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Case Study: Village of Belle Terre v. Bruce Boraas, 1974²³

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example of this form of state action. A case that came from the affluent vil-lage of Belle Terre, in Suffolk County, New York, led to a decision that is astill-viable precedent in this area of constitutional law.Case Study:Village of Belle Terre v. Bruce Boraas,197423Village of Belle Terre v Bruce Boraas, et al.,was a case from Suffolk County,NewYork, that raised the question of the scope of the right to privacy. It in-volved the specific issue of privacy of a place and, again, Marshall disagreedwith the Court majority and with the senior liberal justice William O. Dou-glas, who was the author of the majority opinion inBelle Terre.Belle Terre is located on Long Island’s north shore. There are about 220homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total land area is less than one squaremile. It restricted land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodginghouses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses.The word “family” as used in the ordinance means “one or more persons re-lated by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a sin-gle housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of per-sons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a singlehousekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shallbe deemed to constitute a family.”Bruce Boraas was a co-owner of a building in the village who rented it tosix unrelated university students. The owners were cited for violating theordinance and Boraas brought an action in federal court. He argued that thelocal ordinance was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments’rights of association and privacy. The federal district court held the ordi-nance to be constitutional but the CC2 overturned, ruling that there was aconstitutional violation. The village then appealed to the Supreme Court.For Douglas and seven others, the ordinance was viewed as a piece ofeconomic and social legislation and was upheld because there was shown tobe a reasonable,not an arbitrary,” relationship between the ordinance anda “state objective.” (Belle Terre officials claimed the law was passed to keep“transients” out of their community and the Court majority concluded thatthat was a reasonable goal of the local government.)Douglas waxed eloquent about the family. Family privacy means[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicle [re-strictions] are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to fam-ily needs....The police power is not confined to elimination of filth,The “Rhapsody of the Unitary Family”|75
© 2020 New York University Press, New York, USA

example of this form of state action. A case that came from the affluent vil-lage of Belle Terre, in Suffolk County, New York, led to a decision that is astill-viable precedent in this area of constitutional law.Case Study:Village of Belle Terre v. Bruce Boraas,197423Village of Belle Terre v Bruce Boraas, et al.,was a case from Suffolk County,NewYork, that raised the question of the scope of the right to privacy. It in-volved the specific issue of privacy of a place and, again, Marshall disagreedwith the Court majority and with the senior liberal justice William O. Dou-glas, who was the author of the majority opinion inBelle Terre.Belle Terre is located on Long Island’s north shore. There are about 220homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total land area is less than one squaremile. It restricted land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodginghouses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses.The word “family” as used in the ordinance means “one or more persons re-lated by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a sin-gle housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of per-sons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a singlehousekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shallbe deemed to constitute a family.”Bruce Boraas was a co-owner of a building in the village who rented it tosix unrelated university students. The owners were cited for violating theordinance and Boraas brought an action in federal court. He argued that thelocal ordinance was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments’rights of association and privacy. The federal district court held the ordi-nance to be constitutional but the CC2 overturned, ruling that there was aconstitutional violation. The village then appealed to the Supreme Court.For Douglas and seven others, the ordinance was viewed as a piece ofeconomic and social legislation and was upheld because there was shown tobe a reasonable,not an arbitrary,” relationship between the ordinance anda “state objective.” (Belle Terre officials claimed the law was passed to keep“transients” out of their community and the Court majority concluded thatthat was a reasonable goal of the local government.)Douglas waxed eloquent about the family. Family privacy means[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicle [re-strictions] are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to fam-ily needs....The police power is not confined to elimination of filth,The “Rhapsody of the Unitary Family”|75
© 2020 New York University Press, New York, USA

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents vii
  3. Acknowledgments xi
  4. Introduction 1
  5. 1. “Fundamental” Rights versus State Interests 7
  6. I. “I Am Not Talking Very Much Like a Lawyer” 8
  7. II. The U.S. Supreme Court and “Fundamental” Rights 13
  8. III. The Liberty and Rights Protected by the Due Process Clause 15
  9. Case Study: U.S. v Carolene Products, 1938, Footnote 4³⁶ 19
  10. IV. Is There a Protected Liberty Interest for Persons Having Intimate Homosexual Relations? 22
  11. Case Study: Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)⁵º 24
  12. Case Study: Roy Romer, Governor v Richard Evans, et al., 1996⁵⁴ 26
  13. V. The Limits of Sexual Privacy 29
  14. VI. Summing Up 30
  15. 2. Marriage and Marital Privacy 31
  16. I. “I Should Like to Suggest a Substantial Change for Your Consideration” 32
  17. II. Heterosexual Marriage 35
  18. Case Study: Skinner v Oklahoma, 1942⁴¹ 42
  19. III.Molecular Changes in the Definition and Reality of the Traditional Marital Relationship 44
  20. Case Study: Griswold v Connecticut, 1965⁵º 46
  21. IV. The Dilemma of Intimate Violence and Congressional Passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 1994 49
  22. Case Study: Joshua DeShaney, a minor, by his guardian ad litem, et al., v Winnebago County,Wisconsin Department of Social Services, et al., 1988⁵⁹ 50
  23. Case Study: U.S. v Morrison, 1999⁷⁵ 56
  24. V. Same-Sex Marriage 60
  25. Case Study: Stan Baker, et al. v State of Vermont, et al., 1999⁹⁴ 61
  26. VI. Congressional Passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1996 63
  27. Case Study: Nina Baehr v Miike, 1996, 1999¹º³ 64
  28. VII. Summing Up 67
  29. 3. The “Rhapsody of the Unitary Family”¹ 68
  30. I. “Something Smells about This Case” 70
  31. II. Who Is Family? 73
  32. Case Study: Village of Belle Terre v. Bruce Boraas, 1974²³ 75
  33. III. Family Privacy Rights versus State Interests 77
  34. Case Study: Reynolds v U.S., 1878²⁸ 78
  35. Case Study: Michael H. v Gerald D., 1989 79
  36. IV. Family Privacy Rights versus Personal Autonomy and Other Constitutional Rights 83
  37. Case Study: Eisenstadt v Baird, 1971 87
  38. V. Summing Up 89
  39. 4. Motherhood or Not, That Is Her Decision 90
  40. I. “I Will Be God-damned!”³ 91
  41. II. Not Having Children: Abortion as Personal Right 93
  42. Case Study: Roe v Wade, 1972¹¹ 95
  43. III. After Roe, What Are the Limits of “State Actions” That Regulate the Abortion Procedure? 101
  44. Case Study: Webster v Reproductive Health Services, 1989 104
  45. IV. After Roe, What Are a Husband’s Rights? 108
  46. Case Study: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 1992 110
  47. VI. Back into the Vortex: The “Partial Birth” Abortion Controversy 114
  48. Case Study: Stenberg v Carhart, 1999 117
  49. VII. Summing Up 120
  50. 5. Raising the Child “Father Knows Best”? 122
  51. I. “This Is Really a Ridiculous Case to Be Absorbing Our Time” 123
  52. II. Raising and Educating Children 127
  53. Case Study: Wisconsin v Yoder, 1972 132
  54. III. The Mental and Physical Health and Welfare of the Child 139
  55. Case Study: Parham v J.R., 1979 146
  56. Case Study: Ingraham v Wright, 1977 153
  57. IV. Children’s Rights: Visiting the Grandparents 160
  58. Case Study: Troxel v Granville, 2000 162
  59. V. Summing Up 166
  60. 6. “Let Me Go!” 168
  61. I. “This Case Should Never Have Been Started” 170
  62. II. Terminating Life Support for an Incompetent Family Member: Passive Euthanasia 175
  63. Case Study: Cruzan v Director,Missouri Department of Health, 1990 177
  64. III. Physician-Assisted Suicide: Active Euthanasia 181
  65. Case Study:Washington State v Glucksberg, 1997; Vacco v Quill, 1997 186
  66. IV. Summing Up 198
  67. 7. Family and Personal Privacy in the Twenty-First Century 199
  68. I. “She Kept Screaming” 200
  69. II. Is the Home Still a Castle? 203
  70. Case Study: Kyello v U.S., 2000 204
  71. III. The “Medical Necessity” Exception and Federal Anti-Marijuana-Use Law 208
  72. IV. Summing Up 211
  73. Notes 219
  74. Bibliography 251
  75. Index 259
  76. About the Author 265
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