sold into slavery in oriental markets." (Żygulski, 1994, p. 1, see also Jasiński, 1988). The word *jasyr* probably derives from *esir* or *yesir*, the Turkish names for a slave market (cf. the entry at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_the_Ottoman_Empire; accessed Jan 15, 2013).

15 Today the noun is more often used in the sense of 'protection money.'

16 Possibly, also the word *eunuch* 'castrated human male,' a loanword from Greek also meaning 'harem guard.'

17 Cf. the following excerpt from Jan Kochanowski's 16th-c. poem "The Song about the Ravage of Podole": "Daughters of gentry (God Almighty!) / are making the ugly beds of infidel dogs" (translated by A.W. from Kochanowski, 1970).

18 It is an ironic allusion to the idea of Polish "golden freedom" for the gentry, which by some was considered anarchy.

To sum up, the association of *niewolnik* with unbelievers in general and with the culture of Islam in particular finds its confirmation in Polish lexis and textual data from various periods.

3. What *Niewolnik* Does and What Happens to Him (in the Light of Linguistic Data)

An important semantic component of the lexeme *niewolnik* is 'working for the owner.'¹⁹ It is found in such collocations as *niewolnicza praca* 'slave labor' and *niewolnicza siła robocza* 'slave workforce,' as well as in the many lexicalized metaphors of *Murzyn* 'Negro,' mentioned above. Another association is that of the low quality of slave work, preserved in the proverb *Z niewolnika nie będzie robotnika* 'A slave will not make a good worker.' The proverb, however, provides no explanation why this is so: a slave could be lazy, unmotivated, or could purposely sabotage his/her job. This last interpretation would correspond with the linguistic and cultural image of the mentality of a slave, discussed below.

A slave is also pictured in the Polish language as an object of trade, cf. the following collocations: *handel niewolnikami* 'slave trade,' *handel żywym towarem* 'human trafficking,' *zaprzedać w niewolę* 'to sell into slavery,' *wykupić z niewoli* 'to buy out of slavery,' *zapłacić haracz* 'to pay ransom.' The association is also confirmed in racist jokes about *Murzyn*: *Nie mam nic przeciwko Murzynom – jednego to bym nawet sobie kupił* 'I have nothing against Negroes; I would even buy one for myself.' The verb *kupić* 'buy' serves here as a script switch trigger (Victor Raskin, from Mandler, 1984), actualizing the script of slave trade, which functions as cultural common ground.

Niewolnik is also associated with *piętnowanie* 'body-marking, branding,' which is confirmed by a sentence illustrating the use of the noun in dictionaries:

Her Ladyship would like to have a *branded slave* [*piętnowany niewolnik*] in him, so that he would drink out of her shoes and collect dust from her footprints. (*SJPLin*, 1807-1814; *SJPZdan*, 1861; *SJPWar*, 1900-1927; *SJPDor*, 1958-1969; trans. and emphasis A.W.)

¹⁹ It is not mentioned in all of the dictionaries that I have consulted, but the shape of the entries is a matter of lexicographic convention rather than a sign of specific semantic processes. Lexicographers in the 19th and the early 20th century (*SJPLin*, *SJPWar*) focused on the idea of independence. In contrast, after World War II, with communism as the mainstream ideology, the key category was work, and this can also be observed in dictionary entries.

In this citation from the work of Franciszek Zabłocki, one of the best known Polish comedy writers and satirists of the Enlightenment, the word *piętnowany* (past participle of *piętnować*) appears in its literal sense, but in today's Polish it is mostly used in its metaphorical meaning 'stigmatized.'

4. The Physical and Emotional Condition of a Slave

Niewola is intersubjectively associated with physical and mental suffering, which is reflected in the collocations *jęczeć w niewoli* 'groan in slavery,' *niewola żelazna* 'iron slavery' (contrasted with *złota wolność* 'golden freedom';²⁰ *niewola gniecie* 'slavery weighs (someone) down,' as well as in phrases *niewola ciężka dola* 'slavery – a heavy fate,' *niewola nie raj* 'slavery is not paradise' (NKPKrzyż, 1962-1974; SPOJ, 2004). The concept of a suffering slave is also presupposed in texts cited by lexicographers:

... be he a white or a black slave, whether he *groans* [*jęczy*] under the violence of an unjust law or under his chains, he is a human being and does not differ from us in any respect. (Kotłataj, 1952 [1789], trans. A.W.)

The image of a bounded, suffering slave is a basis for metaphors of love. For example, in the popular expression *być w niewoli miłości* (lit. 'be in the slavery of love') and in love poems, it highlights the paradox of the emotion, which accommodates the opposing qualities of joy and pain:

Nic mię nie boli, a płaczę, rzewliwy,	I feel no pain and yet I cry,
Nikt mnie nie więzi, a przecież	No one holds me captive and yet I yearn...
tęskliwy...	(Hieronim Morsztyn (16 th -17 th c.), <i>Lamentation of a slave</i> ; trans. A.W.)

20 The adjective *żelazny* 'iron, made of iron' is here a metonymy for *kajdany* 'irons' or *okowy* 'fetters, shackles.' The latter words, designating physical objects that serve to restrict a person's physical freedom, are in turn metonymically, but also metaphorically related to *niewola*. The metaphor is motivated by the features 'hard,' 'heavy,' and 'difficult to break,' associated with *kajdany* and *okowy*. Therefore, the expression *niewola żelazna* has the qualitative aspect of being a source of suffering that is difficult to change. Linguistic intuition suggests that *kajdany* i *okowy* are more strongly associated with *więzień* 'prisoner' than with *niewolnik* 'slave,' but the association with the latter transpires through the saying *Nie ma większego okrutnika jak niewolnik rozkuty* 'There is no bigger tormentor than an unchained slave' (NKPKrzyż, 1962-1974; SPOJ, 2004) – I will return to its semantic content presently.

Pierwszy raz jam *niewolnik* rad z swojej niewoli... For the first time I am a *slave*, glad of my slavery...
(Adam Mickiewicz (1826), *Sonnet XIII* of the "Odessa Sonnets" cycle; trans. A.W.)

It is also part of common knowledge that slavery not only brings suffering, but also degrades human beings, equating them with animals, cf. *jarzmo niewoli* 'the yoke of slavery.'

5. The Mentality of *Niewolnik*

Niewolnik also connotes 'submissiveness' and 'obsequiousness,' which is revealed in the metaphorical use of the adjective and the adverb derived from the noun: *niewolniczy* 'submissive, servile' and *niewolniczość w zachowaniu* 'servile behavior' (SWJP, 1996). Such an attitude is obviously a consequence of the fear of the master's rage, so it could be combined with hidden hate, which is expressed in the proverbs *Niewolnik rzadko szczery* 'A slave is seldom sincere,' *Ilu niewolników, tylu nieprzyjaciół* 'So many slaves, so many enemies,'²¹ *Każdy niewolnik jest ukrytym wrogiem* 'Every slave is a hidden enemy,' *Nie ma większego okrutnika jak niewolnik rozkuty* 'There is no bigger tormentor than an unchained slave' (NKPKrzyż, 1962-1974; SPOJ, 2004). The commonly acknowledged belief that a slave is dangerous for his master was often used in the argumentation of ideologists of the Polish Enlightenment, who acted against personal serfdom of peasants, often portraying them as slaves:

[...] a fetus whose father is oppression and whose *mother is slavery*, must exceed in *venom and severity* anything predatory and killing we could imagine... (Kotłataj, 1952 [1789], p. 165; trans. and emphasis A.W.)

The rebellious tendencies of slaves are personified by Spartacus (see section 2.2 above).

This context readily brings to mind a fragment of Adam Mickiewicz's poem *Konrad Wallenrod*, very important for Polish discourse on political and national independence:

21 The proverb has its origins in antiquity. It comes from the Latin *Quot servi, tot hostes* and has counterparts in many European languages (SPOJ, 2004, p. 169).

Tyś niewolnik, jedyna broń niewolników – podstęp.	You are a slave, and slaves' only weapon is deception. (Mickiewicz, 1828, trans. A.W.)
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Niewolnik refers here to a member of a nation invaded and dominated by a foreign state. The image of slaves who conspire and finally rise up is a literary theme characteristic of the discourse on 19th-c. Poland; it appears in Leopold Staff's poem from 1918, the year of a regained sovereignty:

Polsko, nie jesteś ty już <i>niewolnicą</i>, łańcuch twych kajdan stał się tym łańcuchem, Na którym z <i>lochu</i>, co był twą stolicą Lat sto, swym własnym dźwignęłaś się duchem.	Poland, you are no longer a <i>slave</i>; the <i>chain of your irons</i> has become the chain on which you, with your own spirit, have raised out from a <i>dungeon</i> that was your capital for a hundred years. (Leopold Staff, <i>Poland, you are no longer a slave</i>, 1918; trans. by A.W. from Staff, 1955, emphasis added)
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In the poem, we can observe a significant interference of the concepts of SLAVE (expressed by *niewolnica* 'female slave') and PRISONER (implied by the noun *loch* 'dungeon'). Both concepts are linked by the differential semantic component 'lack of freedom' and by the connotation of 'suffering.' It is interesting that being thrown into a dungeon and bound with chains (cf. *kajdany* 'irons' and *łańcuch* 'chain') is associated with being a prisoner rather than with being a slave. The vagueness may result from the fact that *niewolnictwo* 'slavery,' in the strict sense, evokes a rather alien and abstract concept for Polish speakers.

Hidden hate and rebellious tendencies are not the only components of the image of a slave's mentality. In linguistic data, we can also find evidence of the reverse conceptualization: that of an internal inclination toward submissiveness and passiveness, both physical and intellectual. To some extent, these features of *niewolnik* are confirmed by the collocations *niewolnicze naśladownictwo* 'slavish imitation,' *niewolniczy przekład* 'slavish translation,' *niewolnik/niewolnica mody* 'a fashion slave' – these are derogatory terms referring to situations when someone makes no use of their own judgment. Consider also the proverb *Niewola dowcip zatłumia* 'Slavery suppresses intelligence' and a corresponding quotation: *Niewola myśl w człowieku tłumia, niszczy, gasi* 'Human thought is suppressed, destroyed, extinguished by slavery' (NPKPrzyż, 1962-1974). The clearest expression of this idea, however, is the phrase *zniewolony umysł* 'the captive mind' (lit. 'the enslaved mind'), now a conventionalized metaphor, created by Czesław Miłosz (for the title of his 1953 non-fiction book). The idea of captive minds is presupposed in the following texts:

You have changed the human nature in your brother! You have turned the *slave*, who could be useful for the country, into a useless machine. And so the *slavish machine*, totally deprived of will and reason, won't take a step, unless it is forced to. (Stanisław Staszic's political speech on peasants, 1790, trans. by A.W. from Staszic, 2003, p. 179)

[...]
Jest rzeka na wpół lodami przykryta
I *niewolnicze* na brzegach pochody,
Nad siną chmurą, ponad czarne wody
W czerwonym słońcu, błysk *bata*.

Tam, w tym pochodzie, w milczącym szeregu,
Patrz, to twój syn. Policzek przecięty,
Krwawi. On idzie, *małpio uśmiechnięty*,
Krzycz! *W niewolnictwie szczęśliwy*.

[...]
I mija tak człowiek, i już zapomina,
O co miał walczyć i po co.
[...]

[...]
There is a river, half-covered with ice
and *slavish* processions on its banks,
above a livid cloud, over the black waters,
a *whip* flashes in red sunlight.

Look, in the procession, in the row of silent people, marches your son, his cheek cut, bleeding. He walks on, *with a monkey smile*.
Scream! *Happy in slavery*.

[...]
And so one passes by, and forgets
what he was to fight for and why.

[...]
(Miłosz, *Walc* ("The Waltz"), trans. by A.W.
from Miłosz, 1942, emphasis added)

These reflections are revisited in *The Captive Mind* (1953), a philosophical and political essay about the situation in Poland during World War II and in the era of Stalinism, in which Miłosz strongly criticizes the attitude of intellectual submissiveness and passiveness, as when members of a community succumb to being unable to think and decide for themselves.

6. Final Word

As a result of the present reconnaissance of lexical and textual data, we have arrived at a sketchy, panchronic²² picture of the concept of NIEWOLNIK. Some of

22 I use the term *panchronic* in the belief that in studies of the relationship between language, culture, and cognition, the postulate of disjunctive treatment of synchronic states of the language and the processes of its evolution cannot be maintained. This is so for two reasons, connected with two research commitments: "cultural" and "cognitive." The first reason is the need to take into account "the heritage of the past in the present" (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, p. 10), to take note of the continuity of culture. The second reason is the nature of cognitive processes, reflected in linguistic structures and actualized with the participation of language: at play here is the dynamic nature and "radical vagueness" of linguistic categorization over time (Łozowski, 1999, 2000).

its components are probably widespread in European culture, in particular the associations with the black race and the colonial era or ancient times, human trafficking, forced labor, sexual exploitation of women, suffering as a result of ill-treatment, and submissiveness combined with hidden hate. Other features seem to be rather specific to Polish language and culture, for example, the belief in the inalienable conflict between Christianity and slavery, the association between slavery and Muslim culture (Tatars and Turks in particular), perhaps even the idea of “the captive mind.” A corroboration of this view, however, requires further comparative research.

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Chapter 16

The Linguistic View of Patriotism in Selected Polish Political Commentaries

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1. Patriotism in the Polish Lexis and in Questionnaires

Patriotyzm 'patriotism' occupies the twenty-second position in the hierarchy of Polish key words proposed by Walery Pisarek (Pisarek, 2002, p. 31). It has been a subject of interest for sociologists and politicians;¹ it is also one of the main components of ideology. The concept appears often in public discourse,² e.g. in statements of the Polish president Bronisław Komorowski,³ cf. also Levitz (2008) or Wojewódzki (2012).

Patriotyzm also found its place on the list of value terms identified through the use of ASA/ADQ (*Ankieta Słownika Aksjologicznego/Axiological Dictionary Questionnaire*), a questionnaire conducted by Jerzy Bartmiński et al. in 1990, 2000, and 2010 among students at five Polish universities. Therefore, *patriotyzm* occupies an important place in the Polish linguistic worldview, the latter being understood as a:

... linguistic, variously verbalized interpretation of reality, expressed in the form of judgments about the world. The judgments may be "entrenched" in the very matter of language, i.e. its grammar, vocabulary, stereotyped texts (e.g. proverbs), or presupposed, i.e. implied by linguistic forms but entrenched on the level of social knowledge, beliefs, myths and rituals. (Bartmiński, 2006, p. 12)

¹ Literature on the subject is rich; some of the more important publications are Lipski (1981), Karolak (1993), or Walicki (2009 [1990]).

² According to van Dijk (2002), "if we focus on politicians, we shall usually have at least two ideologies as expressed in their text and talk: First professional ideologies that underlie their functioning as politicians. And second, the socio-political ideologies they adhere to, e.g., as members of political parties or social groups." [quoted from www.discourses.org/download/articles/; accessed Jan 25, 2013]

³ www.t.prezydent.pl/download/gfx/prezydent/pl/defaultopisy/.../publikacja5.pdf [accessed Aug 5, 2011]

Naive linguistic worldview is an element of *cultural common ground* (CCG). This concept was introduced by van Dijk (2002) and is used, among others, by Bartmiński & Żuk (2009), in the sense related to the concept of *cultural common knowledge* (CCK) (Suk-Young Chwe, 1996, 2001). CCG is unquestionable, reasonable, and non-ideological, and forms the basis of all cultural knowledge.

The word *patriotyzm* is etymologically related to the Latin *pater* 'father' and *patria* 'fatherland' and denotes 'love of one's homeland' (NSEJP, 2003: 378). Nationalism, chauvinism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and universalism can all be found in the lexical-semantic field of patriotism (cf. Brzozowska, 2011). Patriotism is defined in dictionaries as love of one's homeland, manifested through devotion to one's country and readiness to defend it, sometimes through the love of its past and traditions (SJPDor, 1958-1969) as well as through hard work (SWJP, 1998). It is a term that denotes a feeling and an attitude, the latter being defined in social psychology as a favorable or an unfavorable feeling towards particular people, objects, events, or ideas (Kenrick, Neuberg, & Cialdini, 1999). In many contexts attitudes and feelings become synonymous, since the essence of attitude is believed to reside in an emotional stance towards people, objects, etc.

According to Nowakowska-Kempna (1987, pp. 116-117), the names of feelings-attitudes can be regarded as predicates that lead to three arguments: the subject that experiences a feeling, the object of the feeling, and cause-effect. Anna Wierzbicka defines love as "a desire to do something good to somebody else" (Wierzbicka, 1999, p. 53).

In the light of these approaches and definitions, three argument roles associated with *patriotyzm* can be distinguished (Evans, 2009, p. 131): the Agent experiencing the feeling, the Object of the feeling, and Completion, i.e. the *procendi/faciendi* modus, which describes the way in which the object is dealt with (Wierzbicka's "doing something to the object").

In ideologized dictionaries, such as Szymczak's *SJPSzym* (1978), patriotism is defined as "a socio-political stance and a form of ideology, which combines devotion to one's homeland, a sense of social bonds and devotion to one's nation together with respect for other nations and their sovereign rights," whereas the more recent dictionaries define it as a feeling, e.g. "love of one's own country, combined with readiness to sacrifice one's life for it" (ISJP, 2000). Most of the dictionaries published after World War II distinguish a distinct form of patriotism called *patriotyzm lokalny* 'local patriotism' ("devotion to a place or a region one comes from or one is related to," *SJPSzym*, 1978) or *patriotyzm regionalny* 'regional patriotism' ("local patriotism entails a strong devotion to the place or the region one is related to, when local matters are treated as more important than national ones," *ISJP*, 2000). Another example, *patriotyzm zakładowy* 'workplace patriotism' (SJPDor, 1958-1969), is devotion to one's workplace. Only Linde's *SJPLin* (1807-1814) defines patriotism as "a sense of citizenship."

Generally, love of one's homeland is an expression of (and not only a synonym for) patriotism. It is usually understood as a devotion to one's homeland, love of its past and traditions, and finally (as defined by the post-war dictionaries) readiness to defend the homeland even if it entails making the ultimate sacrifice. Less frequently, patriotism is defined as a devotion to one's nation and a feeling of being bonded with it (in the dictionaries published after World War II, except *SWJP*, 1998 and *ISJP*, 2000), some define it as readiness to make sacrifices for one's nation, others (*SJPSzym*, 1978 and *PSJPZgół*, 2000) highlight respect for other nations and their sovereign rights. *SWJP* (1998) allows for hard work to be an example of patriotism.

Examples of shaping the patriotic attitude can also be found in phraseology. One can *rozpłomienić* 'inflare' (*SJPDor*), *budzić* 'arouse,' *rozpalać* 'stir up,' *krzewić* 'propagate' (*SJPSzym*, *PSJPZgół*, *USJP*), or *uczyć* 'teach' patriotism and *wychowywać kogoś w poczuciu patriotyzmu* 'educate someone in patriotic spirit' (*PSJPZgół*). Patriotism is also a duty: *obowiązki patriotyczne* 'patriotic duties' (Skorupka's *SFJP*, 1985). *Patriotyzm* in post-war dictionaries is a feeling that is *szczerzy* 'sincere,' *autentyczny* 'authentic,' *gorący* 'warm,' *najgorętszy* 'the warmest,' *głęboki* 'deep,' or *żarliwy* 'fervent.' It may also be *prawdziwy* 'true' (*SJPSzym*, *SWJP*, *PSJPZgół*), often *przesadny* 'exaggerated' (*PSJPZgół*) or *falszywy* 'insincere,' *powierzchniowy* 'superficial,' (*PSJPZgół*). It is then called *pseudopatriotyzm* 'pseudo-patriotism,' *antypatriotyzm* 'anti-patriotism,' or *hurrapatriotyzm/hurrapatriotyzm* 'hooray-patriotism' (*PSJPZgół*). It may manifest itself in art and be the theme of songs, poetry, literature, cf. the expression *twórczość patriotyczna* 'patriotic works of art and literature' (*SFJP*). Patriotism in dictionaries is thus portrayed as a feeling or an attitude of human, patriotic love of one's homeland.

The Polish language contains few derivatives of *patriotism*. These are: *patriota* 'patriot-MASC' and *patriotka* 'patriot-FEM,' *patriotyczny* 'patriotic,' *patriotycznie* 'patriotically, in a patriotic way,' and the aforementioned antonyms *pseudopatriotyzm*, *antypatriotyzm*, *hurrapatriotyzm*.

The ASA/ADQ questionnaires conducted three times (1990, 2000, 2010) among students in the city of Lublin, Poland, show the stability of the linguistic view of patriotism as a feeling and an attitude that aims to secure and maintain the political freedom of one's country; to a lesser extent it also focuses on work for the benefit of the country.

The results of ASA/ADQ 1990⁴ show that the most common features of patriotism at that time were love of/bond with/devotion to one's homeland⁵

⁴ For a detailed analysis of the ASA/ADQ 1990 and 2000, see Brzozowska (2006).

⁵ In questionnaires and political commentaries, love of one's homeland is not treated as a synonym of patriotism but as its characteristic.

(22.3% of the cited data), sacrifice for one's homeland (7.06%), working for one's country (4.46%), allegiance to one's country (3.35%), striving for the good of one's country (3.35%), defending/fighting for one's country (2.97%), commitment to (2.23%) and respect for it (1.86). Two general characteristics could be abstracted from these features: (i) the romantic-heroic attitude, which covers the love of the country, devotion to it, and the readiness to defend it; and (ii) the positivistic attitude, which involves – besides love, devotion, and readiness to defend – work for the good of the country, allegiance and respect.

The ASA/ADQ 2000 questionnaire revealed that love/devotion/bond were still the most common features of patriotism (yet, they only covered 18.06% of the cited data), but sacrifice for the country (10.03%) and readiness to defend/fight for it (8.70%) scored higher than in the 1990 questionnaire. The good of the country (4.01%) was also mentioned more frequently, whereas features such as working for the country (2.34%), devotion to the country (2.01%), and allegiance (1.67) scored lower. Some new features were also mentioned: traditions (2.01%), civic community, homesickness for the country, respect for national symbols, a sense of duty (each scoring 1.34%). One can see that the 2000 image of patriotism differs to some extent from its 1990 predecessor. Once again, the romantic attitude can be found here, with features such as sacrifice for the country and readiness to defend it (mentioned even more frequently), as well as the positivistic attitude (though mentioned less frequently). However, a new nostalgic-emigrant syndrome emerged in the wake of economic emigration: it covers love of one's homeland, sacrifice, traditions, community, homesickness, and respect for national symbols.

The ASA/ADQ 2010 questionnaire shows a still different view of patriotism. The most common descriptive feature was still the love of/devotion to one's homeland (but only scoring 12.96% of the cited data), then dedication to one's country (5.26%), and sacrifice (4.86%). The students also mentioned respect for the country (4.86%), respect for the national symbols, culture, and traditions (4.05%). Other features include: readiness to defend one's country (3.64%), readiness to fight for it (2.83%), the country itself (2.83%), allegiance to it (2.43%), and the feeling of pride (because one belongs to the nation and the state, 2.02%). In three cases there was no response and in one case it was: "I don't know; my generation does not know this concept" (1.62%). It is difficult to abstract away the general patterns involved in the 2010 view of patriotism. According to Lublin students, it is first and foremost understood in the traditional romantic and heroic way: they do not mention work for the country (previously, the positivistic attitude) or the feeling of homesickness (the nostalgic-emigrant syndrome), despite the continuing high rate of emigration. See Figure 16.1 for a diagrammatic breakdown of the questionnaire results. The respondents mentioned particular aspects of patriotism with variable frequencies in the three questionnaires, but these differences are not statistically significant.




Fig. 16.1 Characteristics of patriotism in the ASA/ADQ 1990, 2000, and 2010 questionnaires. Aspects of patriotism marked by symbols along the horizontal axis: ? – no answer or “I don’t know”; A – psychosocial aspect; B – existential; E – ethical; F – physical; H – historical; I – ideological; K – cultural; P – psychological; R – religious; S – social; T – political; X – ethnic

It is mostly the romantic image of patriotism that is encoded in the cultural common ground: this is patriotism in the time of war and does not distinguish between “general” (national) patriotism and local one (listed in about half of the dictionaries). According to the questionnaires, positivistic patriotism becomes progressively less common. Apparently, although the young generation does want Poland to flourish, they do not associate economic and social growth with patriotism.

Jerzy Bartmiński (2010) claims that as the idea of the so-called “Fourth Polish Republic”⁶ was conceived, various types of linguistic discourses emerged, each of them being shaped along the lines of a certain ideology. These are: the left-wing discourse, the feminist discourse, the moderate liberal-democratic discourse, the radical liberal (anarchist) discourse, the liberal-Catholic discourse, and the national right-wing discourse. Each of them is a showcase for the ideological, political, social, and economic opinions and attitudes of the speaking subjects. The discourse types are identified along axiological lines. According to Bartmiński, behind each of the discourses there is “a particular speaking subject, i.e. social groups, political parties, institutions, and organizations that

6 A political slogan coined in 1997 and used by the right-wing circles in the 2005 parliamentary election. Its message is a need to radically reform the Third Polish Republic (1989 onwards), both morally and politically.

represent that subject, along with specific newspapers and magazines used to propagandize their views" (2010, p. 19).

In this study, I will limit my analysis to the view of contemporary patriotism in selected political commentary texts, i.e. in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (a weekly, the liberal-Catholic discourse), *Gazeta Wyborcza* (a daily) and *Polityka* (a weekly) (the moderate liberal-democratic discourse), and on the Internet left-wing platform *lewica.pl*. Because patriotism is a certain manifestation (or category) of love, I accept Anna Wierzbicka's definition of love (see above) but in its reformulation by Nowakowska-Kempna (1995): "someone loves someone else, i.e. someone wants to do/does something (good) to someone (something) and it is somehow evaluated." In patriotism, the object is one's homeland (however understood) and the subject is the individual who experiences the emotion and who acts for the good of the homeland (again, however that good is conceptualized). The order in which the aspects of love are presented reflects their relative weight in a given discourse type.

2. Patriotism in the Discourse of *Tygodnik Powszechny*

The word *patriotyzm* does not occur in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (TP) very frequently.

OBJECT OF PATRIOTISM. The general assumption or "editorial attitude" in the weekly is that all people form a big family. The idea of "gradual" patriotism is promoted, of love and devotion to one's country and homeland, but also to Europe or even the whole world. The ideas of Christian universalism come to the foreground: we are all brothers and sisters and have a common homeland, the world created by God. Patriotism, which usually concerns one's homeland, country, and nation, may in the future extend onto the European community and transform into "European patriotism," as was professed by Pope John Paul II.

EXPRESSION OF PATRIOTISM. Patriotism may be *pozytywny* 'positive,' *nowoczesny* 'modern,' and *radosny* 'joyful.' Contemporary patriots must be noticeable:

[P]atriotism should not be only of a martyrological nature [...]. Our social actions and campaigns are aimed at showing people that there are numerous events that we should be proud of and celebrate. We would like to show that there are positive heroes in Poland. (Miłosz Hodun, TP, 11 May, 2010)

Nowadays, patriotism means serving the country and its people. It should not be opposed to the idea of "loving thy neighbor," but should rather complement it:

That is why tax evasion is not a matter of shrewdness, but is unethical behavior and a matter of conscience [...]. The love of homeland and the love of all the people are two different types of love that must complement, and not exclude, each other. (Rev. Michał Heller, *TP*, 2 March, 2010)

Patriotism is a feeling, and when it is exaggerated, it turns into nationalism. However, to “live” patriotism means to undertake actions and pay attention to their consequences:

Patriotism as such has no directions. It can be grand and lofty, it can be hideous. In the latter case, it is usually called nationalism, but that does not change the heart of the matter. Love of one’s country, readiness to make sacrifices are great in themselves, but their practical outcomes for us and for others are another issue. What is valued in Poland most are intentions and feeling, not their results. Take the Bar Confederation⁷ as an example. (Jerzy Szacki, *TP*, 27 April, 2010)

Patriotism should not be limited only to military efforts, it should also encompass respect for the society, its prominent figures included:

Our patriotism brings to mind military combat, a constant struggle for liberation, search for and creation of new enemies. We seem to miss its most important aspect: respect for the community, for the common good, for authority, but also for composers and artists, whose names we often drag through the mud. (Jacek Kasprzyk, *TP*, 3 September, 2008)

Furthermore, patriotism should express a desire for Poland to be appreciated in the world, for the deceased to be respected, and for the living to work for the country’s good.

I would like Poland to be appreciated in the world and I take my hat off to the dead body of the Polish President. Each Christmas Eve I pray together with my children for those who have laid down their lives for the country, and I teach them that a patriot is he who works

7 An association of the Polish *szlachta* (nobility, landed gentry), 1768-1772, that was formed to defend the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth against external forces (Russia), but also against the Polish king (Stanisław August Poniatowski) or attempts, from a group of political reformers, to limit the influence of magnates. The Confederation is viewed as either a patriotic uprising, the first in Polish history, or as an anti-patriotic and antagonistic regressive movement.

hard. I don't treat any of the newspapers as an oracle, and sometimes it makes me laugh, sometimes it makes me cry to see their deadly grip. I lit a candle at the Katyń Cross in Cracow for the remembrance of Jacek Kuroń,⁸ and I lit it recently when we prayed for the victims of the Smolensk catastrophe,⁹ and their political opponents. (Michał Bonowicz, *TP*, 11 May, 2010)

It is not martyrological patriotism, but rather the kind that aims to promote Poland's internal development and its role in Europe and the world.

EVALUATION OF PATRIOTISM. True patriotism is evaluated positively, treated with respect and dignity; patriots are held in high esteem and given as examples to others. According to Pope John Paul II, patriotism should be open to other nations but involve emotional closeness and dedication to one's own nation:

John Paul II regarded a nation – as well as a family – as a natural form of community life. He always dissociated himself from chauvinism. His patriotism, in line with the 19th-century Romantic poets [...], was a patriotism of openness, dialogue, of national bonds, but also a patriotism of dignity, personal freedom, and one that acknowledged the rights of other nations. (Jarosław Gowin, *TP*, 17 April, 2007)

SUBJECT OF PATRIOTISM. Naturally and unquestionably, the subject of patriotic feelings is a human being (usually a Pole).

In sum, *Tygodnik Powszechny* promotes patriotism as an attitude that serves the country and its nation, that involves respect for people, an attitude full of pride and joy, reflection on the past but without a martyrological component.

3. Patriotism in the Discourse of *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Polityka*

The discourse of the daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* (*GW*) and the weekly *Polityka* requires special attention. Two distinct but compatible versions

⁸ The Katyń massacre was the mass execution of around 22,000 Polish army officers, police officers, and intelligentsia, carried out in 1940 by the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). Jacek Kuroń (1934-2004) was a Polish dissident and one of the leaders of the opposition in the communist-run People's Republic of Poland.

⁹ An airplane crash in Smolensk, Russian (April 10, 2010), with a deadly toll of nearly a hundred people, most of them statesmen and politicians, including the Polish president Lech Kaczyński and his wife.

(or profiles¹⁰) of patriotism are promoted there, both of them identifiable in each title. In contrast to *Tygodnik Powszechny*, patriotism is a frequently occurring notion in both *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Polityka*.

Profile I

OBJECT OF PATRIOTISM. The object of patriotism in Profile I is one's "closest circle," but extended, as in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, onto the whole of Europe and even the world. However, it results from a different outlook on life: people are born and live on Earth and this is their homeland. The idea shows a certain affinity to cosmopolitism:

Polish patriotism is tantamount to European patriotism. There is no Poland that is not a part of Europe. You cannot be a non-European Pole. But there is no European patriotism that would be devoid of national identity, just as there are no European lullabies. (Zbigniew Najder, *GW*, 22 May, 2010)

WAY OF EXPRESSION. Patriotism entails work so as to facilitate the growth of the country and reduce the political and economic gap between Poland and Western Europe:

In this new situation there is a need for civic, rational patriotism that would combine emotions with broader actions for the common good. In the center of its attention should be the community and solidarity of actions undertaken by those who identify themselves with a community that is greater than the historical and political one. These features of patriotism require citizens' involvement for the sake of others and for the sake of mutual trust. (*GW*, 15 June, 2010)

Patriotism can also be expressed through respect for fellow-citizens, through cooperation and constructive arguments.

10 Profiling is a linguistic and conceptual operation, performed by the speaking subject, which "consists in shaping the picture of the object in terms of certain aspects [...] of that object: e.g. its origin, features, appearance, functions, experiences, events connected with them, etc., within a certain type of knowledge and in accordance with the requirements of a given viewpoint" (Bartmiński, 2009/2012, 89). A profile is in this understanding tantamount to "a variant of the image of a given object" (*ibid.*, p. 91).

Modern patriotism should be related to one's community and should value responsibility for one's actions and for the common good:

[P]atriotism is all about identifying oneself with the community, which also entails the feeling of shame. (*GW*, 1 June, 2010)

I would like to see a patriotism based on the common good, a patriotism that would exclude no one, that would be critical of history, yet respectful of one's roots and tradition. (Jerzy Jedlicki, *GW*, 26 April 2010)

Patriotism should be based on common values cherished by a civic community (especially human rights, democracy, cross-cultural dialogue, tolerance, openness, dedication to other people), and should not be limited by political borders:

These days we do not need traditional patriotism very much, the patriotism that was supposed to shield us from external threats. Rather, we need a modern type of patriotism, the kind that would encourage us to be more open, more devoted to other people, to promote attitudes we value, and also to understand the differences. Today patriotic feelings need not be confined within the borders of our country, or to the crowned white eagle.¹¹ The respect for human rights, democracy, multicultural dialogue, or a liberal discussion over our philosophical and religious roots, are universal values, not contradictory to patriotism but ones that Poles were not allowed to cultivate for several decades. (*GW*, 10 June, 2010)

New ideas pertaining to Polish patriotism include cooperation with Poland's neighbors for the mutual benefit and constructive domestic arguments, especially on Polish history:

First of all, a patriotism of cooperation. [...] If we make progress, Poland will too. The concept of cooperation boils down to basic daily actions and decisions. Let's do a test: let's plan and realize something together with our neighbors. Something that may be more beneficial to them than to us. [...] Second of all, a patriotism of arguments. Constructive arguments, to be precise. It is not about quarrelling, so common in the public domain:

11 The Polish national emblem.

about who is a better and a worse Pole, who is more righteous, who is a traitor. [...] The patriotism of arguments would be manifested as a discussion about opinions (although sometimes it would also concern fundamental principles). Examples are easy to find. A discussion on Polish history could be particularly beneficial, as history is the source of our [national] identity and views. A different model of teaching and thinking about history would be welcome. (*GW*, 4 June, 2010)

Similarly to the discourse of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Gazeta Wyborcza* also mentions sacrifice and devotion as aspects of patriotism:

For me, being a liberal patriot means involvement in the public life, for the sake of a modern, tolerant, open Poland, even at the expense of one's own career. (Leszek Jażdżewski, the editor-in-chief of *Liberté!*, *GW*, 1 September, 2010)

EVALUATION OF PATRIOTISM. Patriotism is presented with respect and attention, often with other positive values. It is associated with the slogan "Patriotism is trendy" (*GW*, 2 May, 2011).

SUBJECT OF PATRIOTISM. As in the case of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the subject of patriotism is a human being.

Profile II

The other profile of patriotism presented in *Gazeta Wyborcza* is very different from what is found in the cultural common ground. On the one hand, the traditional, heroic form of patriotism is rejected:

... the hysterical and autodestructive model of Polish patriotism¹² is obsolete now. It is not useful anymore. It does more harm than good. It may only be national martyrdom or a source of inspiration for eccentric poets, praising the glory of being executed. (Wojciech Maziarski, *GW*, 13 September, 2012)

On the other hand, patriotism is trivialized, the word is used in inappropriate contexts and generally abused.

¹² The journalist refers here to "honorable suicide," when further resistance against the enemy is futile and defeat is imminent.

OBJECT OF PATRIOTISM. The object of patriotism is not only one's homeland, but also something that particularly appeals to people, such as *patriotyzm radiowy* 'radio patriotism' (a liking for a particular radio station), *patriotyzm stadionowy* 'stadium patriotism' (expressing support for a team or a sports club, often a local one), *patriotyzm futbolowy* 'football patriotism' (a more complex notion, sometimes tantamount to supporting a football team, but sometimes an expression of traditional patriotism through support for the Polish national football team), *patriotyzm cmentarny* 'cemetery patriotism', *patriotyzm nekrofilski* 'necrophilia patriotism' (a liking for the past and one's ancestors), *patriotyzm zakupowy* 'shopping patriotism' (being attached to a particular shop, or most often, a supermarket), *patriotyzm bazarowy* 'market patriotism' (shopping at the particular market), *patriotyzm piwny* 'beer patriotism' (drinking only a certain kind of beer). Sometimes also the scope of patriotism is delineated, e.g. *economic patriotism* etc.

SUBJECT OF PATRIOTISM. The concept of patriotism does not appear only in "traditional" contexts (e.g. the patriotism of citizens, freedom-fighters, of the Polish people, etc.) but also in the contexts such as *patriotyzm bocianów* 'the patriotism of storks', *orłów* 'of eagles', *krokodyli* 'of crocodiles', and *sikorek* 'of titmice': the animals have a tendency to inhabit the same places (e.g. *GW* 22-23 August, 1998; *GW Białystok* 03-05 April, 1999).

EVALUATION OF PATRIOTISM. Patriotism is evaluated positively but with no loftiness. Rather, it comes with a pinch of salt, a concept that is no longer "fresh" or attractive (*Polityka*, 31 January, 2009), or in the neologism *patriotidyizm* 'patriotidocy.' Heroic patriotism is out of the question (cf. above).

4. Patriotism in the Discourse of the Internet Platform *Lewica.pl*

Left-wing groups (www.lewica.pl, last accessed 13 October, 2011) view patriotism in a less traditional way.

SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF PATRIOTISM. The right to patriotism is granted to all the citizens, regardless of the sex, also to minorities (especially sexual and ethnic minorities) living in Poland. Although neither *Tygodnik Powszechny* nor *Gazeta Wyborcza* discriminate against those groups, they do not stress their presence or role. The right to patriotism, according to *lewica.pl*, should not be appropriated by political parties. European patriotism is also possible but only as a result of mutual agreement (Leszek Żuliński, 13 April, 2007).

WAYS OF EXPRESSION. Patriotism does not consist in consent to one's exploitation or to labor that ruins one's health (Grzegorz Ilnicki, 2 February, 2009). Above all, it entails working for the society instead of celebrating innumerable holidays:

... patriotism is not what the right-wing parties make of it, i.e. empty celebration of independence holidays, patriotic ceremonies, etc. [...] [P]atriotism means first and foremost working for the benefit of the Polish society, including the work of a journalist (which I'm doing right now) and of a politician. (Maria Foltyn, 23 November, 2008)

Patriotism is also a feeling of belonging; it involves cultivating traditions and being proud of them:

Being a part of tradition and being proud of it are the foundations of an active participation in the world of ideas, in which the good ideas are a source of inspiration, rather than a tool of "purity" that excludes otherness. (Małgorzata Anna Maciejewska, 16 December, 2010)

Social patriotism should be based on common well-being (Piotr Szumlewicz, 13 November, 2013).

These are not all the versions of patriotism in contemporary Polish. The others include the discourse of radical right-wing groups for which one's homeland and traditional heroic patriotism are fundamental national values, the anarchistic discourse, in which patriotism is a thing of the past, and the feminist discourse, related in its tenor to anarchistic discourse.

5. Concluding Remarks

To sum up, the Polish linguistic view of patriotism in selected political commentaries is diversified. Although all the types of discourse are based on the cultural common ground, each of them defines patriotism differently due to differences in political and ideological orientation. This is reflected in the cognitive structure and content of the concept (see the Appendix for more succinct versions of the explications).

In the discourse of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, patriotism is people's love of their homeland (place of birth, the whole world), love that is manifested through one's readiness to defend the country and work for it: it is close to universalism. In the left-wing discourse its image is similar, with emphasis on everyone's right to patriotism, regardless of their political views. In the discourse of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, patriotism is either love of the homeland understood as one's country of origin or as Europe (expressed through readiness to defend and work for it), or as people's devotion to their country (expressed through emotional attachment and a desire to return to the country). In this discourse type, the notion of patriotism shows signs of degradation and trivialization.

In sum, the range of the concept of PATRIOTISM in the discourse of Polish political commentaries is extending and the concept itself is becoming progressively less clear-cut.

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Appendix

Proposed explications of Polish PATRIOTYZM 'patriotism'

PATRIOTISM IN CULTURAL COMMON GROUND

SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY: feeling

OBJECT OF PATRIOTISM: homeland, i.e. country of origin, also the so-called "little homeland," the land where one was born, and often the people who inhabit it; in line with the etymology of the word *patriotyzm*, related to Latin *patria* 'fatherland' and *pater* 'father'

SUBJECT: since it is a feeling, it can only be ascribed to people

WAYS OF EXPRESSION: in the time of external threats, a patriot should fight for the safety and freedom of the country, and if needed, they should make the ultimate sacrifice; in the time of peace and stability, a patriot works for the country and its growth

EVALUATION: clearly positive evaluation of both patriotism and patriotic persons

PATRIOTISM IN THE DISCOURSE OF *TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY*

SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY: feeling

OBJECT: homeland, i.e. country of origin, and the so-called "great homeland" (the whole world – gradable feeling)

SUBJECT: since it is a feeling, it can only be ascribed to people

EXPRESSION OF PATRIOTISM: in the time of external threats, a patriot should fight for the safety and freedom of the country, and if needed, they should make the ultimate sacrifice; in the time of peace and stability, a patriot works for the country and its growth, serves the country, respects it and is joyful for it

EVALUATION: clearly positive evaluation, provided it is an open type of patriotism

PATRIOTISM IN THE DISCOURSE OF *GAZETA WYBORCZA*

Profile I

SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY: feeling

OBJECT: homeland, i.e. country of origin, and the so-called "great homeland" (Europe), this kind of patriotism is identical with European patriotism

SUBJECT: since it is a feeling, it can only be ascribed to people

EXPRESSION OF PATRIOTISM: in the time of external threats, a patriot should fight for the safety and freedom of the country, and if needed, they should make the ultimate sacrifice; in the time of peace and stability, patriotic persons should respect the country's roots, cherish solidarity, conscientiousness,

rationality, hard work, strive for the country's growth in order to reduce the economic gap between Poland and Western Europe; they should be involved in public life

EVALUATION: positive with the proviso that it cannot be closed to other countries and nations

Profile II

SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY: feeling

OBJECT: homeland, i.e. the country of origin, plus everything that people are emotionally attached to

SUBJECT: it is ascribed to living creatures, i.e. people and animals (reptiles, amphibians, birds) that return to their place of birth and/or defend the place against strangers

EXPRESSION OF PATRIOTISM: in the time of external threats, a patriot should fight for the safety and freedom of the country, and if needed, they should make the ultimate sacrifice; in the time of peace and stability, they return to their place of origin and work for its benefit

EVALUATION: positive, sometimes ambivalent, overused

PATRIOTISM IN THE LEFT-WING DISCOURSE

SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY: feeling

SUBJECT: since it is a feeling, it can only be ascribed to people, with the proviso that the right to feel patriotic should not be appropriated

OBJECT: homeland, i.e. the country of origin, and the so-called "little country," the land where one was born (local patriotism) and sometimes the people who inhabit it; connected with the etymology of the word *patriotyzm*, from Latin *patria* 'fatherland'

EXPRESSION OF PATRIOTISM: in the time of external threats, a patriot should fight for the safety and freedom of the country, and if needed, they should make the ultimate sacrifice; in the time of peace and stability, they should feel a part of the tradition and be proud of it, they should be actively involved in social life, work for the country, its growth and common well-being

EVALUATION: clearly positive

Translated by Konrad Żyśko