

NOTES

INTRODUCTION: THE WAVE

1. This event is officially known as Festival Mawazine Rythmes du Monde. In a musical context, *mawazin* (sing. *wazan*) in Arabic refers to meters or rhythmic patterns.

2. The festival continued to program competition winners and stars of Morocco's hip hop, rock, and fusion scenes before and after this period, but not under the title of LMouja.

3. I follow Saba Mahmood here in considering the ethical as well as social weight that emergent actions and relations—"forms" in the broadest sense—take on over the course of hip hop practitioners' socialization and the genre's history. My interlocutors, like Mahmood's, "elaborate the architecture of the self through the immanent form bodily practices take," including their cultivation of dancing, writing graffiti, musicking, and tastes in music and sound (2005: 121).

4. An incomplete list of scholars who address Moroccan authoritarianism in conjunction with neoliberal development includes: Atia 2019, Bergh 2012, Bogaert 2012, Bono et al. 2015, Catusse 2008 and 2009, Cavatorta 2013, Hibou 2015, Hibou and Bono 2016, Kreitmeyer 2019, Rinker 2020, Zemni and Bogaert 2011.

5. The monarchy is "neither the state nor the nation," but it does hold supreme executive power, including the power to dissolve the Parliament (Saghi 2016: 77; Waterbury 1970). As the monarch, King Mohamed VI is head of state and the national head of the Muslim faith. The government exercises control over Muslim doctrine and practice by appointing the national council of *'ulama*, or religious scholars, and promoting the monarchy's preferred jurisprudential tradition (Maliki) and Sufi groups.

6. Louise Meintjes writes that aesthetic ambiguities "enable life to go on without closure or fixity or certainty, and they ensure that the capacity to instrumentalize the arts toward political ends can never be contained or complete" (2017: 16).

7. The multiple registers of “value” he invokes are present in the English, French, and Arabic equivalents.

8. I am not suggesting that values themselves, in the sense of unexchangeable personal beliefs, can be commoditized separately from the person who holds them; rather, that they can be and are reconsidered by their holders as assets in an imaginary of personal capital. For reviews of value and exchange theory, see Narotzky and Besnier 2014 and Morcom 2020.

9. Al-Makhzen is the precolonial term for the Moroccan state; in today’s usage, it indicates the monarchy and the king’s closest circle, and that small group’s traditional, supra-governmental hold on political and economic life. For some observers, the Makhzen is the true locus of the “apparatus of state violence and domination” and expropriation that defines the state, rather than elected officials or government ministries (Daadaoui 2011: 41). On the precolonial sultanate’s economy and its interactions with European imperial capitalism, see Ben Srhir 2005, Brown 1976, Schroeter 1988. Today, King Mohamed VI and his family control several prominent Moroccan corporations and possess an extensive personal fortune through Al-Mada Holding, formerly known as Omnium Nord-Africain (Greene 2008).

10. Elyachar beautifully encapsulates this process, and the effects of successful ideological spread, from a state perspective: “Within the framework of ‘social capital,’ the cultural practices of people once condemned as backwards and in need of development became an important terrain for the accumulation of capital and a strategic resource through which new forms of governance could be reproduced at little cost to the downsized, neoliberal state” (2005: 147). Here, I focus on practitioners’ theories and strategies for coping with change that seemed both pervasive and inchoate.

11. Deborah Wong observes, “working with or against the assumptions driving music departments means, necessarily, that [ethnomusicologists] have been co-opted before we even begin. . . . We give ourselves over to value systems that dictate we work in permanent states of contradiction and asymmetry” (2014: 347). While my interlocutors “work in permanent states of contradiction,” not all had to adopt or perform new values to receive recognition.

12. Marcus describes anthropologists, especially Geertz, as possessing a “calculated and imposed naiveté . . . [that] is potentially the source of greatest strength and special insight of ethnographic analysis, leading to both the ‘complex or involved’ sense of complicity as well as exposure to complicity’s other sense of ‘being an accomplice, partnership in an evil action’” (124). The two “senses” here both extend from underlying assumptions of collectivity. These assumptions in turn allow us to position complicity as a place from which to contest the individualization and depoliticization of the neoliberal subject.

13. Feld and Kirkegaard (2010) explicitly critique the actions of their subjects, but these are scholars and industry professionals.

14. However, a recent branch of philosophy grapples with collective responsibility for structural injustices (e.g., Nuti 2019).

15. Like Stein, I understand hip hop practitioners’ politics as “complicitous with power, emerging through the marketplace and the commodity form, not in spite of them, in sites made available by state policy” (1998: 92).

16. Moten notes that he is paraphrasing Judith Butler in *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997).

17. This is one of two ways that complicity, as sketched here, departs from a Gramscian framework in which hegemonic logics either induce consent, or provoke nondominant

groups into a “war of position” where they seek to undermine hegemonic forces over time (1992: 219). Productive analysis of subtle forms of political dissent need not address this ethical paradox at the heart of the complicity concept—that is, a belief in human collectivity and therefore human deservingness. In addition, consent is sometimes understood as produced without the consenter’s self-awareness, whereas I use complicity to commit to all actors’ ability to analyze the structures in which they live.

18. This holds whether one views neoliberalism primarily as a normative economic doctrine and project of class maintenance (Harvey 2005); an era of world history (Slobodian 2018; Mirowski and Plehwe 2015); a political rationality (Brown 2005, 2012); or a technology of the self (Foucault 2008).

19. James Laidlaw critiques “practice theory” for popularizing agency-as-opposition, which, according to him, prizes analysts’ preference for examples of opposition to dominant structures over an appreciation of all that people actually do (2014: 182). Diverse musical calls to expand agency to encompass nonhuman agents include Guilbault 1997, Stanyek and Piekut 2010, Piekut 2014.

20. Interview, Fes, June 6, 2010.

21. In Derija: “Rap dyali thawra, mashi mujarad mouja . . . Rap machi hyati, rap ulla mouti.” See emcee Muslim, “A.K.A. Moutamarred (A.K.A. Rebel),” *al-Tamarroud Vol. 1* (The Rebellion Vol. 1), 2010.

22. Le Monde 6/6/2018, 6/9/18; Les Eco 3/5/2018. The creator of the leading Facebook image, Aziz Garrou, published his own statistics: after one week, the image had been adopted by 221,000 Facebook users, of which 42 percent were between twenty-three to thirty-seven years old. Sixteen “prominent artistic figures (shaksiyya barza min finaniyat)” had adopted it as their profile picture (Facebook post, April 28, 2018).

23. Complaints about Mawazine are long-standing, numerous, and diverse (Alami 2011). As *Jeune Afrique* summarizes, “For several years, the critiques have come from all sides. Cultural actors point to the tendency to suck up [*vampiriser*] resources and sponsors to the detriment of other events, while Islamists see it as a site of debauchery” (My translation of Youssef Ait Adkim, “Maroc: Touche pas Mawazine!” *Jeune Afrique*, March 12, 2012, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/142546/culture/maroc-touche-pas-mawazine/>).

24. <https://www.videoclip.site/video/-qJgauY5iSw/-/>, uploaded June 29, 2018.

25. I have not been able to recover this social media post. However, this report, which circulated by the following day, became a piece of the media event in its own right and informs my understanding of the video’s reception.

26. Fieldnotes, Casablanca, June 30, 2018.

27. In a similar fashion, Bigg was once told by an interviewer that he must “love money a great deal” in order to perform at an event for a political party Bigg did not support. Bigg answered, “It’s true, I love money, but no more than most human beings. And the difference is . . . that I say it loudly and strongly” (Ziraoui 2007). Both Bigg and Muslim link entrepreneurship and sincerity, suggesting that entrepreneurship is merely human nature, and honesty about that nature is not only appropriate but moral.

28. A short list of scholarship that draws on Jackson’s framework, itself responding to a long-standing distinction between authenticity and sincerity in sociology, includes Bradley 2012, Harrison 2009, Khabeer 2016, Ramirez 2021, Sharma 2010.

29. On sincerity as a key concept underpinning the modern liberal subject, see Haeri 2017a, Keane 2002, Mahmood 2001, Seligman et al. 2008, Trilling 1972.

30. Erik Nielsen et al., “*Amici Curiae* Brief of Erik Nielson, Charis S. Kubrin, Travis L. Gosa, Michael Render (aka ‘Killer Mike’) and Other Scholars and Artists in Support of Petitioner [Taylor Bell],” Washington, DC, 2015, 6.

31. See Asad (2009 [1986]: 21–23) for a response to similar denials of Muslim interiority.

32. Saba Mahmood responds to such orientalist denigrations of Muslim subjectivity by “revers[ing] the usual routing from interiority to exteriority in which the unconscious manifests itself in somatic forms,” showing this reversal is not only an explicit aspect of some Egyptians’ religious thought but an effective critique of liberal universalism with its own theoretical applications (2005: 121–22).

33. As with many concepts for which Moroccans integrate different enculturated understandings, there are multiple ways of thinking about *niyya*, influenced by both broadly “liberal” and broadly “Islamic” histories of thought. The influential twelfth-century philosopher Abu Hamid al-Ghazali “maintains that God rewards good intentions even if they are not put into action, suggesting that for him *niyya* is the ethical core of an individual’s actions,” a position broadly congruent with liberal Protestantism (Powers 2004: 451n28). Haeri notes that, in contemporary Iran, “there is a great deal of ambivalence and ambiguity” in debates around “the relative importance of intention versus sincerity with regard to acts of worship” (2017: 144). Saba Mahmood notes that individual worshipers consider more than intention: “The attitude with which [prayers and other rituals] are performed is as important as their prescribed form: sincerity (*al-ikhlas*), humility (*khushol*), and feelings of virtuous fear and awe (*khashya* or *taqwa*), are all emotions by which excellence and virtuosity in piety are measured and marked” (2001: 830). Each of these suggests that a concept of sincerity that subsumes intention may be influential in various Muslims’ work toward proper orientations. It is possible, but not necessary, that contemporary “liberal” formulations of sincerity come from liberalism’s sources.

34. This connects to the concept of ‘*aqliyya*, “mentality,” which conveys “worldview” and also describes an obligation to know and restrain oneself in order to be a prosocial person (Rosen 1984).

35. In H-Kayne’s “Ana Hor (I Am Free)” (2017), they implore, “Understand . . . and turn around with intention / Moroccans are always brothers and love each other (Fahem . . . wa dayr bi niyya / Magharba da’iman khout wa ḥbab)”. Translation is mine. See “H-KAYNE Ana Hor (EXCLUSIVE MUSIC VIDEO),” posted by H-Kayne, July 28, 2017, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4_Z5i_qMYk. In the chorus of Fnaire’s “Yed el-Henna (Hand of Henna)” (2007), they sing, “With intention we contribute to [national] development (Bi niyya nsahemou fil tanmiyya).” Translation is mine. See “Yed El Henna” at Genius, <https://genius.com/Fnaire-yed-el-henna-lyrics>, my translation).

36. See, for example, rock band Hoba Hoba Spirit’s 2010 album, *Nafs u Niya (Self and Intention)*, or lines from Casa Crew’s “Bureau” (2007) or Mobydick’s “Kaba” (2018).

37. Within Islamic jurisprudence, sincerity (*ikhlas*) is not a quality applied to intention, but a separate orientation one ought to cultivate. “One need not pile layer upon layer of *niyya*, so that one must not only ‘mean it’ when one acts but also ‘mean to mean it’ and so on indefinitely,” as Powers remarks (2004: 454).

38. As Thomas Docherty asks via Hannah Arendt: “How, then, to engage the world when we live in a state of affairs where ‘every resisting of the evil done in the world necessarily entails some implication in evil?’” (Arendt 2003: 152, as quoted in Docherty 2016: 20).

39. In the 2023 Society for Ethnomusicology Seeger Lecture, the collaborating scholar-performers were Heidi Aklaseaq Senungetuk, Dawn Avery, Sunaina Kale, Haliehana Stepetin, Dylan Robinson, and Trevor Reed.

40. “Transactions” can include many different kinds of interactions, including those in which fieldworkers gain information while research subjects gain less-defined but possibly beneficial experiences. As Jeff Todd Titon explains, applied ethnomusicology in the United States falls broadly into cultural policy interventions, advocacy, and education (2016: 5–8). The first two of these categories can be understood as kinds of completed transactions in which actively addressing and alleviating power relations is a goal. This is not to adopt a procapitalist stance in which “transactions” are a positive way of viewing all interactions, but to theorize from within the poverty of forms and metaphors at my disposal as a neo-liberal subject.

41. For Hannah Arendt, solidarity contains the seeds of its own deformation into complicity, because those with greater power are sorely tempted to romanticize their own goodness (1990 [1963]: 88).

42. By “political quietism,” I refer to an orientation away from electoral politics or activities understood as overtly “political,” in which actors invest in other ways of building the structures and relations they desire (Cavatorta 2020).

1. CRITICAL TRADITIONS: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF AMBIGUITY

1. A full translation of the original can be found at “Nass El Ghiwane: The Sheepskin (1st stanza),” translated by Mohammed Najmi and Doug Davis, http://dzssd.com/cybermaroc/ghiwane_lebtana_english.htm.

2. The World Bank estimates that 84 percent of Moroccans used the internet in 2020, compared with 72 percent in Tunisia and Egypt, and 63 percent in Algeria. See World Bank, Data Indicator, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=MA>.

3. Scholars vary in their estimates of the Years of Lead. Susan Gilson-Miller dates it to 1975, when activists were jailed and tortured on flimsy charges (2013: 170). However, attempts to stifle the Moroccan left began much earlier, such as the state of emergency imposed after student-led riots in 1965 (Gilson-Miller 2013: 169). Brahim el Guabli names 1956—the year of Morocco’s independence from France—through the end of Hassan II’s regime (2020: 146). Susan Slyomovics ends it in 1990, with the creation of the Advisory Council on Human Rights (2001: 18). Moroccan human rights scholar and victim Fadoua Loudiy dates the end to 1999, when King Mohamed VI opened an “indemnification commission” for victims of state crimes and abuses (2014: 5).

4. Despite general strikes in response to rising costs of living in 1981, the Moroccan government moved from short-term support to a World Bank structural adjustment program in 1983. Over the twenty years, the state “reformed” its economy in exchange for debt rescheduling and continued loans. This included opening capital and consumer markets, increasing foreign direct investment, privatizing state-owned industries, and lowering business taxes, all of which disproportionately benefited the king and his family through their corporate holdings, as well as the nation’s land- and business-owning class. The state also shed and added salary caps to public sector jobs, cut consumer and industry subsidies, paid the government’s creditors, and deregulated its markets by reducing tariffs and negotiating

free-trade agreements (Cohen and Jaidi 2006; Maghraoui 2001; Pfeifer 1999; Kydd and Thoyer 1992; Catusse 2009).

5. In 1956, most of the country's best land was "concentrated in the hands of 5,900 Europeans and 1,700 Moroccans" (Swearingen 1987: 143). Instead of returning formerly French-owned land to poor Moroccan farmers, the state either controlled parcels outright or allowed the Moroccan elite to profit from them (Gilson-Miller 2013: 173). Upward redistribution led to explosive migration as farmers moved to cities, particularly Casablanca. Simultaneously, the state deprioritized housing in the late 1960s as it invested more in "agriculture, infrastructure, and tourism," allowing for the "autoconstruction" of informal housing as new waves of migrants arrived (Pennell 2001: 329; Abu-Lughod 1980: 257). Brahim el Guabli, who calls this process the "pauperization of the working classes," argues that growing inequality drove Morocco's urban youths to the left of its existing socialist parties, setting the stage for widespread unrest (2020: 150).

6. The guimbri and banjo both come from marginalized groups descended from enslaved sub-Saharan. The Moroccan Gnawa's guimbri (also known as a *sintir* or *hajhuj*), which is foundational to their ritual music, is related to West African bass spike lutes like the *ngoni* or *khalam*. The banjo originated with enslaved Africans in the Caribbean, who constructed a new instrument from their memories of West African spike lutes (Pestcoe and Adams 2018: 4–5).

7. For more on the 1973 Moroccanization law, see Maghraoui 2001b and Gilson-Miller 2013: 184.

8. Like many other performers, Barry began his career in the hip hop arts as a dancer. His dance trio with Amine Snoop, CasaMuslim, may have garnered the emergent genre's earliest media attention when a local journalist organized for them a miniature tour of the region (personal communication, Barry, October 21, 2009).

9. See *Aujourd'hui* staff, "Centre 2000: quel avenir?" *Aujourd'hui*, September 19, 2005, <https://aujourd'hui.ma/societe/centre-2000-quel-avenir-35536>, for information about the dispute between LONCF, the national train company, and the commercial center. On a recent visit, Soultana and I heard the 1995 hit "I Got 5 On It" on the radio. "Oh, Da Luniz," she exclaimed, eyes wide, deliberately pronouncing "da" as the band's name was occasionally styled. "When this came on at La Cage, you could not find a place on the dance floor" (personal communication, August 6, 2022).

10. A few examples, such as dance battles in the mid-1990s in Mohammedia, which lies on the train route between Casablanca and Rabat, helped to create both intercity and intracity networks (personal conversation, Soultana, August 5, 2022).

11. *Libération* is the paper of the SUPF.

12. See, e.g., the chorus of Casa Crew's 2006 song "Min Zanka l'Zanka (From Street to Street)" where they sing, "Going from street to street / The police trail us knocking [daqqa daqqa]," implying knocking on doors or perhaps heads.

13. My translations from Es-Sayed 2010.

14. Schuyler is translating several layers of meaning here; presumably he is referencing the line "U mal kasi hzin ma bin al-kisan? (And why is my glass the sad one among the glasses?)" (Es-Sayed 2010, my translation).

15. The second half of the song, rarely discussed, continues to address an ambiguous "you" from whom the speaker is running. One could interpret this section in many ways, from a dramatization of addiction or possession to a fear of the era's unchecked and brutal police.

16. El Guabli emphasizes that “other-archives” are often oral and testimonial and that passing them on strengthens community: “*Shahada* (testimony/martyrdom) in Arabic, and in the Moroccan context by extension, is equivalent to being a member of a community of both witnesses and martyrs. . . . Even those who were too young to witness . . . participate in a communal endeavor that is committed to producing other forms of archives that facilitate the writing of taboo histories” (2022: 213).

17. A *zawaya* is a Sufi lodge where members of the brotherhood come to worship.

18. This was dramatically illustrated once when I mentioned the friend with whom I was having coffee to a potential interviewee on the phone. My contact immediately hung up, at which point my friend disclosed their mutual enmity.

19. “Muslim wahed men ch ‘ab/rap dyali tawra machi ghi l ‘ab/chamal janoub charq lgharb / jib L ‘az wla khez dayman felqalb.” Original from “Lyrics A.K.A Motamarred,” Facebook post by Muslim, last edited March 14, 2021, <https://www.facebook.com/notes/muslim/lyrics-aka-motamarred/119721359316>. “Jib l3az wla k7ez” is Muslim’s longtime motto, appearing not only in songs but on T-shirts and as a hashtag. It is perhaps best translated idiomatically as “go big or go home.”

20. “Mli bdit kont ‘aref rap machi l ‘ab/jbart rasi kanmtel ch ‘ab/jbart rasi mas ‘oul ‘ala jil.” See “Lyrics A.K.A Motamarred,” Facebook post by Muslim, last edited March 14, 2021, <https://www.facebook.com/notes/muslim/lyrics-aka-motamarred/119721359316>.

21. Remarks in italics here, without quotations, signal that these are paraphrased recollections from my fieldnotes. The young man I spoke to used “underground” in English, though this was a contested term with diverse meanings.

22. Literally, this phrase translates to “it’s not me who chose [this],” placing the verb at the end for emphasis.

23. As Hajer (2015) notes, substantial social and economic barriers limit access to traditional, religious, and medical models of mental health care for low-income Moroccans.

24. In this example, the words at the end of the first, second, and fifth lines are adjectives; the third and fourth lines end with verbs with the “us” object attached (*na*).

25. Noting the use of what they call “poetic” or “literary” Derija in hip hop in comparison to Nass el-Ghiwane, Caubet and Miller translate these chorus lines as “what is x without y,” leaving aside the noun *qima* altogether (2012: 6).

26. The practice of expressing one’s longing for spiritual “reunification” through metaphors of romantic love has a long history that continues to be used ambiguously today.

27. Abraham Serfaty, a leading Moroccan leftist, wrote approvingly in *Souffles* of the Black Panthers’ holistic analysis: “The Black Americans have now . . . a scientific method of reflection . . . concretely forged in the historic processes of economic, social, and cultural structuration of American society” (1970: 33, my translation). On the “victim-actors” who rejected monetary compensation alone as sufficient for harms suffered during the Years of Lead, see el Guabli 2020b and 2022.

28. Multiple people also dismissed the conflict as a shameless *copier-coller*, or “cut and paste,” of the legendary animosity between the Notorious B.I.G. and Tupac Shakur.

2. A MORAL INSTITUTION: FORMING AND PERFORMING HIP HOP IN THE 2000s

1. Nadia Bezaoui, president of an anti-AIDS NGO, explains, “The reality is that [gay Moroccan men] are tolerated but expected to remain invisible” (Alami 2020). Despite the

way I summarize this conversation here, it is important to point out that, for some, placing “the liberty to ‘say who one is’ . . . at the center of one’s identity” is “inherited from European and American LGBT fights” and “recalls that the category of ‘homosexual’ is situated . . . in the countries called Western” (Gouyon 2018: 111, my translation). I am certainly not suggesting that citizens of non-Western countries cannot or should not identify with the category or with struggles for recognition and equal rights. Instead, I highlight that not all Moroccans understand conforming one’s public and private selves to each other as a superior way to live, much less as a right.

2. In addition to describing social acuity, ‘aql can also denote mental ability as an expression of mental health. To this end, Francophone scholars sometimes translate ‘aql as “spirit” (*l’èsprit*) (e.g., Pandolfo 2006).

3. The *Report on Human Development* noted that “90 percent [of respondents] think that the best elected officials must be characterized by *m’aql*” (Government of Morocco 2005: 32, my translation).

4. Derija lyrics and annotations at “1956,” by Magma (MAR), <https://genius.com/Magma-1956-lyrics>; my translation.

5. The modernist conflation of “Western” liberal subjectivity with affluence made by the affluent here is not limited to Morocco (Gouyon 2018; Hafez 2013).

6. The earliest recording I can find with “3aqliya” in the title is from the group Tears of Mic, active between 2002 and 2010. According to the website-turned-YouTube-channel DimaRapTV, their song “3aqliya Dirty” was released in 2003. It also appears on my copy of a compilation named *Qamouss Znaqi* from defunct website *Raptiviste.net* and Muslim’s Thug Face Productions, which was probably released in 2006.

7. In Derija: “Emerni mantbedel m’a li wgfo m’aya nhar lowl” and “Emerni mansa li tbdelo m’aya wakha m’arftch ‘alach.” See “3aglia,” by Don Bigg, <https://genius.com/Don-bigg-3aglia-lyrics>; my translation.

8. “Had lmoreau lg’a li ‘aqliathom moskha / Nqder nkon hta ana menhom fhem-tini?!” See “3aglia,” by Don Bigg, <https://genius.com/Don-bigg-3aglia-lyrics>; my translation.

9. See Salime 2015 for a translation of “al-Khouf.”

10. “Mehdi Black Wind - Exclusive Interview 2021, La Base,” posted by LaBase, February 8, 2021, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvHAGJ398HI>; my translation.

11. One woman told me she apprenticed at a recording studio. To my knowledge, to date no Moroccan women have appeared in public as hip hop deejays or produced hip hop tracks professionally in Morocco.

12. “Building a career in rap in Morocco is not easy for a woman, how did you impose yourself on the milieu?” (Aziouzi 2020, my translation).

13. “Maghrebya,” by Tigresse Flow, <https://genius.com/Tigresse-flow-maghrebya-lyrics>; my translation.

14. “Interview ‘KRTAS’NSSA’ عليا تليفون و روايا تعنوب عليا.” Posted by TopTivi, January 5, 2018, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luoYXlzXORY>.

15. Miller and Caubet offer a similar sentiment to Khalid Moukdar, a member of the punk band Haoussa: “The revolution must be made in the spirit, and priorities must be established so that we can claim things” (2012: 10, my translation).

16. H-Kayne’s “Issawa Style” (2005) might seem like an exception. The ‘Issawa (also ‘Aissawa or ‘Isawa) are a Sufi brotherhood based in H-Kayne’s home city of Meknes. In the

lyrics, they point out the song's "Issawa melody" (*naghma*) and rhythm; they also imitate sounds of 'Aissawa *dhikr* (devotional chanting) at the ends of sections. At the same time, they use these as a metaphor for Moroccan identity, explicitly linking moving to 'Aissawa sounds to Meknessi and national belonging rather than identifying themselves as members of the brotherhood.

17. Steph Raggaman is now known as Mustapha Slameur. I refer to him by his former name throughout because it is consistent with the period under discussion.

18. "Bayda Nayda," by Mustapha Slameur, <https://genius.com/Mustapha-slameur-bayda-nayda-lyrics>; my translation. In the third line, Raggaman (now known as Mustapha Slameur) says "hada style mejdoub," a word that in other contexts would be better rendered as "trance-induced" or "entrancing" (e.g., Caubet 2011: 283).

19. Jil Jilala's song was released days after King Hassan II announced the Green March (Jones 2023: 82–84).

20. See Almeida (2017: 68–72) for more recent responses to the perennial Western Sahara issue.

21. These end-rhymes come from French: "Brancher dak lmic dirou mono wella stéréo / Sm'a laklami yo la fréquence ra maghribiyo / Je représente a khouty fhad style ragga session / Je représente mon bled al Maghrib c'est ma nation / Dakhla m'ak nnaghma f had style vibration." See "Bayda Nayda," by Mustapha Slameur, <https://genius.com/Mustapha-slameur-bayda-nayda-lyrics>; my translation.

22. Non-Moroccans have conceptualized Morocco via tourism since prior to the French protectorate in 1912; colonists pursued tourism to provide revenue to France (Hillali 2007).

23. The local acts were Under Brother and Saizer Man.

24. "The participant selected from among the audience members will win a latest-model 'super LG cell phone' as well as the official mascot of the MWC. This free pass permits you to enter according to the order of arrival. Thus, it will be impossible to enter if there are no more seats."

25. In Derija: "Kayna fawda fin mabchiti rwina / F bħar al mawja, Chouf f žħam f sfina / Makayn nidam f had zman ghir tchoumirra / A rass idandan o l fawda nayda f les banques." Translated by Youssef Oukaf.

26. "Fin massa'oulin / Fin nass m'aqulin / Manabqawch madloulin / B faqssa m'aloulin." Oukaf translates *m'aqulin* here as "trusted" or "trustworthy," but since the word derives from *'aql*, the term includes connotations like "smart," "rational," or "competent."

27. "Kayna lfawda f ramdan (malkom?) / Ana machi men lli kane / Ana moumane bil-lah wlqor'ane / 'alamate ssa'a katbane / Kif chabba kif chobbane / Mchina dakhna wasste tofane / Kayna fawda, w kaane." I translate "kif chabba kif chobbane" more literally than Youssef Oukaf, who glossed this line as "you can't differentiate between men and women" (personal communication, June 2022).

28. For contrasting journalism about emcees' "engagement" from this period, see Ksikes 2006 and al-'Arousi 2007.

29. When I asked him about the musical and social interests of younger musicians, Caprice gently expressed that then-new artists weren't studying hip hop as he had done, just as he asserts in "Kayna Fawda." "I practiced writing and rapping for years," he said, claiming that younger emcees had spent less time on the techniques and history of the genre (August 8, 2010).

30. This is certainly an example of my own complicity with structures of power that aided my research. Like other complicitous relations, intersectional aspects of my identity led others to treat me in this way. While I could have chosen not to go backstage or take pictures from the VIP section in solidarity with those Moroccans who were not granted the same access, that would also have been understood as snubbing the emcees who invited me to the event. Both the emcees and I, however, correctly assumed that others would treat me deferentially once I entered that space.

31. “Fnaire – Intro Yed El Hanna (Yamdah Salem) أغنية يد الحنا” posted by Fnaire, January 21, 2016, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qNcqEuaYb8>.

32. For example, “They found petrol in us and they called it a mistake / The petrol is under the ground, politics is on top of us / We could be wrong, but these are the words that you said / I want only to understand how you have what is mine to enjoy / I want my right to Ceuta and to go until Melilla.” See “Fin 7a9na,” by L9bi7, <https://genius.com/L9bi7-fin-7a9na-lyrics>; my translation. For more of the song’s lyrics, see Miller and Caubet 2012: 8–9.

33. I hesitated to challenge my interlocutors in part because I wanted to belong. Was it also because I feared losing the privileged “access” I had obtained? My nonaction was influenced by embodied senses of obligation, loyalty, and desire—forms of complicity—that I am socialized to feel but that also structure my work as an academic ethnographer.

34. This logic was familiar to me from frequent advice on how to avoid or cope with public sexual harassment. For those who believe that women and LGBTQIA individuals do not have the same rights to occupy public space as cisgendered, heteronormative men, exercising that control comes as an expression of freedom—the freedom to deny others a central benefit of “real,” or holistic, citizenship.

3. THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF COMPETITIONS

1. Bellops passed away unexpectedly in December 2022.
2. Online news site *Ya Biladi* wrote that “a graffiti battle brought together artists from the four corners of the Kingdom in front of a prestigious international jury. Finally it was Ismail Benyamna, alias SAKO, who left victorious, also winning the sum of 22,000 MAD” (La Rédaction 2018, my translation).
3. On transnational markets for Morocco’s material and immaterial products, see Cohen and Jaidi 2006; Kapchan 2007; Bono and Hibou 2017; Ciucci 2022.
4. In this way it bears striking resemblance to the way Foucault described ancient Greeks’ care of the self (Rabinow and Rose 2003: 153).
5. Hesmondhalgh and Baker write of their UK respondents: “Cultural workers seem torn over the precariousness of their work—bemoaning the mental and emotional states produced, but also resigned to insecurity, and prepared to speak of it as necessary and even desirable” (2010: 13).
6. See chapters 2 and 3 for more discussion of the changing attitudes of the media, the government, and the public after 2003.
7. This conversation took place in English. *Achiri* was a slang term widely used in the Fez-Meknes region. Young men called each other *achiri* as a term of endearment, but it could also be used to describe something cheap or low-class. Red Bull has sponsored dance competitions in Morocco since the mid-2000s.

8. This interview took place in Derija. Here, Khalid said, “Houa ncréeou *industrie* dyal hip hop fil Maghreb.”

9. Soultana once canceled a concert after the organizers refused a written contract (personal conversation, Casablanca, March 18, 2010); Don Bigg refused to perform at the 2008 Boulevard festival after his fee shrank in the absence of a written contract (Callen 2009).

10. Though L-Tzack was in his late twenties at this time, as an unmarried man without a steady job, he was understood as a youth. On the liminal status and unstable income of traditional musicians, see Schuyler 1985.

11. Both Bahou (personal conversation, Casablanca, July 2018) and Merhari (Berrada 2015) say they have received 150 to 200 applications in the hip hop category annually since the early 2000s.

12. This information is from Caubet (2016: 251); sponsors in festival program books and media 2004–17; and personal conversations with embassy personnel in 2009, 2010, and 2015.

13. The nonprofit association Maroc Cultures, which runs the Mawazine festival, became a public utility in 2009, allowing for tax-deductible donations. See Kingdom of Morocco, General Secretariat of the Government, “Liste des associations reconnues d’utilité publique,” <http://www.sgg.gov.ma/eservicesAssociations.aspx>. Today, it is “100 percent independent” from government funds (Maroc Cultures 2017: 12). However, during the competition period, it was led by the king’s personal secretary, granted royal patronage, and funded by state- and monarch-owned companies (Akalay et al. 2010). Since the king and his family own significant portions of major Moroccan companies, sponsorship from those businesses complicates any separation of state and private funding.

14. See discussion in chapter 2.

15. For example, after extensive national press, Tiraline was chosen by the US Consulate to collaborate with American hip hop musicians The Reminders and DJ Man-O-Wax, all three of whom are Muslim, on their 2010 visit to Morocco. Their song “Tolerance” combines a *guimbri* bass line with punctuation by the *ghaita*, a double-reed instrument associated with the Aïssawa Sufi order.

16. This information is from a blog post at <https://hakmin-maroc.skyrock.com/2.html>.

17. See Tom Pfeffer, “Female Rappers Push Limits in Conservative Morocco,” Reuters, May 20, 2009, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-rappers/female-rappers-push-limits-in-conservative-morocco-idUSTRE54J7FS20090520?edition=redirect>; and Sarah Raiss, “MOROCCO: All-Girl Moroccan Rap Bands Break New Ground,” Reuters, March 17, 2009, <https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/711758>.

18. From 2012–14, the competition awarded a single prize across its genre categories. Only the final winner, trap duo Shayfeen, was identified as hip hop.

19. Had they chosen to fully support Tigresse Flow, the Jil Mawazine’s intense media presence might have provided an important expectation-setting function, encouraging women artists to pursue musical interests. No other female-led groups or solo female artists reached the finals in any category prior or subsequent to Tigresse Flow’s win.

20. The gendered dynamics of Soultana’s relative success are explored in chapter 5.

21. Graioui and Belghazi note the simultaneously political/economic/personal ties that define the Makhzen: “The state has encouraged the establishment of foundations and associations and has provided some of them with substantial resources for the patronage of cultural

events. The most prominent of these . . . include Association Maroc-Cultures (which organizes Mawazine festival in Rabat and is headed by the personal secretary of the monarch), Fondation Esprit de Fès (which organizes the Sacred Music Festival in Fès and is chaired by a prominent banker), Association Essaouira-Mogador (which organizes Gnawa Music Festival and is founded by an advisor to the monarch), and Fondation Festival International du Film de Marrakech (which is headed by the brother of King Mohamed VI)” (2013: 269).

22. For example, cofounder Mohamed Merhari defined “independent” in aesthetic terms: “We have never censured any group nor any musical style, we have never imposed anything. It’s a free space” (Despouys 2008: 25).

23. “Ila rasik mlli kunt saghir ygls hna deba, shnou naṣiḥa ‘andik fih? (If your younger self were here right now, what advice would you have for him?)”

24. Originally posted July 23, 2019, on Instagram, on an account that is now closed. <https://www.instagram.com/p/BoRdvjPnon4/?igshid=1iqq7fpqk3gmd>.

4. EMBODYING THE URBAN POOR

1. “Shuft hyati f chari’a twil fih nas zarbana / Nas ma t’arf nas ghanwali waḥed min-houm ana.” From “3Youn Elhak - Boulevard (Clip officiel),” posted by 3youn, June 29, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqlwEJePqwK>. My translation from Derija lyrics provided by ‘Ayoun el Ḥak.

2. The term comes from corrugated metal that often serves as building material. See Cohen and Eleb 2002, or Priepzrak 2016, for a review.

3. In recent decades, major Moroccan cities’ medinas have housed the working poor until and during their gentrification by Europeans.

4. In Derija: “Klaw flous al-sha‘ab wa nta hozi fi ymarso.” *Makhzen* refers to the monarchy and its circle of elites and family members, understood to be the real center of power rather than elected officials.

5. “Bi ism al-sha‘ab li fi galbi nkhawihu 3likoum, ya afkar.” From “Klab dawla l7a9d feat proof 3askri,” posted by Nabil Lakrafi, October 16, 2010, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EAYZ7R5xmvk>.

6. “Arou loubya fil sha‘ab bach g’ama y madi snano” and “al-sha‘ab makayn, matillsh al-sha‘ab.” In his English translation, Bigg glossed the latter line as “the people don’t do nothing for themselves” (p.c., Don Bigg, Berkeley-Casablanca, 2012).

7. See “Soultana - 35.28,” posted by Soultana, August 30, 2017, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUP7i9dd4Zs>. In Derija: “Baraka mn qelet neṣf rah l’alam kay-hder / Skati w skatek khala lmas’oul ‘al sha‘ab ydser / Souti w soutek hesbough ri noqta f akhir ster / mli sout wla kaytba‘ou b dgig zit o sokar.” The first phrase acts like a pun; it can translate to “enough of the same thing” or “enough, we’re out of breath.” However, Soultana translates it as I have here (p.c., August 9, 2019). The final line refers to long-standing subsidies on staple foods.

8. The practice of repurposing traditional expressive forms that Fnaire pioneered is discussed in chapter 2.

9. See “Don Bigg - TJR feat. Ahmed Soultan (Official VIDEO),” posted by Don Bigg, February 13, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ww8YnecpzE4>. In the video, Bigg and his son pass a road marker for Fkih Ben Salah, approximately 110 miles southeast of Casablanca.

10. Tashelhit is the most widespread of three Amazight languages. Soultan, from Taroudant in southeastern Morocco, writes lyrics in Tashelhit, Derija, English, and French.

11. “Ara stylo ara lwarqa nqayad lik 7 dlhwayj ghadi nkafrak fihom kola nhar ma ḥaddi ‘ayech.” Original lyrics from “Don Bigg - TJR feat. Ahmed Soultan (Official VIDEO),” posted by Don Bigg, February 13, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ww8YnecpzE4>.

12. “Li kan tmna lik oulad y choufou walidik oh agharass.”

13. See “MR CRAZY – KUE PASSA x M-FIX [OFFICIEL CLIP HD] - Mixtape Ya Khasar Ya Tkhasar,” posted by Mr Crazy Official, April 11, 2015, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rG4pw3IcC14>. In Derija: “Kanshouf hyati dayz gha promo . . . Lqit rasi ana li khayb hyati khashsha Omo.”

14. See also Tendresse, “B.W.B. (Brani Wst Bladi)” (2020), in chapter 1.

15. See “SISIMO – jid Alfa9r (Starring Said Bey & Fadoua Taleb),” posted by SiSimo, April 11, 2013, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G57Oii6qUFs>.

16. See “Lbenj – Anti,” posted by Lbenj, March 21, 2018, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QK7v74Wq46c>.

17. The story of Grandwizzard Theodore’s discovery is retold, for example, in Katz 2012: 59–60.

18. Grandwizzard Theodore, quoted in Katz 2012: 147.

19. For contemporaneous accounts, see “Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca,” BBC, May 17, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3035803.stm>; “Moroccans March against Terror,” BBC, May 25, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2936918.stm>.

20. Pierre Vermeren tartly described the shock of the print-consuming middle and upper classes: “The trauma was immense in a society which the social elite thought was entirely under [their] control” (2004: 108–9, my translation).

21. “Karian” is the Derija version of the French *carrière*, or “quarry.” Since the early twentieth century, when Casablanca’s first bidonville was built next to Carrière Centrale in what is now part of the neighborhood Hay Mohammadi, the word has connoted informal housing self-built by the very poor (Zaki 2006: note 1).

22. “Complicity” here refers to its legal meaning in the Moroccan penal code.

23. By 2008, Abdellah Tourabi described Karian Toma and similar bidonvilles as “completely abandoned” by the state, yet he insisted that the “sociology of the neighborhood does not suffice to explain the terrorist uprising” (2008: 225, my translation). His position, however, lay outside the foundational assumptions of the public conversation, which were reinforced immediately after the bombings by the actions of the monarchy.

24. In an interview with one of the surviving attackers, *TelQuel* emphasized that his participation was coerced and his beliefs contradictory, closing with the question: “If Rachid Jalil, in the situation where he finds himself [prison], does not understand that it was an inevitable slope to terrorism, who will understand it?” (Benchemsi 2006, my translation).

25. As Koen Bogaert shows, “The problem is presented as one of shepherding its inhabitants toward market integration. . . . Generally, the idea is that once people are good consumers they will eventually become responsible citizens with a ‘proper’ job and a ‘proper’ lifestyle (interview with former ADS official, April 16, 2009). . . . [T]he market becomes the norm by which good citizenship is measured” (2011: 725–26).

26. This conversation took place in English.

27. Articles and interviews mention Moroccan and international financial institutions, including La Fondation BNP Paribas and its subsidiary, the BMCI Foundation (Derville 2016); Bank al-Maghrib; and La Caisse Depot de Gestion's foundation (Bouithy 2014).

28. In the original: "Mama / matkhatfish ghay' ajbiksh angoul" and "Mama / Matkhat-fish 'arif kasha tguli."

29. In the 2010s, *tcharmil* youths—*mcharmilin*, or those who *tcharmil*—were distinguished by their fashion, haircuts, and embrace of stereotypes about lower-class male violence; they "are perceived as young, delinquent, depressed school drop outs, jobless, marginalised, as well as aggressed by the lifestyle of the rich" (El Maarouf and Belghazi 2018: 293). Moroccan commentators defend *mcharmilin*, who inspired a lasting moral panic among affluent urbanites (Strava 2020), as "distan[c]ing themselves" from their sordid reality and everyday life, which is made even unlivable by contempt, exclusion, and rejection, revealing the failure of the country's educational system and limits of its youth policies" (Ghayet 2015, in El Maarouf and Belghazi 2018: 293).

30. My translation from Derija.

31. Mustapha Hamil argues a core insight frames all of the characters' choices in Binebine's novel: "In a way, Yachine and his friends do not need to be convinced to die—not because they are unwilling to do so, but because they do not care one way or the other, an indifference to death which is as tragic as the actual killing" (2011: 557).

32. <http://fondationalizaoua.org/wp/en/ali-zaoua-foundation/>, last accessed September 24, 2018.

33. My translation from French.

34. In an essay on Binebine's novel, Katarzyna Pieprzak describes his characters as spatially, socially, and psychologically immobilized: "Human being and human meaning remain captive in a representational system that . . . den[ies] . . . any sense of futurity" (2016: 39–41).

35. "Train mcha ou ana ghir kanchouf / Nass katmout ra rabbi kaychouf / Qrtasa ulla ghayklek lhout / Oulad chaab riski fi bateau lmout." My translation of lyrics from "3YOUN – MR BOULEVARD (music video). Prod by maestro عيون الحق," posted by 3youn, June 10, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDSG7frB8vE>.

36. In the original: "alaaaaaaaaaaaaah 3youn rje3 l'style dialo" and "كنعرفو لي عيون هوا هدا" .

37. In Don Bigg's "LMeryoula" (2020), the lyrics critique the conflation of personal, social, and economic value in direct terms while the video imitates key plot points and camerawork from *Horses of God*, such as an airborne shot panning over the densely packed karian. As of March 2021, the video has over twenty-three million views.

38. As Sara Ahmed notes, "All these forms of fellow-feeling [compassion, . . . empathy, sympathy and pity] involve fantasy: one can 'feel for' or 'feel with' others, but this depends on how I 'imagine' the other already feels. So 'feeling with' or 'feeling for' does not mean a suspicion of 'feeling about': *one feels with or for others only insofar as one feels 'about' their feelings in the first place*" (2004: 41n9, italics in original).

5. EXPECTATIONS OF FEMINISM

1. My gratitude and apologies go to James Ferguson for this chapter title.
2. I use "caring labor" to encompass both affective labor—the personal and intersubjective work of generating a certain affect, a disposition toward engagement and receptivity

(e.g., Brian Massumi, Michael Hardt)—and emotional labor, culturally recognized emotion produced “for a wage [that] therefore has *exchange value*” (Hochschild 2012 [1983]: 7, *italics in original*). Caring labor is in part necessary because individuals recognize “emotion management” as having potential exchange value; that is, they manage both their “publicly observable” (Hochschild 2012 [1983]: 7), enculturated feelings and their affects to make their public and private personae more exchangeable and more attractive to capital. Caring labor requires a disposition that is open to feeling something with others, though not necessarily the same something they feel (Ahmed 2004: 30). Critically, its deployment blurs lines between paid labor and social obligation.

3. *Revolutionary Arab Rap* blog, “Female Rappers,” <http://revolutionaryarabrap.blogspot.com/p/female-rappers.html>; *Revolutionary Arab Rap* blog, “Soutana – Sawt Nssa (‘The Voice of Women’),” posted February 19, 2012, <http://revolutionaryarabraptheindex.blogspot.com/2012/02/soutana-sawt-nssa-voice-of-women.html>.

4. Hip hop’s association with the Moroccan 2011–12 reform movement was never as strong as in Anglophone coverage of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions (e.g., Fernandes 2012; Wright 2011; Westland 2012). Many Moroccan hip hop artists were silent on February 20. Others called for reforms but did not support the campaign’s calls for a parliamentary democracy instead of executive monarchy. Still others admitted, in private and on Facebook, to supporting the reformists’ goals, but they assured me that the movement’s tactics would change nothing. Like many fellow citizens, some artists found the movement’s alliance with Islamists unacceptable or frightening. Don Bigg’s two songs critiquing the protests, “Mabghitch (I Don’t Want It)” and “Fhamtini (Do You Understand Me),” reflected widespread cynicism. Common responses to my inquiries about el-Ḥaqed (Mouad Belghouat, “the enraged”) in 2011 were surprise and dismissive comments about his musicianship. While committed to the February 20 movement, he was relatively unknown within Casablanca’s hip hop network in 2011 and stated he started rapping in 2007 (el-Ḥaqed 2014).

5. <https://www.dapp.dk/en/about/morocco/>. This link is now inactive. For more information on work DAPP funds in Morocco today, see <https://kvinfo.dk/where-we-work/morocco/?lang=en>.

6. <https://www.dapp.dk/en/about/partners/>.

7. Several organizers have told me they found Soutana through an internet search for female emcees.

8. ECF supports cultural organizations in several European countries. Subtopia promotes arts and cultural production to reframe suburbs like Botkyrka, often understood as concentrating poverty and immigrants outside of Stockholm: “What if we as a municipality could cluster and attract artists and educators, in order to provide cultural, financial and personal growth for passionate individuals in our suburbs[?] . . . We would argue that the most human of all things is culture and relationships so why shouldn’t that be at the core of our cities?” (Duregård, Lekberg, and Lindgren 2016).

9. See <https://www.botkyrka.se/kommun-och-politik/statistik-och-oppna-data/fakta-om-botkyrka>, retrieved November 5, 2024; Statistics Sweden <https://www.scb.se/en/>, retrieved October 16, 2018. If counting residents born in Sweden with one foreign-born and one Swedish-born parent, the number rises to 67 percent (Statistics Sweden). This does not include those whose parents were born in Sweden but are not ethnically Swedish or considered white.

10. Translation from This Is Alby's Facebook page, <https://www.facebook.com/thisisalbyy>, posted August 8, 2015.

11. I wrote to Josefin in July 2015 but did not receive a response. Soultana also wrote to Josefin to ask that I be allowed access to the festival's backstage spaces. I used university research funds to travel.

12. "Sawt l-bnat li day'in wast l-bladi / sawt li bghat tgoul, li bghat tgoul / sawt l-g'a li bghau l- hdaya, bab touba mehloul." More literally, "The voice of she who wants to speak / the voice of everyone who wants a gift, a door to the solution of repentance."

13. Thanks to Ryan Skinner for contextualizing such festivals (personal conversation, October 18, 2018).

14. Sara stressed this was "not normal," writing that "if you are invited for something, everything is payed [sic] for. Like the basics—hotel, meals, transportation" (email, October 10, 2018).

15. After Soultana and Bawss left Sweden, they waited over a month for payment. According to Josefin regulations stipulate that the municipality "can . . . only pay a fee 30 days after an invoice has come in from the artists" (email, August 7, 2018). The bank transfer was addressed to Soultana, not her legal name, causing further delay.

16. Information in the following paragraphs comes from interviews with Hicham Bahou (Casablanca, August 2015 and 2016), Amadou Fall Ba (Dakar, July 2015), and Kane Limam, a.k.a Monza (Casablanca, September 2017) unless otherwise noted.

17. To the best of my knowledge, the Office of African Music Export (BEMA) ran this meeting, which is funded in turn by its West African member nations' ministries of culture, several national and international French organizations, and UNESCO (africultures.com).

18. In 2015, King Mohamed VI toured West African cities to personally support the maintenance and creation of markets for Moroccan products; the Foundation Mohamed VI for training African *ulemas* (religious scholars) opened in Fez in 2016; and Morocco rejoined the African Union in 2016 (Ministère des Habous 2016; de Saint Périer 2016).

19. The final lines in Wolof translate to: "Women know how to ride the beat better than men / hey fans, yell and say 'Jokko!'" I am grateful to Eben for the translation to French.

20. "Sawt illi fi dar, lli waqtha fi l-trottoir / lli 'aisha fil village u lli katrappi fil Boulevard."

21. To do this with their new lineup, they cut a verse by Eben and added Ami to eight bars of the third verse plus four bars of pre-chorus material.

22. "Nous disons 'non' au violence faite au femmes / Nous disons 'oui' à tout ce quoi qu'elles réclament."

23. See Radio France Internationale, "Jokko Fam, la vitrine d'une expérience réussie d'un projet collectif artistique," September 23, 2017, <http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20170924-jokko-fam-vitrine-une-experience-reussie-projet-collectif-artistique>.

24. The Moroccan term *tberguig* describes rumors fueled by malice, jealousy, or pursuit of social capital, regardless of facts, and is used for all genders.

25. Soultana's typical fee has varied little since 2011.

26. See claims by Djur Djura and Zap Mama in Taylor 1997.

27. One might say my writing transforms my experiences into items with use-value and that, by reading, you participate in their transformation into exchange-values. See also Pine 2016.

28. Nettl observes that “comparative musicology entered the academy with the task of providing a corrective to widely held beliefs. It continues sometimes in this function” (2010: 59).

EPILOGUE: THE WORLD THE WAVE MADE,
OR THE SINCERITY OF CAPITAL

1. This interview took place in English.
2. Aminoffice was one half of Double A, the duo that put out the first recognized Derija-language hip hop album in 1996.
3. Caprice is referring to J. Cole’s “Let Nas Down” (2013).
4. This conversation mixed Derija and English.
5. Derija: “It turns, it turns.”
6. Later he clarified, “My musical style don’t change. I learn new things, and I can do them, but I’m still doing what I used to do before.”
7. *Al-‘Adl wa al-Tanmia*, or the Justice and Development Party (PJD), is an Islamist party. Throughout the late 2000s, leading members of the PJD criticized the importation of “Western” popular culture into Morocco. In elections in November 2011, held shortly after the peak of the February 20 movement and a referendum on Morocco’s constitution, the PJD took nearly one-third of Parliament’s seats. As a result, King Mohamed VI appointed the prime minister and most of the ministerial leadership from the PJD.
8. The BMDA is charged with collecting and distributing royalties to registered artists when their recordings are played in Moroccan media. It is notoriously derelict (Almeida 2017: 155). I have met no artist or arts professional who regards the BMDA as functional, and for some, the agency is merely state-legitimized theft (interview with Mohamed Sqalli, 2018; Dizzy Dros on MedinaFM, May 2022). While today Casablanca in particular has more privately owned places to perform, one prominent rehearsal space, and a small network of cultural organizers offering an alternative to postcolonial NGOs like the Institut Français, other aspects of Benchemsî’s editorial have changed little, especially for the rest of Morocco (Kamili and Ksikes 2021, for an overview).
9. This interview took place in English.
10. See “Welcome to NAAR,” <http://naar.fr/welcometonaar/2018>.
11. Robin D. G. Kelley has traced the ways that US social scientists’ narratives about impoverished Black people pathologized their artistry, sometimes in the name of sympathizing (1997, in Aprahamian 2019). Schloss calls this “cultural . . . [and] class determinism” when applied to narratives about hip hop’s origins and significance (2014 [2004]: 27).
12. Despite trying to avoid the classification, NAAR is a good example of Whitmore’s analysis of “world music 2.0,” in which contemporary independent organizations face the same challenges as the traditional record labels that dominated the first iteration (2020: 208–9).
13. See Ganti 2014: 96 for a concise list of ethnographies that provide more nuanced illustrations of how people yoke ideals of self-entrepreneurship to other discourses in various contexts.
14. Matlon examines men’s discourses in particular to theorize *complicit masculinity*, which “explains how articulations from [marginalized men] may perpetuate relations of domination” (2016: 1018, italics in original).

15. For so many Moroccans, as expressed in so many Moroccan hip hop texts and practitioners' actions, migration away from home and into Europe or perhaps North America is the goal. Yet successful migration is not necessarily imagined as permanent departure but as a state of freer circulation, where one accumulates the political means to remain safely anchored in the global north while possessing the financial means to visit one's family and ancestral home in Morocco (Ciucci 2022). This is precisely what the remittance-sending class, *Marocains résidents à l'étranger*, or MREs, does every summer. Flowing in and out of their home like a wave, or a euro, is an ultimate freedom experienced as a birthright by many global north citizens—a freedom in which one does not give up all social ties and obligations, but chooses which to maintain.

16. Rather than locating my use within a particular theory of affect, here I only signify that the expression and reception of the sincerity I invoke is simultaneously embodied and culturally informed. See Desai-Stephens and Reissnour 2020 for an effort to transcend differences between lineages of affect theory.

17. I use “Arab” here because, like many Moroccans, Bigg dis-identified with sub-Saharan Africans at this time. As an example, his song “Ifrikiya” (2009) takes a externalizing, developmentalist perspective on the continent as a place of poverty and helplessness, rather than one of unity or solidarity.