Regelungsautonomie der Sportverbände vs. Kartellverbot – Zum Anwendungsbereich der Meca-Medina-Ausnahme

Abstract

The Autonomy of Sports Associations and the Prohibition of Restrictive Agreements – Application of the Meca-Medina Principles

The article clarifies the relationship between the autonomy of sports associations and the prohibition of restrictive agreements (Article 101 TFEU) in the light of the ECJ’s landmark judgement in the Meca-Medina case and the application of the Meca-Medina principles by the General Court in the recent ISU case. It is shown that the restriction of the general prohibition of restrictive agreements in the case of "purely sporting rules" as judged by the Court of Justice has its basis in the constitutional principle of association autonomy. In this context, the proportionality test applied by the ECJ in Meca-Medina can be interpreted dogmatically as an attempt to rightly balance the conflicting principles of autonomy of associations on the one hand and the protection of competition on the other. Considering the key importance of the fundamental right of autonomy of associations as a benchmark for the Meca-Medina exception, its factual and personal scope is elaborated and defined. A differentiation is to be made between four types of associational regulations. It is shown that sports rules in the narrower and broader sense as well as internal organisational rules (association rules of type 1 and 2) fall within the scope of protection of autonomy of associations, which is why the autonomy of association might restrict the conflicting principle of prohibition of restrictive practices. In contrast, attempts by sports associations to regulate the competitive behaviour of its members vis-à-vis third parties outside the association or even the competitive behaviour of third parties themselves (type 3 and 4 rules) do not enjoy any privilege regarding the prohibition of restrictive practices.