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Opportunity Costs and the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game (With Comments by Lloyd Jeff Dumas)
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Solomon W Polachek
Published/Copyright:
June 9, 2010
This paper summarizes conclusions reached in Polachek and Xiang (International Organization, 2010). It shows how gains from trade decrease the probability of war in an incomplete information game. The result reaffirms how opportunity costs explain the inverse trade-conflict relationship found in current empirical literature on the subject. The ensuing discussion puts the result in the broader context of peacekeeping.
Published Online: 2010-6-9
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Keywords for this article
incomplete information game;
interdependence;
gains from trade;
conflict;
peace-keeping
Articles in the same Issue
- Research Paper
- Costly Interference: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Sanctions
- The Defense-Growth Relationship: An Economic Investigation into Post-Soviet States
- Super-Agents and the Problem of Controlling the Dynamics of Regional Arms Races
- War! What Is It Good For? A Deep Determinants Analysis of the Cost of Interstate Conflict
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- A Small Victorious War: Domestic Revolution and International Conflict
- Regime-Transitions in the 2003-2010 Iraq War: An Approach Based on Correlations of Daily Fatalities
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- International Relative Prices and Civil Wars in Africa: A Note
- Total Economic Consequences of Terrorist Attacks: Insights from 9/11
- Opportunity Costs and the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game (With Comments by Lloyd Jeff Dumas)
- A Comment on the Power Law Relation Between Frequency and Severity of Terrorist Attacks
- A Novel Explanation of the Power-Law Form of the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Events: Reply to Saperstein
- List of Referees 2010
