Introduction: Symposium on Social Norms, Self-Interest and Legal Compliance, Jerusalem, May 2007
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Yuval Feldman
Abstract
The papers presented in this volume are based on the conference "Social Norms, Self-Interest and Legal Compliance" which took place in Bar-Ilan University and Hebrew University in May 2007. The conference focused on several key themes in the social norms literature, including critical approaches to the role of self-interest in social norms and cooperation models; comparative discussions of the various methodologies used in this literature (e.g. ethnographies, game-based experiments, experimental surveys); the nature of the effect of legal regulation on social norms; behavioral accounts of legal instruments that may enhance social cooperation; and explorations of the potential contributions of the social and cognitive psychology sciences to economic models of social norms. In this volume, we present six of the conference papers. All submitted papers were subject to anonymous peer review.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Article
- Introduction: Symposium on Social Norms, Self-Interest and Legal Compliance, Jerusalem, May 2007
- Distinguishing Spurious and Real Peer Effects: Evidence from Artificial Societies, Small-Group Experiments, and Real Schoolyards
- Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law
- The Constructive Value of Overconfidence
- Lawmakers as Norm Entrepreneurs
- Psychology and Institutional Design
- The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium
Articles in the same Issue
- Article
- Introduction: Symposium on Social Norms, Self-Interest and Legal Compliance, Jerusalem, May 2007
- Distinguishing Spurious and Real Peer Effects: Evidence from Artificial Societies, Small-Group Experiments, and Real Schoolyards
- Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law
- The Constructive Value of Overconfidence
- Lawmakers as Norm Entrepreneurs
- Psychology and Institutional Design
- The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium
