

The Dogs of War

Myths of British Anti-Americanism

Patrick Deer

THE RECENT RESURGENCE of widespread anti-American sentiment in Britain provoked by the aggressive neo-imperial foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration, supported by Prime Minister Tony Blair despite a groundswell of popular dismay, is nothing new. Certainly, British protests against the unilateral Anglo-American war on Iraq caught many in the United States by surprise, with opinion polls showing a broad majority opposed in the days before the invasion, numbers at times comparable to those across "old" Europe.¹ Despite the seductive mythology of a "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom, the postwar era has seen frequent and repeated outbursts of British anti-Americanism as the former super-power struggled to adjust to its subordinate position in the cold war Pax Americana. But the present conjuncture, I argue, reveals some crucial shifts. Current manifestations of British anti-Americanism must confront the active involvement of the Blair government in this aggressive drive for U.S. global hegemony, which is justified by a state of permanent warfare against an ill-defined worldwide terrorist threat. Unlike previous protests during the cold war, there are few immediate signs or sites to suggest that the United States as an occupying power threatens the territorial integrity of the British nation. The recent revival of the "special relationship" is revealed as an affair of trans-Atlantic elites, an alliance of arrogant, distant powers perceived to threaten the civil rights, safety, and well-being of the broad majority of the population.

Second, the pervasively popular nature of this latest outburst of British anti-Americanism reveals that, contrary to the rhetoric of politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, there is not a common majority cul-

ture based on shared trans-Atlantic values²—especially when these “values” include the open advocacy of what Condoleezza Rice, the president’s national security adviser, has called an “imperial but not imperialist” role for the United States in international affairs.³ To adapt George Bernard Shaw’s observation, the United States and Britain are now more than ever two nations separated by the same language. What persists is the continued British engagement with American counter-culture and oppositional traditions of popular protest that has been a constant feature of relations between the two countries since World War II. Paradoxically, even in Britain, where global U.S. culture marks almost every aspect of everyday life, America continues to provide resources for resisting globalization and the neo-imperial U.S. foreign policy.

Like the seductive mythology of the special relationship, the new emphasis on “anti-Americanism” in Britain threatens to mask the instability and volatility of the present situation, in which a gulf has opened up between the aggressive war agenda of the trans-Atlantic elites and the various alarmed and bitterly critical sectors of British public opinion that oppose this latest phase in the Bush administration’s drive for U.S. global hegemony. The situation is indeed strange: the new Labor government is acting as a proxy force for the distant Republican administration, and Tony Blair is embodying the remoteness of power traditionally imputed to the “cowboys” in the White House. Prime Minister Blair seems to have taken on the qualities of Graham Greene’s *Quiet American*, memorably recaptured in a recent film adaptation:⁴ he is moralistic, apparently naive, motivated by uneasy desires, with a secret purpose that we cannot comprehend, and he displays a singular lack of irony. With George W. Bush’s help, he seems to have reversed the polarity of the special relationship, in which the irony was supposed to run in the British direction. So much for Americans not having a sense of humor; Blair seems to be still waiting for the punch line, hopelessly earnest in the face of German and French verbal sparring about “old Europe” or even the wise-cracking, wily, and sarcastic circle around George W. Bush. The historical ironies proliferate. The French refuse to collaborate; the Germans restrain U.S. military aggression. And the more the British change, the more they stay the same.

What’s wrong with the discourse of “anti-Americanism” in the British context is that it projects an image of uniformity upon some extremely unstable alliances. The discourse gives popular opposition to

war in Britain the appearance of a nationalist exceptionalism, as if British critiques of U.S. foreign policy are essentially different in kind from those of French, German, or Spanish protesters in “old Europe” or of other members of the dissenting international community.⁵ This supposed exceptionalism mirrors Tony Blair’s singular conversion to the Bush doctrine at a time when it is opposed by the majority of the European Union, or the Bush administration’s own one-sided vision of the United States’s “imperial but not imperialist” geopolitical role. Like the mythic “special relationship,” it also obscures the significance of Blair’s pro-U.S. foreign policy in relation to the delicate game new Labor is playing with British suspicions about greater European integration.⁶

The most powerful unifying thread in current anti-American discourse in Britain is the justified, but exaggerated and often racist, fear that U.S. military aggression and occupation in Iraq will unleash Middle Eastern terrorist reprisals against British targets. Ironically, the enormous shock, sympathy, and compassion extended toward the United States and more especially to New York City in the wake of the September 11 attacks have soured into a profound anxiety that “we will be next.” The repeated refrain runs: “It’s all right for them to go after Iraq. But what about us? We’re right here.” By targeting the United States as a distant aggressor over which the British people have no control or influence, these fears of proximity conveniently forget the origins of the terrorism produced in response to Britain’s own history of colonial rule in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and South Asia.⁷ They also tap into the long tradition of anxieties at Britain’s temporal proximity and cultural closeness to the American future and a fear of colonization of British sovereign territory. These are fears that can also be mobilized in the name of counterterrorism against immigrant communities from South Asia and the Middle East. As many have observed, this anxiety has in large measure to do with Britain’s—or, more accurately, England’s—inability to fully assimilate its postimperial geopolitical position and cultural identity. From elsewhere in the disunited kingdom come more nuanced critiques of U.S. policies that resist the seductions of the “special relationship” or of imperial nostalgia for Britain’s lost international moral authority.

TRANS-ATLANTIC PROJECTIONS

The limited number of previous studies of British anti-Americanism have been overshadowed by the elite logic of the special relationship. They have tended to offer typologies of the different political, cultural, or class bases for anti-American sentiment, as if the phenomenon were a nebulous minority pursuit rather than a constant feature of the post-World War II era.⁸ By emphasizing discontinuity, these typologies tend to obscure the underlying thread to British anti-Americanism, namely the traditions of popular protest against the human costs of the close ties between trans-Atlantic elites. As Paul Gilroy's groundbreaking work on the "Black Atlantic" or Daniel T. Rodgers' study of the "Atlantic crossings" of cosmopolitan left progressives during the first half of the twentieth century remind us, the discourse of the "Atlantic" has been defined most successfully out of oppositional projects of resistance and critique.⁹

Attempts to project a positive spatial imaginary for official Anglo-American relations since 1945 have foundered in the nebulous imagery of Atlanticism. In his famous "iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, Winston Churchill projected Britain as the "swing power" balancing "three circles of influence"—the American, European, and Commonwealth—but the image depended for its force on Britain's imperial power.¹⁰ Half a century later, with the sun set on the British Empire, Tony Blair's current notion of Britain as a "bridge" between America and Europe is a far more unstable fantasy.¹¹ Even if savvy French and German travelers from bad "old Europe" wanted to go to the "new world" these days, why take the bridge and tunnel through London when you can fly direct? The British role as bridge between the United States and Europe seems to have gone the same way as the U.S. special role as mediator between the British government and the parties to the peace process in Ireland. The collapse of British authority in Europe, like the Bush administration's disengagement from Ireland, only recently seemed unthinkable. Whatever Tony Blair's original agenda in relation to the EC or NATO, it is now apparent that the British "bridge" is being used as a wedge by the anti-European Bush administration to divide "old Europe" from "the new" in matters of common defense policy.

The continuing power of the mythology of "special relationship," despite constant conflicts between the partners since World War II, lies

in the fact that it evolved as a structure that claimed to keep friends close and potential enemies closer, always tempering intimacy and closeness with bracing doses of anti-Americanism. The special relationship combined spatial metaphors, of Greece and Rome, Atlanticism, and so on, with a more compelling and predominantly masculinist rhetoric of kinship that shifted drastically depending on the personalities involved. But the consistent feature of this radically asymmetrical relationship on the British side was that the balance of power lay with the wrong partner. The callow American colossus needed British guidance; despite intense, often hostile U.S. economic and political pressure, beginning with the signing of the Atlantic Charter in August, 1941, the fantasy was that the British could manipulate and control the U.S. leadership to serve their own global interests.¹²

From the first, the British side of the Anglo-American elite took a famously suspicious and often hostile attitude toward their U.S. counterparts. During the formative years of the Second World War, even the most benign fantasies about the British capacity to manipulate and control the underschooled and overpowerful America had at their core a marked patrician condescension. Here is Harold Macmillan (who would serve as a Conservative prime minister from 1957 to 1963) holding forth to the young Richard Crossman (a future Labor minister of the 1960s) at Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers in 1943:

We, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in this American empire. You will find Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans—great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run AFHQ as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius.¹³

One of Macmillan's diary entries for 1944 reveals both private mandarin disdain and the seductive fantasy of control at stake in the Atlanticist hierarchy of Greeks and Romans:

They either wish to revert to isolation combined with suspicion of British imperialism, or to intervene in a pathetic desire to solve in a few months by the most childish and amateurish methods problems which have baffled statesmen for many centuries. Somehow between

these two extremes we have got to guide them, both for their own advantage and ours for the future peace of the world.¹⁴

All the stereotypes are there, held in check by English self-restraint and guile. Little wonder there were American suspicions of a "well nigh inexhaustible store of superior cunning" among the British.¹⁵

During the cold war, despite constant conflict, the old magic seemed to work. The greatest success story was Margaret Thatcher's trans-Atlantic romance with Ronald Reagan, in which he played the adoring younger brother.¹⁶ But as its historians have noted, the special relationship was plagued by constant conflict over foreign policy, defense spending, nuclear weapons strategy, European integration, and decolonization. Nevertheless, stereotypical disdain for the untutored, brash "American empire" was held in check by English self-restraint, statesmanship, and guile. Perhaps this is what Tony Blair meant when he bafflingly referred to British anti-Americanism as a "foolish indulgence": you feel it, but you don't give in to it.¹⁷

BULLDOGS, POODLES, AND BLOODHOUNDS

The radical asymmetry of the relationship, in which the subordinate British partner must struggle for control, is parodied in the recent tide of complaints about Tony Blair's position as "Bush's poodle." The "axis of poodle," as analysts might call this phenomenon if they lacked good taste or a sense of decorum, has a venerable history as a term of British political abuse. Lloyd George called the House of Lords "Balfour's poodle" as early as 1908; after the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada, the Labor MP Denis Healey referred to Mrs. Thatcher as "Reagan's poodle."¹⁸ All this is most unfair to the dog, of course, as the head of the British Poodle Owners Association recently complained.¹⁹ The poodle was a German hunting dog first introduced to France during the Napoleonic wars and embraced for its valor by the Emperor Napoleon himself. The point, of course, in the majority of recent criticism of the British premier, is less that Blair should be playing the Churchillian bulldog instead of the poodle than that the wrong beast is at the end of the leash. Britain, no longer shamed by its subordinate position in the U.S. global hegemony, should be leading the way. But, as the disdain for the

Franco-German “poodle” image suggests, for many Britons opposed to the war, the way does not necessarily lie in the direction of Europe.

Prime Minister Blair’s dogmatic support of the Bush doctrine may have to do with the close trans-Atlantic ties between those other dogs of war, the military and intelligence communities. The recent discourse of British “anti-Americanism” highlights the very specific institutional and political alliances between the transnational elites that plan, finance, and arm “from above” aggressive acts of military intervention like the present war in Iraq. As one recent study has observed:

During the Cold War, at least following the repeal of the McMahon Act in 1958, the U.K. enjoyed privileged access to nuclear information from the United States. This, along with the intermeshing of U.S. and British intelligence under the UKUSA agreement of 1947, formed the essence and beating heart of the Cold War relationship.²⁰

The 1947 treaty, described as “quite likely the most secret agreement ever entered into by the English speaking world,” intimately linked the intelligence-gathering agencies of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.²¹ Britain has its own signals intelligence (SIGINT) eavesdropping stations at home and abroad, run by its Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), based in Cheltenham, and provides installations for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in Britain. There are also joint GCHQ and NSA sites at the Ascension Isles in the South Atlantic and on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, islands that proved of strategic significance in both the 1982 Falklands war and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The major NSA station at RAF Menwith Hill, in Yorkshire, for example, which bristles with satellite tracking aerials and dishes, was “built into the heart of Britain’s national communication system” by the British Post Office and has, since the mid-1970s, “sifted the communications of private citizens, corporations and government for information of political or economic value to the U.S.”²² After September 11, 2001, one British newspaper reported that “Britain is so linked into the U.S. intelligence system through the UKUSA accord . . . that intelligence support was automatically supplied.”²³ British stations like Menwith Hill and Morwenstow, Cornwall, remain crucial hubs in the highly secret Echelon system, which gives the UKUSA partners unprecedented power to spy on worldwide nonmilitary communications. Indeed, Ech-

elon was deemed threatening enough to business interests and individual privacy in Europe that the European Parliament made it the subject of two special investigative reports.²⁴ Beyond Echelon, there are the Orwellian projects of Total Information Awareness (TIA) and Carnivore. On April 2, 2003, the British government announced even closer intelligence ties with the newly created Department of Homeland Security in the name of the global war on terrorism.²⁵

The nuclear and conventional armed forces of both countries are also closely allied. The 2003 war against Iraq came after a decade of close military cooperation and bombing by the RAF and USAF there to enforce UN no-fly zones, most notably in the massive December 1998 aerial campaign, Operation Desert Fox. Intelligence cooperation in the war on terrorism, as well as Britain's continued reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons technology for its Trident submarines, and Britain's commitment to the U.S. Nuclear Missile Shield, all suggest that the post-cold war strategic relationship remains a force to be reckoned with.²⁶

To these close intelligence and military ties must be added the British presence in the global arms trade. The British defense ministry and arms manufacturers must compete against the market dominance of the U.S. permanent war economy: the U.S. currently commands 64 percent worldwide, while Britain has the next largest share, around 20 percent.²⁷ But they also share domestic markets and powerful vested interests in promoting arms transfers to developing countries, many of which, such as Iran, Iraq, Argentina, and Chile, have been states with dismal human rights records. As Neil Cooper and John Pilger have asserted, despite its rhetoric of "ethical foreign policy" and cleaning up the "pariah" arms trade in "uncivilized, un-Western" weapons like land mines, the Blair government has relaxed restrictions on sales to countries like Indonesia and Turkey.²⁸ By pressuring the market in low-tech "pariah" arms, the British have joined the United States in promoting a new generation of extremely expensive high-tech precision weaponry, whose prohibitive costs can be sustained only by a vigorous export market. Instead of land mines, trans-Atlantic arms manufacturers produce and promote cluster bombs. This new generation of weaponry also includes the manufacture and use of shells, bombs, and missiles tipped with depleted uranium, which leaves targets widely contaminated by carcinogenic dust that causes cancer and birth defects.²⁹ These are exactly the "humanitarian" weapons used to such devastating effect in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

FROM FORTRESS BRITAIN TO AIRSTRIP ONE

For half a century, it was the American airbases and bombers in Britain that haunted the imaginary of British popular anti-Americanism. During World War II, popular resentment of the American GIs and air force personnel stationed in Britain was expressed in the familiar terms of a disturbing proximity: they were, notoriously, "oversexed, overpaid, and over here."³⁰ Once Attlee's Labor government agreed to build air bases in eastern England for U.S. B-29 nuclear bombers in 1946, these outposts of the American frontier became a permanent feature. In his novel *1984*, George Orwell famously satirized Britain's position in the superpower bloc Oceania as "Airstrip One." Even that dogged imperialist and Atlanticist the part-American Winston Churchill complained bitterly to his doctor during his second spell in government in 1953 that Britain had been reduced to an "aircraft carrier" for Eisenhower's America.³¹

Around the bases in the late 1940s crystallized the familiar, unstable elements of British anti-Americanism: resentment for the punitive terms of the 1946 U.S. loan to Britain; at American demands for a 50 percent increase in the defense budget that hamstrung the Labor reconstruction program and for a more rapid dismantling of the British empire; for the pressure for greater British integration into a postwar European union; for the U.S. refusal to share nuclear weapons secrets that encouraged Britain's own costly pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent; for America's material prosperity and unbridled consumerism at a time of enforced austerity; above all, for the enforced recognition that Britain was a subordinate player in the U.S.-Soviet cold war.³² Perhaps understandably in a country with a distant maritime empire that had just lived through the threat of invasion and the Blitz on its civilian population, the greatest outbursts of popular anti-Americanism occurred when the special relationship brought home the vulnerability of "Fortress Britain." The fears were compounded of this contradictory blend of proximity and distance. Post-World War II, British anti-Americanism erupted most forcibly when the United States's remote actions threatened both Britain's sense of territorial integrity and its prestige as a sovereign power in the *pax Americana*.

The first major postwar outbreak of anti-Americanism on a large scale was during the "A-bomb" scare in 1950, when offhand remarks by President Truman on November 30 about the possible use of nuclear

weapons in the Korean War sparked widespread alarm and protests. The then-Labor MP Roy Jenkins recalled an unprecedented "mood of near panic."³³ The situation was sufficiently alarming that Labor prime minister Clement Attlee himself was dispatched to Washington. Despite U.S. reassurances, opinion polls early in 1951 showed that 60 percent of the British public thought there was a real risk of general war, and though 58 percent expected the Soviet Union to be the guilty party rather than the United States, only 40 percent approved of American policy.³⁴ In a striking parallel with the bitterly divided diplomatic situation before the 2003 war against Iraq, only Britain and Turkey had committed troops in Korea, and the United States was trying to force a resolution through the UN condemning China as the aggressor and imposing sanctions. In his attempts to avoid a cabinet mutiny, Ernest Bevin argued for quiet persuasion rather than open dissent against "the well-intentioned but inexperienced colossus."³⁵ Fortunately for the special relationship, the Chinese rejected a ceasefire, allowing Britain to support UN condemnation in February 1951.

Anti-Americanism flared up during the 1956 Suez Crisis among those angry at the United States for blocking the Anglo-French imperialist adventure in Egypt. But though the events proved bitterly divisive in Britain, shattered the special relationship, and brought down the Conservative prime minister, Anthony Eden, the majority remained sympathetic toward the United States.³⁶ The nuclear fears of the late 1950s and the emergence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the New Left reactivated widespread anti-American sentiment. Calls from the Left for unilateral disarmament, and for British leadership of a "third force" with the Commonwealth and nonaligned nations, were articulated in an unstable blend of imperial nostalgia and romantic invocations of "Deep England" and of the heroicized collective spirit of the Blitz and Dunkirk that persist to the present.³⁷ This contradictory mix of nationalism and internationalism could have unpredictable consequences. In 1961, for example, Hugh Gaitskell played left-wing anti-Americanism against anti-nuclear feeling, persuading the Labor party conference to drop unilateral disarmament from its manifesto by arguing that without its own nuclear weapons Britain would have to hide behind American might.³⁸

During the Vietnam War, the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in 1966 swung public opinion sharply against the United States. Diplomatic relations reached an all-time low in the winter of the following

year over Vietnam, as well as over policy in the Gulf states.³⁹ British protests against the war focused anger against the U.S. Embassy in Grosvenor Square in 1967–1968 but clearly distinguished between opposition to U.S. and U.K. government policy and solidarity with the “other America.”

THE OTHER AMERICA

British hostility to U.S. cold war policy did not necessitate hostility to the American populace or its high and low culture. As early as 1947, reporting on the House Un-American Affairs Committee, the journal *Our Time* published a piece entitled “We Want to Be Un-American,” which argued that the “Hollywood witch trial” was a diversion from “much more serious infringements of thought, constituting a cold war against intellectuals in America,” and saw a similar possible threat in Britain. In an article in the same issue, “cold censorship . . . red-baiting and war-mongering stories” were blamed for the often inarticulate British suspicion of American political intentions: “Ignorance of what Americans are really like today, what decent Americans are doing, and how much, is inevitable because the Americans themselves are blocked off from nearly all means of expression.”⁴⁰

Though the New Left was intensely critical of the Americanization of British popular culture during the 1950s, with the founders of British cultural studies, Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams, often sounding like the fiercely reactionary F. R. Leavis, the 1950s had seen a far more fluid and sympathetic appropriation of U.S. popular culture, in jazz, the blues, abstract expressionism, Pop Art, and the Beat writings. Lindsey Anderson’s 1959 pro-CND documentary film, *March to Alder-marston*, for example, showed a postprotest scene of youngsters dancing to jazz, with the voice-over commenting, “It’s no use being against death if you don’t know how to enjoy life when you’ve got it.”⁴¹ The 1960s offered the examples of hippie counterculture and psychedelia, student revolt, the civil rights movement, and Black Power, to name but a few. Subversive appropriations of U.S. counterculture were strongly present in the British protests against Vietnam, culminating in the riotous protests in Grosvenor Square.⁴²

Punk rock flirtations with anti-Americanism in the late 1970s by bands like the Clash, the Fall, and the Gang of Four were similarly dou-

ble-edged, aimed as much at the dominant British culture as at the "Yankee soldier" of the Clash's "I'm So Bored with the U.S.A."⁴³ During the "new cold war" of the early 1980s, the U.S. airbases once more became the focus of widespread anti-American and anti-nuclear feeling, and strong alliances were formed with the European peace movement. Ronald Reagan's twilight romance with Margaret Thatcher gave the special relationship new life, and the U.S. deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles on British bases, as well as the talk of neutron weapons and a limited nuclear war strategy for northern Europe, reinvigorated the CND.⁴⁴ The women's peace camp outside USAF Greenham Common was to protest and survive until the last cruise missiles were withdrawn. Duncan Campbell's 1985 exposé, *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier*, once again portrayed Britain as occupied territory, a frontline American base. The 1986 bombing of Libya by American F-111's from British bases with Thatcher's consent confirmed the sense of popular outrage. A MORI poll on April 17, 1986, showed 70 percent of Britons hostile to U.S. policy.⁴⁵ Yet CND remained more popular than the opposition Labor party's unilateral nuclear disarmament platform, and the Conservatives won the 1983 and 1987 elections over a weak and divided opposition.

But the Falklands-Malvinas adventure of 1982 had shown there was life in the old dogs yet, allowing Mrs. Thatcher to declare memorably at Cheltenham racecourse that Britain was great once more, and that "nothing had changed."⁴⁶

FROM ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY TO HUMANITARIAN WARFARE

The 1991 Gulf War saw widespread anti-war protests in Britain, but the brevity of the conflict as well as the UN-sponsored multinational coalition limited the outrage. For many commentators, however, the special relationship had seen its last hurrah.⁴⁷ Complaints about the U.S. refusal to send ground troops to stop the genocide in Bosnia were complicated by the European Union's own conspicuous failure to deal adequately with the murderous violence on its own borders. Tony Blair's willingness to act as the point man for the Clinton administration's "humanitarian intervention" using U.S. and NATO air power in

Kosovo drew public hostility, but the official appropriation of the rhetoric and institutions of international human rights complicated the position of those opposed to the bombing.⁴⁸ Prime Minister Blair had learned his lesson. When the new Labor premier flew to support his friend Bill Clinton during the dark days of the Lewinsky scandal and to discuss the runup to the bombing campaign against Milosevic's Serbia, Blair asked President Clinton nervously what would happen if the bombing didn't work—to which Clinton reportedly replied in a far-away voice, "We keep on bombing. We can bomb forever."⁴⁹ Despite widespread international skepticism about the motives for the 2003 war against Iraq, given the absence of evidence of weapons of mass destruction to date and the flawed intelligence analyses used to justify the unilateral intervention, the Blair government continued to invoke the rhetoric of human rights as the last trump card to justify the massive use of precision bombing, ground war, and colonial policing techniques honed for thirty years in Northern Ireland. Armed with the Bush doctrine, the White House has less need to mask its plans for the Middle East in humanitarian rhetoric. It too can bomb forever.

The current anti-war movement draws in part on the sustained protests of the 1980s, one current CND group in Gloucestershire offering to send volunteer weapons inspectors into the remaining U.S. air bases and radar and surveillance sites in Britain.⁵⁰ But the disturbing difference about the present situation is that there are few visible signs of American occupation to protest and that humanitarian rhetoric is being used to justify military aggression. To contest the U.S. drive for global hegemony, in February 2003 more than a million British anti-war protestors had to take to the streets of their own capital. For all the moral indignation and imperial nostalgia in some strains of British anti-Americanism, there is the disturbing fact of continuing British complicity in a militarist drive for U.S. global hegemony. The lesson of the cold war era of British protest is that anti-war movements cannot just wait for the wars to break out; they also have to contest during peacetime the mythology of the technologies and strategies of permanent war. Instead of revealing the mendacious euphemisms of nuclear overkill, those opposed to permanent war now must expose the manipulative projections of postmodern "humanitarian" warfare. No doubt Tony Blair gambled his "moral" stance on the ability of the overwhelming U.S. military firepower to minimize American and British body counts, but, for all the rhetoric of precision bombing, high-tech warfare produced thousands

of Iraqi casualties.⁵¹ The occupation's military and civilian death toll continues to mount. The war on Iraq may appear bloodless, precise, and "morally justified" only because we were not permitted to see the full horror of the dogs of war in action.

NOTES

1. Though opposition to the war held steady around 52 percent before the invasion, public opinion swung behind the British troops after the intervention began on March 17, 2003; after the initial phase of military action failed to uncover Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), criticism of the war and occupation mounted once more. For the shifting public responses to the Bush-Blair war agenda, see Alan Travis and Ian Black, "Blair's Popularity Plummets," *Guardian*, February 18, 2003; John Curtice, "On the Brink of War: Public Opinion: Polls Tilt towards Blair, but This Is Still the Most Unpopular War for Decades," *Independent*, March 19, 2003; Travis, "Surge in War Support Confirms Dramatic Shift in Public Opinion," *Guardian*, April 15, 2003; Travis, "War in the Gulf: Support for War Surges," *Guardian*, March 25, 2003. According to one report, a MORI poll in early March 2003 tracked British opposition to war against Iraq in the absence of a "smoking gun" or a second UN resolution at 67 percent. Catharine Fay de Lestrac, "Blair between a Rock and a Hard Place on Iraq," Agence France Press, March 8, 2003. For British public opinion during the occupation and the controversy over the dubious intelligence reports regarding Iraqi WMD produced by the Blair cabinet to justify unilateral invasion, see Ben Whitford, "Labour Damaged in Polls by WMD Claims," *Guardian*, June 17, 2003.

2. On the question of shared values and strong divergences among the United States, Britain, and "old" and "new" Europe, see the *Economist's* recent special report based on the findings of surveys by the Pew Research Center, the German Marshall Fund, and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, unsigned, "Special Report: American Values: Living with a Superpower: Some Values Are Held in Common by America and Its Allies. As Three Studies Show, Many Others Are Not," *Economist*, January 4, 2003.

3. Peter Beaumont, "Now for the Bush Doctrine," *Observer*, September 22, 2002; Peter Beaumont and Ed Helmore, "Will Bush Go to War against Saddam?" *Observer*, September 1, 2002. The formulation was first promoted in Bush foreign policy circles by Richard Haass, then director of policy planning for Colin Powell's State Department, in a November 11, 2000, paper entitled "Imperial America"; see John Bellamy Foster, "Imperial America and War," *Monthly Review* 55:1 (2003): 1-2. A veteran of the first Bush administration and originally in the moderate wing of the architects of the Bush doctrine, Haass was reported as

telling Nicholas Lemann "there is a big difference between imperial and imperialist" in an interview for a *New Yorker* article; Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order: The Bush Administration May Have a Brand-New Doctrine of Power," *New Yorker*, April 1, 2002, p. 46. For an incisive critique of the intellectual genealogy of this "new kind" of U.S. empire, said by its ideologues to be "divorced from national interest, economic exploitation, racism, or colonialism, and that exists only to promote freedom and human rights" and to emulate a supposedly "enlightened" nineteenth-century British informal imperialism, see Foster, especially pp. 3–4. The phrase "imperial but not imperialist" has since become a commonplace in British news reporting about the Bush doctrine, but Condoleezza Rice's remarks have not been reported by any major U.S. news sources to date.

4. *The Quiet American*, dir. Philip Noyce (U.S.A./Germany/Australia: Miramax Films, 2002), screenplay by Christopher Hampton based on the 1955 novel by Graham Greene. Michael Caine plays Fowler, the cynical *London Times* correspondent in Vietnam; his mistress, Phuong, is played by Do Thi Hai Yen, and his rival, the "quiet American," the CIA covert operative Alden Pyle, by Brendan Fraser.

5. For a discussion of British exceptionalism in relation to the United States and Europe, see Kenneth O. Morgan's conclusion to his lucid survey *The People's Peace: British History 1945–1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 508–520, especially p. 519.

6. In a much-publicized speech to British ambassadors in January 2003 outlining the "seven principles" of British foreign policy, Prime Minister Blair placed the close alliance with the United States as the top priority. Somewhat optimistically, given the vigorous French and German diplomatic opposition in the United Nations to U.S. and U.K. pressure for support for the war against Iraq, he declared as the second principle: "Britain must be at the centre of Europe. . . . To separate ourselves from it would be madness. If we are in, we should be in wholeheartedly. That must include, provided the economic conditions are right, membership of the single currency. For fifty years we have hesitated over Europe. It has never profited us. And there is no greater error in international politics than to believe strong in Europe means weaker with the U.S. The roles reinforce each other. . . . We can indeed help to be a bridge between the U.S. and Europe and such understanding is always needed. Europe should partner the U.S. not be its rival." Tony Blair, "The Prime Minister's Address to British Ambassadors in London," *Guardian*, January 7, 2003, p. 1. (See also note 17.) On British political ambivalence and outright resistance to U.S. pressure for greater European integration after 1945, see Kathleen Burk, "War and Anglo-American Financial Relations in the Twentieth Century," in F. M. Leventhal and Roland E. Quinault, eds., *Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 253–254; C. J. Bartlett, "The Special Re-

lationship": *A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (New York: Longman, 1992); and John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), pp. 173–195.

7. See Bernard Porter, *Britannia's Burden: The Political Evolution of Modern Britain, 1851–1990* (London: E. Arnold, 1994).

8. John Dumbrell, for example, gives a representative survey of the typologies of British anti-Americanism, which include the cultural (comic stereotyping, the supposed American inability to recognize irony, class-based critiques of Americanization of everyday life); leftist (critiques of U.S. militarism, nuclear exterminism, cultural imperialism, globalization); nationalist (High Tory resentment at the U.S. hand in the end of empire, or at U.S. pressure for European integration); and pro-European (the United States as more foreign culturally than continental Europe, the EU as the future for Britain rather than the United States); see Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, pp. 24–32. See also the *Economist's* lively characterizations of British anti-Americanism in unsigned, "Bombs Away: Britain's Anti-War Movement Is Booming but Divided," *Economist*, February 15, 2003. For an eclectic, politically conservative survey that includes some useful literary examples, see Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 371–377.

9. See Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso, 1993), and Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1998).

10. Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, p. 7.

11. For a recent critical view, see David Clark, "Britain's Bridge across the Atlantic Is Fated to Collapse," *Guardian*, May 14, 2002.

12. See, for example, Katherine Burk's sobering account of U.S. *realpolitik* in its financial dealings with wartime British governments throughout the twentieth century. Burk, "War and Anglo-American Financial Relations," pp. 243–260.

13. Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, p. 14.

14. Ibid.

15. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship," p. 12.

16. In her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher remains cordially analytical in her appraisal of her relationship with President Reagan, but the dedication to the color photograph of a seemingly diffident Reagan gazing up at the Iron Lady holding forth at a July 1988 dinner in his honor at 10 Downing Street suggests something of the ironic quality of the romance: "Dear Margaret—As you can see, I agree with every word you are saying. I always do. Warmest Friendship. Sincerely Ron." Margaret Thatcher, *Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years, 1979–1990* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 435. For a more critical appraisal, see Porter, *Britannia's Burden*, pp. 376–377.

17. Tony Blair, "Prime Minister's Address to British Diplomats in London," reprinted in the *Guardian*, January 7, 2003. The prime minister declared as the first of seven principles of U.K. foreign policy: "We should remain the closest ally of the U.S., and as allies influence them to continue broadening their agenda. We are the ally of the U.S. not because they are powerful, but because we share their values. I am not surprised by anti-Americanism; but it is a foolish indulgence" (1). As the second principle, Blair declared: "Britain must be at the centre of Europe. . . . To separate ourselves from it would be madness. If we are in, we should be in wholeheartedly" (see also note 6).

18. Bartlett, *"The Special Relationship,"* p. 157.

19. Nick Cohen, "Without Prejudice: Is Blair Bush's Poodle? That's Unfair to Poodles," *Observer*, February 25, 2001. A survey of recent British news sources suggests that the image of Blair as Bush's poodle emerged in February 2001 following his visit to George W. Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, in a dissenting whispering campaign by Labor traditionalists, then spread in critical comments of new Labor "insiders" in the summer of 2001, and was given prominence in a *Newsnight* interview with the BBC political journalist Jeremy Paxman broadcast on May 15, 2002, in which the prime minister was made to deny that he was Bush's poodle. It was taken up in July 2002 by the tabloid *Daily Mirror* as the centerpiece of a campaign critical of New Labor foreign policy and subsequently became a slogan in national anti-war street protests. One of the more controversial creative products of the recent anti-Blair/anti-American poodle boom was George Michael's satirical music video to his song "Shoot the Dog," which featured the British prime minister as loyal cartoon lapdog to the gun-toting cowboy president. See George Michael, "Shoot the Dog," *Shoot the Dog E.P.* (Polydor, 2002).

20. Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, p. 124.

21. Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the Ukusa Countries—the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 142.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 197. In addition to the secret ties in U.K./U.S. SIGINT, Richelson and Ball also discuss the cold war secret special relationship in air defense, aerial and satellite surveillance, ocean surveillance, the monitoring of radio broadcasts, covert action and assassination, human intelligence, the production of intelligence estimates, and the conduct of security investigations and training (pp. 135–238). They also emphasize, of course, that the cold war relationship was frequently vexed. See chapter 11, "Discord, Non-cooperation and Deceit with the UKUSA Community," pp. 239–268. For the post-cold war period, see Jeffrey Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 291–296. One recent report on the £800 billion new site for GCHQ suggests that 95 percent of the SIGINT handled there is American; see

Richard Norton-Taylor, "Big Brother: The Eavesdroppers: Lords of the Ring: Britain's New GCHQ Is a State of the Art Listening Post. But Who Is in Control, Asks Richard Norton-Taylor," *Guardian*, September 14, 2002, p. 10.

23. Michael Smith, "Britain Could Deploy Tomahawk Missiles," *Daily Telegraph*, September 13, 2001.

24. The European Parliament's findings were strongly critical of the ultra-secret Echelon system's breaches of privacy in the name of U.S./U.K. economic espionage, going so far as to recommend the use of encryption technology to protect email confidentiality, but the Temporary Committee was subsequently disbanded. See European Parliament and Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System, *Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications (Echelon Interception System) (2001/2098[Ini])* (Strasbourg: European Parliament, 2001). For an overview of the controversy, see also Duncan Campbell and Mark Honigsbaum, "Britain and U.S. Spy on World: Big Brother Satellites over Indian and Pacific Oceans Intercept Internet, Fax and Phone Messages," *Observer*, May 23, 1999; Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Desperately Seeking Signals," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 56:2 (2000); James Bamford, "Big Brother: The Eavesdroppers: What Big Ears You Have: Listening Stations Ring the World, Capturing Our Personal Conversations: Perched Like Chattering Magpies above the Earth, Satellites Channel Millions of Private Messages—Straight into Echelon's Global Eavesdropping Net," *Guardian*, September 14, 2002; and the American Civil Liberties Union's highly informative online Echelon article, "Echelon Watch: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about Echelon," available at <http://archive.aclu.org/echelonwatch/faq.html>.

25. For recent congressional checks to the TIA initiative, see Adam Clymer, "Threats and Responses: Electronic Surveillance; Congress Agrees to Bar Pentagon from Terror Watch of Americans," *New York Times*, February 11, 2003. The ACLU website provides a useful overview of TIA and the Carnivore e-mail surveillance system at <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12719&c=207>. For the recent announcement of closer U.K./U.S. intelligence cooperation to combat terrorism, see Alan Travis and Home Affairs editor, "War in the Gulf: Britain and U.S. to Join Forces in Fight against Terrorist Threat," *Guardian*, April 2, 2003; and Audrey Hudson, "U.S., Britain to Train Jointly for Terror Attacks," *Washington Times*, April 2, 2003.

26. For a lucid overview of the British struggle for a nuclear deterrent "with a union jack on it," as Ernest Bevin put it, see Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

27. On the permanent war economy, see Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), and Melman, *After Capitalism: From Managerialism to Workplace Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 2001). See also Mary Kaldor's survey of the recent debates;

Kaldor, "Do Modern Economies Require War or Preparations for Warfare?" in Robert A. Hinde, ed., *The Institution of War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

For the British share in the global arms trade through 1999, see Mark Pythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 22–23, as well as the more conservative U.S. Department of State figures in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 28th Edition* (WMEAT), "Arms Transfers: Arms Export Trends," February 6, 2003: 6. The report is available online at http://www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/1999_2000/.

28. On the British role in the global arms trade, see Neil Cooper, *The Business of Death: Britain's Arms Trade at Home and Abroad* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997); John Pilger, *The New Rulers of the World* (London: Verso, 2002); and Pythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales*. See also Neil Cooper's powerful critique of the use of the discourse of "Western values" to promote high-tech "humanitarian" weaponry in Cooper, "The Pariah Agenda and New Labour's Ethical Arms Sales Policy," in Richard Little and Mark Wicham-Jones, eds., *New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000).

29. See Depleted Uranium Education Project, *Metal of Dishonor, Depleted Uranium: How the Pentagon Radiates Soldiers and Civilians with DU Weapons* (New York: International Action Center, 1997). According to the British-based Campaign against Depleted Uranium, these weapons have also been manufactured and tested in Britain, see <http://www.cadu.org.uk>.

30. For a lively discussion of the presence of American GIs on the wartime home front, see Angus Calder, *The People's War* (London: Pimlico, 1969), pp. 307–311.

31. Porter, *Britannia's Burden*, pp. 288–290.

32. Morgan, *The People's Peace*, pp. 52–60; Porter, *Britannia's Burden*, pp. 272–274.

33. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship," p. 49.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

36. See Morgan, *The People's Peace*, pp. 145–157.

37. Meredith Veldman, *Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening of Britain: Romantic Protest, 1945–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 143–144.

38. See Veldman, *Fantasy, the Bomb, and the Greening of Britain*, pp. 186–187; Morgan, *The People's Peace*, pp. 180–184.

39. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship," pp. 113–115; Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, pp. 147–159.

40. Margaret Garlake, *New Art, New World: British Art in Postwar Society*

(New Haven, Conn.: Published for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art by Yale University Press, 1998), p. 72.

41. Alan Sinfield, *Literature, Politics, and Culture in Postwar Britain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 262. See also Sinfield's discussion of the contradictory attitudes to U.S. popular culture in "Left culturism" and the New Left (pp. 232–252; 258–266); and Alistair Davies and Alan Sinfield, *British Culture of the Postwar: An Introduction to Literature and Society, 1945–1999* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 103–109.

42. Robert Hewison, *Too Much: Art and Society in the Sixties, 1960–75* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 158–163.

43. The Clash, "I'm So Bored with the U.S.A.," *The Clash* (CBS Records, 1977). Of one of the Clash's last U.S. live performances in 1984, Greil Marcus noted, "In 1978 in Berkeley, 'I'm So Bored of the U.S.A.' was a gesture of contempt to a bourgeois audience; this night it was offered to the audience as their own, and they took it. Some of *our* culture to *another* culture," in Greil Marcus, *Ranters and Crowd Pleasers: Punk in Pop Music, 1977–92* (New York: Doubleday, 1993), pp. 304–305. Other notable punk reflections on British anti-Americanism might include the dour Mancunian irony of Mark E. Smith of the Fall, "C'n'c-S. Mithering," *Grotesque (after the Gramme)* (Rough Trade Records, 1980), and the notorious anarchistic provocations of Crass, which resulted in prosecution and censorship by the Thatcher government; see Crass, "Smash the Mac," *Best before . . . 1984* (Crass Records, 1984). On punk and anti-Americanism, see George McKay, "Anti-Americanism, Youth and Popular Music, and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain," in Sylvie Mathe, ed., *Anti-Americanism at Home and Abroad* (Provence: University of Provence Press, 2000). For other lively overviews of the transatlantic genealogy of punk, including its roots in the Black Atlantic, see also Greil Marcus, *Lipstick Traces: A Secret History of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Dick Hebdige, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (London: Routledge, 1988).

44. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship," pp. 157–163; Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, pp. 128–132.

45. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship," p. 158, Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, pp. 102–104.

46. Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, pp. 159–168, Burk, "War and Anglo-American Financial Relations," pp. 255–256.

47. Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, p. 158.

48. For discussions of the shift to postmodern "humanitarian warfare," see Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2001); James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001); Slavoj Žižek, *Nato Kao Lijevo Ruka Boga? Nato as the Left Hand of God?* Bastard International ed. (Ljubljana, Slovenia:

Arkzin, 1999); and Will Bartlett, "'Simply the Right Thing to Do': Labour Goes to War," in Richard Little and Mark Wicham-Jones, eds., *New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000).

49. Andrew Rawnsley, *Servants of the People: The Inside Story of New Labour* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2000), p. 270. See also Richard Hodder-Williams, "Reforging the 'Special Relationship': Blair, Clinton and Foreign Policy," in Richard Little and Mark Wicham-Jones, eds., *New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000).

50. See David Wilson, "Meet the Gloucester Weapons Inspectors: The Protest at the Fairford Stealth Bomber Base," *CounterPunch*, January 30, 2003. See also Gideon Burrows, "Return to Action: After a Period of Relative Inactivity, Direct Action Is Once Again Beginning to Make Its Presence Felt," *Guardian*, April 30, 2003.

51. As of March 7, 2004, verified news reports of Iraqi civilian deaths caused by the invasion and occupation of Iraq ran between 8,437 and 10,282 killed; see <http://www.iraqbodycount.net/bodycount.htm#total>. For an overview of Iraqi civilian casualties, see <http://www.iraqbodycount.net/>. The website provides a highly informative overview of this and other monitoring projects, at http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial_aug0703.htm and http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial_june1203.htm. Because of Saddam Hussein's regime's secrecy and U.S. Central Command's refusal to disclose estimates of Iraqi military casualties, the number of Iraqi soldiers killed and wounded may never be known. Estimated numbers killed generally agree on "the low thousands," though between two thousand and three thousand Iraqi soldiers were reported killed in the final armored assault on Baghdad alone; see Andrew Sullivan, "America Sets the Agenda for Wars of the Future," *Sunday Times*, April 13, 2003; Amy Goldstein, Jonathan Weisman, and Margot Williams, "Casualties: Low Number, Many Causes; Nearly 40 Percent of U.S. Deaths Were Not at Enemy's Hand," *Washington Post*, April 13, 2003; Peter Ford, "Surveys Pointing to High Civilian Death Toll in Iraq," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 22, 2003. By March 7, 2004, there were confirmed reports of 551 U.S., 59 British, and 42 "other nationality" military casualties. Of the total 652 deaths, 195 (or 29.9 percent) resulted from accidents or friendly fire. See Reuters, "Table of Casualties in Iraq," July 2, 2003, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/NL24165019.htm> and "Iraq Coalition Casualty Count," at <http://lunaville.org/warcasualties/Summary.aspx>.