Forward Discount Bias, Nalebuff's Envelope Puzzle, and the Siegel Paradox in Foreign Exchange
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Aaron S. Edlin
Abstract
The bias of forward exchange rates as a predictor of future spot rates is typically explained or decomposed as (1) a risk premium and (2) a convexity term which accounts for the fact that, when there is stochastic inflation, nominal gains from forward currency speculation are higher than real ones and correspondingly losses are smaller. We use Nalebuff’s envelope puzzle to explain a third source of bias which involves real profits from foreign exchange speculation. Both the "real profit" bias and stochastic inflation bias arise from convexity of g(s)=1/s and so derive from Jensen's inequality as observed by Siegel (1972).
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- Advances Article
- The Principal-Agent Matching Market
Articles in the same Issue
- Local Conventions
- Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility
- Bargaining over Risky Assets
- Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
- Regulation by Negotiation: the Private Benefit Bias
- Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending
- The Noisy Duopolist
- Spontaneous Market Emergence
- A Simple Linear Programming Approach to Gain, Loss and Asset Pricing
- Forward Discount Bias, Nalebuff's Envelope Puzzle, and the Siegel Paradox in Foreign Exchange
- Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion
- Advances Article
- The Principal-Agent Matching Market