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A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
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Gregory Pavlov
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
17. Februar 2011
We extend the “no-haggling” result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer’s valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular, we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restricted when the costs are sufficiently low: the optimal mechanisms use only allocations from the “north-east” boundary of the feasible set and the null allocation.
Published Online: 2011-2-17
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
- Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
- A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
- Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
- No-Trade in the Laboratory
- Symmetry or Dynamic Consistency?
- Contributions Article
- When Two-Part Tariffs are Not Enough: Mixing with Nonlinear Pricing
- Sellers Like Clusters
- Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum
- Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
- The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games
- Intertemporal Bounded Rationality as Consideration Sets with Contraction Consistency
- The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies
- A New Existence and Uniqueness Theorem for Continuous Games
- Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
- Topics Article
- Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization
- Input Production Joint Venture
- On the Existence and Social Optimality of Equilibria in a Hotelling Game with Uncertain Demand and Linear-Quadratic Costs
- Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games
- Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities
- Transitional Dynamics in a Tullock Contest with a General Cost Function
- Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model
- Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
multidimensional screenin;
optimal selling strategies;
mechanism design
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
- Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
- A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
- Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
- No-Trade in the Laboratory
- Symmetry or Dynamic Consistency?
- Contributions Article
- When Two-Part Tariffs are Not Enough: Mixing with Nonlinear Pricing
- Sellers Like Clusters
- Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum
- Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
- The Benefit of Mixing Private Noise into Public Information in Beauty Contest Games
- Intertemporal Bounded Rationality as Consideration Sets with Contraction Consistency
- The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies
- A New Existence and Uniqueness Theorem for Continuous Games
- Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation
- Topics Article
- Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization
- Input Production Joint Venture
- On the Existence and Social Optimality of Equilibria in a Hotelling Game with Uncertain Demand and Linear-Quadratic Costs
- Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games
- Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities
- Transitional Dynamics in a Tullock Contest with a General Cost Function
- Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model
- Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
