Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining
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Elhanan Helpman
Abstract
We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- Frontiers of Economic Analysis & Policy
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- Why Governments Should Tax Mobile Capital in the Presence of Unemployment
- Testing the Economic Model of Crime:The National Hockey League's Two-Referee Experiment
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- Optimal Environmental Regulation in the Presence of Other Taxes: The Role of Non-separable Preferences and Technology
- Adverse Selection, Short-Term Contracting, and the Underprovision of On-the-Job Training
- Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis
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- Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Heuristic Search
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- An Assessment of the Proposals of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security
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