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Pricing-to-Market versus Residual Demand Elasticity Analysis of Imperfect Competition in Food Exports: Evidence from Germany
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Thomas Glauben
Published/Copyright:
October 1, 2002
This paper examines the exercise of market power by German food and beverage export industries over international markets. Two approaches are used: pricing-to-market (PTM) and residual demand elasticity (RDE). We find that, while in some cases the PTM approach indicates market power, the RDE approach does not. Competitive conduct seems to prevail in these industries. The occurrence of PTM in some cases might be explained by fixed contracts, which are often used in the food and beverage export market.
Published Online: 2002-10-1
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
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- Cooperative Investment and the Value of Contracting with Transaction Costs
- Tough Love: Optimal Enforcement of Output Quotas in the Presence of Cheating
- Pricing-to-Market versus Residual Demand Elasticity Analysis of Imperfect Competition in Food Exports: Evidence from Germany
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- Social Welfare and the Market Power-Efficiency Tradeoff in U.S. Food Processing: A Note
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- Explaining Plant Exit in the U.S. Meat and Poultry Industries
- Contract Design: A Note on Cash Settled Futures
- Explaining Price Dispersion for Homogeneous Grocery Products
- An Essay on Cooperative Bargaining in U.S. Agricultural Markets
- Costly (Dis)Agreement: Optimal Intervention, Income Redistribution, and Transfer Efficiency of Output Quotas in the Presence of Cheating
- Inventory Constraints in a Dynamic Model of Imperfect Competition: An Application to Beef Packing
- Some Unintended Consequences of TRQ Liberalization
- Information Pooling and Collusion: Implications for The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act
- Concentration and Innovation in the U.S. Food Industries
- Vertical Product Differentiation in Theory and Practice
- Agricultural Marketing Institutions: A Response to Quality Disputes
